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THESIS ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on the role of social capital and institutional networks in determining the 
capacity for learning and adaptation of the regional systems of governance within the European 
regional policy environment, by facilitating collective action among the actors and by shaping 
the local institutional interactions through the processes of exchange and socialization.
The main hypothesis is that, although the Europeanization of public policy has a positive 
impact on the processes of institution-building, learning and adaptation at the local level, and 
particularly in the less-favoured regions of Europe, pre-existing qualitative features of the local 
institutional infrastructure play the most important role in the bottom-up learning and adaptation 
processes. In particular, the presence of dense institutional networks between public and private 
actors and social capital endowments that enable them to be involved in the provision of public 
goods and services facilitates the learning process, that is the capacity of institutional networks 
to adapt their structure and policies to meet the changing politico-economic conditions (European 
environment).
The research compares the response of two regions of Greece (Southern and Northern 
Aegean Islands) -similar in physical resources and financial support provided by the national and 
European regional policy- to the challenges of Europeanization.
Chapter one establishes the general theoretical framework of the thesis, linking social 
capital, institutional networks and learning within the theory of regional development. Chapter 
two defines learning and adaptation in European regional policy and establishes the main 
theoretical hypotheses of the thesis, the methodology for measuring specific structural features 
of the networks and social capital, and criteria for assessing the learning capacity.
Chapter three presents the structural and cultural specificities of the Greek socio-political 
system, as well as the main aspects of the national regional policy.
Chapters four and five map the institutional infrastructure in both regions, drawing their 
political, economic, institutional and cultural features. Chapters six and seven examine the 
processes of institutional and policy adaptation to European structural policy in both regions and 
evaluate their learning capacity.
Finally, chapter eight compares the two cases and draws general conclusions regarding 
the role of social capital and institutional networks in facilitating learning and adaptation within 
European regional policy and extracts main implications for integration theory.
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INTRODUCTION
The technological, economic and political changes that have led to the great transformations we 
experience since the 1970s, marked by the emergence of globalization of information and 
economic activities, have emphasized the role of the learning institutional infrastructure at each 
level of governance, as a prerequisite for managing the inherent in the modem institutional 
settings uncertainty and risk. Thus, the notions of learning and adaptation have emerged recently 
as increasingly debated subjects on a wide range of social sciences, from international relations 
and political science to regional development. In all these contexts learning implies the process 
by which actors acquire new interests and identities and form their preferences through the 
“structure-actor” interactions, thus adapting their behaviour to the changes of the environment. 
Subsequently, the variables that may determine the capacity for learning and adaptation have 
raised as a crucial issue in a wide range of social sciences as well.
This thesis is a contribution to this debate, by introducing the notions of learning and 
adaptation in the European policy-making environment in general and in European regional 
policy in particular. It intends to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the crucial role of national 
or international factors in facilitating or inhibiting the potential of the regional systems of 
governance within the European environment, the processes of adaptation and adjustment depend 
crucially on the learning capacity of the local institutional infrastructure, whereby institutional 
relationships and policies adapt to meet the changing conditions.
The central hypothesis is that the capacity of the local institutional infrastructure for 
learning and adaptation to the European environment depends on the presence of thick 
institutional networks that cross the public-private divide and combine multiple type of resources, 
and social capital that facilitates collective action among the actors within the networks. Thus, 
social capital and institutional networks constitute key components of the learning and adaptation
processes, by facilitating collective action among the actors and by shaping the local interactions 
through the processes of exchange and socialization. Since, however, the Europeanization of 
public policy in general and of regional policy in particular constitutes a rather enduring and 
longstanding challenge for the administrative structures of the centralized member states, it is 
viewed as a positive external shock for promoting institution-building, learning and policy­
making innovation at the regional and local levels. Furthermore, given that the structure of the 
state plays an important role in determining the learning and adaptation capacity of the local 
institutional infrastructure, it should be taken into account in evaluating the local institutional 
capacity.
The research is based on the binary comparison of two regions (Southern and Northern 
Aegean Islands-NUTS II) within the same country, Greece, which is characterized by a 
centralized and weak administrative structure. Both regions have been under the same 
institutional framework of assistance in national and EU structural policy over the same period 
of time. Additionally, they have had similar development potential, based on similar kinds of 
physical resources, while local authorities in both regions have been involved in the functions 
of EU policy-making over the same period of time. However, each region was in a different stage 
of institutional and economic development when the first integrated EU programmes began to 
be implemented. Thus, the comparative analysis will concentrate on evaluating the response of 
each region to the Europeanization of structural policy in the light of their diversified institutional 
and economic performances.
The thesis comprises eight chapters. Chapter one discusses the implications of the 
technological, economic and political changes that led to the emergence of globalization for the 
transformation of production and subsequently for the reformulation of the scope of regional 
development strategies. All these changes have altered the conception of local governance,
emphasizing the role of interactions among the endogenous social, political and economic 
resources in facilitating the mediation of the local specificities and demands into the global 
environment. Based on these considerations, the final part of chapter one focuses on resolving 
the emerging dilemma of collective action: how the interactions among the local actors should 
be shaped to enhance the locality’s development potential. Thus, it assesses the debate on the 
dilemmas of collective action and establishes the general theoretical framework of the thesis, 
within which social capital and institutional networks of specific type, by crossing the public- 
private divide and facilitating collective action among the actors through the processes of 
exchange and socialization, constitute the comer stones of the learning process and subsequently 
of the inherent in modem development strategies adaptation to the global environment. In that 
sense, social capital, institutional networks and learning are viewed as cmcial conceptual tools 
within the contemporary development theory.
Chapter two discusses the theoretical aspects of European regional policy, defines 
learning, adaptation and Europeanization of regional systems of governance and subsequently 
establishes the hypothesis that social capital and institutional networks of specific type are 
prerequisites for learning and adaptation in the field of European regional policy. In particular, 
social capital and dense functional intra-regional networks are identified as independent and 
intervening variables, respectively, of the local capacity for learning and adaptation within the 
European regional policy environment. Furthermore, the Europeanization of public policy and 
the structure of the state are considered as providing opportunities for and constraints on local 
institutional capacity for learning, and hence, some secondary hypotheses are established. Finally, 
the methodology of the research study is outlined. A comparative case study approach is used, 
because of its ability to integrate a variety of data sources and to allow the researcher an in-depth 
analysis of complex social and political phenomena. To identify the interactions between
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structure and culture the thesis adopts a two-stage approach: first carrying out social network 
analysis, a statistical technique which can measure the density of the network and the distribution 
of power among the actors, and second identifying the presence of social capital. The network 
analysis is based on semi-structured in-depth interviews with local elites, while for the 
identification of social capital the study relied on data on membership in voluntary organizations 
and qualitative analysis of the fieldwork research. Additionally, a set of criteria for measuring 
local learning capacity are identified.
Chapter three explores the structural and cultural characteristics of the Greek socio­
political system and main aspects of the regional policy. The chapter demonstrates that the 
combination of a centralized state structure and a weak civil society in Greece breeds hierarchical 
clientelist networks, which constitute a major impediment to the learning, adaptation and 
Europeanization functions of the socio-political structures. However, the gradual Europeanization 
of the public policy in general and of the regional policy in particular have constituted an external 
shock for the hierarchically-structured and centralized system of public administration, which has 
reacted with policies of opening up of the system to bottom-up initiatives. Yet, this reform is 
dependent on the strength of civil society and the development of bottom-up initiatives.
Chapters four and five look at the local specificities and map the institutional 
infrastructure (networks and social capital) in the Southern and Northern Aegean Islands regions. 
Chapter four shows that the better economic performance of the Southern Aegean islands, in 
comparison with the Northern Aegean and most of the other Greek regions, is because of the 
prompt adaptation of its economic structure towards the development of tourism. In institutional 
capacity, however, the main feature is that there are no actual intra-regional networks, but only 
those at the prefectural level. Thus, the Dodecanese demonstrates a very good quality of 
institutional infrastructure, based on dense, horizontally-structured networks of general exchange,
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which is partly attributed to its tradition in institution-building, almost since its incorporation into 
the Greek state in the late 1940s. The Cyclades prefecture, on the other hand, shows a quality of 
institutional networks similar to the Dodecanese, but a less bounded system of local economic 
governance. Finally, the good institutional infrastructure corresponds to the presence of a 
relatively strong civil society in both prefectures.
Chapter five reveals that the divergence of the Northern Aegean islands region at the 
national as well as at the European level should be attributed to the lack of adaptation of its 
economic structure to the changing economic and political environment, rather than to the 
Turkish threat. Moreover, the economic divergence of the region seems to be related to its poor 
institutional infrastructure. In particular, given the common lack of intra-regional networks in 
Greece, the Lesbos prefecture demonstrates a centralized and hierarchically-structured local 
institutional network, which reflects an exogenously-driven local system of governance, relying 
on the central state and particularly on the Regional Secretariat for crucial resources. In a similar 
vein, Samos is characterized by fragmented institutional networks and lack of public-private 
synergies and local leadership. The weakness of the local system of governance in both 
prefectures seems to be related to an extremely weak civil society. Finally, Chios shows 
comparatively more horizontally-structured local institutional networks of general exchange and 
some signs of civic participation.
Chapters six and seven examine the processes of both institutional and policy adaptation 
to European structural policy in the two regions. In policy adaptation chapter six (Southern 
Aegean) shows a rather clear differentiation initially among the Southern and Northern Aegean 
regions and at a second stage among Dodecanese and Cyclades, which is related to the structure 
of priorities, the absorption capacity and the efficient use of resources per subprogramme of both 
Multi-fund Operational Programmes (MOPs). In terms of institutional adaptation the presence
of learning capacity is evident in the Southern Aegean and especially in the Dodecanese. Thus, 
while the structure of the policy networks is generally improved, the adaptation process in the 
Dodecanese is not characterized by the redundancy of the old institutions, but rather by the 
successful structural adjustment of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure, which becomes 
evident with its important involvement in transnational networks. Conversely, the policy network 
in Cyclades, although improved in comparison with that of general exchange, demonstrates 
structural weaknesses, mainly because of the rather marginal role of the University and the 
creation of new institutions as an outcome of the weakness of the old institutions to adapt to the 
European environment.
In the Northern Aegean islands (chapter seven) the differentiation in policy adaptation, 
identified in chapter six, is accompanied by the lack of both learning capacity and leadership in 
the policy networks. Although the structure of the networks at both the regional and prefectural 
levels is significantly improved and the process of structural adjustment has engendered the 
redundancy of the old institutional infrastructure and hence the creation of new institutions, 
especially in Lesbos, the policy networks remain centralized around the Regional Secretariat, 
while there are some differences among the prefectures-islands. Thus, Lesbos, despite the 
significant improvement of the structural features in the policy network, it continues to 
demonstrate lack of local leadership and capacity for learning. Chios, on the other hand, shows 
a comparatively better capacity for learning, but as the policy network structure reveals there is 
a lack of local leadership. Finally, Samos’s generally poor institutional infrastructure shows 
significant improvement in the policy network because of the small number of the active 
institutional actors. Nonetheless, what the case of the Northern Aegean demonstrates is that even 
if the local capacity for learning and adaptation is poor, the Europeanization process creates 
conditions for starting-up of the institution-building and learning processes.
16
Finally, chapter eight draws the most important theoretical conclusions that arise from 
the findings of this research, focusing on the main theoretical concepts of this thesis: social 
capital, institutional networks and learning. Overall, the evidence seems to support the hypothesis 
that, although the state structure plays an important role in determining the learning capacity of 
local systems of governance and hence their adaptation to the European environment, the latter 
is crucially dependent on the presence of capacities for collective action at the local level, and, 
hence on the presence of social capital and dense, functional, intra-regional networks. The 
Europeanization process, on the other hand, by providing an alternative policy field to the nation 
state for other levels of governance, plays a key role in changing the rules of the game and 
enhancing the process of institution-building at the local level, even if the pre-existing 
institutional capacity was poor. Finally, important theoretical implications derive from this 
research for integration theory in general and European regional policy in particular. First, 
learning, adaptation and hence development are socially and institutionally embedded processes, 
which cannot be understood, either by the old tradition of state intervention, or by the new-right 
orthodoxy of a self-regulating market/economy. Second, the lesson drawn for European regional 
policy is that the main criterion for the evaluation of the success or failure of the Structural Funds 
programmes should be the degree of synergies-creation at the regional and local levels. Finally, 
with regard to integration theory, the evidence underlines the limitations of both the rational 
choice-based intergovemmentalist and neo-institutionalist approaches to regional integration, and 
the importance of the notions of “learning and socialization” for the integration process in 
Europe, as alternatives to both the market and hierarchy models that have been dominated the 
Western culture over a long period of time.
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1. SOCIAL CAPITAL, INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS AND LEARNING: 
WHAT’S NEW IN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY?
Introduction
This chapter establishes the general theoretical framework of the thesis. Thus, section one 
discusses the implications of the technological, economic and political changes that led to the 
emergence of globalization for the transformation of production, the redefinition of the notion 
of “local”, and, subsequently, for the reformulation of regional development strategies. Section 
two explores the impact of these changes on the conceptualization of local governance, 
emphasizing the role of the endogenous social, political and economic resources. Finally, section 
three establishes the linkages between the main theoretical concepts of this thesis, that is social 
capital, institutional networks and learning.
1.1 Global Challenge and Local Response
There is a close relationship between the theories of regional development elaborated in the last 
thirty years, the phases in the development process of the European countries, and the strategies 
that have been adopted in policies aimed at reducing regional disparities (Molle and Cappellin 
1988). Traditional regional development theories and policies were consistent with the 
characteristics of the post-war period until the early 1970s, such as the predominance of the 
Fordist model of production1, the rapid expansion of European economies and the strategic role
'The Fordist paradigm is characterized by standardized mass production, which is based on the process o f  the 
division o f  labour. For the institutional structures o f  the economy, economies o f  scale are internal (for the firms) 
and are obtained through fixed capital and labour productivity increases. Standardized products are obtained, using 
special-purpose machinery and predominately unskilled or semiskilled workers with fragmented and standardized 
tasks (division between conception and execution), while the prevailing form o f  the market is oligopolistic and the 
management o f  the economy organized at the national level. The crucial micro-regulatory problem for mass 
production is balancing supply with demand in individual markets, while the Keynesian welfare state emerged as 
the dominant form o f  macro-regulation during the postwar period, focusing on linking purchasing power to 
productivity growth (M. Piore and C. Sabel, 1984; Hirst. P and J. Zeitlin, 1992).
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of investment in capital-intensive sectors (Cappellin, 1992). One of the key-issues in 
understanding the basic arguments of these theories is the overcoming of the basic assumptions 
of the neoclassical economic models (perfect competition, full employment, constant returns to 
scale and perfect mobility of factors of production), and the concentration on various forms of 
market failure (Tsoukalis, 1993:229). Therefore, the approaches that have been advanced to 
explain the process of economic convergence in nation-state systems point to more or less state 
intervention, as a countervailing factor to the market failures, that stimulate growth over time. 
Within this framework, the role of the state is crucial in formulating regional development 
strategies, which, therefore, tend to have a top-down structure. Thus, by the 1960s the region had 
become a secondary locus of economic activity, while regional and local governments were 
subordinate agencies in the national social welfare administrations (Sabel, 1994a: 102).
The main theoretical framework used in the development of regional policies within 
nation-states and at the European level (see chapter 2) is the cumulative causation theory (G. 
Myrdal, 1957), based on a criticism of the comparative advantage model in international trade 
(Holland, 1976; Robson, 1987). The major argument is that market forces cannot bring about an 
equal redistribution of factors of production or income and consequently there are no strong 
reasons to expect the elimination of regional problems through the free interplay of market 
forces. Therefore, initial differences in productivity and economic development can lead to 
circular and cumulative causation and thus growing polarization between different regions. The 
logic of backwash effects implies that the production factors -capital, skilled labour, 
entrepreneurship, technology- move towards the core areas. On the other hand, spread effects 
may arise from an increased demand for imports and from diseconomies of location associated 
with over-congestion in the rapidly-growing centres. The relative importance of backwash and 
spread effects determines the evolution of regional disparities. A similar, rather pessimistic, view
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has been adopted by the Marxist and neo-Marxist schools of thought, emphasizing the systemic 
logic of regional disparities (Holland, 1976,1980).
Under these conditions, the emphasis on economies of scale and the creation of large 
industrial enterprises as a means to promote growth (Hamilton, 1986; Apter, 1987) has 
constituted an intrinsic element of regional development policies adopted by most European 
countries during the post-second world war period. In the same vein, other countries, adopting 
the growth-pole approach2 (Fr. Perroux, 1955), emphasized the role of planned and concentrated 
growth of specific development poles (urbanized, metropolitan areas), in reducing the centre- 
periphery disparities.
Taken as a whole, these theoretical approaches are mainly focused on economic factors as 
the determinants of regional disparities and have underestimated the role of the endogenous 
dynamics in the development process. Along with the core-periphery theories (Tarrow, 1977; 
Rokkan and Urwin, 1983), they view the periphery as characterized by a) physical distance from 
the centre; b) dependence on the centre for its livelihood and well-being; and c) an inferior 
allocation of economic, political and cultural resources (Tarrow, 1977:15-38). The variation, 
however, in the geography of regional disparities (i.e. regions of Third Italy and Spain) raises 
the issue of the role played by crucial non-economic factors, such as social, cultural and political 
(institutional infrastructure) resources, in the development process.
Indeed, the economic, technological and political changes that have occurred since the early 
1970s led to the transformation of production, and particularly the move from mass production
2Extensive operationalization o f  the growth-pole theory took place in the southern European countries from the 
early 1950s to the early 1980s. In Italy, through the activities o f  the Casa per il M ezzogiom o and the Agency for 
the South, public intervention started in the 1950s and ended in the 1970s with poor results in reducing disparities 
between North and South (M ezzogiom o) (Camagni,1991). In Greece, in the two early programmes o f  economic 
and social development after the restoration o f  democracy (1976-80 and 1978-82), the main goal was the 
strengthening o f  rival cities to Athens with the objectives o f  restraining the attraction o f  the Capital and forming 
dynamic centres in the periphery (see chapter 3). For a discussion o f  Perroux, see Holland, 1976.
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towards the “flexible specialization” paradigm3, which marked the emergence of the subnational 
institutional infrastructure as a crucial parameter in the development process. This trend, which 
has been favoured by increased international competition, and the internationalization, 
fragmentation and volatility of the markets is seen as a key factor encouraging the emergence of 
the region as an integrated unit of production and as a key locus of socio-economic governance. 
Additionally, the increasing importance of quick adaptation to changing market demand and 
subsequently the need for promoting viable small-scale production (economies of scope instead 
of economies of scale) have emphasized the role of the intra-regional institutional interactions 
and socio-cultural factors in the development process (Sabel, 1994a,b; Hirst and Zeitlin,1992; 
Storper,1995; Piore and Sabel, 1984). Two major types of institutional frameworks have been 
identified for flexibility to be achieved: either industrial districts of horizontally-integrated and 
spatially-concentrated small and medium-sized firms or, large decentralized companies. This 
'double convergence' (Sabel, 1994a) of small and large firm structures, however, is not associated 
exclusively with the industrial districts-related pattern of regional development, but rather it 
should be seen as an indication of a more general trend, involving decentralized organizational 
structures and horizontal cooperative networks that characterize regional economic and political 
systems in a wide range of development sectors, such as tourism (Stokowski, 1994). Thus, the 
emergence of regions should be seen as a response to the economic and technological changes 
of the 1970s, intrinsic characteristics of which are, on the one hand, the progressive crisis of the 
Fordist pattern of production and the Keynesian welfare state and, on the other hand, the 
increasing role of flexible production methods.
3Flexible specialization is a new technological paradigm challenging the accepted model o f  industrial 
organization (mass production) in a classic Kuhnian style. It is based on flexible automation. Differentiated products 
with small batches o f  production are obtained using flexible, general-purpose machinery and skilled adaptable 
workers, with a close integration o f  mental and manual tasks. Thus, the reduction o f  the customization costs is 
achieved through economies o f  scope (M. Piore and C. Sabel, 1984).
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Yet, the emergence of regions and localities should be understood within the context of a 
changing, globalizing political economy, which implies: i) the global centralization of the 
financial system and the resulting dominance of finance over production; ii) the 
transnationalization of technology and the increasing speed of redundancy of new technology; 
iii) the importance of knowledge and expertize as factors of production; iv) the rise of global 
oligopolies; v) the rise of transnational economic diplomacy; vi) the globalization of 
communication and immigration flows leading to the rise of global culture and the delinking of 
identities and symbols from territory; and vii) as a result of all the above, the development of 
global geographies (Amin and Thrift, 1994:2-4).
The increasing intensity of the globalization of economic activities and information, 
however, does not necessarily imply a homogeneity of preferences in the framework of a global 
village, but rather stresses the existence of local specificities. Thus, the processes of globalization 
and localization coexist in the so-called ‘global-local interplay’ (Dunford and Kafkalas, 1992:3- 
38). The local is embedded in the global and, hence, the degree to which it can mediate this 
relationship shapes its ability to define its economic development trajectory. These seemingly 
contradictory movements are seen as having led to the weakening of the traditional nation-states 
and the erosion of their autonomy. Thus, the ‘hollowing out’ of the state may be interpreted as 
a result of its weakened ability to regulate effectively the economy within its own borders 
because of the internationalization of economic processes: 'this loss of autonomy creates in turn 
both the need for supranational coordination and the space for subnational resurgence' (Jessop, 
1994:264). Consequently, the response of most of the traditional European nation-states, which 
overwhelmed by the globalization of economic relationships, as well as of the risks of financing 
the welfare state have adopted strategies of devolution and decentralization, should be attributed 
to this trend (Leonardi and Garmise, 1993).
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Furthermore, greater decentralization and deconcentration may be interpreted as an
adaptation to the increased importance of the local sphere in every-day life. R. Watts notes:
‘what we are witnessing today is a two-fold process in which, on the one hand, there is a pressure 
throughout the world for larger political units capable of promoting economic development, 
improved security, rising standards of living, influence in an era of ever-growing world-wide 
interdependence; on the other hand, there is the search for identity which arises from the desire 
for smaller, self-governing political units, more responsive to the individual citizen and the desire 
to give expression to primary group attachments,...which provide the distinctive basis for a 
community's sense of identity and yearning for self-determination' (1981:3-4).
Therefore, regionalization4 and regionalism should be seen as two interdependent and interrelated
concepts, given that, while the former is interpreted as a mainly from above process, the latter
constitutes a movement from below5. As Harvie has argued, ‘regionalization, the chopping-up
of problems into manageable areas, has now given way to a subjective and aggressive
regionalism’ (1994:4).
1.2 Paradigm Shift”in Regional Development: re-conceptualizing Regional Governance
The emergence of new patterns of regional development has very often been considered as linked 
to changes in the mode of organization of production. The shift in the pattern of production, 
marked by the gradual change of the ‘technological trajectory’6 from the Fordist model to the
4A. Giddens’s conceptualization o f  regionalization as a process concerning time and space and o f ‘regions’ as 
“contexts o f  interactions”, combining thus structure and actors within the framework o f  structuration theory, is 
relevant to this point (1984:110-132).
5 This distinction draws upon Hadjimichalis's analysis o f  regionalization and regionalism. The former is defined 
as a process designed 'from above' (by the state, local authorities or capital) aimed to facilitate the changing needs 
o f  profitable accumulation, while the latter is referred to the reaction o f  local social groups, whose interests are 
threatened by such a regionalization. This conflict provides evidence o f  the 'social logic o f  the place' (Hadjimichalis, 
1987:286-287).
6 M. Piore and C. Sabel adopted the notion of'technological trajectory', as it has been defined by the French 
regulation school (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1987; Boyer, 1988,1990), and distinguished two specific trajectories: 
mass production and flexible specialization. M.Piore referred to this definition as follows: 'it is that set o f  forces 
which propels the economy through history, causing it to outgrow any particular regulatory framework and enter 
into crisis' (M. Piore, 1992:158).
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flexible specialization paradigm and the re-consolidation of the region as a fundamental basis of 
economic and social life, has promoted a new approach to regional development, which 
emphasizes the role of the endogenous resources in the development process (Cappellin, 1992:2). 
This theoretical interpretation of regional development is based on the assumption that the major 
factors affecting regional development, such as physical infrastructure, labour, capital, and 
technology are rather immobile. Therefore, regional policy should not aim at the mobility of 
factors of production, as suggested by traditional theories, but at; a) full employment and b) 
greater productivity of local resources (Cappellin, 1992:3). In achieving these goals the 
endogenous approach emphasizes the role played by small firms, as well as the interactive 
relationships between grassroots groups in the social system and local or regional political 
institutions. In that sense, it can be seen as a reaction against the Perrouxian growth-pole theory 
and other theories that have emphasized the role of capital-intensive investments and state 
institutions in determining development (Leonardi, 1995a:39).
The endogenous approach has been elaborated by various scholars, and the different 
contributions emphasize different aspects. Some underline the self-centred characteristics of 
regional development and the need for regional autonomy. Others emphasize the role of 
cooperative relations among the local actors in the regional economy, to counterbalance the 
negative impact of automatic market mechanisms. Other contributions analyse the effects of 
changes in production and transportation technologies on the spatial diffusion of industrial and 
service activities. Finally, others focus on the role of local factors in the process of innovation- 
diffusion and on the spatial concentration of high-tech activities (Cappellin, 1992). The end result 
of these reformulations of the problem of development has been above all a different 
conceptualization of space and territory. In contrast with the assumptions of the functionalist 
paradigm, which considered space as simply the place where the effects of the process of
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development occurred, the endogenous approach pays attention to the territorial dimension of 
development and to the categories of environment (milieu). Thus, territory is seen as 'the 
sedimentation of specific and interrelated historical, social and cultural factors in local areas 
which generate significantly different processes of development due to local specifications' 
(Garofoli, 1992:4). Under these considerations the concept of space cannot be interpreted only 
as the distance between different places and a source of costs for economic agents, but instead 
as 'the distinguishing feature of territory, that is a strategic factor of development opportunities, 
a clustering of social relations and the place where local culture and other non-transferable local 
features are superimposed' (Garofoli, 1992:4). Moreover, it represents the meeting place of market 
relationships and social regulation forms, which determine different forms of organization of 
production and different innovative capacities.
Based on this reformulation of the concepts of territory and space the process of 
endogenous development underlines the grassroots character and a high degree of autonomy of 
local development. Thus development should not be seen as a consequence of decentralization 
processes or processes of industrial relocation, but rather as the outcome of the sprouting of new 
entrepreneurship and the presence of social, cultural and economic variables that favour the 
starting up of new economic activities. In that sense development is viewed as a bottom-up 
process rather than as an outcome of a top-down redistributive function of the national 
government (Cappellin, 1992:3; Garofoli, 1992:13). Development from below concentrates on 
factors which influence the adoption of new production processes and product innovation rather 
than on prices of various production inputs. As Garofoli notes, endogenous development means 
in effect:
a) the capacity to transform the socio-economic system; b) the ability to react to external 
challenges; c) the promotion of social learning; d) the ability to introduce specific forms of social 
regulation at the local level which favour the above mentioned points. Endogenous development
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is, in other words, the ability to innovate at the local level (1992:7).
As has already been pointed out, the endogenous development approach differentiates itself 
from traditional theories by emphasizing the importance of the presence of a well-developed 
institutional infrastructure at regional and local levels, that is 'a series of interlocking institutions, 
ad hoc structures, relationships and agreements for collective action’ (Leonardi, 1995a:222). One 
of the main prerequisites of the scheme is the existence of effective regional and local 
governments. While the role of the private sector is to concentrate on the productive and 
distribution phases of the economic process, the role of public subnational institutions is to 
provide the collective goods, such as social services, investment projects and policy planning. 
Therefore, regional government plays a crucial role in identifying the types-sectors of production 
where the regional economy has a comparative advantage, in providing the appropriate incentive 
structure, and in stimulating synergistic7 effects between the participant actors to maximize 
effectiveness in the use of resources (Cappellin, 1992:7; Leonardi, 1995a:40). On the other hand, 
the role of local government is to create the social and physical infrastructure (research, 
vocational training, marketing), to maximize the external for the firms economies of scale. Thus, 
regional and local governments become moderators of regional development, within the concept 
of the region as an institutional or political entrepreneur (Leonardi, 1995a), which implies that 
the region is not only the mediator for the payment of governmental subsidies and transfer 
payments, but also the initiator of development strategies and participant in the development 
process.
Thus, through the redefinition of the roles of the state, the civil society and the market,
7 The notion o f  'synergistic effects' implies the achievement o f  greater output through the cooperation- 
coordination o f  the participant actors and the available resources, than that which would be produced by the 
independent function o f  actors-partners (Cappellin, 1992:7).
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governance in the endogenous approach is envisaged as the process by which the national or 
global environment is mediated by the subnational institutional infrastructure in ways that affect 
the locality's development potential. Hence, notwithstanding the role of national and international 
actors, the capacity for learning and adaptation of the local institutional infrastructure is raised 
as a crucial parameter of the way in which local economies and societies are embedded into the 
global environment.
1.3 Social Capital, Institutional Networks and Learning: the debate
The bottom-up or endogenous approach to regional development has raised the issue of crucial 
non-economic factors8 as determinants of the outcome of development policies, emphasizing the 
impact of territory and local milieu (institutional, social, cultural and historical features) on the 
process of economic development. By providing stable rules and procedures that facilitate the 
exchange and flow of information, institutions9 reduce uncertainty and provide the framework 
for individuals and organizations to achieve and benefit from collective action, thus facilitating 
economic governance. Economic dynamism or backwardness, on the other hand, is seen as a 
function of the way in which institutions develop and change, and, implicitly, of the way in which 
resources and power are distributed both locally and between the local, the national and the 
global. Therefore, focus on institutional networks alone is insufficient for understanding the 
complexities of the development process. What is required is institutional networks with learning 
capacity, that is networks capable of adapting to the changing environment. In that sense, the
8 For the importance o f  non-economic factors both for the endogenous development approach, see Piore, M., 
C. Sabel (1984); Hirst,P., J.Zeitlin (1992); Lorenz, Ed (1992); Sabel, C (1994a,b); Leonardi, R (1995a,b); Storper, 
M (1995); Garofoli,G (1992); Cappellin, R (1992).
9It should be noted that the use o f  the term in this thesis refers alternatively to both institutions and organizations 
(institutional networks).
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learning capacity of the subnational institutional infrastructure constitutes a prerequisite for the 
formulation of coherent and viable regional development strategies (M. Rhodes, 1995).
The notion of learning has emerged in a wide range of social sciences -from evolutionary 
economics10 to political science- as a crucial conceptual tool for explaining adaptation and change 
of system parameters at both the micro and macro levels. In political science learning, as an 
explanatory variable for major changes (paradigm shifts) in the policy-making process, has 
become a crucial concept for analysing the state-society relations and hence for contemporary 
theories of the state (P.Hall, 1993). This thesis focuses on institutional learning as an 
intermediate-explanatory variable of the successful adaptation of local political and economic 
systems to the global and European environment through the processes of exchange and 
socialization. The academic debate on the prerequisites for institutional learning and successful 
adaptation focuses on a wide range of variables that may affect the learning capacity of local 
institutional infrastructure.
The first obvious observation is that institutional learning is crucially influenced by 
previous policy attempts (P. Hall, 1993) and dependent on the way in which the system of intra- 
regional interactions is shaped on a bottom-up basis, that is the way in which the local institutions 
are networked. Since, however, institutional learning is a predominantly interactive process, 
which cannot be simply reduced to a function by which ‘the less proactive regions...learn from 
the activities of their more dynamic counterparts’ (M. Rhodes, 1995:329), the adequacy of 
information flows and communication as well as the presence of fora for dialogue among the 
actors is seen as the second most important factor affecting the learning capacity of local 
institutional infrastructure (M. Rhodes, 1995). Thus, by the joint involvement of institutional
10 The evolutionary models in economics have emerged as a combination o f  socio-biology and economics and 
try to explore parallels between the underlying features o f  genetic survival and evolutionary development among 
animals and similar patterns o f  behaviour among human beings (North, 1990, ch. 3).
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actors in the processes of ‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning by past successes and failures’, 
institutions can become adaptable rather than adapted to the changing conditions (Garmise, 
1995a). Learning in this environment is a function of past policy attempts (and the involved 
actors' interpretation of their successes and failures), of the capacities of institutions to design 
new activities, and of the changing ideas and shifting alliances and balance of powers among the 
actors.
Additionally, when multiple organizations (subnational authorities, business and trade 
associations, universities and other research related agencies) are involved in combined learning, 
the ability to share knowledge" and understanding requires that the interpretation is mutually 
consistent. In other words, knowledge is relational and understanding cannot be completely 
disassociated from the relationships in which it is shared and 'learning is ...a socially embedded 
process which cannot be understood without taking into consideration the institutional and 
cultural context' (Lundvall, 1992:1). Thus, dialogue and communication -key components of 
learning- are empowered or inhibited by the socio-political processes that conceptualize human 
behaviour. Through this process of actor-structure interaction, information exchange and 
communication, actors interprete knowledge and acquire new knowledge, shape their identities 
and interests and form their preferences. Finally, since learning is a process of ‘waking up and 
catching up’ (Sabel, 1994b: 137) and therefore usually undermines the stability of relations 
between the transacting actors, institutions (norms, conventions) provide the glue that cements 
and re-stabilizes the relations among the involved actors.
Moreover, the learning process has implications for the organizational structure of the 
regional politico-economic system. On the one hand it requires that the involved organizations
11 'Knowledge' refers primarily to tacit knowledge, which is learned only by experience, rather than to the 
standardized and codified variety, that is easily transferable. This variety o f  knowledge can be diffused only through 
personal exchange and mobility.
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are flexible to make the appropriate structural adjustments to exploit the benefits of learning. On 
the other, the learning process is crucially dependent on experts who specialize in specific fields 
of policy (P. Hall, 1993; J. Checkel, 1998). Because this combination of flexibility and 
specialization is best achieved in networked organizations, the network paradigm constitutes the 
appropriate organizational form for the learning process (Storper, 1995).
In this context, if institutional networks are to promote self-sustaining development, they 
must be able continually to revise their activities according to both the changing circumstances 
and the understanding that evolves from shared experiences. Thus dialogue, as an intrinsic 
element of the learning process, constitutes the framework for defining and redefining common 
goals and objectives. Networks, as conduits of regional/local rules and practices, must build a 
consensus on development goals.
Furthermore, since the endogenous decision-making requires the presence of sufficient 
institutional and financial resources at the subnational level, the degree of decentralization of the 
administrative structure of the state plays an important role in the learning process (Garmise, 
1995b; M. Rhodes, 1995). However, existing evidence on intra and inter-state differentiation in 
the level of institutional learning and adaptation points to the dynamic character of 
intergovernmental relations, which cannot be simply reduced to a symptom of the state structure 
(Klausen and Goldsmith, 1997). Hence, the crucial prerequisite for institutional learning and 
adaptation is certain capacities for collective action at the regional and local levels to facilitate 
the process of shaping the system of interactions and coalition-building among key social and 
economic actors (Garmise, 1995b; Jeffery, 1997; Paraskevopoulos, 1997, 1998). In that sense, 
both formal and crucial informal institutional arrangements play the decisive role in determining 
the learning capacity of local systems of governance and their capacity for adapting to changing 
conditions. This increasing importance of certain capacities for collective action as the crucial
prerequisite for institutional learning and adaptation is underlined by the emergence of the 
network paradigm as an operational element of the institutional infrastructure at all stages of 
policy-making.
The crucial question, however, refers to the old problem of what causes what structure or 
culture. Are the formal institutions the means to achieve collective action and economic 
performance, or is their success dependent upon the existence of important informal norms that 
evolve from culture, traditions and social behavioural codes? Empirical evidence suggests that 
the differentiation of social norms is highly correlated with varying levels of institutional and 
economic performance at the regional and local levels (Putnam, 1993; Whiteley, 1997). A lively, 
multi-disciplinary literature has examined, in various ways, the linkages between socio-political 
structure, institutional learning, and economic performance at the regional level.
1.3.1 Rational Actors and Dilemmas of Collective Action
How and why dilemmas of collective action arise within contemporary economic and social 
structures, and the way in which they could be resolved, constitutes the crucial parameters upon 
which the creation of effective local synergies is dependent and, subsequently, the main issue 
for modem development strategies based on the bottom-up approach to regional development. 
The conceptualization of the role of institutions and socio-cultural factors in resolving collective 
action problems and thus determining the outcome of development policies should be seen as one 
of its key contributions.
Contemporary research in political science, economic history and economics is focused on 
the way in which rationality by individuals could be reconciled with rationality by society: that 
is the reason for the creation of dilemmas of collective action. 'Collective dilemmas arise when 
choices made by rational individuals lead to outcomes that no one prefers' (Bates, 1988:387).
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Game theory has illustrated the essential property of collective dilemmas and the conditions 
under which rational self-interested individuals can arrive at a Pareto-inferior solution: that is, 
one that leaves both parties worse off than they would have been had they cooperated (Scharpf, 
1991, 1993).
The tragedy o f the commons, since Hardin's challenging article12, has come to symbolize 
the degradation of the environment to be expected from actions of rational individuals, who use 
a scarce resource in common. Each herder receives a direct benefit from his own animals and 
suffers delayed costs from the deterioration of the commons when his and others' cattle over 
graze. Therein is the tragedy. Unlimited grazing destroys the common resource on which the 
livelihood of all depends.
In the famous prisoner's dilemma game, a pair of accomplices is held incommunicado, and 
each is told if he alone implicates his partner he will escape unpunished, but if he remains silent, 
while his partner confesses, he will be punished severely. If both remained silent, both would be 
let off lightly, but unable to coordinate their stories, each is better off squealing, no matter what 
the other does.
Public goods also constitute prisoners' dilemmas. A public good (i.e security) can be 
enjoyed by everyone, regardless of whether he contributes to its provision. Under ordinary 
circumstances, therefore, no one has an incentive to contribute to providing the public good, 
causing all to suffer.
In the logic o f collective action the presumption that the possibility of a benefit for a group 
would be sufficient to generate collective action to achieve that benefit is challenged: 'unless the 
number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to
12 'The tragedy o f  the commons' was the title o f  Garrett Hardin's famous article in Science(\96S). For an 
extensive overview see El. Ostrom (1990: 2-4).
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make individuals to act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act 
to achieve their common or group interests' (M. Olson, 1971:2). Olson's argument is based on the 
assumption that one has little incentive to contribute voluntarily to the provision of a collective 
good, unless he could be excluded from the benefits of that good, once it is produced.
All these concepts are extremely useful for explaining 'how perfectly rational individuals 
can produce, under some circumstances, outcomes that are not "rational" when viewed from the 
perspective of all those involved' (EL Ostrom, 1990:6). This does not arise from misanthropy. 
Even if neither party wishes harm to the other, and even if both are conditionally predisposed to 
cooperate, they can have no guarantee against reneging, when verifiable and enforceable 
commitments are absent. As D.Gambetta has pointed out, 'it is necessary not only to trust others 
before acting cooperatively, but also to believe that one is trusted by others' (1988:216). The 
performance of all social institutions from international credit markets to modem national and 
regional governments, depends on the way in which those dilemmas of collective action can be 
resolved (Putnam, 1993:164).
One of the most classic solutions in confronting the dilemmas of collective action is the 
Hobbesian of third-party enforcement: that is the imposition of a coercive power to create 
cooperative solutions. It implies the state should enable its subjects to do what both parties cannot 
do on their own: trust one another. Such a solution, however, is seen as too expensive. The third- 
party enforcement 'would involve a neutral party with the ability, costlessly, to be able to measure 
the attributes of a contract and, costlessly, to enforce agreements such that the offending party 
always had to compensate the injured party to a degree that made it too costly to violate the 
contract. These are strong conditions that are seldom, if ever, met in the real world' (North, 
1990:58). On the other hand, impartial enforcement being itself a public good, is subject to the 
basic dilemma of collective action. To solve the problem, the third party must itself be
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trustworthy, but there is no power to ensure it would not defect: 'put simply, if the state has 
coercive force, then those who run the state will use that force in their own interest at the expense 
of the rest of the society' (North, 1990:59). Therefore, in the language of game theory the third- 
party enforcement does not constitute a stable equilibrium, that is one in which no player has an 
incentive to change his behaviour.
The crucial question, however, is 'why uncooperative behaviour does not emerge as often 
as game theory predicts' (Gambetta, 1988:217). Game theorists generally agree that cooperation 
is difficult to sustain when the game is not repeated, so the defector cannot be punished in 
successive rounds, when information on the other players is lacking and there are large numbers 
of players. When the prisoner's dilemma game is played only once, the dominant strategy for 
players is to defect. In an iterated prisoner's dilemma game, however, there is no dominant 
strategy. Axelrod's (1984, 1997) optimistic view about the ability of actors to devise cooperative 
solutions to problems without the intervention of a coercive power is based on the assumption 
the winning strategy under these conditions of repeated play is the strategy of tit-for-tat, that is 
one in which the player responds in kind to the action of other players13. Although each of these 
factors is important, they seem to imply that impersonal cooperation should be rare. Nevertheless, 
it seems to be common in much of the modem world.
1.3.2 The New Institutionalists
From the old debate between the substantivist and the formalist schools in anthropology14 flow
13 The ‘Folk Theorem’, one version o f  this strategy, holds that 'always defect' is not a unique equilibrium in the 
repeat-play prisoner's dilemma (R.Axelrod, 1984).
14 The 'substantivist' school is identified especially with Karl Polanyi’s (1944) idea of'm oral economy'. It 
stresses the importance o f  culture, social and institutional structure o f  the society as a whole in understanding the 
texture o f  econom ic relations. The 'formalist' school, on the other hand, is strictly linked to the assumptions o f  
neoclassical economic theory that denies any impact o f  social structure and social relations on economic behaviour. 
For an extensive overview, see M. Granovetter, (1993:3-10).
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two broad intellectual streams in the description and explanation of social action in general and 
of economic action in particular. The first, characteristic of the work of most sociologists, views 
the actor as socialized and the action as governed by social norms, rules and obligations. Its 
principal virtues lie in its ability to describe action and institutions in a social context and to 
explain the way action is shaped, constrained and redirected by the social context. The second 
intellectual stream, characteristic of the work of most economists, sees the actor as acting 
independently and wholly self-interested, while the basic principle of action is that of maximizing 
utility. This principle of action has generated the extensive growth of the political philosophy 
theories of utilitarianism and contractarianism, upon which the rational choice models in 
neoclassical economic theory and political science are based (Coleman, 1988:95-6; Green and 
Shapiro, 1994). This intellectual divide in the social sciences constitutes the main source for the 
new institutionalist school of thought in political science, comprising three main analytical 
approaches: rational choice, historical and sociological (P. Hall and R. Taylor, 1996).
Rational choice new institutionalism in political science, economic history and economics 
attempts to show 'the conditions under which particular institutions arise and the effects of these 
institutions on the functioning of the system' (Coleman, 1988:97) and exhibits a renewed concern 
with institutions as a means for resolving collective dilemmas (North, 1990; Shepsle,1989; 
Scharpf,1989; Moe,1990; Williamson, 1975). In particular, rational choice new institutionalists 
see in collective dilemmas reasons for the existence of institutions, that is 'forms of hierarchy in 
which sanctions are employed to make self-interested choices consistent with the social good' 
(Bates, 1988:387), or 'the rules of the game in the society -the humanly devised constraints- that 
shape human interaction' (North 1990:3). They seek to conceptualize institutions as external 
constraints to personal freedom of choice, by shaping actors’ preferences and optimizing their
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behaviour, thus facilitating collective action15 (El. Ostrom, 1986; Moe, 1990; Shepsle, 1989). 
Through this process, the individual actors’ rationality-based preferences are substituted by 
rational institutional choices or, in K.Shepsle terms, choice o f ‘institutional equilibria’ (Shepsle, 
1989:143).
New institutional economics, in particular, has emphasized the impact of formal institutions 
(hierarchical firms) on the reduction of transaction costs16, on enabling thus agents to overcome 
problems of opportunism and hence on performing economic functions (Williamson, 1975; 
North, 1990). Thus, new institutional economics focuses on the origins of efficient institutions 
that promote the making of contracts, the enforcement of property rights, the removal of 
production externalities and the provision of public goods, that is mechanisms for reconciling the 
gap between individual and collective interests. Given, however, that both production 
externalities and public goods constitute prisoner’s dilemmas, rational choice new 
institutionalists' basic argument is contractarian in spirit: ‘persons facing collective dilemmas 
might prefer to live in a world in which the freedom to choose is constrained’ (Bates, 1988:397).
Yet, rational choice new institutionalism leaves open a crucial question: how and why are 
formal institutions provided? The problem seems to be similar to the solution of the third-party 
enforcement in the sense that the institutional solution itself constitutes a collective dilemma and, 
hence, it seems to be subject to the very incentive problems it is supposed to resolve: the 
demanders of institutions may be unable to secure their supply. To resolve the problem an
15Adr. Windhoff-Heritier's notion o f  institution as 'restriction and opportunity' shows the compatibility between 
new institutionalism and rational choice approach and hence it may be seen as the foundation o f  rational choice 
institutionalism (1991:41). See also J. Coleman (1988:97) and K. Dowding (1994a).
16 The term 'transaction costs' refers to the underestimated in the neoclassical econom ic theory 'information 
costs'. As D.North has pointed out, 'the costliness o f  information is the key to the costs o f  transacting, which consist 
o f  the costs o f  measuring the valuable attributes o f  what is being exchanged and the costs o f  protecting rights and 
policing and enforcing agreements' (1990:27), that is costs associated with banking, insurance, finance, trade, 
lawyers and accountants.
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alternative soft approach to the origins of institutions has been developed: 'rather than being 
founded on notions of contracting, coercion, and sanctions, (...institutions should be) based on 
concepts such as community and trust', or, 'in a world in which there are prisoner's dilemmas, 
cooperative communities will enable rational individuals to transcend collective dilemmas' 
(Bates, 1988:398-99).
Thus, economic sociology's criticism of the undersocialized character of new institutional 
economics focuses on its attempt to explain social institutions from a functional-neoclassical 
point of view (Granovetter, 1985). Granovetter's 'embeddedness argument' stresses the role of 
networks of relations in generating trust and in establishing expectations and norms: ‘social 
relations, rather than institutional arrangements or generalized morality, are responsible for the 
production of trust in economic life’ (1985:491). The embeddedness approach emphasizes the 
social character of economic action, the role of networks as a function between markets and 
hierarchies, and the process of institution-building (Granovetter, 1985). In that sense, it points 
to the influence of social and cultural contexts upon the rational or purposive action and sees 
social structure, learning and adaptation as interrelated concepts.
Granovetter's embeddedness thesis, Coleman's theory of collective action, and R.Burt's 
structural17 approach to action constitute an integral part of the behavioural revolution in political 
science (Shepsle, 1989), focusing on the development of a new theoretical orientation, which 
emphasizes the role of social and cultural contexts in affecting rational or purposive action, and 
views social structure, institutional and economic performance as interdependent concepts upon 
which the development of social organization depends. In that sense, they may be seen as 
attempts to bridge the gap between rational choice, and historical/sociological institutionalist
17 In a parallel way with Granovetter, R. Burt has distinguished between 'atomistic' and 'normative' approaches, 
emphasizing the 'structural' approach to action (R. Burt, 1982,1993).
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approaches. The latter, without denying the rational and purposive character of human behaviour, 
emphasize path dependence and unintended consequences as features of institutional 
development (K. Thelen and S. Steinmo, 1992; Pierson, 1997), and the role of cultural norms and 
social appropriateness in affecting individual action (March and Olsen, 1989; DiMaggio and 
Powel, 1991). Hence, they define institutions as: ‘the formal and informal procedures, routines, 
norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political 
economy’ (P. Hall and R. Taylor, 1996:938). Social capital has emerged as the appropriate 
conceptual tool to be used in this theoretical enterprise (Coleman, 1988:96).
1.3.3 Social Capital: Enhancing Civicness and Building Civil Society 
Social capital has emerged as the crucial conceptual tool that, by facilitating ‘certain actions of 
actors within the structure’ (Coleman, 1988:98), leads to the crossing of the old schism between 
structure and culture. As a resource for action available to an actor it is one way of introducing 
social structure into the rational choice paradigm (ibid., 1988:95; El. Ostrom, 1992, 1995a,b, 
1998). Although Coleman’s (1990:300-302) definition of social capital18 as ‘a set of inherent in 
the social organization social-structural resources that constitute capital assets for the individual’ 
implies it refers to individual actors (persons), it has been acknowledged as a crucial factor for 
facilitating collective action among corporate actors as well: ‘because purposive organizations 
can be actors just as persons can, relations among corporate actors can constitute social capital 
for them as well’ (Coleman, 1988:98). Thus, social capital refers 'to features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated action' (Putnam, 1993:167) or, 'to internalized norms which stress the
18 Although Coleman is considered the scholar who introduced and analysed the term, he credits Glenn Loury 
with introducing the concept into economics to identify the social resources useful for the development o f  human 
capital. See Coleman, (1990:300-301).
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acceptance on the part of citizens of the positive role played by collective action in pursuing 
collective goods related to economic growth and social protection' (Leonardi, 1995b: 169). 
Therefore, voluntary cooperation is easier in a community19 that has inherited a substantial stock 
of social capital, and the pursuit of collective goods is not seen as in contradiction with the 
pursuit of maximizing individual wealth. J. Coleman notes:
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of entities, with two 
elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate 
certain actions of actors-whether persons or corporate actors-within the structure. Like other 
forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that 
in its absence would not be possible. For example, a group whose members manifest 
trustworthiness and place trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a 
comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and trust... Like physical capital and human 
capital, social capital is not completely fungible but may be specific to certain activities... Unlike 
other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and 
among actors. It is not lodged either in the actors themselves or in physical implements of 
production. (1988:98; 1990:302-304).
Another main feature of social capital is that it is ordinarily a public good, whereas 
conventional capital is considered to be a private good. Therefore, like all public goods, it tends 
to be undervalued and undersupplied by private agents, which means that social capital, unlike 
other forms of capital, must often be produced as a by-product of other social activities 
(Coleman,1990:317).
Trust constitutes the most important form of social capital. It is linked to the volatility and 
hence uncetrainty of modem economic and institutional settings and is seen as the crucial 
conceptual mechanism to resolve this uncertainty by shaping the relations between partners and 
facilitating collective action: ‘trust, the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will 
exploit the others’ vulnerability, is today widely regarded as a precondition for competitive
19 S. Singleton and Michael Taylor defined community as: 'a set o f  people (a) with some shared beliefs, including 
normative beliefs and preferences, beyond those constituting their collective action problem, (b) with a more or less 
stable set o f  members, (c) who expect to continue interacting with one another for some time to come, and (d) whose 
relations are direct (unmediated by third parties) and multiplex' (1992:315).
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success’ (Sabel, 1993b: 104). This is the main reason for the increasing attention many scholars 
have paid to the crucial role played by trust in the emergence of flexible regional systems of 
political and economic governance since the 1970s20.
A case that illustrates the role of the trustworthiness in facilitating cooperation is that of 
rotating credit associations, which are informal savings institutions. In a typical rotating credit 
association each member contributes a monthly sum and each month a different member receives 
this month's pot to be used as he or she wished. But without a high degree of trustworthiness 
among the members, the institution could not exist. Thus, the reputation for honesty and 
reliability is an important asset for any would-be participant. In a small, highly personalized 
community the threat of ostracism is a powerful, credible sanction. In more diffuse, impersonal 
societies, by contrast, more complex networks of mutual trust must be woven together to support 
the rotating credit associations (Putnam, 1993:168). In many cases members must trust in the 
trust of others to complete their obligations and hence social networks allow trust to become 
transitive and spread. Rotating credit associations illustrate the way in which external sources of 
social capital -preexisting social relations between individuals- help to overcome problems of 
imperfect information and enforceability, facilitating the solution of problems of collective 
action. Given, however, that in modem economies and societies, what is required is the 
impersonal form of trust, a problem arises about how personal tmst can become social tmst.
Social tmst in modem complex settings can arise from two related forms of social capital: 
norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. Social norms transfer the right to control 
an action from the actor to others because that action has externalities, that is consequences 
(positive or negative) for others. Norms arise when 'an action has similar externalities for a set
20 See, C.Sabel (1994a: 131-132); Ed. Lorenz (1992).
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of others, yet markets in the rights of control of the action cannot easily be established, and not 
single actor can profitably engage in an exchange to gain rights of control' (J.Coleman, 1990:251). 
The most important norm is reciprocity (El. Ostrom, 1998:10). It is of two sorts: balanced and 
generalized (Putnam, 1993:172). Balanced reciprocity refers to a simultaneous exchange of 
equivalent values, while generalized reciprocity is based on a continuing relationship of 
exchange, which involves mutual expectations that a benefit granted now should be repaid in the 
future: ‘if A does something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future, this establishes an 
expectation in A and an obligation on the part of B, which can be conceived as a credit slip held 
by A for performance by B ’ (J.Coleman, 1990:102).
The norm of generalized reciprocity constitutes a highly productive component of social 
capital. Communities in which this norm is followed can more efficiently restrain opportunism 
and resolve problems of collective action by reconciling solidarity and self interest. Generalized 
reciprocity is associated with dense networks of social exchange, through which the core 
relationships between reciprocity, reputation and trust are developed in a mutually reinforcing 
way (El. Ostrom, 1998). Thus norms, and hence social capital, are sustained by socialization and 
by sanctions. These norms (Storper's -1995- 'untraded interdependencies') facilitate the stability 
of intra-network relations and hence the inbuilt capacity of institutional networks to learn and 
adapt to changing circumstances.
The crucial question, however, is whether or not trust and subsequently social capital can 
be created, where it is in demand. A renewed concern with the role of the state in promoting 
collective action and building social capital through successful state/society synergies has 
emerged recently21. The basic argument in the problematique of ‘crossing the great divide’
? 1
" On the state-driven process o f  synergies and collective action, see: Peter Evans, (1996a,b), Jonathan Fox, 
(1996), Patrick Heller, (1996), Fellmeth, Aaron X (1996) and Elinor Ostrom, (1996).
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derives from the debate between the “endowments” and the “constructability” approaches to 
state/society synergies. The former emphasizes the dependence of successful state/society 
synergies on a preexisting strong civil society and presence of substantial stock of social capital 
and therefore points to a long-run process for success, while the latter stresses the possibility of 
short-run institution-building through synergistic relations.
According to the latter, the joint involvement of state, market and civil society (voluntary) 
institutions in development projects and the thus created synergistic relationships are viewed as 
key factors for enhancing collective action and enabling actors to be involved in the production 
of public goods. The evidence of successful synergies with a key-role attributed to the state 
comes from areas of the globe (i.e. Third World countries) where the presence of social capital 
is in demand. Moreover, this “constructability”, as regards social capital, effect of the state’s 
involvement in synergistic relations with society seems to be particularly relevant to success 
stories of development, such as those of the “East Asian Miracle” countries. In analysing East 
Asian countries the argument points to the complementary and mutually supportive relations 
between public and private actors that are substantiated with the development of dense networks 
that cross the two spheres and to the crucial role played by the presence of Weberian qualitative 
features in the structure of the public bureaucracy which add to its efficacy and facilitate the 
process of successful public/private synergies ( Evans, 1996b).
The existing evidence from countries of Southern Europe (Grote, 1997; Putnam, 1993), 
however, seems to point to the opposite direction: that the combination of a centralized state 
structure and a weak civil society creates conditions favourable for hierarchical clientelistic 
intergovernmental relations and networks that inhibit rather than encourage the long-standing 
process of successful synergies and social capital-building. Moreover, even though the role of the 
state in particular cases like those of East Asian countries, or even in some traditionally rich in
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cooperative and coherent relations between public and private actors like Germany and the 
Nordic countries cannot be overlooked, the crucial question arises about whether these successful 
synergistic relations have been facilitated by traditions of civicness and associational life. In that 
sense, the existing evidence on the interregional (actually inter-Laender) differentiation in terms 
of synergistic networks and subsequently successful or not adaptation in Germany -that is Baden 
Wurrtemberg vis-a-vis Nordrhein Westfallen (Grabher, 1993)- as well as, the strong associational 
tradition in the Nordic countries should be stressed.
In general, what the European experience seems to suggest is that issues, such as the 
structure and the degree of centralization of the state and the strength of the civil society 
constitute the crucial parameters that determine the administrative capacity of the state and shape 
the public/private relations. Thus the main features of the state structure in the degrees of 
bureaucratization, centralization and clientelism can account for the way in which local problems 
are regulated and the state/society relations are shaped. Top-down initiatives based on 
hierarchical (clientelistic) intergovernmental networks cannot constitute a viable basis for the 
long-standing processes of social capital-building and crossing the public-private divide 
(Paraskevopoulos, 1998a).
Sabel’s optimistic view, based on the notion of “studied trust” seems to be more relevant. 
Studied trust refers to a 'kind of consensus and the associated forms of economic transactions' that 
result from associative, or cooperative, or autopoietic -that is self-creating- reflexive systems22. 
These are systems in which 'the logic governing the development of each of the elements is
22 The terms refer to the process of'learning to cooperate', which is the outcome o f  a project for the revitalization 
o f Pennsylvania through the reorientation o f  economic development policies. The basic principle governing the new 
development strategy was a shift in consensus from the view that individual actors know their interests and 
government's role is to remove the obstacles to realising them, to the view that it is only by recognising their mutual 
dependence that actors can define their distinct interests, and that government's role is to encourage the recognition 
o f their collectivity and the definition o f  their particularity (Sabel, 1993b: 120-140).
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constantly reshaped by the development of all the others: the parts reflect the whole and vice 
versa' (Sabel, 1993b: 125-30). Sabel's optimistim on the creation of trust is based on the hypothesis 
that 'trust is a constitutive -hence in principle extensive- feature of social life' (1993b: 140).
Both the paradigm of rotating credit associations and Sabel's argument of studied trust 
underline the cumulative character of social capital. Success in starting small-scale institutions 
enables individuals to build on the, thus created, social capital to solve larger problems with 
more complex institutional arrangements. Trust and other forms of social capital, such as norms 
and networks, constitute 'moral resources', that is 'resources whose supply increases rather than 
decreases through use and which become depleted if not used' (Gambeta, 1988:56). For these 
reasons the creation and destruction of social capital are marked by virtuous and vicious circles23 
(Putnam, 1993:170; 1995a,b). This presumption has engendered criticisms, focusing on its 
historicism and ‘path dependence’ logic (Goldberg, 1996; Sabetti, 1996; Levi, 1996; Tarrow, 
1996). The inherent in institutional learning evolutionist approach does not contradict the path 
dependence analysis, in the sense that the function of Teaming to cooperate’ should be 
considered as a rather slow process. This approach, however, should be distinguished from the 
deterministic interpretations of history, since it emphasizes the bottom-up process for the creation 
of social capital through the “structure-actors” interactions and hence redefines the role of public 
policy in encouraging initiatives, rather than imposing collective action and coordination. It is in 
that sense that institutional learning and adaptation can be pursued.
Tmst and inter-organizational networks have been extensively used as factors that underpin 
the industrial districts of SMEs and the restructuring process in areas of industrial decline. 
However, although the research in tourist development so far is mainly focused on the micro­
23 Ed. Banfield (1958) provides empirical evidence for the vicious circles caused from the destruction o f  social 
capital, which provide an exegesis o f  the backwardness o f  M ezzogiom o. See also, M.Olson, (1982).
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level of inter-personal networks among tourist activity participants, the study of inter- 
organizational networks in tourism is seen as ‘the next type of structural analysis to develop in 
leisure research’ (Stokowski, 1994:86). In that respect, this study may be seen as a novel 
approach to the role of institutions and institutional networks in the process of local development. 
Furthermore, there are some similarities in institutional and policy adaptation between the 
productive systems based on the tourist industry and those undergoing industrial restructuring 
(i.e. the shift from massive to flexible forms of tourism).
1.3.4 Institutional Networks and Learning
To understand the distinctive theoretical underpinnings of the network approach one needs to go 
beyond the individualistic interpretations of rational action, based on calculations of utility 
maximization and ignorance of the social context within which the actor is embedded (Knoke and 
Kuklinski, 1982:9). Networks, in general, are based on relations or linkages and therefore they 
cannot be disassociated from the social or organizational system, which involves many other 
actors. Thus institutional networks can be defined as systems of interactions involving both 
public and private institutional actors (individuals, groups, organizations), which are linked 
around a certain policy domain or territory and hence bounded by it24. By definition, a network 
should not be seen merely as a corporate body, but instead as a new quality completely different 
from the total of the features of the involved organizations. In that sense, the nature of the 
linkages and interactions among the actors may affect the pattern of behaviour of any particular 
actor:‘the patterning of linkages can be used to account for some aspects of behaviour of those
24This definition tries to embody A. Windhoff-Heritier’s (1993), Ph. Cooke’s (1996) and P. Kenis and V. 
Schneider’s (1991) emphasis on joint involvement o f  public and private actors, Knoke and Kuklinski (1982) main 
focus on linkages, and Aldrich and Whetten (1981) approach to bounded and holistic character o f  networks.
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involved’ (Mitchell, 1969, cited in Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982:13)25. Hence, network analysis 
assumes the structure of the relations and interactions can either facilitate or constrain the actions 
of the involved organizations. Since structure is interpreted as the ‘regular and persistent pattern 
in the behaviour of the elementary parts of the system’ (Berkowitz, 1982:1), what distinguishes 
one network from another is the differentiation of its inter-organizational structure (Knoke, 
1990). Thus different networks demonstrate different structures, and hence network analysis 
focuses on the mapping of structures (Dowding, 1994b:73). The main structural features to 
categorize networks are: territorial scope, dominant actors, and density or thickness.
There have been identified three types of territorial networks (Leonardi, 1995a): 1) intra- 
regional, which are those within one region or locality; 2) interregional, which are networks 
between regional actors within a national territory; and 3) transregional, which are networks 
between actors in different countries. Intra-regional networks constitute the common type of 
networks within which the system of interactions among the actors is shaped at the regional or 
local levels. The presence of this type of networks constitutes a prerequisite, if the learning and 
institution-building processes are to be pursued, because they integrate all the area resources, and 
particularly information and knowledge with regard to the specificities of the region concerned. 
Regions, which possess this first level of institutional infrastructure, can develop linkages on the 
interregional or transregional level to achieve access to other sources (national, European), or to 
pursue joint lobbying strategies. The ideal qualitative features of this type of networks would 
involve the crossing of public/private divide, by the participation of both public and private actors 
in joint initiatives, and the formulation of a proactive development strategy. Interregional 
networks, on the other hand, are less spread, given that in most nation-states in Europe the
25Mitchell J. Clyde (1969) “The concept and use o f  social networks”, pp. 1-50, in J. C. Mitchell (ed.) Social 
Networks in Urban Situations. Manchester England: Manchester University Press.
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state/region relationships are traditionally more dominant than the region to region one. Finally, 
transregional networks constitute a relatively new phenomenon in Europe, since the main 
motivation for the creation of this type of networks derives from the emergence of regionalism 
(late 1970s).
With regard to the dominant actors, Garmise (1995a) distinguishes governmental, sectoral 
and functional networks. Governmental networks are characterized by the predominance of 
central government agencies and, therefore, these networks usually demonstrate a vertical 
structure, which has particular consequences for the network relations. Sectoral networks emerge 
around specific sectors of the local economy, such as an industry, a service or a sphere of 
voluntary activity. Finally, functional networks consist of both governmental and sectoral actors. 
The main feature of the sectoral and functional networks is that they tend to have a horizontal 
rather than vertical structure. Functional networks are considered as providing the nucleus 
support structure for the learning process, since they tend to shape the public/private relations at 
the local level, thus incorporating multiple types of resources required for the development 
process. Table 1.1 provides an illustration of these two categories of networks.
Table 1.1
Networks by Territorial Scope and Dominant Actor
TE R R IT O R IA L
SC O PE
Intraregional Interregional Transregional
D O M IN A N T  A C T O R
Governmental Intraregional Interregional Transregional
Governmental Governmental Governmental
Sectoral Intraregional Interregional Transregional
Sectoral Sectoral Sectoral
Functional Intraregional Interregional Transregional
Functional Functional Functional
Source: Garmise, 1995a:63.
Thus, the most effective institutional networks are those which are based on intra-regional
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functional networks. These networks, by enabling public and private actors to be actively 
involved in the provision of public goods, and by integrating most of the region’s resources, 
constitute the foundation of and the appropriate regulatory framework for development strategies 
that reflect the local identity and the local demands.
Institutional thickness is the last and most important structural feature of networks. It refers 
to the combination of structural and cultural qualitative elements that determine the level of the 
local institutional capacity. In other words, institutional thickness means: ‘the combination of 
factors including inter-institutional interaction and synergy, collective representation by many 
bodies,... and shared cultural norms and values’ (Amin and Thrift, 1994:15). In structural 
characteristics, thickness refers to the density of the inter-institutional interactions, which, 
however, are conditioned by the way in which the resources are distributed among the actors and 
the strength of the system of cultural norms in which are embedded, that is social capital. The 
distribution and integration of resources points to the fact that thickness cannot be sustained 
without intra-regional functional networks. The role of social capital, on the other hand, is to 
facilitate the communication among the actors and thus the diffusion of information and 
knowledge, which are the most important resources for learning.
Relevant but not synonymous to thickness is the debate on the strength or weakness of the 
linkages between institutions within networks. The strength of the linkages and the number of 
ties any institutions share is closely linked to crucial issues like the flow of information and the 
diffusion of knowledge among the actors, the prevention of opportunism, and the danger of 
institutional lock-in. Strong ties are viewed as encouraging malfeasance, preventing the flow and 
diffusion of information and knowledge, thus undermining the learning process and increasing 
the danger of institutional lock-in. G. Grabher’s work on the Ruhr region has shown how 
perfectly dense and adapted networks produced cognitive and institutional lock-in, when the
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strong ties among the core actors undermined the adaptability of the region to the necessity of 
structural adjustment and led it into the ‘trap of rigid specialization’ (1993:275). Conversely, 
weak ties facilitate the learning process, by functioning as bridges between strongly tied network 
subgroups, thus providing pathways for the diffusion of information: ‘weak ties are more likely 
to link members of different small groups than are strong ones, which tend to be concentrated 
within particular groups’ (Granovetter, 1973:1376).
Although Granovetter's analysis of the advantages of weak ties can perfectly account for 
a wide range of issues, such as the role of institutions like family in the semi-periphery, illustrated 
by Ed. Banfield's (1958) Amoral Familism, learning institutional networks should constitute a 
combination between strong and weak ties. This combination can counterbalance positive and 
negative characteristics of each type of tie, providing trust, and access to new knowledge and 
information, and preventing institutional lock-in. Hence, learning institutional networks should 
combine a core of actors (i.e an intra-regional functional network) linked with strong ties, and 
a range of other local actors connected through looser ties to the core network.
The role o f Power and Exchange in Networks
The concept of power is a crucial and extensively-debated issue in political science. Dowding 
distinguishes between ‘outcome power’ :“the ability of an actor to bring about or help to bring 
about outcomes”; and ‘social power’: “the ability of an actor deliberately to change the incentive 
structure of another actor or actors to bring about or help to bring about outcomes” (1996:5). 
However, this thesis has adopted Metcalfe's definition of power, that is “the ability to attain 
higher levels of collective performance" (1981:504), which seems to be more suitable, because 
it conceives of power as the outcome of collective action among the actors.
Within the inherent in networks bargaining and negotiation contexts there are four ways
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for actors to achieve collective performance by exercising power: persuasion, threats, reward, or 
a 'throffer', which is a combination of threats and offers26 (Dowding, 1991:68). To operationalize 
all these instruments of power within the bargaining process an actor needs to have a number of 
potential resources. Harsanyi has identified four categories of important resources in this respect: 
information or knowledge, legitimate authority, unconditional incentives (where an actor must 
pay the price or reap the benefit whether or not she does what the other wants, i.e. the law), 
conditional incentives (either reward or punishment conditioned on the behaviour the powerful 
wants to impose) (1969, discussed in Dowding, 1991:70-7227). Additionally, stubbornness and 
reputation have also been identified as important resources for bargaining and overcoming 
problems of collective action where a group cannot mobilize itself to act (ibid.,: 145-146).
Knowledge and information are considered as the most important resources of power for 
facilitating the learning process within networks and subsequently their capacity for adapting to 
changing conditions. On the one hand, since learning, adaptation, institutional and economic 
performance constitute public goods and of general interest to most participants, persuasion is 
the most effective political tool, because it implies the voluntary involvement of actors in 
achieving collective performance. On the other, because information and knowledge are 
perceived as crucial resources within an inter-organizational environment dominated by 
uncertainty and interdependence, they provide actors with the potential to influence the policy­
making process, by imposing their interpretation of common problems and solutions on others 
(P. Haas, 1992). Thus, actors have an incentive to increase their access to these resources, since
26According to Dowding, however, there are cases where collective performance is achieved without the 
exercise o f  power, but based on the similarity o f  actors’ preferences. The actors who are benefited by the thus 
achieved collective action are just lucky (1996:52-54).
27Harsanyi, J.C (1969) ‘Measurement o f  Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory o f  Two-person 
Bargaining Games’, in Bell, P et. al (eds) (1969) Political Power: A Reader. London: Macmillan, pp.226-238.
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this can lead to changes of attitudes and patterns of behaviour of the other actors. Hence, the role 
of knowledge and information as resources of power is crucial in two respects: first for the 
persuasion of actors to be involved in collective action, and second, for influencing the policy­
making through the processes of problem identification and solution provision.
Given that inter-organizational networks are characterized by a significant amount of 
expertize and specialization and hence resource interdependencies among the actors (Kenis and 
Schneider, 1991), power relations within networks are based mainly on the process of exchange 
(Marin, 1990). Exchange relations involve a variety of resources: money, information, authority. 
Exchange is seen as one way to achieve collective action among the actors. It refers to the 
process by which ‘possibilities for action, linked to the possession of mutually valued resources, 
are exchanged between complex organizations’ (Parri, 1989:200). Exchange, like power, 
presupposes a bargaining and negotiation framework within which actors are offering something 
of value to achieve their own objectives. Thus it can take place at a functional or territorial level 
and involves both public and private actors. For example, a state organization may allow the 
influence of a private organization on the policy process in exchange for that organization's 
resources. In that sense, bargaining and negotiation are considered as intrinsic elements of the 
cooperation and institution-building processes: ‘the process of negotiation is itself a vital part of 
the institution-building process’ (Amin and Thrift, 1994:15). Moreover, negotiation constitutes 
an integral part of the process of coalition- building, which plays an important role in the way in 
which both the institutional and policy learning are pursued (Sabatier, 1993). The crucial 
question, however, is how external shocks influence the coalition blocks and subsequently how 
these changes affect the relations among the actors.
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Stability and Change in Networks
What the discussion so far suggests is that the inherent resource interdependencies and the 
process of exchange determine, to a significant degree, the distribution of power within the 
network. Thus, the system of exchange constitutes a power dependence framework, within which 
corporate actors spend resources to achieve objectives (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). In this 
framework, however, it is implicitly acknowledged that no actor is completely autonomous but 
depends, to varying degrees, on the resources exchanged with other organizations. This restricted 
autonomy points to the fact that political exchange should be distinguished from the exchange 
within the free market model, because its fundamental bases are the notions of self-organization 
and antagonistic cooperation that help competitive, functionally interdependent actors manage 
the uncertainties of complex strategic interactions and to be collectively involved in the provision 
of public goods in multiple policy areas (Marin and Mayntz, 1991). Resource interdependency 
alone, however, does not determine the structure of the network. Since actors’ social positions, 
strategies and objectives vary, the exchange of resources and the subsequent formation of the 
system of interactions may lead to asymmetrical interdependencies amongst the involved 
organizations. Hence the differentiation of network structures across sectors and localities.
Furthermore, although within the power-dependence framework networks, especially in 
neo-corporatist systems of governance28, are considered as the appropriate institutional systems 
to accomplish the interest intermediation function (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992), in the context of 
the learning process a much broader interpretation of their role should be applied. Even though 
the interest intermediation function cannot be overlooked, the main role of the networks as actors 
in a learning environment is to shape the interactions among the public and private actors and to
Functioning within neo-corporatist systems local actors usually constitute the grass roots organizational 
members o f  a hierarchically-structured, vertical network dominated by an ‘umbrella-peak association’, which leaves 
little space for autonomous action -even in terms o f  interest intermediation- to local actors (Dunleavy, 1991).
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coordinate resources and initiatives for the general interest of the community. Under these 
considerations, the revolutionary contribution of the network paradigm is the redefinition of the 
notion of the public sphere, by combining governmental, private and voluntary actors.
The process of exchange, however, is crucially influenced by the local context. Although 
it is based on rational choices of the actors, the impact of the historical and cultural factors cannot 
be ignored. While history and geography determine to a significant degree the way resources have 
been distributed, actors’ choices with regard to the exchangeable resources are conditioned by 
norms, values, conventions and rules of behaviour. In fact, mutually reinforcing self-perceptions 
may distort actors' collective judgements concerning the value of certain resources. Thus, 
exchange relations do not depend on the availability of resources, but on actors' perceptions about 
their value and usefulness. In that sense, even in the process of exchange between actors within 
networks, collective action is facilitated or inhibited by the presence or the lack of social capital 
(Marin, 1990:14).
Under these considerations, the multiplicity and differentiation of network structures 
between policy areas within a region or between regions in the same policy area is explained by 
the differentiation in the distribution of resources and the variety of socially-constructed exchange 
choices. The distribution of resources among and within the public and private sectors and the 
way in which these resources are distributed territorially determine the territorial scope and the 
dominant actors within a network. Thus within centralized states, because central state actors 
hold most of the public sector resources, several local agents tend to exchange more with these 
central state organizations than with their local counterparts. On the other hand, network density 
is shaped by the degree of concentration or dispersion of resources among the actors and by the 
value attributed to these resources for the day-to-day function of the network. Hence network 
thickness depends, to a significant degree, on the multiplicity, the variety and the regularity of
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the exchanges. Thus, the process of exchange is considered the most important component for 
maintaining network continuity over a long period of time (Garmise, 1995a). Networks based 
on the process of exchange constitute long-term events and not opportunistic, short-term 
institutional actors focusing just on reaping quick gains by exploiting temporary chances.
However, three categories of factors have been identified, that can cause networks to 
change. The first source of change derives from the transformation of the external parameters, 
that can subsequently result in redistribution of resources and power within the network. These 
transformations may include shifts in the socioeconomic conditions, technological changes, shift 
in governing coalitions, initiation of new policy and funding decisions, and finally the influence 
by other subsystems. With regard to the last parameter, there are cases in which the success of 
specific networks encourage the creation of collective action subsystems or groups which in turn 
at a later stage cause network change from the outside (K. Dowding, 1994b:73). The second 
category of factors that cause networks to change are the deliberate or accidental restructuring 
of internal power relations. This can be the outcome of changes in the strategy of a group of 
actors within the network. Finally, the third important source of change derives from the learning 
process. Since new ideas and approaches may be adopted as a result of the learning process, there 
may be required changes in the use of resources and therefore new shift in the balance of power 
within the network. What needs to be stressed is that in all these cases change constitutes a shock 
for network structure, which is followed by a new balance among winners and losers. The latter 
is expected to resist change and fight to maintain their influence within the network.
To sum up, intra-regional functional networks, by integrating most of the region’s resources 
and overcoming the public/private divide, provide the appropriate organizational structure for an 
institutional environment favourable for learning. However, although the way resources, and 
particularly knowledge and information, are distributed plays an important role in shaping the
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intra-regional institutional interactions and achieving collective action through the process of 
exchange, the broad social context and the socialization function determine the value of the 
resources and hence the way in which the exchange process is shaped. Therefore, since learning 
is crucially influenced by the level of collective action among the actors, exchange and 
socialization constitute procedural components of the learning process. Hence social capital, as 
the conceptual tool of the socialization function, constitutes a prerequisite for the learning process 
within networks.
Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that the technological, economic and political changes that have 
underpinned the emergence of globalization emphasize the role of the endogenous political and 
socio-cultural resources in the development process. Thus, in the era of globalization the way in 
which the local is embedded into the global depends crucially on the presence of a learning 
institutional infrastructure at the local level rather than on the protective role of the state.
Learning is a function of past policy attempts, their interpretation and experience obtained 
by the local institutional infrastructure, which, in this way, becomes capable of adapting to 
changing conditions. Therefore, the presence of fora for dialogue and communication that 
facilitate the flow, diffusion and exchange of information and knowledge among the actors 
constitute preconditions for a policy environment favourable for learning. Thus, the process of 
exchange and hence the distribution of resources and power among the actors constitute an 
important component of the learning process. The process of exchange, however, is crucially 
influenced by the socio-cultural context, within which the valuation of the exchangeable 
resources takes place. Hence social norms and conventions constitute crucial parameters for the 
exchange process and subsequently for learning, which is viewed as a function, depending
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crucially on both the exchange and socialization processes.
Within this framework, institutions and institutional networks provide the appropriate 
organizational structure for collective action and learning, by shaping the intra-regional 
institutional interactions and overcoming the public/private divide. In that sense, social capital 
and institutional networks are considered the prerequisites for the learning process and 
subsequently for adaptable institutional infrastructure at the regional and local levels: by 
facilitating collective action among the actors the former and integration of resources through the 
process of exchange the latter.
Finally, the notion of learning in this thesis implies the process of both structural and policy 
adaptation, whereby institutional networks and policy choices change to adapt to changing 
conditions. What is considered its key contribution, however, is its attempt to capture the system 
of interactions between culture and structure, that is the causal nexus between cultural norms and 
attitudes and the institutional structure (institutional networks) that make up the civic community. 
In that sense, learning may be seen as a concept determined to bridge the gap between the rational 
and historical/sociological new institutionalist approaches in political science, on the one hand, 
by taking into account the role of the contextual factors (historical and cultural parameters of 
institutional evolution) and on the other, by refusing the pure path-dependence and teleological 
assumptions of historical new institutionalism.
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2. INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING AND ADAPTATION 
IN EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY: 
DESIGNING THE RESEARCH STRATEGY
Introduction
In chapter one of this thesis social capital and institutional networks were identified as key 
components of learning institutional infrastructure and hence of dynamic economic governance 
at the regional level, facilitating coordination of resources and collective action among the actors 
through the processes of exchange and socialization.
This chapter introduces the same concepts -social capital and institutional networks- in 
the field of European regional policy as prerequisites for learning, adaptation and 
Europeanization of the regional systems of governance. Section one explores the evolutionary 
process of building a European regional policy and identifies the impact of the Europeanization 
on local systems of governance, establishing specific criteria for measuring it. Sections two and 
three examine the theoretical justification of European regional policy within the framework of 
Integration theory and set out the main hypotheses of the thesis. Section four discusses the 
constraints on the local capacity for learning that emerge from the structure of the state and 
elaborates the secondary hypothesis. Finally, section five presents the methodological approach 
of this thesis, and designs a research strategy for investigating the relationship between local 
institutional capacity and European regional policy.
2.1 European Regional Policy and Europeanization of Local Systems of Governance
Structural policy is considered the most important redistributive instrument at the EU level. It 
represents approximately 35% of the budget and most of that money goes to the less developed 
countries and regions. Net annual transfers to Greece, Ireland and Portugal usually exceed 3 per
58
cent of their respective GDP (Tsoukalis, 1998). After the coming into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty in particular, the goal of economic and social cohesion is linked to the steps towards 
further economic integration, namely to the process for the creation of EMU.
The theoretical justification for fostering economic and social cohesion at the EU level 
has constituted a key element of both the academic debate and the every day policy-making at the 
European level, since the establishment of the EEC in 1957. Four main arguments have been 
developed for this justification (Armstrong, 1989). First, EU regional policy can improve the 
efficiency in the use of the funds, by targeting spending and by imposing discipline on the 
policies of member states. Second, the coordination of member states’ regional policies can 
reduce the scope for costly and inefficient competition for mobile investments between nations 
and regions. Third, the “vested interest” argument points to the unacceptability of major regional 
disparities on grounds of social equity. Finally, there is an argument that regional disparities may 
be a barrier to further integration.
The evolutionary process of building a coherent and effective European regional policy 
has more or less followed the gradual path of the integration process. In general, three main 
phases have been identified in the evolution of European regional policy since the establishment 
of the EEC in 1957 (Tsoukalis, 1993). The first phase, which lasted until 1975 was characterized 
by the lack of any well-structured and coherent regional policy and by the predominance of the 
sectoral, rather than the integrated approach to regional development. The second phase, which 
lasted until the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds, was marked by the strengthening of the 
regional policy dimension of the existing institutions, the creation of new instruments and the 
steady increase of the allocated funds. The third phase is closely linked to the 1988 reform of the 
Structural Funds, which has constituted a turning-point in the search for greater effectiveness and 
efficiency of the common instruments and the further increase in the funds for regional policy.
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This evolutionary process is seen as: ‘attempts to improve the adaptive capacity of regional 
economies adversely affected by processes of economic transformation or to increase the growth 
potential of backward economies’ (Chesire, et. al., 1991:169).
2.1.1 The Emergence o f  European Regional Policy on the EC Policy-Making Agenda: 
from  the Treaty o f  Rome to the 1988 Reform o f the Structural Funds
Although the original six members of the European Community, with the exception of Italy
which was the only country with serious regional problems, constituted a relatively homogeneous
economic group, the Treaty of Rome did indicate a general goal to reduce regional disparities1,
while the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Social Fund (ESF) -established in
1957- and, to a lesser extent, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)
-established in 1964- provided loans and development assistance to depressed regions. A major
report on regional problems, submitted by the European Commission to the Council in 1965
signalled the start up of the process for the creation of the Directorate General for Regional Policy
(DG XVI) by the 1967 Merger Treaty.
With the first enlargement of the EC in 1973 -to include Britain, Ireland and Denmark- 
and the subsequent change in the political balance within the EC, regional policy issues moved 
to the centre stage of the policy-making, since two of the new member-states (Ireland and Britain) 
had strong reasons for backing such a policy (Chesire, et. al, 1991). Ireland viewed regional 
policy as a way of overcoming its poor, peripheral position, while Britain, with a small highly 
efficient and modem agrarian sector but severely hit by problems of industrial decline, viewed
'The preamble o f  the Treaty o f  Rome (1957) contained a broad commitment to regional development by 
stressing the goal o f  “reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness o f  the 
less favoured regions”. The goal was restated in Article 2, through which the member states agreed to “promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development o f  economic activities, a continuous and balanced
expansion”.
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regional policy as: 1) a way to cope with de-industrialization, which had a strong spatial 
dimension; and 2) a way of counterbalancing the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
to which Britain would be a net contributor (Garmise, 1995a).
The creation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975, which gave 
the EU ‘a financial instrument for explicit regional intervention’ (Croxford, et., al, 1987:25), has 
been seen as the result of this new political balance. However, although the creation of this new 
institution was considered as the first step towards the establishment of European regional policy, 
the principles that governed its activity during its first years were based on the notion that 
regional development policy was predominantly a national rather than a Community concern, in 
the sense that both the decision making and the implementation processes of regional policy 
constituted exclusive competences of the national governments (Nanetti, 1990). Thus, the 
Community’s role was limited in providing financial resources, which, primarily, had the form 
of grants for infrastructure investments, in accordance with national quotas whereby each member 
state received a guaranteed level of support. Nonetheless, a major part of this financial assistance 
was directed to member states with GDP per capita below the Community average.
The increasing importance of regional policy issues at the European level was the driving 
force of a series of step-by-step reforms of the ERDF, which gradually transformed it towards a 
real planning instrument for development strategy (Nanetti, 1990). The first (1979) reform 
brought about the following important changes in the function of the Fund. First, a five per cent 
non-quota element was established, that could be used at the discretion of the Commission to 
finance development projects, focusing on regions with development problems emerged as a by­
product of the implementation of other Community policies2. Second, within this non-quota
2The non-quota section was focused primarily on regions affected by industrial decline, that is regions dependent 
on iron and steel, ship-building and textiles and clothing.
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section, financial assistance was provided to multi-annual, rather than to yearly programmes. 
Third, there had been a shift regarding the qualitative characteristics of the supported projects, 
in the sense that not only infrastructure-related, but a broader range of projects and initiatives, (i.e 
support to SMEs) could get financial assistance. Finally, the funds could be allocated to areas and 
regions, not necessarily designated by the national governments. In that sense, by enhancing the 
discretionary competences of the EC Commission, these changes have been interpreted as early 
steps towards the ‘Europeanization’ of European regional policy (Cheshire, et al, 1991).
After a 1981 proposal presented to the Council by the Commission, in 1984 the Council 
adopted a regulation3 which introduced the second major reform of the Fund. The 1984 reform 
of the ERDF replaced the system of fixed national quotas with a system of indicative ranges 
(minimum and maximum) for the allocation of the funds to each member state. Within the new 
system, the minimum limit was representing the guaranteed level of each country’s allocated 
funds. This part of national allocations amounted to 88.6% of the funds, while the remaining 
amount was left to be allocated at the Commission’s (ERDF) discretion. To receive funds above 
the minimum range of national allocations, member state governments had to submit proposals 
fulfilling the priority and eligibility criteria established by the Commission. Given that in the 
1787 Regulation there was a provision for replacement of the individual project approach by the 
‘integrated-programme approach’, this latest reform, by increasing the Commission’s room for 
manoeuver in the monitoring and managing the allocation of the funds, may be seen as another 
step towards the Europeanization of both the functional level and the scope of the Community’s 
regional policy. Moreover, the management of the ‘notorious’ additionality principle was 
gradually moved from the hands of member state governments towards the supranational level
J Regulation 1787 has constituted the codification o f  the modified initial Commission’s proposal, which was 
suggesting the adoption o f  the integrated programme approach and a system for almost complete regionalization 
o f quotas (Nanetti, 1990).
(EU Commission).
This gradual shift from the ‘individual project’ towards the ‘programming’ approach had 
been formulated within two types of programming: the National Programmes of Community 
Interest (NPCI) and the Community Interest Programmes (CIP) -which constitute the first version 
of what later has become known as Community Initiatives. Whereas the former were based on 
the national governments’ programming initiatives, the latter, which constituted the formulation 
of the non-quota section of ERDF, were originated in initiatives taken by the Commission, which 
usually referred to regions of more than one member state. The major innovation brought about 
by the programming approach is the initiation of the principle of the ‘contractual partnership’ 
within the framework of European regional policy. What this principle implies is the partnership 
between supranational (EU Commission), national (national governments) and subnational 
(regional or local) authorities on a contractual basis in the planning, implementation and 
monitoring processes of European regional policy (Nanetti, 1990). This innovation may be seen 
as the departure point for the Europeanization function of subnational elites on a bottom up basis.
The catalytic political and economic changes of the early 1980s in Europe and the 
subsequent enlargement of the EC with the accession of Greece (1981), and Spain and Portugal 
(1986), signalled a new shift of European regional policy towards the integrated approach to 
development. The integrated approach has been interpreted as the move from the independent and 
not coordinated actions of each particular Fund, to coordinated structural interventions. 
Therefore, it should involve: first a restructuring of the three Funds responsible for the 
development policy (ERDF, ESF and EAGGF-Guidance section); and second, coordinated 
structural interventions in the economic and social spheres of the areas with regional problem. 
Although the integrated approach had been adopted in two pilot projects in Naples (1979) and 
in Belfast (1981) with poor results, its first ambitious test was with the introduction of the
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Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) in 1985. They constituted the most numerous 
integrated actions undertaken by the Community (29) in three countries (France, Italy and 
Greece), accompanied by significant resources (6.6 billion ECUs) and their introduction was 
linked to the need of the most vulnerable economic sectors of the member states, and most 
notably agriculture, to be prepared for the increased competition from the imminent entry into 
the Community of Spain and Portugal.
The creation of the IMPs signalled a radical departure for European regional policy, by 
introducing the following major innovations in the planning, implementation and monitoring 
processes. First, they were the implementation instruments of strategic coordinated actions in 
almost every economic sector, involving infrastructure, industry, agriculture and vocational 
training. The main goal was the Community investment to provide additional resources, which 
could enhance the potential for endogenous local development in the areas concerned4. The 
second radical aspect of the IMPs was the central role attributed to the subnational level of 
government through the partnership institutional arrangements at all stages of policy-making: 
planning the specific programmes, implementing the individual ‘measures’ or actions, monitoring 
their progress, and evaluating the overall impact. Thus, the committees responsible for the overall 
implementation of the programmes were made up of regional governments, national and 
Commission representatives. A third major change introduced by the IMPs was the requirement 
for both ex ante and ex post evaluation of the programmes. The former involved the projected 
impact of the investment on crucial regional indicators, such as the level of employment and 
regional GDP, while the latter referred to the qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the results 
achieved after the implementation of the programmes. The codification of the contractual
4The shift towards the endogenous model o f  development corresponds to similar trends in the theory o f  regional 
development (chapter 1).
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approach, by the requirement for a legally binding contract signed by the Commission, regional 
and member state authorities, constituted the final and most important innovation introduced by 
the IMPs, since the principle of partnership, reinforced further during the 1988 reforms of the 
Structural Funds, was to become the revolutionary feature of European regional policy (Nanetti, 
1996).
The financial outcome of all these changes was that the funds available through the ERDF 
grew steadily over the years. Thus, the initial allocation of 257.6 million ECU increased ten-fold 
in the period 1975-1987 and before the scheduled doubling of the Fund for the period 1989-1993 
its allocation reached the amount of 3.3 billion ECUs in 1987, which accounted for almost 10% 
of the EC annual budget, while the total of structural actions in the same year accounted for 19% 
of the budget, or 7 billion ECU. However, the total amount of money remained small, when 
compared with the expenditures for regional policy at the national level (Tsoukalis, 1993). In 
1988, before the implementation of the reform, the ERDF assistance amounted to only 0.09 per 
cent of EC GDP and 0.46 per cent of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) (CEC, 1990b).
2.1.2 From the Single European Act (SEA) to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and
beyond
The programme for the completion of the Single Market, initiated by the 1985 White Paper, and 
its liberalization effect on the function of European markets has coincided, as it should be 
expected, with an increased concern with the tackling of the problems of social and economic 
cohesion to enable all regions to exploit the opportunities presented by the single market (Nanetti, 
1996). Thus the goal of economic and social cohesion was eminent in the Single Act Treaty5
5ln article 130c, in particular, by identifying the ERDF as the principal instrument for regional policy, cohesion 
is defined as the task to “redress the principal regional imbalances in the Community through participating in the 
development and structural adjustment o f  regions whose development is lagging behind and in the conversion o f  
declining industrial regions".
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(Articles 130 a to e). The doubling in real terms of the resources available to the Funds 
responsible for the regional policy -the ERDF, the ESF and the EAGGF (Guidance section), all 
three referred to as Structural Funds- agreed by the Brussels European Council in February 1988, 
accompanied by a major qualitative change in the principles of the structural policy.
Two major qualitative features have been identified in the reform of the Structural Funds6: 
first, the generalized adoption of the integrated approach and, second, the further enforcement 
of the Commission’s discretionary power to prioritize the regions-objectives and to concentrate 
the structural interventions on a limited number of clearly-defined goals, thus signalling the move 
towards further Europeanization of regional policy.
In particular, the first policy principle, which characterises the reform of the Funds, is the 
geographical targeting of their resources, transforming regional policy into an instrument with 
real economic impact, by focusing on the greatest concentration of the structural interventions. 
Five priority objectives7 were assigned to the Funds upon which, the EIB was also expected to 
redefine its contributions8. It is worth noting that the major concentration of resources (80% of 
the three Funds between 1989 and 1993) was focused on the objectives with real ‘regional’ 
dimension (1,2 and 5b)9. The second major innovation brought about by the reform was the 
institutionalization of the integrated approach, by combining the interventions in financial
6The reform was carried out through five Council Regulations, which became effective on January 1, 1989. 
These are: the Framework Regulation (2052/88) and four implementation Regulations (4253/88 ,4254/88 ,4255/88 , 
4256/88) (Nanetti, 1990).
•j
These are related to: Objective 1, the less developed regions whose GDP is below 75% o f  the Community 
average; Objective 2, regions o f  industrial decline; Objective 3, regions with severe long-term unemployment; 
Objective 4, the employment o f  young people; Objective 5a, adjustment o f  agricultural structures; and Objective 
5b, development o f  rural areas.
o
Later, in the light o f  the next enlargement towards the European Economic Area (EEA) countries, a new  
objective (6) was created to cover the ultra-peripheral regions o f  the Nordic countries.
9Objective 1 regions constituted the main beneficiaries within the three regional objectives, given that 65% o f  
the total o f  resources o f  the three Funds has targeted to these regions.
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commitments running over larger periods of time (multi-year, multi-faceted programmes, the so 
called Community Support Frameworks -CSFs), instead of financing individual projects proposed 
by the member states. This development reflects the lessons learned from the implementation of 
the IMPs. The third and arguably most important innovation is the institutionalization of the 
principle of partnership. At all stages (planning, implementing and monitoring) of the CSFs, EU 
Commission, national and regional authorities are engaged in formal negotiations, which lead to 
close co-operation and co-ordination. Whereas the Commission used to deal exclusively with 
national governments, which articulated their own regional plans, since 1988 the process has been 
opened to subnational governments to be involved in the planning and implementation of the 
Operational Programmes (OPs). The reinforcement of the principle of additionality, which 
requires that the financial contribution by the Structural Funds should be in addition to the funds 
that would have been given by national governments in its absence, was the fourth important 
characteristic of the reform. Finally, the reformulation and expansion of the formerly (under the 
1984 Regulation of the Funds) Community Interest Programmes (CIPs) into what has become 
known as Community Initiatives10 (CIs) has constituted a major motivation for the regional 
mobilization at the European level. The Community Initiatives are subject-oriented Community- 
wide projects focusing on a particular problem or type of region designed by the Commission and 
involving, usually, the transregional cooperation of regions in more than one member states. In 
that sense, because of the upgraded role attributed to the Commission and the subnational 
authorities vis-a-vis the national governments, they are seen as reliable instruments for enhancing 
the adaptation and Europeanization processes at the regional level. For the period of the first
10Under the 1988 reforms, 10 per cent o f  the funds was allocated to Community Initiatives, while the remaining 
90 per cent was focused on financing measures o f  the CSFs (CEC, 1991).
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CSFs (1989-93) there were twelve Community Initiatives11, representing a financial commitment 
of 3800 million ECUs from which 2100 million were focused on objective 1 regions.
Although this study is confined within the period of the first CSFs and therefore stops at 
1993-94, it is worth a brief discussion of the changes brought about by the last (1993) reform of 
European structural policy, which occurred after the coming into force of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) and paved the way for the 1994-99 second phase of the CSFs. In the Maastricht 
Treaty cohesion is mentioned as a central concern linked to the goal of achieving economic and 
monetary union (EMU). To meet the convergence criteria laid down by the Treaty the weaker 
national economies have focused on the adjustment of their macro-economic policies (reduction 
of budgetary deficits) by reducing the funding of extensive development projects at the national, 
regional or local levels. Under these considerations, the pursuit of the goal of cohesion at the EU 
level is viewed as a function facilitating the process of structural adjustment of the member states.
Thus, the doubling, once again, of the resources available to the Structural Funds for the 
period 1994-99 (27.4 billion ECU by 1999), agreed at the Edinburgh Summit of December 1992, 
and the two new additions to the institutional set-up of the EU, namely the Cohesion Fund and 
the Committee of Regions (CoR), brought about by the TEU, have extended the scope and 
contributed to the further institutionalization of EU regional policy. The Cohesion Fund makes 
financial contributions to projects in the fields of transport infrastructure and environment and 
is targeted at those member states with a per capita Gross National Product (GNP) below 90 per 
cent of the EU average, that is Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. However, the creation of the
11 The Initiatives accompanied the first CSF concerned coal areas (RECHAR), environmental protection 
(ENVIREG), improvement o f  research and development capacity (STRIDE), transborder cooperation 
(INTERREG), ultra-peripheral zones (REGIS), natural gas (REGEN), small and medium-sized enterprises 
(PRISMA), telecommunications (TELEMATIQUE), rural development (LEADER), new transnational employment 
opportunities (EUROFORM), equal opportunities between men and women (NOW) and, integration o f  handicapped 
people (HORIZON) (CEC, 1991).
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Cohesion Fund has coincided with the establishment of a direct link between the structural and 
macro-economic policies at the national level. According to the new, and much criticized, 
“conditionality” principle introduced with respect to the Cohesion Fund, the financial assistance 
provided by the Fund is conditioned by the existence of a programme of economic convergence 
approved by the Council (ECOFIN).
The creation of the CoR, even though it has not been given decision-making powers by 
both the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, is considered an important institutional innovation, 
contributing to the recognition of the role of the subnational (regional, local) levels of 
government in the EU policy-making process, along with other interest groups (Economic and 
Social Committee). However, the limited role of the Committee within the EU system of 
governance is partly attributed to the multiplicity and differentiation of regional interests at the 
European level, such as the existing within the Committee antithesis between regional and local 
level representatives (Jeffery, 1995:256; Hooghe, 1995:181).
With regard to the content of the 1993 reforms, although it has been argued their main 
feature was the orientation towards the reinforcing of the role of the member states vis-a-vis the 
Commission and the subnational governments (Mitsos, 1995; Hooghe, 1996), they have largely 
continued the thrust of the 1988 reforms by improving the efficiency of the management and 
monitoring procedures. The first important change refers to the strengthening of the monitoring 
and assessment provisions, by laying down explicit requirements for ex ante and ex post 
evaluation of the programmes. These procedures will be under the supervision of the 
Commission. The second change is related to the wording of the provisions on the additionality 
principle. The change involves the widening of the parameters that should be taken into account 
to evaluate the member states’ consistency in coping with the principle. Thus, while the main 
criterion for this evaluation was the level of expenditure during the previous programming period,
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the new wording suggests other factors like the privatization programmes and the business cycles 
in the national economy to count as well. The third and most important change refers to the 
financing and managing the Community Initiatives for the period 1994-99’2. The amount to be 
devoted to the CIs was reduced from 10 per cent to 9 per cent of the total of the Structural Funds 
budget, leaving the remaining 1 per cent to be spent in the so called Pilot projects (Art. 10). More 
importantly, to improve the coordination function of the CIs a management committee’3 has been 
created to approve or reject by qualified majority the submitted by the Commission proposals for 
CIs. Finally, the list of the regions eligible under Objective 1 was substantially amended, by the 
inclusion of the new German Laender and the reclassification of other regions (Hainaut in 
Belgium, Flevoland in the Netherlands, certain districts in northern France, Merseyside and the 
Highlands and Islands in the UK and Cantabria in Spain), while a new instrument -the Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG)- to provide support for the fisheries sector was created.
Facing the challenge of enlargement in the dawn of the twenty first century, the 
Commission’s proposals on structural policy included in the Agenda 2000 are aimed at 
reconciling the interests of the major net contributors to the EU budget, namely the Northern 
European countries and most notably Germany, of the present beneficiaries (countries of the 
Southern Europe and Ireland), and of the prospective members, that is the countries of Eastern
I ')
"The Initiatives o f  the second CSFs (1994-99) are focused on: cross-border cooperation and energy networks 
INTERREG II (incorporating REGEN), rural development LEADER II, remote regions REGIS II, human resources 
EMPLOI (incorporating NOW , HORIZON and YOUTHSTART), training ADAPT, restructuring o f  coal areas 
RECHAR, steel areas RESIDER, textiles and clothing areas RETEX, defence dependent areas KONVER, 
Portuguese textile industry TEXTILE, small and medium-sized enterprises SMEs, depressed urban areas URBAN  
and fishing industry PESCA (CEC, 1994b)
,3This refers to the famous within the European policy-making jargon “com itology” procedure. It implies the 
involvement o f  numerous and multi-targeted (advisory, management, regulatory) Committees in the process o f  
decision making in the EU and, in particular, during the so called ‘communication between Council and 
Commission’ procedures. Those committees are considered purely intergovernmental instruments focusing on 
checking the Commission’s room for manoeuvre and thus falsifying the supranational character o f  decision-making 
(Pollack, 1996:445).
70
Europe (Tsoukalis, 1998). Thus, keeping unchanged the upper ceilings of own resources and 
structural interventions at 1.27 per cent and 0.47 per cent of the EU GNP respectively, the 
Commission has estimated that a total amount of ECU 275 billion (at 1997 prices) will be 
allocated to structural policies for the period 2000-2006, as compared with ECU 200 billion for 
the period 1994-99. Within this budget framework, 210 billion are to be spent for the existing 
members through the Structural Funds, while 45 billion are to be earmarked for the new 
members, including 7 billion in the form of pre-accession aid for all the candidates, and the 
remaining amount to be spent through the Cohesion Fund (CEC, 1997).
The financial framework, involving the level of both the revenue and the expenditure 
within which the structural policy is the second biggest expenditure after the CAP, will be the 
subject of long and difficult negotiations. However, the whole process will be crucially affected 
by the viability of the EMU and the single currency projects, which during the same period are 
expected to be facing the repercussions of the inherent in the experiment deficiencies, such as the 
asymmetry between a centralized monetary and decentralized fiscal policies, the rigidities of the 
labour markets and the mosaic of diversified structures of the welfare and social security 
provisions among member states across Europe.
Nonetheless, the evolutionary process of building a European regional policy has 
constituted a challenge for well-established structures within the systems of governance at both 
the national and subnational levels and played the decisive role in the administrative restructuring 
process within the member states and in enhancing the institutional capacity of the subnational 
systems of governance. Let us examine the changes in the system parameters that the 
Europeanization process has engendered for the local systems of governance across Europe.
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2.1.3 Europeanization of Subnational Governments: definition and identification
The Europeanization function refers to the process by which subnational authorities become 
involved in actions and programmes related to the EU policy-making process. In that sense, it is 
almost synonymous to the ‘subnational mobilization’ (Hooghe, 1995) at the European level. 
Given the Europeanization of the structures, cultures and processes of public policy-making 
accompanied by the emergence of a more pluralistic policy environment at the European level, 
it is difficult to identify any field of public policy, which is not subject to some degree of EU 
influence (Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Scharpf, 1994; Goldsmith, 1993). On the other hand, 
the size of the Commission’s ‘adolescent bureaucracy’ (Mazey and Richardson, 1993:10) is 
considered to be relatively small, with regard to the EU policy objectives (Goldsmith, 1993). 
Within this policy-making environment, the increased involvement of subnational authorities in 
EU-oriented activities should be interpreted as a function of two parallel and mutually reinforcing 
trends: the desire on the part of the EU Commission to deal with subnational governments and 
the desire on the part of the subnational governments to deal with the EU.
The objectives of subnational authorities for developing linkages with the Commission 
are to enhance their resource base in information, finance and knowledge, and to influence the 
EU policy process in order to circumvent or roll back central government or European policies 
that undermine or constrain local government activities. On the other hand, the EU Commission 
has two reasons for deepening its relationship with subnational governments: first, subnational 
authorities can provide the Commission with first-hand information with regard to both the policy 
objectives and the success (or lack of success) of policies which are already implemented, thus 
counterbalancing the inherent in the information provided by the national governments 
expediencies; second, subnational authorities can provide the Commission with the institutional 
capacity it lacks to implement and monitor the EU policies, especially in federal or regionalized
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countries, where the policies and regulations have a direct impact on both the federal/national and 
the regional institutional structures (Marks, 1996; Goldsmith, 1993). Moreover, by participating 
in transregional networks, subnational governments may derive from the lack of congruence 
between the definition of the eligible for funding territorial units used by the Commission, the 
well known NUTS (Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units), and the designations within 
each member state (Goldsmith, 1993). This differentiation has been seen as a factor encouraging 
the cooperation of regional authorities on a transnational basis to exploit the EU funding 
opportunities.
Four stages have been identified in the Europeanization process of subnational 
governments (John, 1994). The first stage, which could be characterized as minimal 
Europeanization, refers to information-related activities of subnational authorities, involving the 
implementation of EU directives and regulations, managing European information and 
communicating this information to the whole range (public and private) of local actors. This 
activity depends crucially on the state structure, on the local institutional capacity and on the 
intensity of the identity or interest-related national/regional conflicts (Marks, 1996; Marks,et.al., 
1996). As a 1992 survey conducted in Britain reveals, almost 60 per cent of English and Welsh 
local authorities had specialized staff working on EU matters, whereas the equivalent proportion 
in Denmark does not exceed 8 per cent (Goldsmith, 1993).
The second stage, financial Europeanization, refers to the subnational governments’ 
ability to gain access to more EU funding and use these resources to promote local economic 
development. Subnational governments in Objective 1, 2 and 5b regions are considered as most 
mobilized in this area. The development of network linkages with other local organizations 
through their joint involvement in EU programmes or initiatives -local networking- is seen as the 
third stage of the Europeanization process. The Structural Funds programmes constitute a strong
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incentive for private sector’s involvement in development projects jointly with public agencies 
and institutions, thus overcoming the public/private divide (Benington and Harvey, 1994).
Finally, the last stage, full Europeanization, involves the shift from the reactive to 
proactive policy approach towards the EU, which is substantiated by the participation of 
subnational institutions in transeuropean collaborative networks, the creation, through these 
networks, of advisory channels towards the Commission to influence the policy-making process, 
and the launching of European-style policy initiatives at the local level.
What is required to identify the degree of Europeanization is in depth case study analysis. 
However, the degree of private sector financial contribution to the CSFs has been used as an 
indicator of local actors’ participation in the European development process on a transnational 
basis (Garmise, 1995). Table 2.1 below presents data on the average contribution of the private 
sector to the CSFs for the period 1989-93, based on the statistical bulletins “The Community’s 
Structural Interventions” (CEC, 1992a,b).
In general, the private sector was found to participate financially to some extent in most 
(91.3%) of all CSFs. Comparing this result with the data available on the IMPs -the first major 
implementation of the integrated approach- an important finding emerges: that private sector 
participation in EU projects has substantially increased in terms of both the number of projects 
and initiatives and the percentage of overall funding. In particular, the private sector was involved 
in 28% (around 46% in France, 28% in Italy and 10% in Greece) of the individual interventions 
of the IMPs (Bianchi, 1993:61), while the overall financial participation of the private sector in 
the IMPs was 11.7%14, compared to 17.48% in the Structural Funds. What these data suggest is
l4The overall evaluation o f  the IMPs has been conducted in a project (1990) directed by Dr. Robert Leonardi 
at the European University Institute and financed by the Commission o f  the European Communities (grant no 88- 
88001).
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the longer a country is involved in EU Structural Funds programmes, the greater its ability to 
mobilize private funds in development-related objectives.
Table 2.1
Average, per cent, Contribution of the Private Sector to the CSFs by Country and by
Ob ective (1989-1993)
Private Sector Contrib.(%) 
Country
Total Object.
1
Objec.
2
Ob/s
3/4
Objec.
5b
Germany 39.51 47.4815 5.3 0.47 47.9
France 19.14 9.17 26.06 0 29.3
Italy 12.6 7.05 49.8 0 49.62
Netherlands 12.5 — 22.13 2.7 17.6
Belgium 17.06 — 25.44 0.13 24.85
Luxembourg 35.32 — 43.84 0 21.5
UK 12.27 24.47 14.77 0 6.8
Ireland 25.22 25.22 -- — —
Denmark 20.89 — 45.84 0 30.2
Greece 7.5 7.5 — — —
Spain 15.01 16.30 13.78 0 14.13
Portugal 7.8 7.8 — — —
EU 12 17.48 18.52 19.68 0.24 33.29
Source: CEC, (1992a,b), author’s elaboration
To sum up, the process of Europeanization of the regional and local systems of
governance plays a crucial role in shaping the public/private relations and promoting networking
at the regional and local levels. Hence, its impact on the endogenous local development capacity
is twofold: a direct one, by providing increased resources, and an indirect one, by shaping the
15This refers to the CSF for the N ew  German Laender (Council Regulation EEC 3575/1990), which was 
approved in March 1991 (CEC, 1992a).
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intraregional interactions and thus promoting the creation of intra, inter and transregional 
networks that support the local development initiatives. Since, however, the degree of 
Europeanization of local systems of governance vary significantly across Europe, what is required 
is to identify the prerequisites for successful adaptation and Europeanization of the local 
institutional infrastructure. This is the task of the next two sections, which deal with the 
establishment of the linkages between European regional policy, integration theory, and the main 
theoretical concepts of this thesis, that is social capital, institutional networks and learning.
2.2 European Regional Policy and ‘traditional' Integration Theory
The gradual Europeanization of regional policy since the introduction of the IMPs in 1985 and 
in particular the operationalization of the principles of partnership and subsidiarity, being 
considered as the main components of European structural policy after the 1988 reform of the 
Structural Funds the former, and of the emerging, after the coming into force of the TEU, Euro- 
polity the latter, are seen as having far reaching repercussions for the EU system of governance. 
First, although the formal incorporation of subsidiarity in the TEU (art.3B) poses it as a mainly 
procedural criterion for delineating competences between EU Commission and member state 
governments, its substantive meaning -the need for policy to be made at the closest possible level 
to the citizen (art. A)- plays a key role in promoting accountability and transparency in the policy­
making process and hence it is seen as a recognition of the necessity for flexibility in the EU 
decision-taking processes. Second, this flexibility implies the need for flexibility within the 
member states, that is the need for devolution and de-concentration of their administrative and 
economic structures. Third, the operationalization of partnership focuses on promoting 
cooperation between supranational, national and regional elites and, at a second stage, on 
encouraging the creation of synergistic networks between public, private and voluntary-
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community actors at the local level. Finally, the encouragement of synergies among the actors and 
the formation of the system of intra-regional interactions is closely linked to the outward-looking 
orientation of local governments, namely to their capacity for developing linkages and 
participating in transnational networks (Paraskevopoulos, 1997,1998). It is in that sense that the 
degree of partnerships and synergies creation at the regional and local levels has been adopted 
as a criterion for the degree of Europeanization of local governments (P. John, 1994; Benington 
and Harvey 1994; Goldsmith, 1993).
Thus the institutionalization of subnational governments has substantiated their chance 
to bypass the central governments in the policy-making process, challenging their traditional role 
as 'gatekeepers', in S. Hoffmann's (1966:862-915) terms, between subnational and supranational 
levels of government, which subsequently opens up possibilities for coalitions between both ends 
against the middle (member states). The emergence of regionalism and the concept of 'Europe 
of Regions', however, should be linked to the increasing intensity of the changing, globalizing 
political economy (discussed in chapter 1) and, therefore, the response of most of the traditional 
European states, which have adopted strategies of devolution and decentralization, should be 
attributed to this trend16 (Leonardi and Garmise, 1993). Hence, the academic debate on the impact 
of the Single European Market (SEM) on the regional disparities and the role of the state and 
regional institutions in the integration process has influenced the integration theory.
In particular, the ‘side payment’ argument (Marks, 1992:194-206) is linked, on the one 
hand, to the impact of the SEM on regional disparities and, on the other, to the 
intergovemmentalist approach to regional integration in Europe. Thus, in terms of the formal
16Although decentralization policies have been pursued in almost all EU countries, the intensity o f  the 
devolution process varies. Thus, with regard to the constitutional structure, Loughlin (1996) distinguishes among 
federal states (Germany, Austria, Belgium), unitary regionalized states (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal), unitary 
decentralized states (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Netherlands) and unitary centralized states (UK, Greece, Ireland).
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policy-making process at the EU level, it has been, almost generally, accepted as providing a 
powerful explanation for the growth of the Structural Funds’ budget over a long period of time.
The predominance of the supply-side/neo-liberal orientation in the programme for the 
completion of the SEM is viewed as leading to an inevitable process of Myrdalian 'circular and 
cumulative causation' and 'backwash effects' (discussed in chapter 1). In a similar vein, the new 
theories of international trade place emphasis on the role of economies of scale, imperfect 
competition, differentiated products and innovation (Krugman and Venables, 1990; Tsoukalis, 
1993, 1998). According to this core-dominance hypothesis, the core of the EU is viewed as 
centred on the famous 'golden banana', which runs from the south-east England to the northern 
Italy, while the periphery is represented by the whole or some parts of the southern and western 
Europe (Amin and Tomaney, 1995a; Hadjimichalis, 1994). Subsequently, the SEM and the 
programme for EMU provide benefits to the rich regions, who are the only real enthusiasts of 
regionalism. The most relevant case, used to underline the argument, is the 'Four Motors of 
Europe' project, which refers to a co-operative network between four of Europe's economically 
strongest regions: Baden Wuerttemberg, Rhone Alpes, Lombardia and Catalunya (Amin and 
Tomaney, 1995a; Hadjimichalis, 1994). By contrast, Europe's Less Favoured Regions are viewed 
as trying to survive within a global environment dominated by multinational corporations and 
transnational banks without having any chance for sustainable development (Amin/Tomaney, 
1995a,b; Hadjimichalis, 1994; Amin/Malmberg, 1994).
Based on this analysis the intergovemmentalist and ‘side payment’ approaches view the 
development of European stmctural policy as a process of successive side-payment rounds in 
large intergovernmental bargains aimed at buying off the agreement of the weaker member states 
in other policy areas, such as market integration or enlargement. Thus, the creation of the ERDF 
in 1975 is seen as the outcome of the pressures imposed by the 1973 enlargement involving the
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entry of the UK, Denmark and Ireland, the introduction of the IMPs as the result of the threat of 
Greece, Italy and France to veto the 1986 enlargement towards the Iberian peninsula, and the 
1988 and 1992 decisions for the doubling of the Funds’ budget as buying off the agreement of 
the weaker European economies for the programme of market liberalization and the creation of 
the SEM (Taylor, 1991; Pollack, 1995). Additionally, the orientation of the Cohesion Fund in 
providing support for the poorest member states, rather than the poorest regions, is viewed as a 
clear reaffirmation of the intergovernmental nature of the EU policy-making structure and of the 
dominant role of national sovereignty in economic policy. Hence, the nation state is viewed, on 
the one hand, as a gatekeeper balancing domestic demands and international pressures 
(Moravcsik, 1991,1993; P. Taylor, 1991,1993; Anderson, 1990) and on the other as a key-actor 
in formulating regional development strategies (Amin and Tomaney, 1995a,b; Teague, 1995; 
Pollack, 1995).The involvement of the German federal government in the structural policy 
through the joint task mechanism (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe) and in supporting national cohesion 
through the operation of the Laenderfinanzausgleich mechanism has been usually used as the 
most relevant example.
Nevertheless, there is little evidence on the contribution of economic integration to the 
widening of regional disparities (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991). Conversely, theoretical 
approaches to and empirical evidence on the effects of integration have created an unclear 
landscape (Keating and Hooghe, 1994). What the evidence from the interregional rankings clearly 
indicates is that some regions are more capable than others of adjusting to the rapidly changing 
economic and social environment. Successful regional development strategies in regions across 
Europe, such as the regions of 'third' Italy, southern Germany (Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg) 
and Spain (Catalunia, Madrid, Murcia) can be used as the most prominent examples. Moreover, 
it is doubtful whether successful regional development strategies in southern Germany should be
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attributed to the support provided by a powerful nation-state, given that, despite the interlocking 
character of the federal system, development strategies are usually the outcome of bottom-up 
initiatives (Morgan, 1992). Thus, as Marks has argued, the uncertain effect of market and 
monetary integration on the less favoured regions weakens the side payments hypothesis, because 
would be recipients cannot demonstrate the certainty of losses as a result of these processes. 
Therefore, the increase in Structural Funds spending may be driven by new conceptions of 
equality and fairness within the EU (Marks, 1992:202-204).
On the other hand, the ‘unintended consequences’17 of the intergovernmental 
redistributive decisions in the EU policy making process should not be overlooked. Even though 
most of these decisions may be formally attributed to the classical intergovernmental bargains, 
the dynamics of the system cannot be confined within the limits of the intergovemmentalists’ 
reductionism. Hence, although intergovemmentalism describes adequately the formalities of the 
decision-making process in the EU, it is incapable of capturing the dynamics of the system18, 
within which, at least after the completion of the internal market (SEA) the role of nation-state 
has, to a significant degree, been replaced by the 'voluntarism of the market and civil society' 
(Streeck and Schmitter, 1991:157). Moreover, although neofunctionalism’s emphasis on the role 
of supranational institutions and on the “top-down” process of transformation of loyalties and 
identities implicitly acknowledges the role of the process of learning to cooperate on a top-down 
basis, it seems to be incapable of capturing the bottom-up dynamics of the system, within which
17The term (Marks, et. al., 1996b:355; Pollack, 1995:362) refers to the way in which the outcomes o f  the 
intergovernmental bargains, in particular the 1988 reforms o f  the Structural Funds, can, as perfectly as 
neofunctionalist theory would have predicted, lead to the mobilization o f  the dynamics o f  the system, which in this 
case seems to have led to “multilevel governance".
1 X
Or as P. Taylor puts it: “in terms o f  the current range o f  integration theories the dynamics which strengthen 
the community level are identified most clearly within neofunctionalism, whereas the pressures which tend to 
encapsulate the segments, in the form o f  the states, are identified best within consociationalism” (1991:125).
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the multiplicity of interests has been raised as its main feature (Marks et.al, 1996b; Schmidt, 
1996).
All these considerations have constituted the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of 
the system of ‘multilevel governance’ (Marks, 1993:392; Scharpf, 1994) or ‘co-operative 
regionalism’ (Scott, et. al, 1994:47-67) in the EU, involving the 'outflanking' (Marks, 1992:212) 
of the states, on the one side by the transfer of authority to the EU supranational institutions and 
on the other by the emergence of powerful regional bodies. Additionally, there is evidence of a 
shift in the pattern of regional interests representation at the European level (i.e the limited role 
of the Committee of Regions within the EU system of governance) from the well-known from 
specific nation-states neo-corporatist system, to a rather pluralistic and more competitive 
paradigm, which is conceptualized as a system of “competitive federalism” or “disjointed 
pluralism” (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991:159). Within this multi-layered policy-making 
environment, characterized by a great degree of interactions between actors, regional and local 
systems of governance are increasingly affected by the linkages with the supranational level and 
by their capacity to exploit the challenges those linkages present. Subsequently, the learning 
capacity of the institutional infrastructure at every level of governance is raised as the crucial 
parameter that, by facilitating the adaptation, can improve the levels of effectiveness and 
efficiency of the policy-making process.
2.3 Learning and Adaptation in European Regional Policy
The notion of “learning” has emerged recently as a crucial concept within the theoretical 
framework of integration in Europe (J.Richardson, 1996:17-34; B.Kohler-Koch, 1996:370-71; 
Checkel, 1998; Paraskevopoulos, 1998c). It is considered as linked to the inherent among 
international actors uncertainty and thus points to the role of knowledge and information flows
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in facilitating cooperative relations among the actors. Indeed, institutional learning is interpreted 
as a function of adaptable systems of ‘governance under uncertainty’ (Richardson, 1996:20)19. 
As defined in chapter 1, it involves the process whereby actors through interaction with broader 
institutional contexts (norms) acquire new interests and preferences (Checkel, 1998). Therefore, 
actors’ interests and identities are shaped through interaction. In that sense, learning is seen as 
the conceptual tool for reconciling rational choice and historical/sociological neo-institutionalist 
approaches to the integration process.
Within the EU policy-making process, rational choice new institutionalists emphasize 
actors’ (member states’) preferences as the explanatory variable for both institutional creation and 
change (Bulmer, 1994; Pollack, 1996, 1997). Thus, they are mainly focused either on two-level 
game modelling, that is the way in which domestic institutions are used for strengthening the 
member state governments’ position in the bargaining within the European Council (Schneider 
and Cederman, 1994) or, on the extent to which the decision-making procedures (cooperation, 
co-decision) have an impact on the redistribution of power among key EU institutional actors 
(EP, ECJ) (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996). Additionally, in the field of the EU structural policy, 
rational choice institutionalism has focused on the impact of particular institutional choices on 
the distribution of power among supranational, national and subnational levels of governance 
(Pollack, 1995).
However, existing evidence from the European structural policy points to the role of the 
learning institutional infrastructure at the local level in facilitating the adaptation process , which
I9In particular, Richardson (1996:17-34) attempts to use the notion o f ‘epistemic communities’, originally 
conceptualized in the field o f  international relations (P. Haas, 1992), within the EU policy-making. Given that the 
concept o f  ‘epistemic communities’ refers to the uncertainty o f  international actors and thus points to the role o f  
knowledge and information flows in facilitating cooperative relations, Richardson’s attempt can be seen as a step 
o f  introducing the notion o f  learning in the theoretical approaches to regional integration in Europe. See also, B. 
Kohler-Koch, (1996:370-371).
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is not necessarily associated with the role of national or international actors (see previous 
section). In particular, although the degree of decentralization of the administrative structure of 
the state plays a key role in determining the learning capacity of the regional institutional 
infrastructure, because of the dynamic character of intergovernmental relations, the crucial 
prerequisite for institutional learning and adaptation within the EU structural policy environment 
is certain capacities for collective action at the local level (discussed in chapter 1). This point has 
been reinforced by recent research outcomes that sustain Marks's Europe with the regions thesis, 
showing that the strength of associational culture, regional identity and conflicting 
national/regional interests are the underlying factors of the regional mobilization at the European 
level, rather than a funding/resource focusing logic (Keating, 1996; Marks, et. al., 1996a).
Within this framework, the concepts of social capital and institutional networks, by 
facilitating collective action and by shaping the intra-regional interactions through the processes 
of exchange and socialization (discussed in chapter 1) constitute the prerequisites for learning and 
adaptation to the changing European environment. Hence, in the planning and implementation 
processes of European structural policy social capital and institutional networks are considered 
the crucial parameters upon which the Europeanization of regional and local economies and 
systems of governance is dependent. On the part of the EU Commission this is illustrated by its 
initiative to encourage partnership at all stages of the policy-making process, which constitutes 
the starting up for social capital formation at the regional level. More specifically, the expansion 
in number and scope of the Community Initiatives as a tool for enabling regional actors to be 
involved in cooperative relations has reinforced the importance of networks on both the 
interregional and transnational basis20. This trend corresponds to the emergence of the policy
20However, as a research by R. Bennett and G. Krebs, (1994) on the LEDA Initiative shows, although the EU 
financed programmes and most importantly the Community Initiatives represent a start up for network creation in 
Europe’s less favoured regions, by enhancing partnership, they cannot ensure the continuity o f  the newly-created
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network approach on almost all the policy domains within the EU system of governance 
(Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991; R.A.W Rhodes, et.al., 1996; Peterson, 1995; Kassim, 1994; B. 
Kohler-Koch, 1996; Richardson, 1996; Kenis and Schneider, 1991; Windhoff-Heritier, 1993).
Thus, the social capital-based learning process can be distinguished from the historical 
and sociological neo-institutionalist approaches to integration, which emphasize the role of thick 
institutions in influencing actors’ (member states’) preferences. The inherent in the learning 
process evolutionist approach does not contradict the path dependence analysis, since the function 
of ‘learning to cooperate’ (Sabel, 1993b: 120-140) is considered as a rather slow process, and in 
that sense, it is familiar with historical neo-institutionalism (Pierson, 1996). However, it should 
be distinguished from the deterministic interpretations of history, since it is based on the process 
of making collective action a rational choice. Additionally, the notions of civic engagement and 
strong civil society, based on the presence of social capital, constitute intrinsic elements of 
Western culture, which cannot be simply reduced to the rationality of markets and hierarchies 
(bureaucracy) (Finnemore, 1996).
Thus, by adapting the general theoretical understanding of the network dynamics, as 
established in chapter 1, to the European policy-making environment, the proposed theoretical 
model of a learning institutional infrastructure is based on a local functional network, since 
functional networks, by shaping the public/private relations, incorporating multiple type of 
resources and thus facilitating collective action, provide the nucleus support structure for learning 
and adaptation (see chapter 1). Hence, where there is lack of this type of networks, as in the 
Objective 1 regions of the smaller and more centralized member states, the adopted development 
strategies are usually driven by the central state administrative structures and therefore,
forms o f interactions, which are primarily influenced by the local social and cultural context and secondarily by the 
structure o f  the state.
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irrespective of their effectiveness and efficiency (i.e Ireland), inhibit rather than facilitate the 
bottom-up learning and adaptation processes (Leonardi, 1995a).
On the other hand, European regional policy is considered a fundamental change in the 
system parameters that represents simultaneously a threat to the preexisting institutional 
arrangements in both the economic and political spheres, and an opportunity for institution- 
building and network-creation, especially in the less favoured Objective 1 regions. In particular, 
by challenging embedded structures and well-established interests at the regional and local levels, 
the Structural Funds programmes cause instability in the intra-network relations, which, in turn, 
on the one hand, leads to the resistance to change on the part of some organizations for which 
change means loss of security and power, while, on the other, opens up the process of 
institutional restructuring, especially in regions with poor institutional infrastructure, by 
weakening the position of firmly established interests. This process facilitates the building of new 
institutions, because under specific conditions, which seem to be relevant to the Objective 1 
regions, the process of institution-building presupposes the redundancy of the old institutional 
infrastructure (Storper, 1995).
In these conditions the presence of multiple and collective leadership roles within the 
network can prevent the de-stabilization of the intra-network relations, while, simultaneously, the 
collective response to the crisis can effectively moderate the local repercussions of the changes. 
In this role as moderator of the tensions between learning and monitoring of the power relations 
that the changes may engender (discussed in chapter 1), an effective leadership should: first, 
satisfy all groups who have a stake in what is occurring; second, create a strategic vision and 
convince all those involved; and third, allow space for independent actions that adhere to the 
general strategic vision (Bennett, et. al., 1994:292-3). Defined in this way, leadership requires the 
decentralization of power and responsibility and a high level of involvement of the participants.
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Hence, learning institutional networks in such a policy environment should combine a core of 
actors (intra-regional functional network) linked with strong ties, and a range of other local actors 
connected through looser ties to the core network.
The diagram of Figure 2.1 illustrates the way in which a learning institutional network at 
the local level, based on the processes of exchange and socialization, can facilitate the adaptation 
process of the region within the multi-level governance structure we are witnessing in European 
regional policy. In particular, the graph reveals the way in which the intra-regional interactions 
should be shaped. There is a group of actors (intra-regional functional network) linked with 
strong ties, while some of them (3,4,5) are loosely connected with other peripheral actors. This 
structure of the local interactions reflects both the need for local leadership involving public and 
private actors and the importance of the linkages with other peripheral local or non-local actors 
for access to new resources (information, knowledge, new ideas). Furthermore, the graph 
demonstrates the distribution of power among the actors based on the process of exchange, 
whereby an actor's power is strengthened by his/her ability to combine external, as well as 
internal linkages and, therefore, access to multiple resources. Hence, the distribution of power 
within the network plays a key role in shaping the intra-regional interactions and achieving 
collective action. Finally, the role of social capital is to facilitate collective action among the 
actors through the socialization process, which involves their active involvement in the provision 
of public goods and services that support the local productive system.
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Figure 2.1
Learning and Adaptation in Multi-Level Governance Networks
EU C om m ission
Government
L O C A L  N E T W O R K
S E R V I C E SP U B L I C  G O O D S  &
S O C I A L C A P I T A L
This leads to the major hypothesis of this thesis:
Hypothesis 1: Regional economies and societies possessing dense, intra-regional functional 
institutional networks, with a learning capacity, which is facilitated by the presence o f social 
capital endowments, will be better able to adapt both their institutional relations and their policy 
output in response to the changes occurring in the global or European environment. In that sense 
they will be more apt to face the challenges and grasp the opportunities that the European 
regional policy presents. These networks will provide an effective range o f local services, and 
will also be able to integrate more resources from the EU Structural Funds.
However, given that EU regional policy imposes a rather enduring and longstanding 
challenge on the cluster o f interests that may underpin the old institutional establishments across 
Europe, the thesis assumes the resistance to change should be seen as a temporary, rather than 
permanent condition. In that sense it views European regional policy as a positive external shock 
for promoting institutional and policy-making innovation at the regional level, especially in the
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regions of highly centralized member states, most of which are eligible of assistance under 
Objective 1. Hence, the second hypothesis of the thesis is:
Hypothesis 2: Even if the preexisting institutional capacity for learning and institution-building 
is poor, regions facing the challenges of Europeanization and being involved in EU programmes 
and initiatives will begin build institutional infrastructure and participate in networks of all kind 
to increase their development potential by gaining access to the EU funds.
The definition of learning as a two-fold process involving institutional and policy 
adaptation suggests a two-stage approach to the study of institutional networks and the 
implementation of European regional policy (CSF, 1989-93). The first stage is an investigation 
of national conditions which affect the local policy environment and the development of local 
institutional capacity. Of particular importance is the structure of the state. The second stage is 
to evaluate the local institutional infrastructure by mapping the institutional networks and 
identifying the presence of social capital, as well as by measuring local learning capacity through 
an investigation of how policy and institutional relations have evolved.
This section has shown that social capital and institutional networks play the key role in 
facilitating the learning and adaptation processes of regional and local systems of governance 
within the EU structural policy. Therefore social capital, learning, adaptation and Europeanization 
of the regions across Europe should be seen as interrelated and interdependent concepts. The 
following sections assess the impact of the state structure on shaping the local institutional 
capacity and establish the methodology for mapping institutional networks, identifying the 
presence of social capital and evaluating the learning capacity of the institutional infrastructure.
2.4 The Structure of the State and Local Capacity for Learning
The structure of the state in terms of both its constitutional dimension and the dynamics of the 
intergovernmental relations constitutes an important component for the formation of the so called
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“domestic policy networks” (Anderson, 1991:417) or the “European domestic policy” (Jeffery, 
1997:13) frameworks, which have been identified as crucial parameters for moulding the 
territorial division of powers within states and hence the shaping of the institutional capacity of 
subnational authorities across Europe. Furthermore, the effectiveness and efficiency of public 
administration at the regional and local levels play a key role in enforcing or inhibiting the local 
institutional infrastructure, even though they are affected to a significant degree by the form of 
intergovernmental relations.
Within the system of intergovernmental relations, the territorial division of powers is 
closely linked to the distribution of resources among the levels of government and in that sense 
it affects directly both the level and the scope for autonomous action of subnational authorities 
and patterns the nature of relations among the levels of government. In particular, if the system 
of interactions among the local actors and the local decision-taking process are dependent on 
higher tiers of government for crucial resources (financial, administrative) or for favourable 
attitude, there is less space for horizontal cooperation, learning and building of a bounded system 
of policy-making at the subnational level (Anderson, 1995:462). Thus different state structures 
can account for the differentiation of institutional capacity among European regions21.
Hence, within centralized states, the structure of intergovernmental relations is expected 
to be dominated by vertical networks. Although these networks can impose cooperative relations 
between centre and periphery, they discourage the creation of horizontal networks at the local 
level and thus are seen as a major impediment to local institutional capacity in two ways. First, 
while horizontal networks are bringing together actors of equivalent status and power, the vertical
" Existing evidence, however, on regional differentiation in institutional capacity and degree o f  mobilization 
at the European level, disassociated with the state structure, points to the role played by other crucial factors 
affecting the institutional capacity, such as culture and territorial identity (Jeffery, 1997; Keating, 1996; Marks et., 
al, 1996a).
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are linking unequal agents in asymmetric relations of hierarchy and dependence. Within these
structures the build up of social trust is discouraged, because the flow and the reliability of
information among the levels of government and the sanctions that support the norms against
opportunism are inhibited22. The example of patron-client relations that involve vertical
interpersonal exchange and reciprocal but asymmetric obligations is relevant to this point.
Second, vertical networks demonstrate a bureaucratic hierarchical structure, within which all
aspects of public policy are accomplished. Subsequently, there is little space for horizontal
cooperation at the local level. Conversely, institutional thickness, upon which the learning
process is based, presupposes the presence of horizontally interconnected institutions that
represent the broad range of local economic and social actors and responsive subnational
authorities that can provide interchangeable leadership roles. Van de Ven (1975) notes:
Vertical patterns are usually highly structured by clearly defined contracts, charters, laws, 
administrative policies and procedures. They are usually bureaucratically organized with 
rational planning, specified goals, prescribed means, and clear authority and sanctioning 
patterns. As a result, horizontal integration, particularly at the local level, is difficult to 
achieve (cited in Aldrich and Whetten, 1981:389)23.
Therefore, in centralized states the dynamic system of intergovernmental relations tends 
to have a vertical, hierarchical and bureaucratically-organized structure, within which local 
authorities depend on higher levels of government for resources. Thus the institutional 
infrastructure at the local level will be dominated by intergovernmental, rather than functional 
networks, which means less space for a bounded local system of governance. This leads to the
22 Or as Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993:174) put it: “A  vertical network, no matter how dense and how  
important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation. Vertical flows o f  information are often less 
reliable than horizontal flows, in part because the subordinate husbands information as a hedge against exploitation. 
More important, sanctions that support norms o f  reciprocity against the threat o f  opportunism are less likely to be 
imposed upwards and less likely to be acceded to, if  imposed”.
2jVan de Ven, Andrew H. (1975) 'Design for Evaluating Inter-Agencv Networks Among Texas Earlv Childhood 
Organizations'. Working paper, College o f  Business, Kent State University, p. 12.
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third hypothesis of the thesis:
Hypothesis 3: The capacity for learning and adaptation of the local institutional infrastructure is 
significantly affected by the structure of the state. Therefore, interregional comparisons within 
centralized states should take into account the character of the state and hence the possible 
differentiation should be interpreted in relative terms.
In evaluating, however, the qualities of regional and local institutional infrastructure, a
secondary parameter, namely the degree of efficiency of local public authorities, should be taken
into account. This is crucially dependent on the character of the local political system (i.e extent
of clientelism) and the way in which public officials and civil servants are selected -whether the
recruitment system is dominated by professional or political considerations- which play a key role
in determining the effectiveness and efficiency of local public administration. Furthermore, given
the requirements of the learning process in terms of openness, quick assimilation-interpretation
of knowledge and information and taking initiatives, the extent to which local public authorities
can be successfully involved in the process is dependent on the qualities of the human capital.
Therefore, the quality of the local public administration system will constitute an integral part of
our evaluation of local institutional capacity.
2.5 Social Capital, Institutional Learning and European Regional Policy: 
the Methodology
This chapter has hypothesized that the capacity of regions across Europe to adapt successfully 
to the changing European environment (European structural policy) is dependent upon:
a) the presence of thick institutional networks at the local level which shape the system of 
interactions, by achieving collective action among public, private and voluntary-community 
actors and by coordinating and managing all resources in the area;
b) the capacity of these institutional networks to learn, that is to adapt both their structures and 
policy outcomes to meet the changing requirements and rules of the game that European regional 
policy presents;
c) the presence of social capital endowments -trust, norms and networks of civic engagement- at
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the regional and local levels that constitute the prerequisites for both the processes of achieving 
synergy and collective action among the actors, and of facilitating learning and adaptation of the 
network as a whole; and
d) the structure of the state, especially the territorial and functional division of power and 
resources.
Since European regional policy represents an enduring challenge for regional systems of 
governance, this thesis assumes:
—even poor (in institutional capacity) regions, once they are involved in EU programmes and 
initiatives, start to build an institutional infrastructure and participate in interregional or/and 
transregional networks.
To investigate the hypotheses the thesis has adopted the comparative case study approach, 
which is the most appropriate methodology for identifying possible differentiation in the 
adaptation process among regions or localities. It uses varied data, such as interviews, statistics, 
documents and surveys (Yin, 1989). The main advantage of research based on comparative case 
studies is it allows the researcher an in-depth analysis of complex social and political phenomena. 
In this thesis, which involves qualitative research, it enables a comparison between complicated 
systems of interactions, focusing on both interactions among actors and interactions between 
structural and cultural features.
The first part of this section discusses the advantages of the case-study approach and 
explains the choice of cases. The second part outlines the methodological tools for measuring the 
main concepts of the thesis: networks, social capital and learning.
2.5.1 Why National Interregional Case Study? the Choice o f  Cases
The research study is based on the binary comparison of two regions (NUTS II) within the same
country, Greece. Two reasons make the example of Greece particularly relevant for an assessment
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of the impact of institutional networks and social capital on facilitating the learning and 
adaptation of subnational systems of governance and determining the outcomes of regional 
development strategies in the Europe of the 1990s. First, though Greece has been a member of 
the EC since 1981 and a recipient of major funding programmes, its economy has not responded 
adequately to the flow of EC investment funds and lags behind the other peripheral states 
(Lyberaki, 1993). Second, Greece is characterized by a centralized and weak national 
administrative structure and the lack of a viable system of subnational government. Thus, even 
though a series of important institutional changes were introduced in 1986-87 as a consequence 
of the implementation of the IMPs and the CSFs (the country was divided into thirteen 
programme-regions with appointed regional councils headed by a government-appointed regional 
secretary), the planning role of the regional council and the region as a locus of politico-economic 
governance has yet to be established.
However, the degree of adaptation and mobilization of subnational governments for 
influencing the EU policy-making is not analogous with the constitutional position nor even the 
structure of intergovernmental relations within specific member states (Jeffery, 1997), and hence, 
there can be perfectly clear patterns of interregional differentiation within a particular -even 
centralized- member state (Klausen and Goldsmith, 1997). What this evidence emphasizes is the 
increasing importance of other variables, such as the qualities of the system of intra-regional 
interactions (institutional networks), in determining the degree of adaptability of regions across 
Europe. Hence it makes sense to undertake interregional comparison within the same state 
structure.
Additionally, since the researcher is investigating the validity of the hypotheses in 
different contexts, binary comparison is related to the comparison of nations/states with similar
structure, and hence allows for greater theoretical sophistication, deriving feedback the
\
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comparison creates and a subsequent redefinition of the initial research hypotheses (Dogan and 
Pelassy, 1990). Yet, with binary comparisons there are two considerations the researcher should 
take into account: first, the appropriateness of the subject to one case more than the other, and 
second, the difficulty of extracting general truths and theoretical propositions based on 
specificities of particular contexts (Dogan and Pelassy, 1990). With the former, because of their 
importance for the dynamic process of adaptation to the European environment, social capital and 
institutional learning constitute common ‘comparative independent variable’ (Windhoff-Heritier, 
1993) for both regions, hence comparison is valid. With the latter, even though it can be difficult 
to generalize, when the research is based on specific contexts, case studies are usually used for 
extracting and testing theoretical assumptions and propositions (Yin, 1989). Furthermore, in this 
research study there is a wide range of shared contextual independent variables, such as the 
almost complete Europeanization of structural policy, the upgraded role of the EU Commission 
in policy-making and the same national political and administrative environment, that can 
validate general theoretical conclusions.
The choice of the specific cases has been based on several criteria. First, both cases have 
been under the same institutional framework of assistance in EU structural policy (IMP Aegean 
Isis, CSF Obj.l), and over the same period of time. Second, they have had more or less similar 
development potential, being based on similar kinds of physical resource. Third, local authorities 
in both cases have been involved in the functions (planning, monitoring) of EU policy-making 
over the same period of time. Finally, each case was in a different stage of institutional and 
economic development when the first integrated EU programmes began to be implemented. 
These comparable cases are the Southern Aegean Islands (SAI) and the Northern Aegean Islands 
(NAI) regions.
Stimulus for this research has derived from the politico-economic differentiation in the
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developmental path of the two regions (NUTS II). Beyond the repercussions of the multi- 
fragmentation of space (especially in the Southern Aegean), such as the fragmentation of cultural, 
political, and economic patterns among the islands, there are important common features that 
differentiate the profile of each region, especially their prosperity and their history.
The Southern Aegean Islands (SAI) region consists of two island-complexes and 
simultaneously prefectures, the Cyclades and the Dodecanese. Although there are significant 
intra-regional (among the islands) differences in the rate of development, it is one of the most 
converging regions of the country and also with a good ranking among European regions (NUTS 
II). The economic and administrative centre of the region is shared among the most developed 
islands (the "four motors" of development, i.e Rhodes, Kos, Mykonos, Santorini).
Conversely, the Northern Aegean Islands (NAI) region, which consists of three big islands 
(Lesbos, Chios and Samos), each of which, along with some smaller islands, constitutes its own 
prefecture, lags behind both within Greece as well as at the European level.
The main qualitative difference in economic development between the SAI and the NAI 
regions lies in the speedy adjustment of the economic structure of the former in the development 
of the service (tertiary) sector of the economy, in particular tourism, whereas the latter has 
continued to rely on traditional (for each island) productive sectors (agriculture with an emphasis 
on olive oil for Lesbos, shipping-maritime industry for Chios and agriculture with some small- 
scale tourist development for Samos), demonstrating, in general, an inability to adapt to the 
changing environment. On the other hand, the Dodecanese, the most prosperous of the two island 
complexes of the SAI, was incorporated into Greece only in 1947, being until then under Italian 
rule, and some of the islands in the Cyclades complex (Syros) have strong traditions of trade and 
cultural relations with western Europe. On the contrary, the NAI followed the path of other Greek 
territories, being under Ottoman rule till the beginning of the twentieth century.
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2.5.2 Measurement
To identify the interactions between structure and culture at both the intra-regional and 
interregional levels, possible synergistic relations among the public and private actors, as well 
as the interactions between the external shock caused by the implementation of the Structural 
Funds' programmes and the existing institutional infrastructure, the thesis adopts a two-stage 
approach: first, carrying out network analysis and second identifying the presence of social 
capital.
Network analysis is based on semi-structured in-depth interviews with representatives of 
all the prominent organizations at the regional level, such as subnational governments, local 
development agencies, chambers of commerce, university and research institutions, and other 
regional institutions having a say on development issues in general and on planning and 
implementing the EU Structural Funds’ programmes in particular. Around thirty five interviews 
were conducted in each region. Elite interviewing constitutes an important methodological 
approach to testing hypotheses and carrying out qualitative research (Oppenheim, 1996). The 
choice of actors in each case has been based on: a) positional identification, and b) reputational 
identification. According to the former, the selection of actors is linked to their position within 
a particular policy domain and within the region, whereas, according to the latter, actors’ 
selection is based on information collected during the interview process or on preliminary 
information. Respondents were asked with whom they had regular interactions to exchange 
resources (information) and with whom they had interactions within the framework of the EU 
Funds’ programmes and initiatives. Because of the inherent in small, closed communities 
difficulty to identify the presence or absence of linkages -given that the lack of regular meetings 
does not necessarily mean absence of linkage- the research added a second question: with whom 
did they undertake joint general activities, and with whom did they jointly participate in EU
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programmes or initiatives.
Based on the responses, the research created adjacency matrices: a statistical tool that 
identifies the presence or absence of linkages among the organizations. The emerging pattern of 
linkages reveals the role and the position of each organization and the nature of the inter- 
organizational relationships (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982:17). By using adjacency matrices and 
by employing the UCINET software programme (Borgatti, et., al, 1992) the research performed 
Social Network Analysis (SNA), which can measure the degree of institutional thickness (density 
calculations), the distribution of power among the actors (centralization measures), the structural 
equivalence among the actors (structural equivalence measurements), and finally the graph of the 
network structure, for both the processes of general exchange and the implementation of the 
Structural Funds’ programmes in the two regions. Density measurement refers to the degree of 
connectedness of the entire network whereby zero indicates no connections between any actor 
and one means that all actors are linked to one another. Because density demonstrates the strength 
of ties, it can be used as a partial measurement for thickness. However, thickness has qualitative 
features, which were explored during the interviews. While density measures the degree of 
network cohesion, centralization refers to the extent to which this cohesion is organized around 
specific actors: those with the greatest number of linkages (Scott, 1994). Centrality measurements 
reveal actors’ involvement in network relations and demonstrate the structure -horizontal or 
vertical- of the networks and also constitute an indicator of the distribution of power among the 
actors. Finally, structural equivalence reveals the network structure by categorizing the actors in 
their relational linkages and according to their common structural positions (Scott, 1994). The 
research used the CONCOR technique of structural equivalence because it ‘produces a 
classification of network actors into discrete, mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories’ 
(Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982:73) based on the nature of their inter-organizational relations.
The presence of social capital, on the other hand, is usually identified either by mass 
survey data or, by data on membership in voluntary-community organizations. The interview 
schedules usually used social capital identification questions. However, because the interviewees 
did not constitute a sample, with the exception of some extreme characteristics, these data cannot 
constitute the basis for social capital identification. Thus, because of lack of financial resources 
required for mass surveys, the research relied on data on membership in voluntary organizations 
-which has been facilitated by a research project that is being carried out in Greece24- and on 
qualitative analysis of the fieldwork research.
For the identification of the networks’ learning capacity, the following criteria have been 
identified that reflect the discussion in chapter one.
a) given the importance of dialogue and communication for the learning process, the presence of 
fora for dialogue, such as conferences and committees focusing on specific fields, are considered 
the first indicator for the identification of learning (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993);
b) the building of new institutions and the expansion of the already existing institutional 
networks, bringing in new actors in response to changing external conditions that necessitate new 
policy areas and subsequently new sources of information and knowledge, are seen jointly as the 
second criterion for learning capacity;
c) the problem identification procedures and the gradual achievement of general consensus 
among the actors about the problem, which can be seen as the previous stage of the Sabel’s 
‘learning to cooperate’, constitutes the third indicator of learning (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier,
1993);
d) finally, the presence of a good amount of formal and informal communication channels among 
the policy actors of the public sphere in a broad sense and private interest actors (firms), whereby 
the public/private divide is being overcome, is seen as the last but not least necessary prerequisite 
for institutional thickness and learning.
24The ‘ VOLMED’ research project is financed by the EU Commission (DG V) and focuses on registering the 
voluntary organizations in the Mediterranean countries. The research for Greece has been undertaken by the 
Panteion Univ o f  Social Sciences (dept, o f  Social Statistics); coordinator: associate prof. Ms Stasinopoulou.
Conclusions
This chapter discussed the theoretical aspects of European regional policy and defined the notions 
of learning, adaptation and Europeanization of regional systems of governance, which constitute 
the core concepts of this thesis. Subsequently, it established the main hypothesis of the thesis: that 
social capital and dense functional intra-regional networks are identified as independent and 
intervening variables respectively, of the local capacity for learning and adaptation within the 
European regional policy environment. Furthermore, the Europeanization of public policy and 
the structure of the state have been considered as providing opportunities for and constraints on 
the local institutional capacity for learning. Hence, some secondary hypotheses related to the role 
of the Europeanization process and the structure of the state in facilitating or inhibiting the 
learning and adaptation capacity of the local institutions were established.
Finally, this chapter outlined the methodology of the research study. A comparative case 
study approach is used, because of its ability to integrate a variety of data sources and to allow 
an in-depth analysis of complex social and political phenomena. To identify the interactions 
between structure and culture the thesis adopts a two-stage approach: first carrying out social 
network analysis, a statistical technique which can measure the density of the network and the 
distribution of power among the actors, and second identifying the presence of social capital. The 
network analysis is based on semi-structured in-depth interviews with local elites, while for the 
identification of social capital the study relied on data on membership in voluntary organizations 
and qualitative analysis by fieldwork research. Additionally, a set of criteria for measuring the 
local learning capacity are identified.
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3. GREECE: RESTRUCTURING UNDER PRESSURE 
OR THE RESPONSE TO AN EXTERNAL SHOCK
Introduction
This chapter deals with two important features affecting, directly or indirectly, the system of local 
institutional interactions (local institutional infrastructure) and its learning capacity (adaptability): 
first, the structural -structure of the state and intergovernmental relations- and cultural -civic 
culture and social capital- specificities of the Greek socio-political system; and second, the main 
aspects of national regional policy, as it has gradually evolved after the second world war and the 
civil war, as well as the impact of the Europeanization process, especially after the introduction 
of the IMPs (1985). The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one presents the main 
features of the state structure and the system of intergovernmental relations and assesses their 
impact on the learning capacity and the Europeanization of local systems of governance. Section 
two focuses on the gradual transformation of national regional policy as a consequence of 
pressures from EU membership. Finally, section three discusses the impact of cultural 
characteristics on facilitating or inhibiting structural and political adaptation.
3.1 State Structure and Intergovernmental Relations: from Local Clientelism to Clientelist
Corporatism
As chapter two has established, the distribution of power and financial resources between 
different levels of government and the political and administrative capacity of regional and local 
authorities may facilitate or inhibit the learning and adaptation processes of the subnational 
systems of governance.
The highly centralized and weak administrative structure and the lack of a viable system 
of subnational government are generally considered as the impediments to Greece’s adjustment 
to the new European environment and the successful exploitation of the chances it presents for
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modernization and economic development. However, Greece’s entry into the EU and, in 
particular, the gradual Europeanization of regional policy, have constituted external shocks to the 
structure of the state and its public administration. In that sense the slow process towards 
administrative restructuring and adjustment, which started in the 1980s, is interpreted as a 
response to the challenges of the European environment. This section is divided into three 
subsections: the first focuses on the origins of the modem Greek state structure and the 
distribution of functions and competencies between different levels of government; the second 
examines the way in which financial resources are allocated and the resource-dependence 
relations between the tiers of government are shaped; finally, the third evaluates the capacity of 
bureaucracy and public administration, and the quality of the subnational political elites, for 
institutional learning and adaptation.
3.1.1 From Local Clientelism to State Clientelist Patronage
In Greece there are mainly three levels of subnational government: the region (NUTS II level-13), 
the prefecture (NUTS III level-55) and the municipality (437 demoi)-comrnunQ (5388 
koinotites)\ Given that the regions (perifereies) were established for the purposes of and under 
the pressure of implementation of European regional policy programmes (IMPs and CSFs) only 
in 1986 with their core functions concerning regional development and planning, the prefecture 
and the first tier of local government (municipalities and communes) constitute the traditional 
forms of subnational government. Both originated either during the Ottoman occupation or 
during the creation of the modem Greek state in the first quarter of the 19th century, and the 
subsequent tensions between centralization and decentralization.
Thus, the coexistence (duality) of municipalities (demoi) and a plethora of non-viable
'The numbers o f  municipalities and communes derive from the most recent administrative charter, based 
on the 1991 population census.
communes (koinotites) constitutes the main characteristic of the Greek system of local 
government, which can be traced back to distinctive features of the economic, political and social 
structures of the Ottoman empire. These features refer to the combination of a highly centralized 
economic and political structure with autonomous small villages2, which, since the middle of the 
16th century and the increasing commercialization of agriculture produced a more or less total 
autonomy for local potentates {pashas) at the expense of both the state and the peasants. This 
process is viewed as a crucial factor in the creation and further reinforcement of local clientelistic 
networks (Mouzelis, 1978; Hadjimichalis, 1987).
This framework helps one to understand the system of Greek local government in the 
Ottoman era (Greek communes), as well as the demoi/communes {koinotites) antithesis, which 
constituted an important parameter of the intergovernmental relations in the modem Greek state. 
The communes in Ottoman Greece constituted nuclei systems of local government that 
performed a wide range of functions, involving the provision of a variety of public goods and 
services (education, public works, water provision) financed by the raising of their own taxes 
(Kontogiorgis, 1982). Despite the varied forms of organization, the common feature of their 
administrative structure was the predominant role of local landowning elites (local potentates - 
prouchontes) in choosing the local leadership, given the indirect and guided election procedures
2This system o f  power distribution within the empire evolved from the diversified patterns o f  
landownership. Thus, in contrast with the feudal lords o f  western Europe, who had clear ownership rights over the 
land (feuds), the main feature o f  the timar system o f  landholding in the Ottoman empire was that all land belonged 
to the sultan, while the timar holders had a non-hereditary right over part o f  the production. The peasants, on the 
other hand, had a hereditary right over their land, subject to cultivating it regularly. Consequently, the distribution 
o f  power among the sultan and the leading social classes (aristocracy) led to a highly centralized structure, which 
did not allow for high rates o f  mobility o f  people and exchange o f  goods and ideas, that was the main underpinning 
factor for the crucial role o f  the cities as loci o f  political, economic and social functions that eventually led to the 
emergence o f  capitalism in western Europe. Furthermore, this system o f  power-distribution inhibited the 
regionalization process within the empire and the emergence o f  regions as integrated units o f  productive 
specialization and socio-political governance, which was the most important territorial feature in western Europe. 
Conversely, the Ottoman system o f  governance was favourable for the early development o f  clientelistic networks 
at the local level (M ouzelis, 1978).
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(Christofilopoulou, 1990). Thus, the Greek communes, owing their existence to the financial and 
administrative requirements of the Ottoman system of administration (i.e the collection of taxes), 
and their survival to the tolerance of the empire’s central authority (Christofilopoulou, 1990), 
should be seen simultaneously as quasi-democratic forms of local governance and nuclei bases 
for the formulation of local clientelism. Paradoxically enough, the ideological expediencies that 
accompanied the creation of the modern Greek state and emphasized the role of the communes 
in the Ottoman era as cells for the preservation of Greek language, religion and culture3 were 
used simultaneously by the opponents of ideas of decentralization (Kontogiorgis, 1985:75).
Thus, the structure of the newly-founded Greek state started, even from the first steps, to 
reflect the inherent from the long Ottoman period inconsistencies and discrepancies between the 
political (institutional), economic and social spheres. Hence, not surprisingly, the westemizers’- 
modernizers’4 approach to the tension between centralization and decentralization of the state 
structure was identified with the former, which, beyond the trends of the age in favour of highly 
centralized nation-states, in the Greek case was seen as a necessity, given the lack of class-based 
linkages between state and civil society and well-established personalistic, clientelistic, 
hierarchical networks at the local level (J. Petropoulos, 1968; Mouzelis, 1978). Moreover, the 
major asymmetry between, on the one hand, the political/institutional infrastructure, transplanted 
from the already matured capitalist countries of western Europe, and, on the other hand, the pre­
capitalist structure of Greek economy and society led to an imposed ‘from above’ model of
This historical debate is mainly dominated by the expediency for establishing the argument in favour o f  
the continuity o f  Hellenism under the Ottoman rule, which has constituted the basis for the foundation o f  the 
Hellenic-Christian ideological movement that accompanied the creation o f  the modem Greek state. In that sense, 
the emergence and expansion o f  the communes have been interpreted either as the continuation o f  the communes 
in Byzantium or as a renewed version o f  the Greek cities o f  the Roman times (for an overview, see Kontogiorgis, 
1982:31-33).
4The term refers to the ideological and political movement, which, based on the Greek diaspora o f  the 
West, constituted the leading force o f  the independence struggle (see section 3.3).
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modernization, that became gradually a consistently persistent pattern for promoting political and 
economic innovation in Greece.
Within this framework, the institutional foundations laid down by Capodistrias5, the first 
Governor of Greece (1828-31), and King Otto (1833-62), were based on the perception of a 
centralized and unitary state structure with emphasis on core institutional aspects, such as the 
army and public bureaucracy. In intergovernmental relations this trend was substantiated with 
the establishment of the prefectural system, based on the departmental conception of nomoi 
involving the prefecture and the province as intrinsic features of the territorial and administrative 
state structure, headed by central state-appointed prefects (nomarchs) and heads of the provinces 
(eparchs) respectively. Furthermore, the creation of a new unit of local government, the 
municipality {demos), consisting of more than one communes, was seen as an attempt to assault 
the powerful local prouchontes.
However, the communes survived over time and their role was further reinforced by the 
so called “liberation of the communes” reform introduced by the prime minister Venizelos in 
1912 (Law DNZ), in an attempt to liberate the communes from the organizational oppression of 
demoi, that had in the meantime become strongholds of his monarchic political opponents. What 
the Venizelos’s reform implicitly brought about was the transfer of clientelistic relations from 
the local to the national level, following the gradual establishment of the parliamentary system 
and the creation of national political parties. Thus, local clientelistic networks became gradually 
the bottom tier of the hierarchical, clientelistic networks, upon which the national political system 
and the organization of the political parties were based (Mouzelis, 1978). Hence, Venizelos’s
5Capodistrias’s endeavour to create a centralized state structure, an intrinsic element o f  which was the 
organization o f  the centre-periphery relations around the concept o f  the prefecture, has been interpreted as the first, 
failed, attempt to promote the “modernization from above”process, which, being against the interests o f  the local 
clientelist networks (prouchontism), eventually led to his assassination (Filias, 1974; M ouzelis, 1978).
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reform is considered a source of the structural problems facing the contemporary Greek 
administrative system (a large number of fragmented and non-viable communes6).
Within this hierarchical state structure, the role of the prefecture has had always been 
central in the system of centre-periphery relations, performing the functions of all ministries, and 
headed by the prefect, who was -until 1994- appointed delegate of the central government. Thus, 
since the provision of services and the distribution of the transferred from the central government 
funds were decided by the prefect and his officials and the prefectures are the electoral 
constituencies for general elections, the usually used channel for the satisfaction of local needs 
was through political pressures exercised by local politicians and local authority executives 
focusing mainly on the incorporation of municipal works into the Public Investment Programme 
of the prefecture, thus breeding the hierarchical clientelistic networks at the local level.
In the political upheaval of the post-civil war period in the 1950s and 1960s, the emphasis 
placed by the dominant ideology on the neutrality of the state was the appropriate tool for the 
covering up of the interconnectedness between the expansion of political clientelism and the 
strengthening of the state repression. The reform of the prefects’ status, introduced by the 1955- 
57 reform, involving specific criteria and methods of recruitment which strengthened the civil 
servant-status of the prefects should be seen as an indication of this trend. Additionally, the 
predominance of the ideology of “apolitical” local government, emphasizing the administrative 
role of local institutions and the tightening of the prefectural supervision of local authorities, 
involving both ex ante and ex post control of municipal decisions, should be seen as a logical 
consequence.
The above features of the post-war centre-periphery relations, which were, to a significant
6It should be noted, that a major reform with the code name “Capodistrias” focused on the creation o f  
viable local government units by the compulsory mergers o f  communes into new demoi is currently under 
implementation in Greece.
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extent, dominant even in the first period after the restoration of democracy (1974-81), created a 
policy environment favourable for local governments’ control by political clientelism, financial 
dependence on the central state and administrative supervision by the Ministry of the Interior. In 
this respect, the Greek system of local government is considered similar to the French one, given 
the existing in both systems schism between administrative and political functions of local 
authorities and their approach to decentralization as a functional reproduction of the central state 
at the local level (Christofilopoulou, 1990).
Yet, the process of democratic stabilization and the opening up of the European prospects 
have constituted the crucial determinants of the restructuring of the state and the reformulation 
of the intergovernmental relations after the restoration of democracy in 1974. The first post­
dictatorship period (1974-80) was characterized by a series of reluctant reforms undertaken by 
the New Democracy right-wing government, involving mainly the reinstatement of key pre­
dictatorship legislation and the modernization of existing institutions. Thus, the first step was the 
restoration of the “quasi-civil servant” status of the prefects, according to which prefects were 
chosen by the government from a “List of Prefects” drawn by a group of judges called the 
“Council of Prefects”, who used specific criteria for their appointment and evaluation.
Furthermore, with regard to the first tier of local government, a new Municipal Code was 
introduced in 1980 with a provision for a reluctant transfer of functions. Urban transport, 
nurseries, old age centres, housing and municipal market places were among a series of new 
competences transferred to local government. Additionally, the new Code provided for the 
division of local authority functions into “exclusive” and “shared” competences, that is functions 
performed either by local government or by other public sector organizations. Under this 
distinction, the only exclusive functions introduced by the new Code were: urban transport, 
municipal sports facilities and youth centres, the construction of municipal buildings and parking
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meters. Conversely, a series of crucial for local development functions, such as tourist 
development of municipal land, public housing, culture, nurseries, hygiene and health care 
centres, pollution and building controls were characterized as shared competences. Thus, this 
distinction contributed to a considerable overlapping of functions among different levels of 
government, which raised as a crucial issue for centre-periphery relations after the reforms of the 
1980s.
Finally, the ability -given to local governments- to create municipal enterprises -an 
important step towards enhancing the entrepreneurial character of local authorities with far 
reaching repercussions for getting access to and managing of the EU resources- and the 
establishment of the Municipal Enterprises of Water Supply and Sewerage (DEYA-Demotikes 
Epichiriseis Ydrefsis Apochetefsis) for managing the water supply and sewage systems in towns 
of more than 10000 inhabitants were the last important innovations of this first post-dictatorship 
period.
To sum up, the general characteristic of this first post-dictatorship period was the partial 
resurgence of the pre-dictatorship clientelist networks and the national party-driven patronage 
coupled with some reluctant reforms towards modernization.
3.1.2 Intergovernmental Relations and the Emergence of State Clientelist Corporatism
The entry into the EC in 1981 coincided with a major change in Greek politics: the coming to 
power of the first PASOK government. Thus, the period of Greece’s response to the challenge 
of adjustment to the new European environment in the 1980s was marked by the presence of a 
new, socialist, government, that came into power with a strong commitment to and a widely- 
publicized programme of decentralization. The changes occurred in the system of 
intergovernmental relations in the post-1981 period are characterized by the tendency towards
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a more corporatist system of regional interest representation (Andrikopoulou, et.al, 1988), which, 
however, is still based on the previous clientelist relations. Thus the reforms of the 1980s have 
led to what may be called clientelist corporatism7.
This trend became initially evident by the changes in the nature and the role of the 
prefectural councils introduced by the law 1235/82. Instead of being composed mainly by civil 
servants, they transformed into advisory councils representing the various organized interests of 
the prefecture. The new councils include local government representatives, that make up half the 
council, the mayor of the leading municipality of the prefecture, two representatives of the Local 
Association of Municipalities and Communes-LAMC (Topikes Enoseis Dimon ke Koinotiton- 
TEDK), while the remaining members are elected representatives of professional organizations, 
chambers of commerce, agricultural cooperatives and labour movement organizations at the 
prefecture level. Moreover, although the civil servants of the prefecture are allowed to attend the 
council meetings, they no longer have the right to vote.
This reform in the composition of the councils, however, coincided with a second change, 
involving the deinstitutionalization and ‘politicization’ (Christofilopoulou, 1990:88) of the 
prefects’ status. The appointment and the evaluation of the prefects were no longer the 
responsibility of any specific governmental institution (Council of Prefects). Instead, the prefects 
were directly appointed and dismissed by the government, without any criteria for recruitment 
and time limits concerning their term in office.
The reformulation of the nature and the role of the prefect and the prefectural councils 
was accompanied by a third reform involving the relations between the prefecture and the first 
tier of local government. In particular, the ex ante and ex post controls of the prefects on the
The term refers to the combination o f  political clientelism and elements o f  corporatist interest 
representation, involving hierarchically structured umbrella organizations, most o f  which get preferential treatment 
by the central state (Tsoukalas, 1986:92-95).
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expediency of the municipal decisions were significantly restricted8 and the prefectural tutelage 
limited to checks on the legality of municipal decisions. Even though these reforms signaled a 
functional transformation of the role of the prefecture, they did not fulfil the virtues attributed by 
the wording of the law to the prefectural councils as “organs of popular representation”, given 
that they were not directly elected institutions. Instead, what the reform really brought about was 
a shift from the well-known clientelistic relations between local state (prefecture) and society 
(civil society, interests groups) towards an interest group-corporatist representation at the 
prefecture-level policy-making process (Vemey and Papageorgiou, 1993:113).
At the local government level the main goal of the PASOK reforms was the opening up 
of the system for citizens’ participation in the decision-making on local issues. Thus, the 
provincial councils and the creation of directly elected district and neighbourhood councils, 
introduced by law 1416/84, were the innovations at the sub-prefectural and sub-municipal levels. 
Furthermore, a wide range of incentives for voluntary mergers of small demoi and neighbouring 
communes, as well as, for inter-municipal cooperation and the establishment of municipal 
enterprises involving public/private partnerships at the local level were introduced with poor, 
however, results.
Moreover, the major reform, introduced by law 1622/86, for the creation of an elected 
second tier of local government at the prefectural level -the so called prefectural local authorities 
(nomarchiakes autodioikiseis)- was not implemented until 1994, when the elections were held 
under a different legal framework.
Finally, the provision for the creation of an elected second tier of local government was 
accompanied by the establishment of the administrative regions (periphereies) as central
o
The expediency control o f  the Prefect, however, remained in policy areas, such as the sale o f  municipal 
or community land and buildings, the budgeting and the names given to municipal roads.
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administrative units for regional planning and regional development. Both reforms, the creation 
of the regions and the provision for directly-elected prefectural councils, have constituted 
Greece’s response to the increasing pace of Europeanization of regional policy in the 1980s and 
the subsequent reorientation of the planning, implementation and monitoring processes. Thus, 
the country was divided into thirteen regions9, headed by directly appointed and dismissed by the 
government General Secretaries of the Regions, while the regional councils, that were set up 
besides the General Secretaries consist of the prefects of each nomos of the region, and one 
representative of the Local Association of Municipalities and Communes of each nomos. In the 
regional Monitoring Committees of the Structural Funds’ operational programmes, however, 
interest group representatives of each nomos of the region (chambers of commerce, agricultural 
cooperatives, trade unions) are actively involved in the process.
The structure of the system of intergovernmental relations in Greece, as it has been 
formed in the 1980s, is presented in Figure 3.1. What this graph reveals, is that, despite several 
reforms, involving the opening up of the system to civic participation and the encouragement 
provided for the formulation of local interactions, because of the persistent reluctance of the state 
to decentralize, the centre-periphery relations are hierarchically structured, and highly centralized, 
since the various bottom-up features are abrogated by the final control of the central state. Thus, 
the traditional administrative hierarchy between the levels of government involves mainly the 
central government, the prefecture and the local authorities, while the newly-created region 
constitutes the institutional aspect of the top-down approach to strategic regional planning. The 
only directly-elected form of subnational government within the system is the first tier of local 
government, whose interests at the central government level are represented through an umbrella
9The regions are: Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Central Macedonia, Western Macedonia, Thessaly, 
Hepirus, Ionian Islands, Western Greece, Sterea Ellada, Peloponnese, Attica, Northern Aegean Islands, Southern 
Aegean Islands and Crete.
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organization, the Central Association o f Municipalities and Communes (Kentriki Enosi Dimon 
ke Koinotiton-KEDKE), in a traditionally neo-corporatist manner. As it might have been 
expected -and will be shown in the following section of this chapter- the processes of regional 
planning and democratic programming in Greece in the 1980s have been profoundly influenced 
by this structure o f intergovernmental relations.
Figure 3.1
Intergovernmental Relations in Greece prior to the last (1994) Reform
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The distribution o f functions between different levels o f subnational government, after 
the reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s, constitutes a crucial issue for the shaping of the local
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interactions, the level and the scope of inter-organizational learning and adaptation, and hence, 
for the Europeanization function of local governments. Additionally, the European dimension 
and its dialectic interaction with the process of administrative restructuring has expanded 
dramatically the functional limits of subnational governments in Greece.
Table 3.1 below shows the distribution of functions among various levels of government 
after the reforms of the 1980s. Three are the main features of this distribution. First, with the 
exception of the traditional functions of the state, most of the other functions are shared between 
the central government, the prefecture and the first tier of local government. A wide range of 
economic, social and even territorial functions are shared predominantly among the central state 
and the prefecture. In particular, the powers of the prefectural councils include: planning and 
regional development, agriculture, tourism, health, social welfare, labour and commerce, 
transport, culture and education. Some of these functions are shared with the municipality, whose 
powers, however, remain minimal. Second, subsequently, in almost all policy areas there is a 
functional interference of the central state. Third, the functional role of the region is limited to 
that of a strategic regional planner, which places it at the margins of the local system of 
governance, which consists mainly of the prefecture and the local authorities. Thus, the high 
degree of functional overlapping has been raised as a crucial characteristic of the Greek system 
of subnational government after the reforms of the 1980s (Psychopedis and Getimis, 1989). This 
overlapping character has several consequences for the system of intergovernmental relations, 
which may inhibit or facilitate the degree of effectiveness within the system and the formation 
of the intra-regional or interregional interactions, that are seen as the necessary prerequisites for 
the building up of learning institutional policy networks at the local level.
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Table 3.1
Distribution of Functions bv Level of Government in Greece
National Regional Prefectural Local
Policy Areas______________ Government______ Council___________ Council Government
TRADITIONAL
Law & Order, Public Admin. x x x x x
Foreign Affairs, Defence x x x x x
Monetary Policy x x x x x
Foreign Trade, Fiscal Policy x x x x x
Statistics, M edia, 
Com m unication
x x x x x
ECONOMY-SECTORS
Agriculture, Fisheries XX X XX
SM Es XXX XX
Commerce, Trade, Markets XXX XX
Tourism XX XX X
Banking, Insurance x x x x x
Employm ent, Industrial 
Relations
XXX XX
E conom ic Planning x x x x x
SOCIETY
Education XX X XX
Flealth-Welfare XX XX X
Social Services X XXX X
Social Insurance x x x x x
Culture, Leisure X XX XX
TERRITORY
Regional Planning X XXX X X
Urban Planning-H ousing X XX XX
Public Works X XXX X
Public Transport XX XX X
Roads XX XX X
W ater&Sewage x x x x x
Energy x x x x x
Environment X XX XX
Source: Municipal Code, Law 1622/86; elaborated by the author.
These consequences are three-fold. First, the strong overlap of functions, the 
imperceptible bounds of responsibilities and the subsequent coordination problems create 
dysfunctions in the system, that often inhibit rather than facilitate its effectiveness. Psychopedis 
and Getimis (1989:99) note:
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The transfer and diffusion of powers among new decentralized institutions at the local 
level does not necessarily lead to the improvement of their performance. The conflict 
between the new institutions regarding the decentralized powers, the problem of strong 
functional overlap and the dispersion of responsibilities to various separate and isolated 
institutions continue to be considered the crucial issues of local institutions.
Second, the unclear distribution of functions opens up possibilities for a dynamic flexibility in
the system of intergovernmental relations, within which local authorities are given space for
bounded and relatively autonomous policy-making through the establishment of rules of the game
among participants, thus providing the necessary environment for building cooperative policy
networks in areas of common concern. Within this policy environment, characterized by a
disorganized stability, the differentiation in innovation capacity and capability of adapting among
subnational governments is crucially dependent on the availability of economic resources and
civic culture endowments, that can facilitate the formation of inter-institutional interactions, by
exploiting the benefits of institutional learning. The chances provided by the European policy
framework and, in particular, by the Europeanization of regional policy play the catalytic role in
this process. Finally, the resource interdependence and the subsequent bargaining requirements
between levels of government or among institutions within the same level provide the foundation
for dialogue and communication, and consequently, the basis, at least, of a learning environment.
Hence, the functional overlapping of the Greek subnational system of government -a
consequence of the fragmentary and often incoherent decentralization policy since the early
1980s- represents simultaneously a danger of inefficiency and a chance for flexible adaptation
of subnational governments. The most crucial factor in this process is the presence of civicness
(social capital endowments) at the local level.
Although this thesis focuses formally on the period up to 1993, a quick look at the
developments occurred after this time limit in the centre-periphery relations would be extremely
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useful, since the reform of 199410 and the elections for the second tier of local government, which 
were held in the same year, have changed significantly the landscape of intergovernmental 
relations in Greece. Figure 3.2 presents the structure of the intergovernmental relations after the 
1994 reform. The main features of the reform refer to the role of the old prefectural councils, 
which have been renamed to nomarchal local authorities. The nomarchal local authorities 
constitute the elected second tier of local government with their own financial resources and the 
right to establish their own agencies, as well as to participate together with other local actors in 
enterprises. However, there is no administrative tutelage or hierarchical control between the 
second and the first tier. The abolition of the hierarchical relationship between the old prefecture 
and the local authorities implies the anticipated conflicts between the two tiers, because of the 
existing strong overlap of their functions. However, a sort of administrative tutelage of the region 
(Regional General Secretary), with regard to the legality of the decisions of the prefectural 
councils has been established, which points to the start up of a gradual process leading to the 
substitution of the old prefecture as a central state representative at the local level by the region.
Thus, the newly-reformed system of intergovernmental relations consists of two directly 
elected tiers of local government with unclearly allocated and strongly overlapping 
responsibilities and a third tier (region), directly-controlled by the central state. Within this 
institutional structure, the distribution of competences among the three levels and, especially 
among the prefecture and the local governments should be performed within the framework of 
territorial and functional subsidiarity.
l0Although this reform is substantially based on the provisions o f  the 1986 legal framework (law 1622), 
the fact that the elections for the new prefectural councils were not held until eight years later led to a further 
reformulation o f  the legal framework as well (laws 2218 ,2 2 4 0 ,2 2 7 3 /9 4  and 2 2 8 4 ,2297 ,2307 /95 ).
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Figure 3.2
Intergovernmental Relations in Greece after the 1994 Reform
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Finally, the transfer of almost all functions o f the traditional “local state” (prefecture) to 
the new nomarchal authorities" has refocused the debate on two traditionally crucial issues for 
the subnational government in Greece: the problem of financial resources and the political and 
public administration capacity.
1 'With the exception of the hard core functions of the central state (defense, foreign affairs, law&order, 
economic policy, statistics and the administrative control of the first tier of local government by the Ministry of the 
Interior) all other functions of the state at the prefectural level have been transferred to the new nomarchal councils.
116
3.1.3 The system o f Local Government finance and Centre-Periphery relations
The system of local government finance in Greece has had always been the crucial administrative 
field that reflects the centralized state structure, as well as its interconnectedness with the 
resource-dependence relations between centre and periphery and the shaping of the hierarchical 
clientelistic networks at the national and local levels.
In the post-war period the centralization trend is indicated by both the limited role of local 
governments in the management of their own finances and the level of local government revenue 
as a percentage of the central state budget. Thus, only 52 out of 5999 local authorities have had 
their own financial services with the rest having delegated this task to the central state. Moreover, 
local government revenue as a percentage of the state budget in the post-war period dropped from
9.3 in 1948 to 6.6 in 1974 to be increased again to 11.1 in 1984 (Tatsos N, 1988:22).
The revenue of local government is categorized in “regular” and “extraordinary”(Ministry 
of the Interior, 1987). The former consists of the income from property, local taxes, charges and 
the regular grants of the central government, while the latter -most of which was abolished in the 
1989 reform- concerns mainly grants from the Public Investment Programme of the Ministry of 
National Economy distributed by the prefectures, or specific grants given to local authorities by 
other public actors (i.e Ministry of Culture) for specific purpose municipal works.
Given the centralization of the fiscal system, Greek local authorities had minimal power 
to tax. On the other hand, the various charges imposed on all inhabitants for several services 
constitute a rather stable, but relatively limited source of revenue. Thus, the grants of central 
government have had constituted the main source of local government revenue12. Since both the 
regular and extraordinary transfers were to a significant extent at the discretion of the central
I2It is worth noting that the sum o f  the regular and extraordinary grants rose dramatically from about 40%  
o f local government revenue in 1974 to about 65% in 1984 (Tatsos, 1988:33-39).
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government and subsequently a permanent source of uncertainty for local economic planning, 
they facilitated the development of clientelist relationships between local authorities officials and 
central state political elites. Hence, the 1989 reform13 of local government finance was focused 
on strengthening local governments’ financial autonomy, by rationalizing the revenue system. 
Thus, the return of the existing tax on immovable property to municipalities was accompanied 
by the abolition of the regular and most of the specific and extraordinary grants and their 
substitution by a new revenue sharing system: the so called “Central Autonomous Resources of 
Local Government” scheme. According to this scheme, the central transfers are made up of 20% 
of both the personal and corporate income tax, 20% of the tax on the immovable property, 50% 
of the road tax and 3% of the tax on the transfer of immovable property. Moreover, the grants 
from the Peripheral Investment programme of the Ministry of National Economy have been 
replaced by the one third of the local government share of the income tax, which is separated 
from the Central Autonomous Resources. Finally, and more importantly, local authorities are 
allowed, but not obliged, to introduce additional taxation for the completion of specific municipal 
programmes.
This major reform of local government finance, however, did not result to a substantial 
increase of revenue, given the political reluctance and the administrative incapacity for raising 
the tax on immovable property -the only tax given as a whole to local government. For this reason 
the responsibility for its collection was returned later to the central state services14. Subsequently, 
some local authorities in an attempt to strengthen their financial autonomy have tried to pursue
13The reform was introduced by law 1828/89.
l4It should be noted, that, given the high political costs, because o f  the specific weight o f  the immovable 
property for Greeks, (the country has one o f  the highest rates o f  privately-owned houses in Europe), and the 
administration problems (lack o f  real estate registry, evaluation difficulties), the revenue from the tax on immovable 
property has had always been insignificant, either for the central state, or for local governments, when compared 
to other sources o f  taxation (Tatsos, 1989:35-37).
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policies involving the provision of social services (day care, transport, cafeterias etc) as an 
indirect source of revenue. Nonetheless, the rationalization of the system of grant revenue 
accompanied by the enactment of “objective” criteria for its distribution has contributed to the 
institutionalization of a redistributive function of these transfers seeking to equalize the 
differences between rich and poor.
Within the EU policy-making environment, however, the reform of the system of local 
government finance constitutes a major challenge for both the local political leadership and the 
other public, private and voluntary (civil society) actors towards the reshaping of the system of 
local interactions on a reciprocal basis, involving the imposition of specific local taxes on the one 
hand and the commitment for the provision of public goods and services on the other. This 
process will be facilitated by the financial status of the new prefectural councils.
The financial function of the prefectural councils up to the 1994 reform was two-fold: 
first, the distribution of the funds provided by the Peripheral Public Investment Programme, and 
second, the administrative-legal control of the budget of local authorities (municipalities and 
communes). These functions were in line with the dual role of the prefecture, on the one hand, 
as the institutional formulation of what has been called “local state” (Psychopedis and Getimis, 
1989) and, on the other, as the appropriate administration field for incorporating the local needs 
into the central decision-making and thus absorbing the local pressures. Both functions are 
performed through the Public Investment Programme, which provides the ground for the 
regulation of local problems by bridging the gap between local needs and availability of resources 
(Psychopedis and Getimis, 1989:84-85). The means to achieve these objectives lie with the 
functional and territorial differentiation of the Public Investment Programme, which is facilitated 
by its division into the programme of the central state (Collective Decision of Action-CDA; 
Silogiki Apofasi Ergou-SAE) and the regional public investment programme (Collective Decision
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of the Prefectural Fund-CDPF; Silogiki Apofasi Nomarchiakou Tamiou-SANT). What this 
differentiation implies, is that, within the framework of the decentralization policies pursued in 
the post-1981 period, the central state undertakes the regulation of problems arising in policy 
areas, where the economies of scale are high (i.e large scale investments), while simultaneously 
leaves the regulation of local scale problems (i.e small scale infrastructure) to the local state 
(prefecture). Furthermore, in formulating the Peripheral Public Investment Programme local 
needs are taken into account, even within the limitations of the clientelist system.
After the 1994 reform, however, and the subsequent abolition of the budgetary control of 
local authorities by the prefecture, there has been a distinction of the nomarchal local authorities 
revenue, similar to that of the municipalities: in regular and extraordinary revenue. The regular 
revenue consists of taxes, charges, income from property, the central autonomous resources and 
the specific annual financial transfer for the costs of exercising central state functions. On the 
other hand, the extraordinary revenue refers to loans, specific transfers of other public actors and 
the resources from the EU.
To sum up, the maintenance of the financial dependence of subnational governments on 
the central state transfers accompanied by the strong functional overlap has constituted an 
intrinsic element of the system of intergovernmental relations in Greece. Nonetheless the opening 
up of the system to bottom-up initiatives based on flexible schemes for mobilization of 
endogenous resources (additional taxation, use of modern cooperative financial tools) presents 
a challenge to the local system of governance. Hence, the learning, adaptation and 
Europeanization processes rely on formal or informal networks at the local level, that can achieve 
synergistic effects among the actors by combining public and private resources. The success of 
this process, however, is crucially dependent on the presence of a strong civil society, the capacity 
of local political elites and the administration system. The next subsection examines the quality
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of local political elites and the capacity o f the public administration bureaucracy.
3.1.4 Subnational political elites and the quality of Public Administration Bureaucracy
Greek municipal and communal councils are elected every four years according to a double-ballot 
majoritarian electoral system15. In municipalities of more than 5000 inhabitants the winning list 
is that, which gains the absolute majority of the votes. The head of the winning list becomes 
mayor or president of the commune. In municipalities where no list receives absolute majority 
in the first ballot there is a second ballot between the leading candidates a week later. After each 
municipal election, the local authorities elect the governing boards of Local Associations of 
Demoi and Communes (TEDK), their corporate organization at the nomos level, which in turn 
elect their representatives in the Central Association of Demoi and Communes (KEDKE), the 
umbrella organization of local authorities on a nationwide basis. Both the KEDKE and the 51 
TEDK, however, lack the appropriate organization and scientific expertise to provide the needed 
technical support and consultation to their members, or to present efficiently local authorities’ 
interests and demands at the central government level.
Although there is no formal appearance of the names of political parties on the lists -a 
practice consistent with the post-war dominant ideology of “apolitical” local government- local 
elections are dominated by intense “party politicization” especially in the urban areas. Thus, 
municipal councils are usually run by party coalitions, which are formed either before the first 
ballot, or in the second ballot, when no separate list corresponding to major political parties wins 
the majority of the votes in the first ballot (Christofilopoulou, 1990).
The role of political parties as vehicles of political clientelism has had always been
15The same electoral system applies to the elections for the second tier o f  local government (new nomarchal 
councils) after the 1994 reform.
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decisive for the huge expansion of the inefficient state bureaucracy16, as well as for the 
incorporation of civil society and the allocation of resources. Thus, the interrelated and mutually 
reinforcing processes of political clientelism and the expansion of a legalistic and inefficient 
bureaucracy are considered the main features of the system of public administration with serious 
repercussions for the functioning of the public sector. First, the usually used inappropriate 
recruitment criteria, as a result of political interventions, and the subsequent bureaucratic growth 
have led to the creation of a relatively autonomous from the political patrons bureaucracy, who 
resist the implementation of reformist political decisions insofar these decisions affect their 
interests (Flogaitis, 1987). This, in turn, creates conditions of the so called “bureaucratic vicious 
circle17” (Flogaitis, 1987:52-54), according to which bureaucrats’ resistance to reformist measures 
leads to their non-implementation, thus deteriorating their ineffectiveness, which results to new 
reform efforts. Second, the legalistic character of the system, the so called ‘notorious legalism 
of public administration’ (Athanasopoulos, D, 1983:13718; cited in Christofilopoulou, 1990:286), 
constitutes a major impediment to the system, given the dependence of public policy making on 
the bureaucracy’s expertise in legal formalities. Third, the hierarchical structure of the system 
accompanied by very small wage differentials and absolute job security discourages civil 
servants’ initiative, most of whom try to find secondary work in the parallel economy. Finally,
16A s Tsoukalas argues, the bureaucratic organization in Greece does not correspond to organizational 
functions, but rather it is used, almost exclusively, for clientelistic political purposes, thus serving as a form o f  
“political division o f  labour” (1986:121). Historically, this tendency goes back to the formulation o f  the patronage 
system o f  politics, when the enormous expansion o f  employment in the state bureaucracy had reached a 
disproportionate rate with regard to the size o f  both the population and the resources. As it has been calculated, by 
1880 the civil servants’ analogy per 10000 population was ten times higher in Greece than in the UK (Dertilis, 1976, 
Social change and military intervention in politics: Greece. 1881-1928. unpublished Ph.D thesis, University o f  
Sheffield.; cited in M ouzelis, 1978:17). After the last restoration o f  democracy, the revival o f  clientelism became 
evident by the increase in the number o f  civil servants by 74% in the period 1974-80 (Flogaitis, 1987:247).
17The term has been borrowed from similar accounts o f  the Italian public administration identified by 
Cassese, S (1983) II Sistema Administrativo Italiano. Bologna: II Mulino.
18
Athanasopoulos, D, (1983) The Greek Administration. Athens: Papazisis (in Greek).
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as a consequence of the previous, in contrast with most European countries, there is no functional 
relationship between public administration and civil society. Hence, the political parties play the 
role of interlocutors between public sector bureaucracy and civil society, by attempting to bypass 
the rigidities of the public administration, thus bridging the gap in the state/society relations.
Within this framework, the functions of local authorities have had to be accomplished 
between the Scylla of the party-dominated political clientelism and the Charybdis of a highly 
centralized, hierarchically-structured system of public administration, with far reaching 
repercussions for local policy-making. Thus, being public law entities primarily under the 
administrative control and tutelage of the Ministry of the Interior19, and hence obliged to follow 
the rigid procedures of the public sector for personnel recruitment and salaries, local governments 
cannot attract competent, well educated, appropriate staff20. Consequently, they lack the planning 
and project development capacity, necessary for the preparation of project proposals for 
participation in EU or national development programmes, thus facing enormous difficulties in 
tapping vital for local development resources. Furthermore, the above mentioned deficiencies 
block and ultimately undermine important development projects, while, on the other hand, the 
undertaking of planning functions by the central state bureaucracy results in huge delays in the 
transfer of EU or national funds. Finally, because of the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the state 
structure, the decision-making process is much more time-consuming than in other local actors 
(i.e private or voluntary).
Under these circumstances, the role of political parties and local MPs is similar to that 
observed at the national level, that is role of interlocutors between the central state bureaucracy
19Until 1994 this function was executed through the prefectural directions o f  the Ministry o f  the Interior.
20It should be noted that higher education graduates represent only 9.9% o f  municipal personnel, while the 
majority (90.1%) are high school and secondary school graduates (Ministry o f  the Interior, 1996).
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and local authorities to facilitate the transfer of resources by circumventing bureaucratic channels. 
In this process, local government executives (i.e mayors) are increasingly involved in a similar 
to the observed by S. Tarrow (1974:46-47) in Italy, political brokerage, which implies the use of 
contacts with their own or other political party deputies to achieve objectives corresponding to 
local needs. The crucial importance of the political parties, however, is not simply reduced to 
their role in the transferring of the necessary resources, but also to their ideological and 
organizational impact on the management of local issues and the quality of local elites.
Thus, in the post-war period, local government constituted the traditional forum for the, 
almost permanently in opposition during the 1950s and 1960s, centre and left-wing parties. The 
majority of urban demoi in this period were under the control of coalitions formed between the 
centre and left-wing parties. This “castle of democracy” approach to local government, however, 
although it was seen as an appropriate political tool against the authoritarianism of the post-war 
state and the predominance of the “apolitical” approach to local government, in fact contributed 
to the marginalization of crucial for local governance issues, by merely using local governments 
as forums for opposition on issues of the national political arena.
With the restoration of democracy in 1974 a new profoundly-altered political landscape 
emerged, that was marked by the reformulation of the old and the emergence of new political 
parties21. During the first post-dictatorship period (1975-81), that was substantially preparatory
91" In the right wing o f  the political spectrum the pre-dictatorship right-wing party o f  National Radical Union 
was replaced by a new party, the N ew  Democracy (ND), that won the 1974 and 1977 elections and remained in 
power until 1981. In the centre and left wing, on the other hand, the legalization o f  the Communist left -that after 
the 1968 split was divided into the pro-Soviet Communist Party o f  Greece (KKE) and the Communist Party o f  the 
Interior (KKEes)- allowed for its first in the post-war period appearance in the formal political arena, while the 
emergence o f  the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which absorbed the pre-dictatorship centre-wing party, 
the Centre Union, and became gradually the dominant party o f  the centre-left, led to a significant shift o f  the whole 
political spectrum towards the left. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the foundation -from the 
Communist Party o f  the Interior and other small left-wing parties- o f  the Coalition o f  the Left has redefined the 
boundaries o f  the centre-left wing o f  the political spectrum, which currently consists mainly o f  the PASOK, the 
Communist party and the Coalition o f  the Left.
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period for the accession into the EC, decentralization and local government issues remained again 
at the margins of the public debate. The vast majority of municipalities were under the control 
of coalitions between PASOK and the parties of the communist Left, whose “politicization” 
approach to local government was in contradiction with the attitude of the New Democracy right- 
wing government, which considered local government as a branch of public administration 
(Christofilopoulou, 1990). The opportunistic strategy of PASOK, however, to exploit these 
alliances at the local level by presenting the image of a bloc of the so called “progressive 
democratic forces” against the “authoritarian” government led to the significant underplaying of 
local government issues as subordinates in the framework of the general confrontation with the 
government. A similar, in many respects, approach had been adopted by the major party of the 
communist left, the Communist Party of Greece, whose commitment to centralized state and 
central planning had led to a pathetic attitude of local governments, since local issues were seen 
as depended upon the change of government at the central state level. Additionally, the policies 
of these main opposition parties (PASOK and KKE) were crucially influenced by their common 
position against Greece’s entry into the EC. Within this political climate, there is no easily 
identifiable differentiation in administrative capacity at the local government level among the 
right and left-wing political parties. Rather, whatever the differentiation in institutional 
performance, it should be attributed, either to personal initiatives or, to the impact of 
differentiation in cultural or institutional capacity on shaping the interactions among the local 
actors. Moreover, the trend to use local government as a springboard for personal political 
elevation, which has had constituted common characteristic of all political parties in the post­
dictatorship period, should be attributed to these deficiencies of all parties’ policy approach to 
local government.
In the second, after 1981, post-dictatorship period, which is characterized, with the
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exception of the 1990-93 period, by the predominant role of PASOK in Greek politics, local
government has had continuously been the preferential policy area of PASOK in collaboration
with the left-wing parties, even though, since 1986, New Democracy has been proved particularly
competent in increasing its influence in major urban municipalities (Athens and Salonika).
Therefore, beyond the necessities imposed by the EC membership, the reluctant reforms
introduced by the PASOK governments during the 1980s should be partly attributed to the
PASOK’s powerful position in local governments, based on its well-established mechanisms for
political mobilization at the local level, since 1974. These local strongholds have had constituted
the first tier of the centralized clientelist structure of PASOK in the 1980s, upon which the
populist mobilization was based. Mouzelis (1995:19) notes:
Papandreou managed to build the first non-Communist mass party organization in Greece, 
with PASOK’s branches extending into the remotest Greek villages. This....contributed 
to the further centralization of political parties. Clientelistic bosses gradually saw their 
control over local votes being undermined by a populistically controlled, centralized party 
structure, which replaced traditional patrons with better-educated party cadres who 
derived their authority from above (from Papandreou’s charisma) rather than form the 
grass-roots level.
Within this framework, very often during the 1980s, local governments were used as the 
appropriate base for mobilization and support of PASOK’s policies at the national level and 
especially in foreign affairs22, thus underplaying their functions at the local level. However, the 
gradual shift of PASOK’s European policy towards the complete acceptance of the EU 
orientation of the country since the late 1980s and especially during its last -matured- term in 
office after 1993 has contributed to the change of local governments attitude and the refocusing 
of their interest in local rather than national policy issues. Within these changing attitudes, EU 
membership is no longer considered as a threat for local development, but rather as a challenge
“ O f particular importance in this process was the reluctant attitude o f  PASOK towards the EC membership 
until the late 1980s and the general confrontation towards US policies in sensitive foreign affairs problems, such 
as the Cyprus issue.
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for the reformulation of local interactions.
In conclusion, because of Greece’s highly centralized administrative structure, the role 
of the political parties as mediators between centre and periphery is crucial. However, there is no 
identifiable identical pattern of administrative capacity at the local level among the political 
parties. What matters is the strength or weakness of the systems of interactions at the local level, 
which determine the local institutional capacity and the way in which local demands are mediated 
at the national or European level. In a country, where centralized planning remains predominant, 
the way in which central-local relations are shaped is particularly evident in the framework of 
regional policy, the gradual Europeanization of which is the subject of the following section.
3.2 Regional Policy in Greece: the National and the European Context
The centralized, hierarchical structure of the Greek administrative system corresponds to the 
pattern of regional disparities between centre and periphery, the main feature of which is the 
concentration of population and economic, social and cultural activities primarily in the greater 
Athens area and secondarily in Salonika. The origins of the regional problem are traced back to 
the transformations occurred in the beginning of the twentieth century that led to the early take­
off of the industrial capitalist development. This process was boosted by the coincidence of 
several factors, such as the collapse of Asia Minor in 1922 and the subsequent refugees’ waves 
of 1.6 million people, the acceleration of land reform and an enormous influx of foreign funds 
(Mouzelis, 1978; Hadjimichalis, 1987). Since the industrial activities were concentrated in the 
major cities -Athens, Piraeus, Patras, Volos and Salonika- the industrial boom of this period 
constituted the first crucial factor for the formulation of what called “development axes of the 
country” (Patras-Athens-Salonika). During the post-civil war period, the emigration waves and 
the subsequent concentration of population in the Athens and Salonika areas combined with the
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administrative centralization contributed to the intensification of the problem, which became 
gradually the most serious national issue. Hence, the need for a national regional policy.
The evolutionary process for the formulation of a national regional policy, based on fiscal 
and monetary incentive packages (investment grants, interest-related subsidies, depreciation 
allowances) for attracting private investments in the periphery and creating basic economic and 
social infrastructure through the Public Investment Programme, can be divided in three pre-EC 
membership sub-periods: the first from 1948 to 1960, the second from 1961 to 1974 and the third 
from 1975 to 1979.
During the first post-war period, regional development policy was focused mainly on the 
abolition of indirect taxes imposed on the circulation of goods and services (the equivalent of the 
VAT), on increasing depreciation allowances for regional industry and on fiscal concessions for 
reinvesting profits25, while interest rate subsidies for industrial loans were introduced.
The second period (1961-74) was characterized by an upgraded role of regional planning 
at the national level. This trend was substantiated by the operationalization of Regional 
Development Agencies (RDA) at the prefecture level under the control of the then Ministry of 
Coordination, and by the creation of the Industrial Areas Network undertaken by the Bank for 
Industrial Development. Furthermore, with the institutional framework of that period26 the entire 
country was divided in four incentive zones and for the first time investment grants, conditioned 
on each region’s level of development, were introduced (Paraskevopoulos, 1988).
After the restoration of democracy in 1974 emphasis was placed on the improvement of 
the incentive schemes for the development of the border regions, and especially Thrace, for 
national reasons. Furthermore, in an attempt to rationalize the system of investment grants, the
25Law 843/48, Leg. Degree 2176/52, Law 3213/55.
26Law 4458/65, Leg. Decree 1078/71, Leg. Decree 1312/72.
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manufacturing branches were distinguished in branches of high, medium and low assistance 
(Paraskevopoulos, 1988). In the same period, however, the introduction of the first post­
dictatorship regional development plan (1978-82) signaled a shift in spatial and regional planning 
towards the nodal or “growth poles” approach to regional development27 (Konsolas, 1985:383-5). 
In particular, the main goal of the plan was the reduction of regional disparities through the 
development of a network of rival to Athens and Salonika cities. Thus, specific quantitative goals, 
in terms of population, were set up for primarily selected dynamic urban centres, the so called 
“Centres of Intensive Development Programmes” (KEPA-Kentra Entatikis Periferiakis 
Anaptyxis, i.e. Patras, Larissa), which were to be transformed into poles of self-sustaining 
development. Additionally, another network of less dynamic centres, consisting mainly of the 
capitals of the nomoi, constituted the so called “Municipal Urban Centres” (ASTOK-Astika 
Oikistika Kentra), in which special programmes for the improvement of infrastructure were 
provided. The rest of the urban areas of the country were organized in “Systems of Agricultural 
or Agro-Industrial Urban Centres”.
Although the notion of central economic planning had been introduced in 1964 following 
the establishment of the National Centre for Planning and Economic Research (KEPE-Kentro 
Programmatismou kai Erevnon), the five-year plans became gradually synonymous with highly 
centralized exercises on paper, because they did not take into account the real conditions and 
eventually they were not implemented. This rule did apply to this first post-dictatorship plan 
(1978-82), which was not implemented because of the change of government in 1981. Yet, it 
foresaw and influenced indirectly the developments, given that most of the urban centres selected 
by the plan for intensive development programmes became gradually, during the 1980s, growth
77
" The specification o f  the main goals o f  the programme was made by the decision o f  the National Council 
for Spatial Planning and Environment (23/3/79).
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poles, by concentrating population and economic resources from their broader region.
In the first period after the accession into the EC, which coincided with the coming into 
power of the PASOK government, the maintenance of the national character of regional policy, 
based on centralized “top-down” control, became evident in the modification of the system of 
regional development incentives, that was introduced by law 1262/8228. The innovations brought 
about by the reform were three-fold. First, the broadening of the range of activities qualified for 
incentives, by including, in particular, the non-state public sector of the economy, that is the 
entrepreneurial initiatives of local authorities and various cooperatives and associations. Second, 
the increasing involvement of the regional and prefecture councils in the decisions concerning 
the approval of applications, which, however, reinforced the role of central administration 
bureaucracy (Ministry of National Economy), since both the regional and prefecture councils 
were not directly elected bodies and there was no provision for the involvement of local 
governments (Andrikopoulou, 1992). Third, a re-designation of the four broad incentive zones, 
according to their level of development29, took place.
The top-down character of the decision-making, based on the dominant role of the 
Ministry of National Economy and its Regional Development Agencies at the prefecture level and 
the exclusion of the elected local authorities, coupled with the lack of coordination between the 
main responsible for regional development ministries of National Economy and Interior have had 
constituted intrinsic elements of the regional incentive policy (Psychopedis and Getimis, 1989:53-
" It should be noted that, despite several reforms, the main features o f  this framework, aimed at 
strengthening the attractiveness o f  peripheral regions for investment, have remained the same up today.
90
" Thus, the A and B zones o f  assistance comprise developed areas, such as the prefectures o f  Attica, 
Salonika, Corinth, Corfu (only for tourist enterprises), the city o f  Rhodes etc, the C zone consists o f  areas o f  
medium level o f  development, while in the D zone o f  high assistance level belong the border areas, among which 
the prefectures o f  Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Dodecanese (with the exception o f  the city o f  Rhodes. It must be noted 
that, as far as the tourist sector is concerned, the Cyclades prefecture (with the exception o f  M ykonos-zone B) 
belongs to the C zone.
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54). The coincidence of the above characteristics with the lack of information flows, 
communication and dialogue between actors at the local level led to the reduction of regional 
development policy into a series of fragmented and uncoordinated actions (ibid.). Since the 
incentives system and the Public Investment Programme constitute the main instruments of 
regional policy, the combination of centralized decision-making and the lack of local networks 
leaves little space for endogenous decision-taking, which is viewed as the main prerequisite for 
integrated development strategies (see chapter 1).
Moreover, interestingly enough, the gradual Europeanization of regional policy in the 
1980s, in contrast with most of the Northern member states, did not result to the reduction of the 
regional incentive expenditure, but rather to its significant increase30. This trend, which seems 
to be consistent with the expansionary fiscal policy followed by the PASOK governments in the 
1980s and not affected by the short austerity programme of 1986-88, should be attributed to the 
well established political clientelist relations (see previous section) and the subsequent protective 
role of the state. Additionally, the persistence of the national incentives scheme as a quasi­
national branch of regional policy has to a significant extent led, on the one hand, to a low 
contribution of the private sector to the sub-programmes or measures of the IMPs and CSFs (see 
chapter 2), and on the other, to the waste of national and European financial resources, since both 
the national contribution to the EU programmes and the regional incentives scheme are financed 
through the Public Investment programme.
The system of regional planning and the key role of the Public Investment Programme 
were at the centre of the institutional reforms imposed by the Europeanization of regional policy
j0The Regional Incentive Expenditure increased as a percentage o f  the national Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) from 0.07% in 1980 to 0.35% in 1985 and to 0.49% in 1990, and as a per head o f  the population o f  the 
assisted regions (ECU 1990 prices) from 7.13 in 1980 to 36.28 in 1985 and to 52.47 in 1990. Similar trends have 
been observed in Italy in the same period (CEC, 1994:135-142).
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with the introduction of the six IMPs in 1985 and the CSFs in 1989. The very substance of the 
Greek centralized planning procedures was challenged by the principles of European structural 
policy, and especially by the operationalization of partnership and subsidiarity to facilitate the 
mobilization of subnational governments in the planning and implementation processes (see 
chapter 2). The integrated approach initialized by the IMPs implied the start up of the institutional 
learning process for Greek subnational authorities, by requiring their active participation in the 
planning and monitoring procedures. The maintenance and endurance of the same approach in 
formulating the Regional Development Plans (RDP) of the CSFs created conditions of a 
permanent pressure upon the central state for decentralization and restructuring of the planning 
system. The major reform of the intergovernmental relations in the 1980s, introduced by law 
1622/86 (see previous section), coincided with the restructuring of the planning system, that was 
initialized by the 1983-87 five year plan. Thus, even though the IMPs and the RDPs were 
primarily conceived of as programmes for promoting economic development, their most 
important function in the Greek case has been that of ‘a financial “stimulus” to promote the 
reform of sub-national governmental structures’ (Papageorgiou and Vemey, 1993:141).
The main features of the new planning system were two-fold. First, the opening up of 
procedures of democratic planning at each spatial level, which would be facilitated by the 
institutional changes in the intergovernmental relations (elected prefectural councils). Second, 
the maintenance of the hierarchical, “top-down” structure, within which the coherence and 
complementarity of plans in terms of spatial level and time (short and long-term) would be 
achieved. Thus, the functional limits of the new system were set by its attempt ‘to combine “top- 
down” control with “bottom-up” definition of priorities’ (Andrikopoulou, 1992:198).
As is shown in Figure 3.3, while annual and medium-term plans are to be drawn up at 
each spatial level, each tier of government decides the allocation of Public Investment Funds to
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the next lower level. These decisions are constraint by the expenditure ceilings for each level of 
government defined by the ministry o f National Economy. Under these conditions, what the 
decentralization and democratic planning reforms implicitly brought about, was the identification 
of specific projects at each level of government, subject to the expenditure constraints of the 
higher tier. Moreover, given the lack o f directly-elected planning bodies at the prefectural level 
until the 1994 reform and the division of the Public Investment Programme into a national and 
a prefectural component, the real impact of democratic planning on the regionalization o f the 
budget was the -controlled by the centre- co-management o f the Public Investment Programme 
by the ministry of National Economy and the prefectures.
Figure 3.3
Regional Planning and Centre-Peripherv relations in Greece prior to the 1994 reform
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This structure of regional planning and budget management, dominated by the central role 
of the ministry of National Economy31, has constituted a major impediment to the implementation 
and monitoring of both the IMPs and the Regional Operational Programmes (ROPs) of the CSFs. 
In particular, the absence of direct links between the EU Commission and subnational 
governments has created major coordination problems and seriously inhibited the development 
of learning and adaptation capacities by the subnational elites, that constitute the prerequisites 
for the endogenously-driven integrated development strategies. Thus, during the formulation of 
the IMPs the centralization of decision-making was accompanied by a lack of formal or informal 
channels of information exchange and communication on intra or inter-regional basis, that is lack 
of intra and inter-regional horizontal institutional networks (Papageorgiou and Vemey, 1993). 
This inadequacy of local institutional infrastructure caused the piecemeal drawing up of the IMPs 
by the ministry of National Economy, instead of it being an outcome of integrated planning, 
within which local needs would have been taken into account32. Consequently, the 
implementation of two-thirds of the IMPs budget was allocated to central agencies, while the 
remaining one-third was managed by the prefectures (ibid.,: 148). Furthermore, in the monitoring 
procedures the lack of direct communication between the regional monitoring committees33 and 
the EU bureaucracy became evident, since the channels of information between supranational and
31The financial control function o f  the ministry o f  National Economy, implicitly based on the additionality 
principle, has resulted to the incorporation o f  the EU financial resources into the state budget, through which 
indirect financial support for the Public Investment Programme is provided. However, this process is also usually 
used for financing the national balance o f  payments deficit (Andrikopoulou, 1992:201).
j2The case o f  the Crete IMP, in which measures o f  tourist-related infrastructure (i.e airports), despite the 
w ill o f  public and private actors representing tourism interests, were underfunded for the benefit o f  subsidized 
private hotel investment (Papageorgiou and Vem ey, 1993:145).
j3The regional monitoring committees o f  the IMPs were chaired by the regional secretaries and their 
members included the sub-programme managers and local interest groups representatives and officials from at least 
two directorate generals o f  the EC Commission. Because, however, o f  the lack o f  preexisting network experience 
and administrative dysfunctions, their role was marginal.
134
subnational level passed through the central Inter-ministerial Committee. All these dysfunctions 
led, in substance, to the distortion of the scope of the IMPs, which were aimed at enhancing the 
learning and adaptation functions at the subnational level by the operationalization of the 
integrated approach. Thus, instead of being integrated strategic plans for development, the IMPs 
were essentially lists of proposals by the prefectures on the basis of demands from local 
authorities and other local agencies (Konsolas, 1992). Hence the eventual outcome -the lowest 
implementation rate in comparison with the other beneficiaries (France and Italy) (Leonardi, 
1995)- should be attributed to the limited Europeanization of the Greek administrative system and 
the lack of local institutional capacity. These weaknesses are indicated by the low rate of private- 
sector involvement in IMPs structural interventions34.
The lessons learned by the implementation of the IMPs, the upgraded role of the regional 
secretariat in drawing up the Regional Operational Programmes and administrative support 
provided by the programme managers and the evaluation consultants, are the main improvements 
in the implementation of the first CSF (1989-93). However, the unfavourable political and 
economic circumstances, especially during the initial phase, the well-known administrative 
weaknesses and the maintenance of the hierarchical structure of the planning procedures, 
functioned as counter-forces causing internal and external inconsistencies, significant delays and 
inefficiencies (CEC, 1995; Ioakimidis, 1996). With the Regional Operational Programmes, on 
the one hand, control of the ministry of National Economy over the financial resources of the CSF 
and more importantly over Community Initiatives funds and, on the other, the low quality of the 
local institutional infrastructure in learning and adaptation (absence of learning intra-regional 
networks) played an important role in inhibiting endogenous decision-making, the formulation
j4The private sectors was involved in 10% o f the individual interventions o f  the IMPs in comparison with 
around 46% in France and 28% in Italy (Bianchi, 1993).
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of integrated development strategies, and eventually the Europeanization of subnational 
governments. Nevertheless, there are signs of some differentiation in effectiveness among regions 
and prefectures (CEC, 1995), which point to the crucial role of civic culture and the strength of 
civil society, that can facilitate or inhibit the formulation of the system of interactions among the 
actors at the local level. The cultural peculiarities and the strength of civil society in Greece are 
the subjects of the next section.
3.3 Civil Society and the Cultural Schism
The question of civicness constitutes a crucial as well as neglected side of Greek history. Even 
though in R. Ingleharf s (1988) classification of European countries about mutual trust Greece 
appears to be above all parts of Italy, research on social trust and civic engagement is completely 
overlooked. However, the clientelistic political system, the lack of administrative transparency 
and the inadequate institutional infrastructure, which are the usually used explanations for the 
relative divergence of Greek economy (Lyberaki, 1993) and society, seem to be closely linked 
to an “extremely weak civil society” (Mouzelis, 1995:19).
Indeed, since the construction of the modem Greek state in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, its history has been dominated by a cross-cutting cultural schism -Diamandouros's 
cultural dualism32 - between two powerful and conflicting cultural trends: the Western on the one 
hand and the Byzantine-Ottoman on the other (1994:8). The former is linked to the western 
Enlightenment traditions of civicness, rule of law and constitutionalism, as they have been 
reformulated over time since their original Hellenic roots, and the latter to the pre-capitalist
35The notion o f  “cultural dualism”, which in the Greek case has a cross-sectional nature in the sense that 
it is not exclusively identified with specific institution or structure but rather cuts across every institution in Greek 
society, is used by Diamandouros under the conceptual framework o f  the “critical juncture”, that is as a determinant 
o f  the developmental trajectory useful in ‘path-dependent analysis’ and ‘chaos theory’ (Diamandouros, 1994:6-7).
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despotic tradition of strong state, clientelism and the Orthodox Church, that is a combination of 
the later Byzantine and Ottoman heritages (Mouzelis, 1986, 1995).
During the independence struggle the cultural schism was evident in the conflict between 
the revolutionary block of “westemizers”, within which the enlightened Greek diaspora of the 
West played the key role, and the reluctant block dominated by the Orthodox Church (Mouzelis, 
1978; Diamandouros, 1994; Clogg, 1979). The former consisted of the enlightened Greek 
diaspora bourgeoisie, the western-oriented, western-trained intelligentsia, who provided both the 
leadership and the necessary material resources for the struggle, and the masses of peasantry and 
ruined artisans, who were primarily interested in safeguarding their traditional rights against the 
increasing power of local notables. The latter (a reluctant) block comprised the Orthodox Church, 
whose hostility to any attempt to overthrow the Ottoman rule should be attributed to its fear of 
loss of its privileges and subsequently its political power; the Phanariotes, whose reluctance is 
easily explainable by their privileged position in the administrative hierarchy and their close 
relations to the Church; and the local notables, who because of their landowning power status 
were extremely reluctant to join the nationalist mood (Mouzelis, 1978; Filias, 1974; 
Diamandouros, 1994).
Two other important developments deserve reference, if the main features of the 
multifaceted processes that influenced crucially the structure of state/society relations are to be 
understood. The first refers to the protagonist role of Greeks in European commerce, which had 
been boosted, primarily, by highly favourable international circumstances that started as early as 
the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries. This development had a 
direct impact on what has been called the “early take-off’ period of the Greek capitalist
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accumulation, (Moscof, 197236, cited in Mouzelis, 1978:10-11), involving a significant shift from 
the distribution sphere to productive economic sectors. This second important development, that 
started in the middle of the 18th century, was marked by an increasing tendency of investments 
in the shipbuilding industry and handicrafts (mainly textiles), among which the Ambelakia 
cooperative is the most famous case37. However, the Ambelakia and the other cooperative 
handicraft industrial associations are directly comparable with and represent the Greek version 
of the 16th century proto-capitalist industrial movement in Europe and in particular the English 
industrial districts, that did not flourish because of the predominance of the paradigm of mass 
production that marked the dawn of the English Industrial Revolution (Mouzelis, 1978).
Thus, the eventually failed attempts at industrial development based on shipbuilding and 
handicraft cooperative activities signaled the predominance of the distinctively compradoric 
character of the Greek indigenous bourgeoisie and subsequently of Greek capitalism, which is 
not irrelevant to the structural and cultural characteristics of the modem Greek state.
Within this framework the cultural differentiation, a substantially Greek v Hellenist 
antithesis, has had far-reaching repercussions on Greece's transition to modernity and its capacity 
to adapt to changes in the global or European environments. The predominance of 
Diamandouros's famous 'underdog culture'38 during the period of transition, and even during the 
later period after the second world war and the civil war, determined to a significant extent the
36M oscof, C (1972) The national and social consciousness in Greece: 1830-1909 (in Greek):.83 ff, 
Salonika.
37The Ambelakia cooperative (an association o f  villages in Thessaly specializing in the production and 
export o f  high quality yam) employed 40000-50000 people and had an accumulated capital o f  20 million French 
francs, at the peak o f  its expansion -end o f  18th/beginning o f  19th century (V. Kremmidas, 1976, Introduction to the 
history o f  modem Greek society 1700-1821.: 143. Athens: Exantas; cited in M ouzelis, 1978:10).
i o
The most distinctive features o f  this culture are: the preponderant role assigned to the state vis-a-vis civil 
society; the underestimation o f  the role o f  institutions, the central role o f  the family in combination with clientelistic 
practices, and finally, a conspirational approach towards the Western world, combined with an overestimation o f  
the importance o f  Greece in international affairs (Diamandouros, 1994:15).
138
"qualities" of the contemporary Greek economy and society. Furthermore, the emergence of the 
subcultures of clientelism and populism (Mouzelis, 1995; Lyrintzis, 1993), coupled with the 
quasi-capitalist character of the Greek economy characterized by the dominant role of the state, 
have led to the "atrophic civil society"-"hypertrophic state" interplay (Campbell, 1964). 
Additionally, the peculiar combination of populism, clientelism and elements of state 
corporatism (Mavrogordatos, 1988,1993; Schmitter, 1995) after the emergence of PASOK in the 
1980s led to what may be called state-clientelist corporatism that has added to the deterioration 
of state/society relations at the expense of the latter (Paraskevopoulos, 1998). Deriving from this 
analysis and emphasizing the weakness of civil society similarities between Greece -as an 
exception from the other southern European countries- and Latin America, over, in particular, the 
transition from authoritarianism have been identified (Schmitter, 1986).
Under these considerations, mutual trust, norms of reciprocity and networks of civic 
engagement, which constitute intrinsic elements of civicness, are difficult to be identified. 
Conversely, the Greek version of individualism and free-riding, within the framework of a still 
pre-modem society, is countrbalanced by the well-publicized, substitutes for trust notions of 
filotimo and besa39, which however, being primarily irrational and non-contractual, in both the 
formal and informal senses, cannot be seen as convincing substitutes for mutual trust (Tsoukalas, 
1995). Hence, the irresponsible, authoritarian and anomic behaviour identified by Banfield with 
familism in Southern Italy may be relevant to the Greek case as well.
Yet, notwithstanding these unfavourable circumstances the process of Europeanization 
is interpreted as an external shock for society and the economy by imposing pressures for change 
(Kazakos, 1991). Furthermore, reactionary attitudes towards trade unionism and subject-oriented
39The notions refer to a sort o f  ill-defined, complex norms o f ‘civic responsibility and contractual honesty’ 
(Tsoukalas, 1995:197), which, however, being considered as irrational reciprocities, are problematically treated 
within the rational analytic framework.
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new social movements provide evidence of “from below” postmodern reactions that challenge 
well-established patterns of behaviour (Mouzelis, 1995). These trends are expected to create 
conditions of instability and change in the political system, which, even after Papandreou’s death, 
despite the current from above movement towards a more prompt adaptation, is still dominated 
by the cross-sectional rivalry between modernizers and populists.
Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that the combination of a centralized state structure and a weak 
civil society in Greece creates conditions that breed hierarchical clientelist networks, which in 
turn constitute a major impediment to learning, adaptation and Europeanization functions of the 
socio-political and economic structures. In particular, the well established clientelist networks, 
upon which the political system is traditionally based, have constituted the crucial determinant 
for shaping state-society and centre-periphery relations, since they function as mediators between 
the inefficient state bureaucracy and society (interest groups, civil society). Within this 
framework subnational governments’ functions have had to be accomplished between the Scylla 
of party-dominated political clientelism and the Charybdis of a highly centralized, hierarchically 
structured system of public administration.
However, the gradual process of Europeanization of regional policy in the 1980s has 
constituted an external constraint on administrative restructuring and adjustment of the 
hierarchically-structured Greek political and economic systems. Hence, the 1989 reform of local 
government finance, the establishment of the directly-elected second tier of subnational 
government at the prefectural level, and the initiation of democratic planning at the regional level 
have led to the opening up of the local governance system to bottom-up initiatives. However, they 
are crucially dependent on the strength of civil society and the formation of the system of
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interactions among the actors at the regional and local levels on a horizontal basis.
Although our analysis suggests that the peculiar individualism of the Greek people has 
led to a country of free riders, in which civicness and social capital are major problems for 
society’s capacity for learning and adaptation, the following chapters identify a regional 
differentiation in institutional learning and adaptation evolving from different traditions in 
institution-building, in the strength of civil society and in adaptation between the regions.
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4. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
IN SOUTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS
Introduction
Although the centralized state structure, as outlined in chapter 3, constituted an important 
constraint for local institutional capacity in Greece, given the dynamic character of the system 
of intergovernmental relations, the specificities of the system of intra-regional interactions play 
the decisive role for the dynamism of the local systems of governance and their capacity for 
adaptation. This chapter maps the institutional infrastructure in the Southern Aegean Islands 
region, drawing its political, economic, institutional and cultural (social capital) features.
4.1 The Local Specificities and the Political Climate
The Southern Aegean Islands region (NUT II) comprises 78 islands, from which only 43 are 
inhabited, with a population of 257.481, or 2.51% of the entire country's population (1991). It 
consists of two island-complexes and simultaneously prefectures, the Cyclades with a population 
of 94.005 inhabitants, and the Dodecanese with a population of 163.476 (1991). The 
demographic picture of the region1 is one of the best in the country since the early 1970s. After 
a substantial decrease during the decade 1961-71 (7.01% or 0.7 per annum) because of the 
internal and external emigration flows of the age, the population of the region increased 
significantly (12.6% or 1.26 per annum) in the decade 1971-81. Finally, during the 1981-91 
decade, the region demonstrated the best demographic picture in comparison with the other 
Greek regions. Its population increased by 10.25%, or 1.0 per annum, while all the other regions 
had lower rates of increase in the same period. At the prefectural level, the Dodecanese
1 [Ethniki Statistiki Ypiresiatis Ellados-ESYE: Apografes Plithismou 1 9 6 1 ,1 9 7 1 ,1 9 8 1 ,1 9 9 1 ]. National 
Statistical Service o f  Greece (NSSG): Population censuses 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991.
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prefecture, after a small decrease in population in the decade 1961-71 (1.63%) -by far the 
smallest among the five prefectures of the Aegean islands in the same period- since the early 
1970s has had demonstrated the best demographic picture in comparison with all the other 
Aegean islands prefectures, with an increase of 19.88% during the decade 1971-81 and 13% in 
the decade 1981-91. The Cyclades prefecture, on the other hand, shows a better performance 
when compared with the Northern Aegean islands, but lags behind of the Dodecanese. In 
particular, after a substantial decrease during the decade 1961-71 (-13.63%), its population 
increased significantly during the decades 1971-81 (2.46%) and 1981-91 (6.27%).
With regard to the educational features, the region lags behind the country averages. In 
particular, according to the 1991 population census, it demonstrates a lower percentage (7.1%) 
in university graduates when compared with the national mean (11.5%) in 1991. The picture is 
the same in the secondary education (27.95% vis-a-vis 31.5% respectively), while the region has 
a higher level of illiteracy than the national mean (7.75% vis-a-vis 6.8%).
The administrative and economic centre of the region is shared among the most 
prosperous islands. The capital city of the Syros island (Ermoupolis) is the capital of both the 
region (seat of the regional secretariat) and the Cyclades prefecture, while Rhodes is the capital 
of the Dodecanese. In terms of economic development, because of the significant intra-regional 
(among the islands) disparities, the economic centre of the region is shared among a leading 
group of developed islands consisting of Rhodes and Kos in the Dodecanese, and Mykonos and 
Santorini in the Cyclades. Additionally, the island character and the subsequent fragmentation 
of the space has important consequences for the administrative structure of the region at the sub- 
prefectural level. It involves ten provinces (provincial councils): seven in the Cyclades complex 
(Andros, Santorini, Milos, Naxos, Kea, Tinos, Paros) and three in the Dodecanese (Kos, 
Karpathos, Kalymnos). However, the subordinate character of the province vis-a-vis the
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prefecture and the first tier of local government (municipalities) and the short life of the directly- 
elected sub-prefects (the first election took place just in 1994) have resulted to their limited role 
within the regional system of governance.
A significant aspect of the spatial fragmentation within the region is illustrated by the 
problematic communication between the two island-complexes and the subsequent lack of 
communication and transport linkages between the capitals of the prefectures (Syros and 
Rhodes). Under these circumstances, although the old dispute between the Cyclades and the 
Dodecanese with regard to the seat of the regional secretariat is interpreted as a symptom of the 
traditional parochialism of the Greek periphery, it may be viewed as a consequence of the 
centripetal structure of the Greek administrative and transport systems as well. Thus, the island 
character of the region should be seen as an aggravating factor that simply contributes to the 
deterioration of the structural deficiencies that derive from the Greek socio-political system (see 
chapter 3). Nonetheless, the undertaken by the regional secretariat policy-making initiatives, 
especially since the early 1990s, are focused on actions ‘towards a cohesive and integrative 
approach to the development challenges facing the entire Southern Aegean Islands region’2. 
Given, however, the limitations of the role of the regional secretariat deriving from its function 
within the centralized and hierarchical structure of the public administration system and the fact 
that both the regional secretary and the regional councils are directly appointed by the central 
government, one should take into account the existing specificities and particularities at the 
prefectural level.
Thus, the Dodecanese, arguably the most prosperous of the two Southern Aegean island- 
complexes, was incorporated into Greece in 1947, being until then under Italian rule. This is
"Interview N o 41 with the General Secretary o f  the region (Ermoupolis, Syros: October, 1996).
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considered as a crucial factor for the shaping of an identical, in comparison with the rest of
Greece, political, economic and civic environment since the 1950s and 1960s. In particular, with
regard to the prerequisites for economic development, the special tariff regime for the imported
in the prefecture products since 1947 and the advanced infrastructure left by the Italians (land
registry, transport network, ports, airports, theatres, public buildings) have had constituted crucial
parameters for the formulation of the local specificities in terms of political, economic and social
climate (Getimis, 1989). As one of the interviewees3 underlined:
the physical infrastructure and cultural environment inherited from the Italians have 
constituted a unique asset for the tourist development of the Dodecanese, which, under 
a different -not that of the Greek state structure- policy making environment, would had 
secured the future of the Dodecanese islands as the leading tourist destination in Europe.
Furthermore, the local governance institutions and especially the city councils of Rhodes and Kos
as well as the private-interest organizations (Chamber) have been proved particularly competent
in comparison with their counterparts in other regions.
Additionally, within the Cyclades complex, some islands (Mykonos in the 1960s) started
to demonstrate a policy-making environment similar to the Dodecanese, while some other (i.e.
Syros) have had strong cultural and trade relations with western Europe originated in their role
as niches of early capitalist development in the middle of the 19th century (1830-1860) (Kardasis,
1987).
With regard to the political climate, the dominance of the parties of the centre and centre- 
left of the political spectrum in the Dodecanese should be stressed. In particular, by contrast with 
most of the other Greek regions which were characterized by the predominant role either of 
extreme Right or extreme Left-wing political parties, the moderate political climate has had 
constituted the main feature of the Dodecanese in the post-civil war period. In that sense, the
in terview  N o 60 with the President o f  the Rhodes Hotel Owners' Association (Rhodes, October, 1996).
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Dodecanese has had an identical, for the Greek case, policy-making environment, facilitated by 
a political climate, which was not seriously affected by the political upheaval of the post-civil 
war Greece. Thus, during the pre-dictatorship years, it was considered a stronghold of the big 
coalition of the small Centre-wing political parties, the Centre Union, while the political 
influence of both the Right and extreme Left-wing political parties was rather marginal. In the 
post-dictatorship period, however, the process of building the two-party system in Greek politics, 
involving the marginalization and later the elimination of the Centre Union, resulted to the 
gradual replacement of the Centre Union by PASOK as the predominant party in the Dodecanese 
politics (table 4.1).
TABLE 4.1
SOUTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS: DODECANESE Pref.:
Genera Elections 1974-1996 (percentage of votes by party'
PASOK
(Panhell.
Socialist
M ovem .)
N .D
(N ew
D em o
cracy)
EDHK
(Centre
U nion)
United
Left
K.K.E
(Comm.
Party)
Coalition  
o f  the Left 
(KKE+  
KKEint.)
K.K.E(i) 
(Comm. 
Party o f  
Interior)
Coali 
tion 
o f  the 
Left
POLAN
(Political
Spring)
DEKKI
(D em oc
Social
M ov.)
1974 21.01 45.35 16.98 2 .39 — — — — — ____
1977 27.71 41.43 25 .06 — 2.72 — — 1.15 ____ ____
1981 58.19 30 .29 — — 4.89 — 0.80 ____ ____ ____
1985 56.67 36 .10 — — 5.08 — 1.12 — ____ ____
1990 50.50 42.78 — — — 4.83 — ____ ____ ____
1993 56.41 35.32 — — 1.75 — — 1.84 4.12 ____
1996 51.48 34.21 — — 2.35 — — 3.53 3.90 3.20
SOURCE: Ministry o f  the Interior: National Elections’ results (1974-1996)
The Cyclades prefecture, on the other hand, having been during the post-civil war period 
and until 1981 a stronghold for the right and centre-right political parties, in the post-1981 period 
followed the changes in the political climate, characterized by a shift towards the centre-left of 
the political spectrum and led by the gradual emergence and endurance of PASOK in Greek 
politics (table 4.2).
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TABLE 4.2
SOUTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS: CYCLADES Pref.:
PASOK N .D EDHK United
Left
K.K.E Coalition 
o f  the Left 
(KKE+  
KKEint)
K.K.E
(int.)
Coalition  
o f  the Left
P O L A N DEKKI
1974 10.44 62.91 23.82 2.01 — — — — — —
1977 22 .92 54.95 12.61 — 3.45 — — 2.38 — —
1981 47 .02 45.75 — — 4 .56 — 0.67 — — —
1985 48 .12 45 .39 — — 4.31 — 1.14 — — —
1990 41.91 51.53 — — — 4 .70 — — — —
1993 48 .94 42.05 — — 1.71 — — 1.90 4 .69 —
1996 42.41 40 .66 — — 2.25 — — 3 .94 2.71 5.83
SOURCE: Ministry o f  the Interior: National Elections’ results (1974-1996).
At the prefectural level, after the 1994 elections both prefectural councils are dominated 
by PASOK (Table 4.3). In Dodecanese there was a clear majority for the PASOK candidate, 
while in Cyclades the centre-left coalition consisting of PASOK and the Coalition of the Left 
won the majority of the votes.
TABLE 4.3
SOUTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS: PREFECTURAL ELECTIONS 1994
(percentage of votes by party)
PA.SO.K N ew
Democracy
Coalition o f  
the Left
K.K.E POL.AN
Dodecanese Pref. 53.4 31.5 6.3 4.0 4.8
Cyclades Pref. 50.9
(Cooperation with 
“Coalition o f  the Left”)
49.1 — — —
Source: Ministry o f  the Interior: Prefectural Elections’ results, 1994.
Finally, at the local level (municipalities and communes), Dodecanese is characterized 
by a strong tradition of PASOK dominance. Even after the last (1994) election, the vast majority 
of the 17 municipal and the 57 communal councils of the prefecture are dominated either by
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PASOK, or by coalitions between PASOK and the Coalition of the Left. Thus, most of the 
mayorships and especially those of the big cities of the prefecture (Rhodes, Kos, Kalymnos) are 
held by the PASOK candidates. Furthermore, in Cyclades, although the majority of the 10 
municipal and the 107 communal councils are governed by PASOK or by coalitions with the 
Coalition of the Left, there is an important present of New Democracy mayorships in Mykonos 
and Andros.
To sum up, the Southern Aegean Islands region, despite the consequences of the state 
structure for administrative and economic dependence of the regional, prefectural and local 
governments on the central state, demonstrates a relatively good [for the Greek case] policy­
making and institution-building environment, especially at the prefectural level. The Dodecanese, 
in particular, has a strong tradition of collaborative relations among the local actors, which should 
be partly attributed to historical and cultural reasons. Additionally, some of the Cyclades islands 
have demonstrated similar trends, especially since the early 1960s.
4.2 Economic Structure, Boundedness and Adaptation
The Southern Aegean Islands region is one of the most converging regions in the country in both 
economic and welfare indicators. Subsequently, it demonstrates a relatively good ranking among 
the European regions (NUTS II). This is illustrated by the macro-economic indicators of table 
4.4. Thus, in the interregional comparison based on the GDP index (EU 12=100) the three year 
(1989-91) GDP average in PPS per inhabitant of the region is 52.2, well above of the country's 
average of 48.1. Additionally, in terms of unemployment, the region demonstrates a low rate 
(3.6) when compared with the country's average (7.8), while it has the second best, among the 
Greek regions, rate in the change of unemployment for the period 1988-93 (-1.5). Furthermore, 
it should be emphasized that in the interregional ranking of the EU regions according to their
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level of unemployment, the Southern Aegean Islands holds the twentieth first position within the 
group of the most converging regions in Europe (CEC, 1994:195-97).
TABLE 4.4
Principal Indicators per Region (NUTS II)
Regions
GDP three year average 1989-91 
(EUR 12= 100)
Share o f  sectors in total 
employment (1991)
Unemployment rate
per
inhab.
(PPS)
per pers. 
empl. 
(PPS)
per pers. 
empl. 
(ECU)
Agr. Ind. Serv. Rate
1993
Change
1988-93
1 .East. M acedonia &Thrace 43.3 42.2 31.4 43.0 20.3 36.7 5.5 -3.5
2 .Central M acedonia 46.8 53.1 39.5 25.1 28.4 46.5 6.2 -0.6
3. Western M acedonia 50.2 62.3 46.4 29.5 32.2 38.4 8.1 2.1
4.Ipeiros 36.2 41.1 30.6 34.8 22.5 42.7 9.9 4.9
5.Thessalia 43.7 49.2 36.6 36.1 24.5 39.4 7.0 0.1
6 .Ionian Islands 43.7 41.3 30.7 35.7 17.7 46.6 4.0 0.6
7. Western Greece 40.8 42.1 31.3 39.0 19.4 41.7 8.8 1.6
8.Sterea Ellada 58.0 73.0 54.4 38.3 27.2 34.5 7.1 0.2
9.Peloponese 47.3 51.2 38.1 45.5 19.5 35.0 5.7 -0.1
lO.Attiki 52.3 56.2 41.8 1.3 29.6 69.2 10.0 0.0
11 .Northern Aegean Isis. 35.2 42.3 31.5 20.7 17.3 61.9 9.0 3.6
12.Southern Aegean Isis. 52.2 67.2 50.0 8.4 23.7 68.0 3.6 -1.5
13. Crete 45.5 48.8 36.3 45.0 15.9 39.1 4.0 0.5
GREECE 48.1 52.8 39.3 22.2 25.7 52.1 7.8 0.1
Source: CEC, 1994.
The good economic performance in macro-economic indicators, however, should not be 
simply reduced to a symptom of the EU regional policy interventions. Conversely, it should be 
strictly linked to the preexisting trends of the development process in the region since the late 
1960s and early 1970s, which have been accelerated by the flow of the EU funds, especially in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, as it is shown in Figure 4.1, the average annual change of 
GDP during the decade 1970-80 (5.30%) was well above the country's average (4.57), while in 
the decade 1980-91 the region experienced the highest, among the Greek regions, rate of average
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annual change (23.16%) and, consequently, 
well above the country's average (20.07)4. Finally, 
in the post-1991 period, the share of the region 
in the national GDP increased substantially 
from 2.73% in 1991 to 2.78% in 1994.
Figure 4.1
However, the processes o f convergence and catching up in the Southern Aegean region 
are better illustrated by its ranking within the per capita GDP index (country=100) over time and 
by its performance with regard to specific welfare indicators. Thus, as it is shown in Figure 4.2, 
although the region had a relatively good ranking -sixth among the thirteen regions and definitely 
above the Northern Aegean- in 1970, it was lagging behind the country's average. During the 
period 1970-1981 it caught up to the third position within the index, just behind Attika and Sterea 
Ellada regions, and reached the country's mean. Finally, in the period 1981-91 the GDP per 
capita rate of the region exceeded the country's average. Finally, it must be emphasized that, even 
though the region was fourth in the 1991 index, in 1988 it was the second region just under 
Sterea Ellada.
4[Ethniki Statistiki Ypiresia Ellados-ESYE: Ethniki Logariasmi]. National Statistical Service of Greece, 
"‘National Accounts’’ (elaboration of primary data).
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Figure 4.2
In welfare indicators, the Southern Aegean Islands was the first region in telephones per 100 
inhabitants in 1991 and the second region in per capita savings, just after Attika in 1990 (see 
Figure 4.3). However, following the 
traditional weakness o f the Greek 
periphery in social services, according to 
1991 data, it lags behind in medical 
personnel per 1 0 0 0  inhabitants, which is 
mainly concentrated primarily in the 
Athens area and secondarily in Salonika 
(Central Macedonia)5.
?The weakness of the Greek periphery in medical personnel corresponds to the generally poor social 
infrastructure (Athanasiou, et.al, 1995:51).
W e l f a r e  In di ca t or s  ( G r e e c e = 1 0 0 )
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Figure 4.3
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The crucial factor, however, that can account for the Southern Aegean's good economic 
performance and the closing of the divergence gap is the prompt adaptation o f the economic 
structure o f the region, characterized by the shift towards the development o f the tertiary 
(services) sector o f the economy with particular emphasis on tourism since the 1960s. This trend 
is particularly evident in the sectoral distribution of employment, which is illustrated by the 
spectacular increase of the employment in the tertiary sector from 38% in 1971 to 50% in 1981 
and 6 8 % in 1991 (see table 4.4). Conversely, the employment in the primary sector (mainly 
agriculture) of the economy decreased dramatically from 36% in 1971 to 21.1% in 1981 and 8.4 
in 1991 (ibid). Furthermore, as the Location Quotients6 based on employment data show, the 
region of Southern Aegean Islands along with Attika -with values of the quotient varying from 
1.24 to 1.46 respectively- were the only regions of the country with a clear orientation towards 
the tertiary sector o f production in the 1980s (1981 and 1987) (Konsolas et.al., 1993:46-47). 
Nonetheless, the specific 
weight of tourism in the 
productive structure of the 
regional economy is 
illustrated by the share of the 
region in hotel units and in 
foreign tourists' overnights 
(see Figure 4.4).
6The Location Quotient is one of the main indicators used in regional analysis for the identification of the 
regional specialization and for interregional comparisons with regard to the economic structure of each region. It 
is based on indirect reference to the national data and its value (varying from lower, equal or higher than 1) shows 
the degree to which (lower, equal or higher respectively) a specific productive sector is developed in a specific 
region in comparison with the country as a whole.
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In particular, the Southern Aegean is the first region of the country in hotel units, accounting for 
24% of the total capacity7, while, simultaneously, it constitutes the main destination for foreign 
tourists with 32.8% in 19918.
Finally, in macro-economic indicators, the structural composition o f the regional GDP 
among the main productive sectors of the economy for 1994 is revealing. The sector of 
‘‘Miscellaneous Services”, which refers mainly to the tourist industry, accounts for the 36.53% 
of the regional GDP9 (see Figure 4.5). Hence, it constitutes the leading sector o f the economy 
with “Commerce” being the complementary services-oriented sector and “Agriculture” 
accounting for a rather marginal, for the Greek case, percentage o f regional GDP10. Furthermore, 
on an interregional basis, while the share of the Southern Aegean in the national GDP was 2.78% 
in 1994. its contribution 
to the specific sector o f 
“ M i s c e l l a n e o u s  
Services” on a national 
basis amounted to 
10.57% for the same 
year.
7EUROSTAT (1995) “EC Tourism in the 1990s”-DG XXIII.
8[ESYE (1991): Statistiki Tourismou]. NSSG (1991): Tourism Statistics.
9[ESYE (1994): Ethniki Logariasmif NSSG (1994): National Accounts: Section of Regional Accounts. 
l0Compare this with the outcome of the Northern Aegean Islands sectoral analysis (chapter 5).
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Regional GDP by Sector of Production (1994)
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Figure 4.5
Although the analysis o f the economic structure at the regional level constitutes a 
prerequisite for the evaluation o f the local institutional infrastructure, given the specifics o f the 
Greek administrative system (see chapter 3), the identification of the learning capacity o f the 
local system of governance requires the qualitative features at the prefectural level to be raised. 
Thus, at the prefectural level, the specifics of the economic structure and the local system of 
governance in Dodecanese can, to a significant extent, account for the developmental path o f the 
entire Southern Aegean Islands region, given the specific weight of the prefecture within the 
regional economic and political structure.
The first important feature of the Dodecanese economic structure is its prompt adaptation 
towards the tertiary sector of the economy and particularly the tourist industry. This process, 
which started in the 1960s, was facilitated, to some an extent, by the advanced infrastructure left 
by the Italians and by the special 
tariff regime" since its incorporation 
into the Greek state in 1947 (Getimis,
1989). Thus, as figure 4.6 reveals, the 
employment in the tertiary sector, 
which in 1971 was already the 
leading sector o f the Dodecanese 
economy, increased significantly 
from 43.3% in 1971 to 68.2% in 
1991, while the share
"This special tariff regime, involving initially tariff reductions to a wide range of imported in the 
prefecture goods, has been gradually restricted to a small amount of goods, such as china, textiles, umbrellas and
cosmetics (Getimis, 1989:137).
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of the primary sector dropped dramatically from 29.7% to 7.8% respectively. Hence, the 
economic structure of the Dodecanese is similar to that of Attika, rather than to the country's
average.
Furthermore, the emphasis on the development of the tourist industry becomes evident 
from the data on the sectoral composition of GDP. Thus, in 1994, the share of the “Miscellaneous 
Services” sector -the branch of the tertiary sector that refers mainly to the tourist industry- 
accounted for the 46.15% of the prefectural GDP, while in the same year the share of the primary 
sector was dropped to just 5.15%. Additionally, the Dodecanese prefecture accounted for the 
18% of the annual inflows of foreign exchange in the period 1988-92 (1988-92 plan, Prefecture 
report) and has had demonstrated an extremely low rate of permanent inhabitants per foreigner 
tourist overnight over time (see table 4.5).
TABLE 4.5
Permanent inhabitants per foreigner tourist overnight
PREFECTURES
1977 1981 1987 1991
Dodecanese Pref. 10.6 7.4 5.4 6.3
Cyclades Pref. 66.2 43.1 36.5 58.5
GREECE 1034.8 866.5 804.2 1243.8
Source: [ESYE, Statistikes Plithismou, 1981, 1991; Statistikes Tourismou, 1977,1987]. NSSG , Population Censi, 
1981,1991; Tourism Statistics, 1977, 1987.
The emphasis on tourist development, however, has had important consequences for the other 
sectors of the economy. Thus, as the data on industrial specialization at the prefectural level 
reveal, the viability of the industrial sectors in Dodecanese depends crucially on their 
complementarity to the tourist industry (Paraskevopoulos, 1988; Getimis, 1989). In that sense, 
the industrial specialization in traditional, for the Greek industry, branches, such as those of food 
(20), beverages (21), non-metallic mineral products (33) and furniture (26) should be attributed
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mainly to their complementarity to the tourist industry. The criterion of complementarity refers 
also to the primary sector, mainly agriculture, even though this trend has been substantiated 
recently (since the late 1980s). Conversely, during the initial take-off period, the increasing needs 
for agricultural products, because of the expansion of tourist industry, had led to an increased 
imports-trade, which had become the dominant sector of trade at the expense of the exports-trade, 
that was limited to just 3% of the import (Finas, 1981).
The concentration, however, of the tourist development in the islands of Rhodes and Kos, 
which are viewed as international tourist centres, has constituted the second important feature 
of the Dodecanese economic structure. In particular, even until the early 1980s Rhodes and Kos 
were dominated the tourist development in the prefecture with Rhodes concentrating the great 
part (86%) of the prefectural tourist product (Logothetis, 1983). Nonetheless, this trend has 
started to change since the late 1980s and early 1990s, given that the negative impact of the over­
concentration on the quality and the gradual shift of consumers' preferences towards the small- 
scale tourism (Stokowski, 1994) have had contributed to the diffusion of the tourist development 
to the other islands of the prefecture.
Finally, the last and most crucial feature of the local economic structure, which is related 
to the functional performance of the Dodecanese local governments, and hence to the degree of 
boundedness of the local system of governance, is the Council tax. The Council tax (4 and 2 per 
cent on the value of imports and exports of the prefecture respectively) that has been imposed by 
all -both city and communal- local councils constitutes an important financial resource for all 
local governments of the prefecture and points to a comparatively bounded and endogenously 
driven system of local governance. It should be noted that in 1985 and only for the councils of 
the Rhodes island the Council tax revenue reached the amount of 800 million drs (Rhodes 
council 55%) (Getimis, 1989:137). Thus, the revenue from the Council tax and the Income tax
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has led the local governments of Dodecanese (demoi and communes) to be the first in the country 
in terms of revenue per inhabitants (ibid.).
In this swing of the pendulum towards the tourism-oriented development followed 
gradually some islands of the Cyclades complex. This process was led by Mykonos in the 1960s, 
which had been favoured by a number of concurrent factors, such as the favourable international 
environment and a relatively good institutional infrastructure, was joined later by Santorini and 
the other islands. Nonetheless, as the data of table 4.5 demonstrate, the tourist development in 
Cyclades is less intense than in Dodecanese. This is because o f the diversification of the types 
of development among the Cyclades islands, with some islands being based on the tourist 
industry (Mykonos, Santorini) and some others remaining mainly agriculture-oriented (Naxos). 
Hence, the Cyclades complex is characterized by a considerable role o f agriculture in the 
productive structure o f the prefectural economy.
Thus, as Figure 4.7 reveals, despite the increasing importance of tourism in the prefectural 
economy since the 1970s, the agriculture sector retains a significant share o f the Cyclades GDP 
varying from 25.46% in 1970 to 21.40% in 
1994. Additionally, the Cyclades tourist 
sector accounted for only 12.75% of the 
sectoral regional GDP (Miscellaneous 
Services) compared with the 87.25% of 
Dodecanese. Conversely, the Cyclades GDP 
in agriculture constitutes the great share 
(67.76%) of the sectoral GDP at the regional 
level. However, in terms of the share o f the
Figure 4.7
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main sectors in the employment, the tertiary sector has jumped from 32.5% in 1971 to 66.6% in 
1991, while, according to the latest data available for 1998, the tourism and commerce sectors 
account for the 52.48% of the total employment12.
Finally, despite the lack of the Dodecanese historical background, there is a considerable 
degree of endogenous decision-making, which, although it was initially confined in Mykonos, 
gradually expanded to include the Syros institutional infrastructure. This may be interpreted as 
a combination of the specific weight of Syros and Mykonos; the former as the administrative 
centre (seat of the prefect) of the prefecture and the latter as the leading island in the tourist 
industry, which has resulted to an increasing weight of Mykonos local institutions, and especially 
of the mayor and the municipal council, in the decision-making process of the prefecture.
This section has demonstrated that the relatively good economic performance of the 
Southern Aegean Islands region is mainly because of the prompt adaptation of its economic 
structure towards the tertiary sector of the economy with particular emphasis on the tourist 
industry. This process was facilitated by capacities for endogenously-driven mechanisms of 
economic governance, primarily in Dodecanese and secondarily in the Cyclades. We now turn 
to examine, in the third and fourth sections, the crucial formal and informal institutional 
arrangements, that have underpinned the processes of learning and adaptation in these islands. 
Within this framework, the way in which local institutions as corporate actors interact with each 
other (institutional networks) and the crucial role played by the informal civic norms (civil 
society/social capital) is expected to show the way in which the structure-culture interactions may 
be viewed as the determinants of state/society relations and the capacity for learning and 
adaptation at the local level.
12[ESYE (1998): Apografi Katastimaton]. NSSG (1998): Firms and Employment Census per Sector o f  
Production.
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4.3 Local Institutional Networks and their Learning Capacity
This section draws the institutional map of the region and evaluates the structural features of the 
local institutional networks of general exchange. By measuring structural features, such as 
density, centralization and structural equivalence, we show the way in which the formulation of 
local institutional interactions through the processes of exchange, resource interdependence and 
power distribution affects the level of collective action and hence the learning and adaptation 
capacities at both the regional and prefectural levels.
4.3.1 Institutional Networks in the Southern Aegean Islands
The assessment of the structure of local institutional networks at the regional and prefectural 
levels is based on social network analysis (SNA) and, in particular, on density, centralization and 
structural equivalence measures, which reveal crucial features of the network structure, 
intrinsically linked to its collective action, learning and adaptation capacities (see chapter 2). 
These features -the degree of network cohesion (institutional thickness), the identification of the 
central actors within the network and finally the structure of the network- constitute indicative 
indicators of the way in which the interactions between the institutional actors are formulated and 
the public/private relations are shaped at the local level. Additionally, by using the 
multidimensional scaling technique all these features are illustrated within the graph of the 
network.
The most prominent public and private actors at the regional and local levels in 
reputation, position and role within the local system of governance were entered into the matrix13.
13The selection o f  actors is based on the criteria o f  their role within the local system o f  governance and the 
productive structure o f  the region or the prefecture. Therefore, local branches o f  corporate-umbrella organizations 
(i.e trade unions) or o f  central state agencies, which function as conveyors o f  central state policy choices (i.e the 
Ministry o f  the Aegean or the Tourist Training High School o f  Rhodes, run by the Greek Tourist Organization), 
have not been included in the matrix.
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Thus, at the regional level, twenty one actors were identified as central for the regional system 
of governance. The sub-group of public actors comprises: the regional secretariat (SRGS), the 
two prefectural councils (DPREFC and CYPREFC), the local associations of municipalities and 
communes (DAMC and CYAMC), the city councils of Rhodes and Kos (RCITY, KCITY) in the 
Dodecanese and Ermoupolis and Mykonos (ERCITY, MYCITY) in Cyclades and the University 
of the Aegean. Additionally, the group of the most important private-interest organizations 
consists of the two Chambers of Commerce (DCHAMBER and CYCHAMBER), two Hotel 
Owners' Associations (RHOTELA, MYHOTELA), the Tourist Agents' Associations (DTOURA, 
MYTOURA). Finally, the development agencies (DDA and CYDA), which are mainly focused 
on the management of EU Structural Funds programmes or initiatives have become important 
actors, especially since the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds and the increasing needs for 
management and monitoring of the Regional Operational Programmes and Measures and the 
Community Initiatives.
As table 4.6 reveals, the network at the regional level is characterized by low density 
(0.367) and high centralization (70%) indicators. What these indicators underline is that there 
are no actual intra-regional networks but only ones within each prefecture. In particular, because, 
on the one hand, of the administrative structure of the state (see chapter 3) and, on the other hand, 
the fragmentation of space due to the island character of the region, at the regional level the 
network is highly centralized around the Regional Secretariat. Two lessons, however, should be 
drawn from this observation: first, that the prefecture, mainly because of historical reasons, 
remains the main locus of economic and political governance; and second, that the region has not 
yet been legitimized as a key actor within the subnational level of governance. Thus, it constitutes 
the meso-level between the two main levels of governance: the central state and the local 
government, consisting of the prefecture and the municipalities.
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TABLE 4.6
Centrality Measures of General Exchange Network in the Southern Aegean Islands
Organizations Network Centralitv
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00
2. Dodecanese Pref. Council 55.00
3. Cyclades Pref. Council 50.00
4. Dodecanese Chamber 45.00
5. Cyclades Chamber 45.00
6. Dodecanese Ass. Munic.&Comm. 45.00
7. Cyclades Ass. Munic.& Comm. 45.00
8. Rhodes City Council 40.00
9. Dodecanese Tourist Ag. Ass. 40.00
10.Kos City Council 35.00
11 .Rhodes Hotel Owners Ass. 35.00
12.Kos Hotel Owners Ass. 35.00
13.Mykonos City Council 35.00
14.Ermoupolis City Council 30.00
15.Mykonos Hotel Owners As. 30.00
16.Mykonos Tourist Agents As. 30.00
17.Cyclades Training Centre 20.00
18.Dodecanese Development Ag. 15.00
19.Cyclades Development Ag. 15.00
20.University 15.00
21.Ermoupolis Development Ag. 10.00
Total Network Centralization 70.00%
With regard, in particular, to the extremely low specific weight of the University of the 
Aegean, it must be emphasized that, because of its location (its main departments are located on 
the Northern Aegean Islands), it constitutes a relatively more important actor for the Northern, 
rather than for the Southern Aegean Islands region (centrality measures). Furthermore, the 
marginal role of the Dodecanese, Cyclades and Ermoupolis development agencies should be 
interpreted as a result of their almost exclusive role in the management of programmes financed 
by the EU Structural Funds.
Thus, as Figure 4.8 based on the multidimensional scaling reveals, the regional secretariat 
is the central actor -mainly because of its role within the administrative hierarchy- and the real
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networks are those at the prefectural level.
Figure 4.8
Institutional Networks in Southern Aegean Islands Region
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4.3.2 Institutions and Institutional Networks in Dodecanese
The institutional infrastructure of the Dodecanese prefecture constitutes itself part of the heritage 
left by the Italians14. In particular, the “Italian heritage” should not be reduced to the physical 
infrastructure (road networks, airports, water and sewage systems), but it should include a series 
of pivotal institutions, such as the system of land registry15. Thus, the Dodecanese is the only 
prefecture in Greece with a land registry system, which has been a crucial factor for the 
protection of the physical environment, the separation between public and private use of land and 
the provision of public spaces in the cities. Additionally, beyond the city councils, which have 
been proved particularly competent in comparison with their counterparts in other regions,
l4Interview N o 60 with the president o f  the Hotel Owners' Association (Rhodes).
15It should be noted that Greece and Albania are the only countries in Europe without a national land 
registry system.
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Dodecanese demonstrates a strong presence of private-interest organizations, such as the 
Chamber, the Hotel Owners' Associations and the Tourist Agents' Association, which are active 
participants in the local system of governance.
The Chamber was established in 1949 and has 20287 members from all the islands of the 
Dodecanese complex. Although it is seated in Rhodes, it has three provincial offices in the Kos, 
Kalymnos and Karpathos islands and provides its members a wide range of services, such as 
administrative assistance, expert advice and reports, as well as information on important issues. 
Despite the fact that in Greece, as in most of the continental European countries, the Chambers 
are Public Law institutions, the Dodecanese Chamber constitutes the most historic and prominent 
private-interest organization and simultaneously one of the key actors in the institutional structure 
of the prefecture. In particular, having overcome its role as a unionist and corporatist body 
representing the merchants' interests, it is an important actor in the development process and the 
initiator of almost all the fora for information, dialogue and communication in the prefecture. 
Hence, it has been the key actor in the decision making processes in almost all policy areas. Thus, 
beyond its role within the regional council, it also participates in all decision making bodies, such 
as the economic and social committee of the prefecture, the health-related committees, as well 
as in the prefectural and provincial tourism committees. Finally, it is the only Greek chamber 
with a membership status in the Union of the Mediterranean Chambers (ASCAME), as well as 
in the EUROCHAMBERS, while simultaneously participates, along with the other chambers of 
the Aegean islands, in the only existing interregional (among the Southern and Northern Aegean 
regions) network, that is the Chambers' Association for the development of the Aegean Islands.
The Rhodes and Kos Hotel Owners' Associations constitute the second “pillar” of the 
private-interest institutional infrastructure of the Dodecanese. They were established in 1949 and 
1956 respectively and have had constituted, along with the Chamber, the crucial institutional
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components of the productive restructuring, that is the move from development based on 
agriculture and trade towards tourism, since the 1950s. The associations with around 650 
members (450 only the Rhodes association) have had constituted key actors within the local 
system of governance. The Rhodes Association in particular, plays a key role in initiatives and 
projects related to the tourist industry. Thus, it was the initiator, along with other institutional 
actors (i.e the Local Association of Municipalities and Communes of the prefecture), for the 
creation of an advisory committee -in substance an informal prefectural council- dealing with 
development issues, besides the formal prefectural council. This committee has been an 
important forum for dialogue and communication in the prefecture since 1984.
Finally, the Tourist Agents Association, constituting substantially the tourist department 
of the Chamber, is considered an important actor in tourism-related local initiatives, along with 
the Chamber and the Hotel Owners.
Within this framework, the existing evidence on distinguished, in comparison with other 
regions, institution building and network creation on a bottom-up basis should be linked to 
intrinsic qualitative features of the institutional infrastructure in Dodecanese. This evidence 
should include the following. First, the city councils, and especially the Rhodes and Kos councils 
have undertaken pioneering initiatives in creating infrastructure and providing social services. 
The Rhodes council, in particular, has created the first municipal transport company in Greece 
(ROD A) based on an initial Italian plan. Second, in a paradigm of horizontal networks at the 
local level, a mini-network has been created by the Hotel Owners Association, the Tourist 
Agents, the Chamber and the Association of Municipalities and Communes, focused on policy 
making initiatives with regard to the tourist industry. The institutional form of this network is the
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Organization for Tourist Promotion16, which is financed by a special council tax. Finally, the 
Dodecanese Cooperative Bank, which has been created on a Chamber's initiative in cooperation 
with the Rhodes City Council and its branches' network includes both the Rhodes and Kos 
islands, may be seen as a Greek version of rotating credit associations at the local level.
The quality of the local institutional infrastructure, however, is illustrated by specific 
indicators of institutional performance at the prefectural level, such as the distribution of the 
financial resources among the main sectors of the local economy (investment vis-a-vis 
consumption) and the priorities of the prefectural public investment programme. In particular, 
without taking into account the grants and subsidies of the national regional policy (law 
1262/82), the public investment expenditure for the years 1983,1984 and 1985 accounted for the 
46%, 51.5% and 61.8% of the total state expenditure in the prefecture respectively. Conversely, 
the public consumption and functional administrative expenses accounted for the 28.5%, 28.8% 
and 29.5% respectively, and the income support subsidies for the 21%, 16.9% and 21% 
respectively (Getimis, 1989:157). This investment-oriented structure of the public expenditure 
in Dodecanese diverges significantly from the country's average and especially from that of 
Attika region, where the public investment expenditure does not exceed the 25% and the 11% 
of the total expenditure respectively (ibid.).
Additionally, with regard to the sectoral prioritization of the public investment 
expenditure, the prefectural public investment programme (Collective Prefectural Fund's Action) 
demonstrates a more coherent and consistent orientation towards the “first priority” local 
problems, when compared with the orientation of the central state public investment (Collective
l6The Organization for Tourist Promotion, whose origin should be traced back to an initiative undertaken 
by the Hotel Owners' Association in the 1960s, constitutes a unique, for the Greek case, forum for dialogue, 
communication and subsequently learning at the local level, which has facilitated the adaptation process o f  the local 
productive and economic systems (Hotel Owners' Association, 1992, anniversary edition).
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Decision for Action). In particular, the sectors of transport/communication and water/sewage, 
which have had constituted the most crucial local issues given their impact on the tourist sector, 
were the first priorities of the prefectural public investment programme in the midi 980s, whereas 
the central state investments had not a coherent orientation corresponding to the local needs 
(Getimis, 1989:153-54).
The structure of the institutional networks in Dodecanese reflects the above mentioned 
qualities of the local institutional infrastructure, the outcome of its strong -for the Greek case- 
tradition in institution building since its incorporation into the Greek state in the early 1950s. 
Thus, the density measure of the general exchange network (0.727), which shows the degree of 
network cohesion, indicates that almost all the actors are connected to each other.
TABLE 4.7
Centrality Measures of General Exchange Network in Dodecanese Prefecture
Organization Network Centrality
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00
2. Pref. Council 100.00
3. Association Mun.&Comm. 90.00
4. Chamber 80.00
5. Rhodes City Council 80.00
6. Tourist Agents’ Ass. 80.00
7. Kos City Council 70.00
8. Rhodes Hotel Owners Ass. 70.00
9. Kos Hotel Owners Ass. 70.00
10.University 30.00
11 .Development Agency 30.00
Total Network Centralization: 33.33%
Furthermore, the centralization measures (table 4.7) reveal the way in which resources 
and hence power are distributed among the actors and, subsequently, the central actors within the 
network, that is those with the greatest number of linkages (Scott, 1994). The low degree of 
centralization (33.33%) demonstrates a horizontal, rather than vertical-hierarchical structure of
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the network. What the density and centralization measures indicate is that resources and power 
are rather equally dispersed among a wide range of actors, and subsequently this structure 
provides the ground for shifting alliances and creating synergies among public and private actors, 
which is a prerequisite for achieving collective action, and hence facilitating the learning and 
adaptation processes within the network.
Nonetheless, as the individual centralization measures of each actor demonstrate, certain 
actors hold more central positions than others. Thus, beyond the Regional Secretariat, whose 
central position derives from its role within the administrative hierarchy of the central state, there 
is a number of both public and private local actors, which provide certain capacities for 
alternative leadership roles. Thus, the following points deserve reference. First, the central role 
of the Prefectural Council, which is connected to all other actors, is complemented by the quite 
central position of the Association of the Municipalities that constitute the interlocutor between 
the first and the second tiers of local government and provides municipalities and communes of 
the prefecture crucial services, such as technical and administrative assistance. Additionally, the 
Rhodes City Council, the Chamber and the Tourist Agents hold quite central positions within the 
network, which reflects their key role in the decision making processes. Second, the low 
centrality of the University is due to its dislocation among the Aegean islands. In particular, the 
main university departments are located in the Northern Aegean islands (see chapter 5) with the 
exception of the education department, which is the only department located in the Southern 
Aegean (Rhodes). Moreover, the university is a quite new institution (it has been established in 
1985), which has not yet acquired its role within the institutional structure of the region. Finally, 
the marginal position of the Development Agency should be attributed to its exclusive orientation 
towards the management of EU regional policy programmes and initiatives.
The structural characteristics that derive from the analysis of centrality are further
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strengthened by the analysis of the structural equivalence, which identifies common structural 
positions among the actors with regard to their linkages (Scott, 1994).
Figure 4.9
Structural equivalence of Network Actors in Dodecanese
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What the structural equivalence of the actors in the Dodecanese general exchange network 
(Figure 4.9) reveals is that, beyond the public actors of block one -Region's General Secretariat 
and Prefecture Council- which are completely connected to all other actors and can constitute the 
leadership of the network, there is a second block consisting of both public -Rhodes and Kos City 
Councils, Association of Municipalities- and private-interest organizations -Chamber, Rhodes 
and Kos Hotel Owners'Associations and the Tourist Agents' Association. Even though these 
actors are not completely connected, with the exception of the two marginal actors of block three, 
namely the University and the Dodecanese Development Agency (DDA), they have a good rate
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of linkages within the network. The marginal character of the University and the DDA is because 
of the dislocation of the departments of the former among the Aegean islands and the specific 
role of the latter as an organization created primarily for the management of Structural Funds 
programmes (Community Initiatives).
Finally, the graphical depiction of the network, by using the multidimensional scaling 
technique, in Figure 4.10, reflects the above structural characteristics. The principal actors of the 
network (Regional Secretariat, Prefectural Council, Association of Municipalities, Rhodes city, 
Chamber and Tourist Agents) are depicted in the centre of the graph, while the other less central 
actors (Hotel Owners, Kos city) are depicted around the core centre. Conversely, the University 
and the Development Agency are at the margins of the network.
Figure 4.10 
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To sum up, the Dodecanese has a good [for the Greek case] institutional infrastructure, 
characterized by dense and horizontal local institutional networks. Despite the leading role of the 
Regional Secretariat and the prefecture as a consequence of the state structure, there is a
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considerable presence of synergistic networks that cross the public/private divide and play a 
decisive role in the local system of governance. Thus, the horizontal structure of the local 
network should be attributed to the upgraded structure of the local institutions rather than to a 
differentiation of the state structure.
4.3.3 Institutions and Institutional Networks in Cyclades
The institutional infrastructure in the Cyclades prefecture is, to a significant extent, similar to that 
of the Dodecanese. Despite the lack of the Dodecanese tradition in institution-building and the 
differentiation in institutional capacity and economic structure between the islands of the 
Cyclades complex, the central institutional actors of the prefecture are particularly active in 
undertaking initiatives towards the institutional and economic adjustment of the prefecture. Thus, 
beyond the Regional Secretariat and the Prefectural Council, which provide the formal 
leadership, mainly because of their role within the administrative structure of the state, a series 
of public (Association of Municipalities and Communes, Mykonos and Ermoupolis City 
Councils) and private-interest (Chamber, Hotel Owners, Tourist Agents) actors play an important 
role within the local system of governance. In particular, the underpinning factors that have had 
sustained the Cyclades institutional structure should be identified, on the one hand, with the 
strong trade and cultural relations of Syros with western Europe in the middle of the 19th century 
(1832-1857) and, on the other, with the prompt adjustment of the economic structure of other 
islands (Mykonos, Santorini) towards the tourist sector since the early 1960s.
Thus, with regard to the private-interest organizations, the Chamber constitutes one of 
the most historic and prominent actors within the local system of governance. It was established 
in the dawn of the Syros take-off period (1836) and has been the first chamber of the country. It 
is seated in Syros and amounts around 10000 members. Although it has been in the past the
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leading institutional actor because of its role in the export-oriented trade in the “golden” period, 
it currently focuses on leading the adaptation process of Syros and the other Cyclades islands, by 
combining tourist development with trade and a small scale agriculture17. Therefore, beyond 
providing its members the usual services in terms of administrative and technical assistance, the 
Chamber participates in initiatives focusing on self-sustainable development18 at the local, intra- 
regional and inter-regional levels. Hence, at the local level, it participates, along with the 
Ermoupolis City Council and the Association of Municipalities, in a local network, the 
institutional form of which is the Ermoupolis Municipal Development Agency. This agency 
focuses on the regeneration of the, famous for its architecture, Ermoupolis city and the 
management of related EU programmes or initiatives. Second, at the prefectural level, the 
Chamber is actively involved, along with the Prefectural Council and the Association of 
Municipalities, in the creation of the prefectural training centre, the establishment of a credit 
association focusing on financing local development projects, as well as in the development of 
an energy policy centre for renewable energy sources. Finally, the Chamber participates, along 
with the other chambers of both the Northern and Southern Aegean islands, in the only 
interregional network of the archipelago, the Chambers' Association for the development of the 
Aegean Islands, while it is active participant in the tourism committee of the Union of Greek 
Chambers.
The Hotel Owners and the Tourist Agents Associations are active participants in tourism- 
related initiatives undertaken especially by the city councils. In particular, they participate in the 
tourism committees of both the Syros and Mykonos city councils, with whom they usually take
^Interview No 43 with the president o f  the Cyclades Chamber (Syros, November 1996).
18In the particular case o f  the Syros island, the pursuit o f  the goal o f  sustainable development should not 
overlook the strong tradition o f  the island in shipbuilding industry, given that the Syros shipyard still constitutes 
an important parameter o f  its economic structure, accounting for a considerable share o f  the local employment.
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part in international tourism-related exhibitions (i.e Philoxenia). Additionally, they participate 
in the cooperative programmes for tourist promotion, organized by the prefectural council.
With regard to the public actors of the prefecture, the Ermoupolis and Mykonos City 
Councils have been proved particularly competent in taking initiatives with emphasis on tourism- 
related infrastructure, upgrading the physical and cultural environment and improving the training 
capacity of the prefecture. In particular, the Ermoupolis city council has developed a 
controversial project, financed jointly by the private sector (60%) and the Municipal Enterprise 
for Tourist Development (40%), for the creation of the Aegean casino on the Syros island by the 
end of 1997. Additionally, the mayor of Mykonos and the city council have played a key role 
within the Cyclades Development Agency (presided by the Mykonos mayor), which has been 
created on an initiative by the Prefectural Council, along with the Association of Municipalities 
and Communes. Finally, the Prefectural Training Centre is the outcome of the joint action 
undertaken by the Association of Municipalities, the Prefectural Council and the Chamber.
Looking at the structural characteristics of the institutional networks in the Cyclades, it 
reflects, to a significant extent, the above mentioned qualitative features of the local institutional 
infrastructure. Thus, the density measure in the general exchange network (0.545), which reflects 
the degree of network cohesion, indicates that most of the central actors are connected to each 
other. Additionally, as the centrality measures of table 4.8 reveal, the relatively high rate of 
network centralization (54.55%) is mainly due to the extremely low presence of the University. 
It should be noted that there is no any University department located on any of the Cyclades 
islands, which can partly account for its marginal role within the network. Therefore, the 
centrality measures do not correspond to a vertical structure of the network, but rather stress the 
division of the other network actors in mainly two groups. The first group consists of the leading 
actors with the greatest number of linkages, while the second comprises the less connected actors.
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TABLE 4.8
Centrality Measures of General Exchange Network in Cyclades Prefecture
Organization Network Centralitv
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00
2. Prefecture Council 81.82
3. Association of Munic.&Comm. 81.82
4. Chamber 72.73
5. Mykonos City Council 63.64
6. Ermoupolis City Council 54.55
7. Hotel Owners Ass. 54.55
8. Tourist Ag. Ass. 54.55
9. Training Centre 36.36
lO.Development Agency 27.27
11 .Ermoupolis Development Ag. 18.18
12.University 9.09
Total Network Centralization: 54.55%
Thus, beyond the Regional Secretariat, which is the most central actor because of its 
position within the administrative hierarchy of the state, the Prefecture Council and the 
Association of Municipalities and at a second stage the Chamber constitute the leading actors of 
the network, providing alternatives for leadership roles within the local system of governance. 
Furthermore, the Mykonos and Ermoupolis City Councils, as well as the Hotel Owners 
Association and the Tourist Agents, although less central, provide the ground for public/private 
synergies that facilitate the learning and adaptation processes. Additionally, the relatively 
marginal position of the Training Centre does not reflect the expectations for its dynamic role, 
especially in the implementation of EU Social Fund programmes, given that it is a quite new 
institution. Finally, the rather marginal position of the prefectural and the Ermoupolis 
Development Agencies should be attributed to the orientation primarily towards the management
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of Structural Funds programmes, while the University19 is at the extreme margins of the 
institutional infrastructure.
The main features of the institutional infrastructure that derive from the centrality 
measures are further strengthened by the block model of structural equivalence, which identifies 
common structural positions among the actors.
Figure 4.11
Structural Equivalence of Network Actors in Cyclades
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In particular, the structural equivalence of the actors in the general exchange network (Figure 
4.11) demonstrates a, to a significant extent, similar structure to that of the Dodecanese. More 
specifically, under the leading -public- actors of block one (Regional Secretariat, Prefecture
19Although the dislocation o f  the University departments among the Aegean islands cannot fully explain 
its extremely marginal role within the Cyclades institutional networks, there is a plan for creation o f  a School for 
Fine Arts in Syros. Additionally, there is a considerable involvement o f  the University in local networks during the 
implementation o f  the second CSF (1994-99).
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Council, Association of Municipalities and Communes) there is a group of public and private- 
interest organizations (Mykonos and Ermoupolis City Councils, Chamber, Hotel Owners' 
Association and Tourist Agents), which, although less connected within the network, contribute 
to its cohesive and relatively horizontal character. This is not revealed in the density and 
centralization measures mainly because of the marginal presence of the University.
Figure 4.12 
Institutional networks in Cyclades
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The graph of the network (Figure 4.12), based on the multidimensional scaling technique, 
represents the above mentioned structural features of the network. Thus, the Regional Secretariat 
(SRGS) is depicted at the centre of the graph surrounded by two groups of central actors which 
constitute the local network. The first group consists of the Prefecture Council, the Chamber and 
the Association of Municipalities (CYAMC). The second group comprises the Mykonos and 
Ermoupolis City Councils, the Hotel Owners and the Tourist Agents. Finally, at the margins of 
the network are depicted the Cyclades Development Agency (CYDA), the Training Centre
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(CYKEK), the Ermoupolis Development Agency (ERMDA) and the University.
In conclusion, the Cyclades demonstrates general exchange networks relatively similar 
to that o f the Dodecanese, which, with the exception o f the University and the EU Funds-oriented 
actors, is horizontally structured, thus providing alternative leadership roles and public/private
synergies.
4.4 Social Capital and Civic Culture
Beyond the fact that research on social trust and civic engagement is completely overlooked in 
Greece, its identification may be misleading, given the unclearly defined boundaries between 
trust and its famous Greek substitute 
o i filotimo (see chapter 3). Therefore, 
research on social trust, norms and
M e m b e r s h i p  in V o lu n ta ry  O rg an iz a t i on s  1996  
(percentage  o f  populat ion by ca tegory)
8% f /networks o f civic engagement, that is 7<>/0 y
6 % ^
social capital, should take into 5% X
4% 2
account the Greek specificities and 3 % r/  —V
2/0 Z y  0  Z V/peculiarities. Within this framework, 1 % ^  y  _ /y
0% ^  _yr — —/ .
it has been difficult to identify clear- Cultural Athletic  Health E nv /m ent  Other Total
cut differences in the levels o f social —  Northern A e g e a n
Southern A e g e a n
capital among the regions concerned.
However, as it is shown in Figure 4.13 
Figure 4.13, which is based on registration data of membership in voluntary organizations20, there
20The collection of the data has been facilitated by the ‘ VOLMED’ research project, financed by the EU 
Commission (DG V) and focusing on the registration of the voluntary organizations in the Mediterranean countries. 
The fieldwork research for Greece, which is now being carried out, has been undertaken by the Panteion University 
of Social Sciences and coordinated by the assistant professor, Dr. Stasinopoulou.
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is an almost clear superiority of the Southern Aegean Islands in all the categories of voluntaristic 
participation21. In particular, the differentiation is predominantly evident in the cultural and health 
care-related categories, as well as, at a second level, in the category ‘other’, which includes 
crucial sub-categories, such as the human rights and women organizations. Nonetheless, what 
the qualitative analysis of the data underlines, is that voluntarism and civic engagement in the 
Southern Aegean focuses mainly on initiatives for the provision of public goods (i.e health care).
Looking at the qualitative features of the fieldwork, however, an unclear picture emerges 
from the answers of our respondents -although they do not constitute a sample- to the questions 
about law and order (obedience of the law) and trust issues. In particular, while there seems to 
be a vast majority arguing there is trust in the region, another vast majority is negative about 
obedience of the law22. Additionally, there is some evidence on transgression of the law, 
especially about construction regulations, which is mainly related to the land registry system in 
Dodecanese (Getimis, 1989). Moreover, the presence of social trust needs to be further 
researched, since it is usually confused with the strong tradition offilotimo.
Nonetheless, the relative strength of civil society in the Southern Aegean should be 
attributed to the strong tradition of civicness in most of the Dodecanese islands and in some 
islands of the Cyclades complex (Syros, Mykonos). In the Dodecanese, it seems to be closely 
linked to the long period of Italian rule and the subsequent western orientation of the local 
economy and society. In the Cyclades, the tradition of civicness is related to the presence of a
91
“ It should be noted that the data, although they derive from registration, demonstrate age-long trends in 
terms o f  percentage o f  population, since the membership has followed the demographic and population trends. 
(Interview N o 49 with the responsible for cultural policy issues o f  the Dodecanese prefecture).
22More specifically, the “agree completely” and “more or less agree” answers amounted to around 90% 
o f  the respondents to the statement: “the citizens o f  the region usually obey the law only if  it does not contravene 
their personal interests”. Conversely, the same answers accounted for more than 95% o f  the respondents to the 
statement: “in this region usually people trust each other”.
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civic class in some islands (i.e Syros in the 19th century23), which influenced, to a significant 
extent, the prompt adaptation of other islands (Mykonos) towards the development of tourism 
in the 1960s.
However, an in-depth assessment of the strength of civil society and the presence of social 
capital would require the local specificities at the prefectural level to be raised. Thus, as the data 
of the table 4.9 reveal, mainly the health-care and cultural organizations can account for the 
strength of civil society in both the Cyclades and Dodecanese prefectures. For the former, it is 
particularly evident by the important presence of health-care and social protection-related 
organizations in both prefectures. In that sense, the following cases deserve special reference. 
First, in Syros, a 200-member strong complete network providing home-care services for 
disabled people has been established. Additionally, another huge, in comparison with the 
population, network of civic engagement involving 2000 voluntarist blood-donors in Syros has 
contributed to the substantial independence of the Cyclades prefectural hospital on blood24.
TABLE 4.9
Membership in Voluntary Organizations 1996 
(percentage of population by category)
Cultural Athletic Health Care Env/ment Other Total
Cyclades Prefecture 4.5 1.15 3.15 0.45 0.65 9.9
Dodecanese Pref. 2.8 0.75 2.5 0.3 0.45 6.8
Southern Aegean Isl. 3.4 0.9 2.8 0.35 0.5 7.95
Source: VOLMED Research Project (1996), author’s research; elaborated by the author.
Furthermore, in the Dodecanese, the Association of Persons with Special Needs with 2000 
members, by operating under city council schemes, provides social protection services and has
" Compare this with the Mytilene experience (chapter 5), which demonstrates a significantly different
picture.
24Interview with the president o f  the organization (Syros, October, 1996).
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been involved in several local initiatives. Within this framework, it had undertaken the 
implementation of the HORIZON I Initiative during the period of the first CSF (1989-1993) in 
the entire prefecture25.
With regard to the cultural voluntarist organizations, most of them (Lyceums of Greek 
Women, theatre groups) were established during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and 
were closely linked to the presence of a trade-oriented and strongly influenced by western cultural 
forms civil class. Thus, although the evident in the past civic traditions have been significantly 
undermined by the collapse of the old civil class in these islands, there are signs of cultural 
differentiation and relative civicness. Hence, in the particular case of Syros, a special city council 
tax, the so called “cultural tax” has been imposed focusing on the financial support of the local 
cultural organizations and, especially, the Lyceum of Greek Women, established in 1915, and 
several theatre groups26. Additionally, most of the other social protection-related organizations 
in Cyclades are financially supported by the city councils.
Finally, the considerable presence of voluntarist organizations concerned with human 
rights and women-related issues have been included in the category “other”. Thus, in the 
Cyclades prefecture women organizations have been identified primarily in the Naxos and Paros 
islands, which are actively involved in cultural activities as well. Additionally, in the 
Dodecanese, the involvement of the Kos and Rhodes women organizations in crucial local issues 
has been identified. The Kos women society, in particular, constitutes an important actor within 
the local system of governance, since it participates in several local networks in close cooperation
25Interview N o 59 with the president o f  the organization, a member o f  the Rhodes city council (Rhodes, 
November, 1996).
26Interview N o 44 with the mayor o f  Ermoupolis (Ermoupolis, October, 1996).
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with the Kos city council27.
This section has demonstrated in is that, despite the lack of mass survey data, there is a 
relatively civic policy-making environment in the Southern Aegean Islands region. In particular, 
beyond the data analysis, this trend seems to be vindicated by the qualitative features arising from 
the fieldwork research and is attributable to the pre-existing strong tradition of cultural and trade 
relations with western European countries in most of these islands.
Conclusions
This chapter has shown that the Southern Aegean Islands region has demonstrated a better, in 
comparison with the Northern Aegean Islands and most of the other regions in Greece, economic 
performance in macroeconomic indicators. This differentiation should be attributed to the prompt 
adaptation of the economic structure of the region towards the tertiary sector of the economy with 
particular emphasis on tourism. In institutional capacity, however, it has been shown that there 
are no actual intra-regional networks, but only ones at the prefectural level. This observation 
points to the fact that the Regional Secretariat remains at the margins of the local system of 
governance, because of historical and state-structure reasons.
Thus, the Dodecanese prefecture demonstrates a very good, for the Greek case, quality 
of institutional infrastructure, characterized by dense and horizontally-structured general 
exchange institutional networks and a relatively bounded system of local economic governance, 
which should be, to a significant extent, attributed to its tradition in institution-building since its 
incorporation into the Greek state in the late 1940s. This institutional infrastructure involves 
cooperative relations among public and private institutional actors and provides a variety of
97
" Interview with the president o f  the Kos women society (Kos, November, 1996).
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leadership roles, which, especially after 1994 with the elected prefectural council, provides the 
ground for a learning environment that can facilitate the adaptation process within the framework 
of the EU regional policy. The Cyclades prefecture, on the other hand, has a quality of 
institutional networks similar to the Dodecanese, but a less bounded system of local economic 
governance.
Finally, the good institutional infrastructure is facilitated by the presence of a relatively 
strong civil society and social capital endowments in both prefectures.
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5. POLICY ENVIRONMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
IN NORTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS
Introduction
As it has been shown in chapter 4, in the case of the Southern Aegean islands, despite the 
centralized structure of the state, the local specificities in institutional networks and in the 
strength of the civil society can play an important role in facilitating the learning and adaptation 
processes of the local system of governance. This chapter maps the institutional infrastructure 
in the Northern Aegean Islands region, drawing its political, economic, institutional and cultural 
features.
5.1 The Local Specificities and the Political Climate
The Northern Aegean Islands region (NUT II), with a population of 199.231 inhabitants, or 
1.94% of the entire country in 1991, consists of three big islands (Lesbos, Chios and Samos), 
each of which, along with some smaller islands constitutes a homonymous prefecture. Thus, the 
Lesbos prefecture with a population of 105.082 inhabitants (1991) comprises mainly the Lesbos 
and Limnos islands. The Samos prefecture consists mainly of the Samos and Ikaria islands with 
a population of 41.965 inhabitants (1991). Finally, the Chios prefecture with a population of 
52.184 (1991) comprises the Chios island and the small islands of Innouses and Psara. The 
demographic picture of the region is one of the worst in the country, characterized by significant 
population losses since the 1950s and 1960s. In particular, its population decreased significantly 
during the decades 1961-71 (17.30%) and 1971-81 (7.34%), while only in the 1981-91 decade 
the region demonstrated a small increase (2.17%).
At the prefectural level, the Lesbos prefecture has demonstrated the worst demographic 
picture since the 1960s, with population decreases of 18.14% and 8.87% for the decades 1961 -71
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and 1971-81 respectively, while only during the last decade 1981-91 it experienced a small 
increase in population (0.4%). The Samos prefecture demonstrates a similar picture with 
population losses of 19.82% and 2.85% during the decades 1961-71 and 1971-81 respectively, 
and a small increase (0.6%) during the 1981-91 decade. Finally, the best, in relative terms, 
demographic picture is that of Chios prefecture with population decreases of 13.30% and 7.57% 
during the decades 1961-71 and 1971-81 respectively and a substantial increase (4.7%) in the last 
decade 1981-91.
With regard to the educational features, the region lags behind the country averages with 
the exception of the illiteracy rate. In particular, according to the 1991 census, it demonstrates 
a lower percentage (7.46%) in university and technical colleges graduates in comparison with the 
national average (11.5%). Additionally, the situation is similar in the secondary education (28.1 % 
vis-a-vis 31.5% respectively), while the level of illiteracy is lower (5.30%) than the national 
average (6.8%).
The complete fragmentation of the administrative and economic structures between the 
three prefectures is the main feature of the region. Although Mytilene -the capital of the Lesbos 
prefecture- is the seat of the regional secretariat and hence the administrative centre of the region, 
it does not constitute the economic centre of the region, since the development patterns among 
the islands-prefectures are fragmented. Thus, the only similarity in terms of economic 
development among the islands is the low level of development. Additionally, the administrative 
structure is affected by the degree of fragmentation of space. In that sense, it involves only two 
provinces (provincial councils): one in the Lesbos (Limnos) and one in the Samos prefectures 
(Ikaria). However, for reasons similar to those in the Southern Aegean (see chapter 4) the role 
of the provincial councils remains marginal within the regional system of governance.
The fragmentation of administrative and economic structures is illustrated by the
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problematic transport and communication linkages between the islands-prefectures. Thus, the 
only existing transport linkage is a boat line between Lesbos and Chios, while Samos is 
completely isolated from the other two prefectures having transport and communication linkages 
directly with Athens. Therefore, the existing dispute between the three prefectures, regarding 
mainly the distribution of the public investment funds, should be viewed as a consequence of the 
radial structure of the Greek administrative and transport/communication systems and the 
structure of the intra-regional interactions. Within this framework, ‘the only cohesive institution 
of the region is the regional Secretariat, whose relatively good administrative structure is mainly 
due to the stability and continuity of the personnel’1. However, given on the one hand the 
limitations of the role of the regional secretariat (see chapters 3, 4) and, on the other hand, the 
existing differentiation in local specificities at the prefectural level, to identify the particularities 
of the policy making environment one needs to go into the analysis at the prefectural level. 
Moreover, the important common features of the Northern Aegean islands, in terms of their 
contemporaneous liberation from the Ottoman rule and incorporation into the Greek state, as well 
as their economic dependence on the trade with the Asia Minor region with which they had 
constituted an integrated economic area, do not abrogate the crucial role of the local peculiarities.
Thus, Lesbos was incorporated into the Greek state in 1912, being until then under the 
Ottoman rule. However, during the last years of the Ottoman rule (1880-1912) it experienced a 
period of early capitalist development based exclusively on the olive oil and soap production 
(Siphneou, 1996). The subsequent development of trade and cultural relations with the countries 
of the western Europe contributed, on the one hand, to the formulation of a cosmopolitan civil 
class and on the other to the start up of a premature working class movement based on germs of
'interview with the EU Commission (DG XVI) responsible for the Structural Funds programmes on the 
Aegean Islands (Brussels, June, 1996).
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the socialist ideas of the age (beginning of the 20th century). Nonetheless, the collapse of the Asia 
Minor (1922) and the world economic crisis of the 1930s led to the gradual decline of the Lesbos 
economy and society, which was still based on the monoculture of olive oil. Additionally, the 
subsequent refugees' wave played the key role in the formulation of a strong socialist movement, 
which constituted an important component of the newly founded (during the 1920s and 1930s) 
Communist party of Greece. Under these circumstances, Lesbos, having been headquarter of a 
very strong partisan army, became one of the main theatres of the Greek civil war (1946-1949) 
and a stronghold of the Communist party during the post-war period. Moreover, since the 
collapse of the old civil class in the 1920s, Lesbos has remained an olive oil-dependent economy 
and society, ‘demonstrating a consistently persistent lack of both institutional and policy 
adaptation, accompanied by the lack of local leadership that would had led the adaptation process 
of the economy and the society’2. Within this framework, the challenge of adaptation and 
adjustment constitutes the most crucial issue for Lesbos economic and institutional structures 
today.
Samos, on the other hand, has demonstrated similar to Lesbos economic and political 
characteristics. After its liberation from the Ottoman rule in 1913 incorporated into the Greek 
state. The refugees' waves that followed the collapse of Asia Minor led to the development of 
a strong communist tradition. Hence, during the civil war it was also a strong headquarter of 
partisan army. The Ikaria island, in particular, having been used as place for political exiles 
during the post-civil war period of political upheaval, continues, even today to be considered one 
of the strongholds of the Communist party. Thus, Samos has remained a primarily agriculture- 
oriented economy and society, characterized by lack adaptation capacity, even though in the post­
"Interview N o 4 with the president o f  the Local Association o f  Municipalities and Communes, Mytilene, 
(October, 1996).
dictatorship period there has been evidence of a shift towards the small scale tourism.
Finally, Chios, having been liberated in the same period with the other Northern Aegean 
islands (1912-13), has had demonstrated similar adaptation problems, without, however, the 
agricultural and partisan tradition of the other islands. Conversely, it is considered the island of 
ship owners and shipping-maritime industry, while on the other hand it has had characterized by 
a rather moderate political climate. Thus, its adaptation incapacity is related to its traditional 
dependence on the shipping-maritime industry.
TABLE 5.1
NORTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS: LESBOS Pref.: 
General Elections 1974-1996 (percentage of votes by party)
PASOK
(Panhell.
Socialist
M ov)
N .D
(N ew
Dem o
cracy)
EDHK
(Centre
Union)
United
Left
K.K.E
(Comm.
Party)
Coalitio  
n o f  the 
Left 
(KKE+ 
KKEint)
K.K.E
(i)
(Comm. 
Party o f  
Interior)
C oalitio  
n o f  the 
Left
POL.AN
(Political
Spring)
DEKKI
(D em oc
Social.
M ov.)
1974 15.14 42 .88 16.77 24 .54 — — — — — _
1977 20.79 42.77 7.96 — 24.13 — — 2.45 _ _
1981 39.9 31 .39 — — 26 .04 — 1.43 — — —
1985 44.48 30.23 — — 22 .58 — 1.62 — _ _
1990 37.78 38.78 — — — 21.83 — _ _ _
1993 47.63 33 .79 — — 11.53 — — 3.3 3.15 _
1996 40.93 31 .87 — — 14.39 — — 5.19 2 .35 3.98
Source: Ministry o f  the Interior: National Elections’ results (1974-1996)
Under these circumstances, the main feature of the political climate in both the Lesbos 
and Samos prefectures has been the Left/Right divide. In particular, the extreme Left-extreme 
Right clashes dominated the political life of both islands during the post-civil war period. Thus, 
Lesbos was considered the “red island”, because of the strong presence of the Communist party 
during the whole post-civil war period and even after the restoration of democracy in 1974 (table 
5.1). This trend was not affected by the emergence of the PASOK phenomenon in the first post­
dictatorship years, but only after 1993, when, for the first time, the Communist party experienced
a substantial reduction of its power for the benefit of PASOK and the other Left-wing parties (i.e 
Coalition of the Left). However, as it will be shown in section 4 of this chapter, the strong 
presence of this Communist party3 in the political life of the island, especially during the post­
dictatorship period, ‘has had important consequences for the local system of governance and its 
adaptation and learning capacity’4.
TABLE 5.2
NORTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS: SAMOS Pref.:
General Elections 1974-1996 (percentage of votes by party)
PASOK
(Panhell.
Socialist
M ov)
N .D
(N ew
Dem o
cracy)
EDHK
(Centre
Union)
United
Left
K.K.E
(Comm.
Party)
Coalitio  
n o f  the 
Left 
(KKE+ 
KKEint)
K.K.E
(0
(Comm. 
Party o f  
Interior)
Coalitio  
n o f  the 
Left
POL.AN
(Pol/cal
Spring)
DEKKI
(D em oc.
Social.
M ov)
1974 7.21 51.22 24 .52 16.37 — — — — — —
1977 10.88 43 .39 21 .54 — 17.58 — — 3.07 — —
1981 33.73 41.21 — — 21 .12 — 2.5 — — —
1985 40 .99 36.2 — — 19.3 — 2.48 — — —
1990 — 43 .76 — — — 52.91
(with
PASOK)
— — —
1993 43 .56 36.4 — — 12.22 — — 4.18 2.8 —
1996 35.67 36 .38 — — 14.82 — — 6.14 1.96 3 .06
Source: Ministry o f  the Interior: National Elections’ results (1974-1996).
The Samos prefecture demonstrates a similar to Lesbos political climate, characterized
by the strong presence of the Communist party, even during the post-dictatorship period.
Nonetheless, the specific feature of the Samos prefecture has been a more clear-cut Left/Right
divide, which is identified by the Right-wing New Democracy party percentages in the post­
3In Greece, after the 1968 split, which was crucially influenced by the Czechoslovakia invasion, there have 
been two Communist parties: the reformist and Euro-communist party (Communist Party o f  the Interior) that has 
more or less followed the trajectory o f  the Italian PCI and currently participates in the Coalition o f  the Left, and the 
hard-core more powerful party (Communist Party o f  Greece), which was well-disposed towards the ex Soviet 
Union.
interview  N o 4 with the president o f  the Local Association o f  Municipalities and Communes, Mytilene 
(October, 1996).
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dictatorship period (table, 5.2). Additionally, after 1993 there has been a considerable reduction 
in the percentages of the Communist party for the benefit of PASOK and the Coalition of the 
Left.
TABLE 5.3
NORTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS: CHIOS Pref.:
General Elections 1974-1996 (percentage of votes by party)
PASOK
(Panhell.
Socialist
M ov)
N .D
(N ew
Dem o
cracy)
EDHK
(Centre
Union)
United
Left
K.K.E
(Comm.
Party)
Coalitio  
n o f  the 
Left 
(KKE+ 
KKEint)
K .K .E(i) 
(Com m . 
Party o f  
Interior)
Coalitio  
n o f  the 
Left
POL. AN
(Pol/cal
Spring)
DEKKI
(Dem oc.
Social.
M ov)
1974 10.89 53.19 29.28 5.98 — — — — — —
1977 15.67 47 .76 27.03 — 5.4 — — 2 .14 — —
1981 48 .97 42 .68 — — 6 .18 — 1.01 — — —
1985 52.33 39.08 — — 5.91 — 1.65 — — —
1990 43.21 46 .64 — — — 7.53 — — — —
1993 50.05 38.75 — — 3 .19 — — 2 .64 4 .6 —
1996 45.51 37.82 — — 4.01 — — 5.62 3.2 2.31
Source: Ministry o f  the Interior: National Elections’ results (1974-1996).
Finally, the political climate in Chios is completely different. In particular, after the 
restoration of democracy Chios has demonstrated a rather moderate and similar to the trends at 
the national level political climate. Thus, while in the first post-dictatorship period it was 
dominated by the centre-right, after 1981 followed the changes in the political climate brought 
about by the emergence of the PASOK and the subsequent shift towards the centre-left of the 
political spectrum (table 5.3).
At the prefectural level, after the 1994 election, despite the considerable presence of the 
Communist party in both Lesbos and Samos, there is a clear predominance of PASOK in all the 
three prefectures (table 5.4). Thus, in Lesbos and Chios there was a clear majority for the PASOK 
candidate, while in Samos the centre-left coalition consisting of PASOK and the Coalition of the 
Left won the majority of the votes.
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TABLE 5.4
NORTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS: Prefectural Elections 1994
(percentage of votes by party)
P A S O K
(Panhellenic
Socialist
M ovem ent)
N .D
(N ew  Dem ocracy)
Coalition  
o f  the Left
K.K.E 
(Com m unist Party)
POL.AN  
(Political Spring)
Lesvos Pref. 40.8 32.2 9 13.9 4.2
Chios Pref. 46.9 44.3 4.3 4.6
Samos Pref. 42.3 
(Coop, with 
"Coalition o f  
the Left”)
41.1 — 16.6 —
Source: Ministry o f  the Interior: Prefectural Elections’ results, 1994.
Finally, at the crucial local level (municipalities and communes) Lesbos and Samos, have 
had a strong tradition of Communist party predominance. In particular, until recently (1994), the 
vast majority of the 10 municipal and 90 communal councils of Lesbos and the 5 municipal and 
43 communal councils of Samos were dominated by the Communist party. More specifically, 
most of the local councils of the Lesbos prefecture are still dominated by the Communist party, 
while only after the last 1994 election there have been some PASOK or Coalition of the Left 
majorities or mayorships. The climate in Samos is similar, although in the Samos prefecture there 
is a clear-cut differentiation between the Samos and Ikaria islands. In Chios, however, especially 
during the later period after 1981, the majority of the 9 municipal and the 32 communal councils 
are mainly PASOK or Coalition of the Left dominated.
In conclusion, the Northern Aegean Islands region demonstrates a lack of the political and 
structural prerequisites for a policy-making environment that would facilitate the processes of 
institution-building and adaptation at both the regional and prefectural levels. In particular, the 
monoculture of olive oil in Lesbos, the persistently strong dependence of Chios on the shipping 
and maritime industry and the agricultural orientation of Samos, which provide evidence for a 
lack of learning and adaptation capacities, point to the absence of crucial institutional and cultural
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features from the local system of governance. The strong presence of the stalinist communist 
party in Lesbos and Samos and, especially, the ideological orientation of this party after the 1968 
split have affected the qualities of the institutional infrastructure in these islands.
5.2 Economic Structure, Boundedness and Adaptation
Despite the close proximity and the similar level of natural resources with the Southern Aegean, 
the Northern Aegean Islands region is one of the most diverging region within Greece, as well 
as at the European level, in terms of both the economic and welfare indicators (see table 4.4). 
Thus, in the interregional comparison based on the GDP index (EU 12=100) its three year (1989- 
91) average in PPS per inhabitant of the region is just 35.2, lagging behind the country's average 
(48.1). Furthermore, the region has demonstrated one of the higher rates of unemployment (9%) 
well above the country's average (7.8%) in 1993, while it had the second worst rate of 
unemployment increase for the period 1988-93 (3.6). Additionally, in the interregional ranking 
at the EU level (NUTS II), according to the GDP per head criterion, the Northern Aegean is the 
sixth most diverging region in the EU (CEC, 1994:192-94).
This divergence, in macro-economic indicators, however, is not a new phenomenon, but 
it is linked to preexisting trends of the economic performance in the region. Thus, as Figure 4.1 
shows, the average annual change of GDP during the 1970-80 decade (2.18%) was inferior to the 
country's average (4.57%), as well as to that of the Southern Aegean (5.30%). Additionally, in 
the decade 1980-91 the region had the same with the national mean rate of average annual 
change, but it was lagging behind the Southern Aegean. Finally, in the post-1991 period the share 
of the region in the national GDP dropped substantially from 1.33% in 1991 to 1.31% in 19945.
5[ESYE: Ethniki Logariasmi]. NSSG , “National Accounts" (elaboration o f  primary data).
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The divergence gap of the region, however, is further illustrated by its ranking within the 
per capita GDP index (country=100) over time and by assessing its performance regarding 
specific welfare indicators. Thus, as Figure 4.2 reveals, the Northern Aegean was one o f the 
worst regions in the country in 1970, while during the 1970-81 decade it felt to the last position, 
lagging behind the country's average and the Southern Aegean. Finally, in 1991 the Northern 
Aegean Islands was the second worst region in the country just above Epirus. Moreover, with 
regard to welfare indicators, the region was inferior to both the country's average and the 
Southern Aegean in telephones per 100 inhabitants in 1991 and in per capita savings in 1990 (see 
Figure 4.3). Additionally, according to the 1991 data, it had one of the worst indicators o f the 
country in medical personnel per 1000 inhabitants (Athanasiou, et al, 1995:51), even though the 
low level o f social services constitutes a traditional weakness o f the Greek periphery.
Nonetheless, the crucial factor that can account for the economic divergence o f the region 
is the lack of adaptation o f its economic structure to the changing conditions. Thus, despite the 
close proximity to the Southern Aegean and the similar climatological conditions, the region has
continued to rely
on the traditional R e g i o n a l  G D P  by S e c to r  o f  P r o d u c t i o n  ( 1 99 4 )
-------------------------------------------------------- , I M A N U F A C T U R IN G  S .7% |
for each island C O N S T R U C T IO N  8 .5%
A G R IC U L T U R E  10 .0%
productive sector,
which has led to
the dominant role
C O M M E R C E  13.9V.I
M ISCELLA N EO U S SERV. 11.3* |
of agriculture in
B A N K IN G  3 .1%
the structure of H E A L T H  A  E D U C A T IO N  7.6% |
P U B L IC  ADM . A  D E F E N C E  7.5*
the regional
economy, which Figure 5.1
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is illustrated by the 1994 structural composition of the regional GDP. As Figure 5.1 reveals, the 
sector o f agriculture accounts for the 20% of the regional GDP and hence it constitutes the 
leading sector of the economy. Conversely, the sector of Miscellaneous services, which refers 
primarily to the tourist industry, represents just the 11.3% of the regional GDP6.
Additionally, although the share of agriculture in the total employment has been 
substantially decreased during the last decades, it still remains significantly high (20.7% in 1991) 
(see table 4.4). Moreover, this is vindicated by the Location Quotients for the 13 Greek regions 
based on employment data, which show the agricultural specialization o f the region in the 1980s 
(Konsolas, et.,al., 1993:46-47). Conversely, the share o f the region in the foreigners-oriented 
tourist industry in 1991 was just 2.2%, in comparison with the 32.8% o f the Southern Aegean 
(see Figure 4.4).
However, another crucial factor affecting the structural features o f the regional economy 
has been its dependence on the 
defence-related activities. In 
particular, because o f the 
deterioration o f the Greece-Turkey 
relations during the post-1974 period, 
the Northern Aegean Islands region 
is considered the most defence- 
dependent region of the EU. As 
Figure 5.2 based on employment data 
reveals, the Northern Aegean is the
6[ESYE: Ethniki Logariasmi, 1994], NSSG: National Accounts: Section of Regional Accounts, 1994 
(elaboration of primary data).
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first defence-dependent region in Greece, with a high (29.9%) share o f the defence-related 
employment (CEC, 1994:180). This may be interpreted as an indication o f the way in which the 
lack o f an endogenously-driven, bounded system of local economic governance and the 
subsequent failure o f structural adjustment and adaptation o f the regional economy, accompanied 
by a low level of economic performance, are substituted by non productive economic activities, 
such as the defence-related financial transfers o f the central state.
The structural characteristics at the regional level, however, are inadequate to capture the 
peculiarities of the local system of governance, because o f the role of the fragmentation of space 
and the specifics of the Greek administrative system, which require the qualitative features at the
prefectural level to be raised. Thus, the most important feature o f economic structure in all the
three islands-prefectures is the persistence on the traditional for each island productive sectors.
In particular, the strong agricultural tradition emphasizing the monoculture of olive (olive 
oil) is viewed as the main feature o f Lesbos's economic structure. Hence, it constitutes the 
explanatory variable for both its take­
off period in the dawn of the 
twentieth century and its gradual 
decline after the collapse o f the Asia 
Minor (1922). As Figure 5.3 shows, 
the share o f agriculture in the 
structural composition o f the Lesbos 
prefectural GDP has had always been 
extremely high, varying from 34.2%
Share  o f  A gr i cu l tu re  in L es b o s  G D P  (% )
35 %
30 %
2 5 %
20%
15%
10%
5 %
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in 1970 to 27.75% in 19947. Additionally, the share of agriculture in the total employment still 
remains identically high, even though it has been dramatically decreased from around 60% in 
1971 to around 29% in 19918. Conversely, the share of the sector o f Miscellaneous services, 
which reflects the dynamism of the tourist industry, accounted for just the 9.75 % of the 1994 
prefectural GDP9. What these data illustrate is the lack o f adaptation capacity o f the Lesbos's 
system of governance, which points to crucial weaknesses of the local institutional infrastructure, 
which are discussed in the next section.
Although Samos, on the other hand, has tried since the 1980s to combine the agricultural 
with small-scale tourist development, agriculture remains its basic economic sector. Thus, even 
though the share o f agriculture in the 
total employment has decreased 
significantly during the last decades, 
it still constitutes the second sector of 
the prefectural economy in terms of 
its contribution to the structural 
composition of the GDP. In 
particular, while the employment in 
the primary sector has dropped from 
57.1% in 1971 to 25.1% in 1991 with 
a parallel increase o f the employment
7[ESYE: Ethniki Logariasmi]. NSSG: National Accounts: Section of Regional Accounts (elaboration of
primaiy data).
8Thodori-Markoyiannaki et.,al (1986) and NSSG, 1991 census.
9[ESYE: Ethniki Logariasmi]. NSSG: National Accounts. Section of Regional Accounts, 1994 (elaboration
of primary data).
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in the tertiary sector (see Figure 5.4), agriculture accounted for the 13.34% of the 1994 
prefectural GDP vis-a-vis the 17.12% of the Miscellaneous Services (tourism)10.
Finally, Chios demonstrates a different from the other islands-prefectures economic 
structure, characterized by its dependence on its traditional sector o f the shipping-maritime 
industry. This is illustrated by the structural composition o f the prefectural GDP in 1994. As 
Figure 5.5 reveals, Chios main feature is the rather transport/communication and commerce- 
driven economy. In particular, they constitute the leading sectors of the prefectural economy, 
accounting for the 31.2% of the prefectural GDP. Additionally, the share of agriculture and 
tourism (miscellaneous services) is limited, with the share o f the latter not exceeding the 9.2% 
of the GDP. Thus, although Chios has the lower rate of employment in the primary and the 
highest rate in the tertiary sector of the economy (15.2% and 59.5% respectively in 1991) among 
the Northern Aegean
islands, its tertiary
s e c t o r - o r i e n t e d  
economic structure is 
not related to the
development of the
tourist industry, but to 
the role o f the 
c o m m e r c e  and  
transport/communicati 
on sectors.
I0[ESYE: Ethniki Logariasmi, 1994], NSSG: National Accounts. Regional Accounts, 1994.
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This point is further strengthened by the data on foreigner tourists overnights (table 5.5). 
According to these indicative indicators, Chios is the less tourist developed island of the Northern 
Aegean.
TABLE 5.5
Permanent inhabitants per foreigner tourist overnight
PREFECTURES
1977 1981 1987 1991
Lesbos Pref. 314.2 239.2 178.5 157.1
Chios Pref. 278 183.4 251.4 269.6
Samos Pref. 119.3 46.4 29.7 41.9
GREECE 1034.8 866.5 804.2 1243.8
Source: [ESYE, Apografes Plithismou, Statistikes Tourismou]. NSSG , Population Censi, 1981,1991; Tourism 
Statistics, 1977, 1987.
These indicators are also revealing with regard to the tourist development on the other islands 
of both the Northern and the Southern Aegean (see chapter 4). Thus, Samos is the most foreign 
tourism-oriented island of the Northern Aegean. Conversely, the underdeveloped, in general, 
tourist industry of the other Northern Aegean islands is mainly oriented towards the domestic 
tourist market. However, the Dodecanese is, by far, the most foreign tourism-oriented prefecture, 
while domestic tourism holds a significant share in the Cyclades tourist industry.
This section has shown that the economic divergence of the Northern Aegean islands 
should be mainly attributed to the lack of adaptation of their economic structure to changing 
conditions, remaining crucially dependent on the traditional for each island economic sector. This 
process is accompanied by the lack of any endogenous mechanisms of economic governance. The 
following sections are focused on the evaluation of the formal and informal institutional 
arrangements, that is local institutional networks and strength of the civil society, upon which 
the learning and adaptation processes depend.
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5.3 Local Institutional Networks and their Learning Capacity
This section assesses the quality of the institutional infrastructure of the region, by mapping the 
institutional networks of general exchange and measuring structural features, such as density, 
centralization and structural equivalence. These features are expected to reveal the way in which 
the formulation of institutional interactions through the processes of exchange, resource 
interdependence and power distribution affects the level of collective action and hence the 
capacities for learning and adaptation at the regional and local levels.
5.3.1 Institutional Networks in the Northern Aegean Islands region
The evaluation of the structure of institutional networks at both the regional and prefectural levels 
is based on social network analysis (SNA). The above mentioned structural measures (density, 
centralization and structural equivalence) refer to crucial structural features, such as the degree 
of network cohesion, the identification of the central actors within the network and finally the 
network structure, which constitute indicative indicators of the way in which the institutional 
interactions are formulated and the public/private relations are shaped at the local level. 
Furthermore, all these features are illustrated within the graph of the network, by using the 
multidimensional scaling technique.
Thus, the most prominent public and private actors at the regional and local levels in 
terms of reputation, position and role within the local system of governance were entered into the 
matrix. At the regional level, twenty three public and private actors were identified as central for 
the system of governance. Within this framework, the group of public actors consists of: the 
regional secretariat (NRGS), the three prefectural councils (LPREFC, CPREFC and SPREFC), 
the local associations of municipalities and communes (LAMC, CAMC and SAMC), the city 
councils of Mytilene (MCITY), Chios (CCITY) and Samos (SCITY) and finally, the University
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of the Aegean (UNIVER). Furthermore, the second sub-group comprises the most important 
private-interest organizations: the three chambers of commerce (LCHAMBER, CCHAMBER 
and SCHAMBER), the Lesbos farmers’ association (LFARMA), the Chios mastic growers’ 
association (CMASTA) and the Samos wine makers’ association (SWINE). Finally, the Lesbos 
and Chios training centres (KEKANAL and CKEK), as well as the development agencies in 
Lesbos (Local Development Agency-LLDA, Aeoliki Development Agency-AEOLIKI, Mytilene 
Municipal Development Agency-MDA) and Chios (Municipal Development Agency-CDA) 
constitute the outcome of public/private initiatives under the pressure of the increasing needs for 
the implementation of the Structural Funds programmes.
What the low density (0.237) and high centralization (83.55%) measures of table 5.6 
reveal, is that the structure of the network at the regional level is even worse than in the Southern 
Aegean. In particular, beyond the lack, in substance, of intra-regional interactions, the networks 
are even more fragmented within each prefecture. Thus, the regional network demonstrates a high 
degree of centralization around the Regional Secretariat. Given, however, the common 
administrative structure of the state and the fact that the fragmentation of space is not worse than 
in the Southern Aegean, the slight differentiation of network structures at the regional level 
points to different structures of institutional interactions at the prefectural level. Additionally, the 
relatively higher than in the Southern Aegean specific weight of the University (see chapter 4) 
should be attributed to the fact that its main departments are located in the Northern Aegean 
islands. Finally, the marginal role of both the Lesbos and Chios development agencies and 
training centres should be seen as a consequence of their almost exclusive role in the 
implementation and management of programmes financed by the EU Structural Funds.
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TABLE 5.6
Centrality Measures o f Exchange Network in Northern Aegean Islands
Organization Network Centrality
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00
2. Lesbos Pref. Council 40.91
3. Chios Pref. Council 36.36
4. Mytilene City Council 31.82
5. Samos Pref. Council 27.27
6. Lesbos Chamber 27.27
7. Chios Chamber 27.27
8. Chios City Council 27.27
9. University 22.73
10.Lesbos Farmers’ Ass. 22.73
11 .Samos City Council 22.73
12.Samos Chamber 22.73
13 .Lesbos Ass. Munic.&Comm. 18.18
14.Chios Mastic Growers’ Ass. 18.18
15.Samos Wine Makers’ Ass. 18.18
16.Lesbos Training Centre 13.64
17.Chios Ass. Munic.&Comm. 13.64
18.Samos Ass. Munic.&Comm. 13.64
19.Aeoliki Dev. Agency 9.09
20.Mytilene Mun. Dev. Agency 9.09
21 .Chios Mun. Dev. Agency 9.09
22.Chios Training Centre 9.09
23.Lesbos Local Dev. Agency 4.55
Total Network Centralization: 83.55%
Thus, in the graph of the regional network in Figure 5.6, which is based on the 
multidimensional scaling technique, the regional secretariat is depicted at the centre of the 
network, as central actor, mainly because of its position within the administrative hierarchy. It 
is surrounded by the other actors, which constitute the three prefectural networks. However, the 
structure of the networks at the prefectural level differ substantially in comparison with those in 
the Southern Aegean (see chapter 4). This is due to the different structural characteristics at the 
prefectural level, which will be raised from the analysis in the following sub-sections.
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Figure 5.6
Institutional Networks in the Northern Aegean Islands region
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5.3.2 Institutions and Institutional Networks in the Lesbos Prefecture
The quantitative and qualitative features of the institutional infrastructure in the Lesbos 
prefecture reflect the lack of local leadership since the collapse of the old civil class in the dawn 
of the twentieth century and its subsequent reliance on the centralized and hierarchical structures 
of the Greek state". Thus, Lesbos is characterized by a weak system of local governance, whose 
main feature is the lack of the appropriate decision making mechanisms and fora for dialogue and 
communication among the local public and private actors. Subsequently, the system of local 
interactions demonstrates symptoms of incapacity of bottom-up initiatives and abandonment on 
the central state agencies for the necessary financial, administrative and technical resources.
The weaknesses of the system of local governance are illustrated by the low level of
1 'interviews N o 4 and 8 with the presidents o f  the Local Association o f  Municipalities and Communes and 
the Local Development Agency respectively (Lesbos, October, 1996).
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synergies among the actors and the subsequent lack of an endogenously driven development 
strategy. Additionally, the public actors of the prefecture (i.e. city councils) are incapable of 
providing the necessary public goods (services) that would support the local productive system. 
Thus, it is almost exclusively relied on uncoordinated and fragmented initiatives undertaken 
mainly by specific private actors, such as the Chamber, which, however, lead to poor, in terms 
of effectiveness and efficiency, results.
Within this policy environment, the Chamber constitutes the only active institutional 
actor of the prefecture with 8400 members. Although it is seated in Mytilene, the capital of 
Lesbos, it has another provincial office on the Limnos island. It is one of the most historic local 
institutions -it was established during the “golden” age of Lesbos in 1918- and the leading actor 
in development initiatives focused on facilitating the adaptation capacity of the local productive 
structure towards the changing conditions of the environment. Thus, beyond providing its 
members the traditional services, it is the pioneer in local initiatives focusing on the shift of the 
local productive system towards small-scale tourist development supported by the agricultural 
sector. Within this framework, it has undertaken initiatives aimed at the tourist promotion of the 
Lesbos and Limnos islands, the agricultural restructuring by the exploitation of comparative 
advantages of the islands (cultivation of sweet-smelling herbs) and finally the creation of a 
cooperative bank to improve the financial services sector on the islands. However, “its action is 
restricted by the limitations and weaknesses of the local institutional infrastructure and the 
system of local interactions”12. Moreover, at the interregional level, the Chamber participates, 
along with the chambers of the other Aegean islands, in the only existing interregional (among 
the Southern and the Northern Aegean regions) network, that is the Chambers’ Association for
1 in terview  N o 3 with the president o f  the Chamber (Mytilene, October 1996).
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the development o f the Aegean Islands.
The Farmers’ Association, because of the agricultural orientation of the local economy 
with emphasis on olive oil, constitutes the second most important private-interest institutional 
actor of the prefecture. It has been established in 1931 and consists of 61 first degree 
organizations, most of which are olive oil-producing, representing around 13500 members. 
Although the leadership of the association has adopted a policy towards gradual agricultural 
restructuring, “the lack of fora for dialogue and communication at the local level and the 
mentality of the local society constitute crucial impediments for achieving collective action and 
synergies and hence for the adaptation process”13. Moreover, the lack of agricultural restructuring 
and adaptation has been identified as a crucial local issue from the respondents’ degree of 
satisfaction with regard to specific sectors of the economic and social structure of the 
prefecture14.
With regard to the public actors, it should be noted that Lesbos has been chosen as the 
seat of a wide range of public actors in a ‘from above’ attempt to enhance the development 
potential of the region, but with poor results. Thus, it constitutes the typical seat of the Ministry 
of the Aegean, whose, however, substantial headquarter and decision making centre is seated in 
Athens. Additionally, Lesbos has two of the basic departments of the University of the Aegean 
(environment and social anthropology). The case of the University deserves special reference, 
mainly because of the hostile environment it faced during the initial period of its presence on the 
island (1985-90). These identical of both the Greek parochialism and the local mentality 
reactions were rooted in well established short-term individualistic economic interests closely
'^Interview N o 5 with the secretary o f  the Farmers’ Association (Mytilene, October, 1996).
l4The vast majority o f  the respondents (98%), who, although do not constitute a sample, represent the most 
prominent local organizations, stated as ‘not at all satisfactory’ the situation o f  the prefecture regarding the 
agricultural restructuring (Interviews N o 1-23, Lesbos prefecture, October, 1996).
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linked to the preexisting function of the Educational Institute on the island and its large numbers 
of students15. Nonetheless, beyond the fact that the University is a quite new institution and 
hence rather marginal within the local institutional infrastructure, the evidence does not seem to 
support the hypothesis that the location of its main departments in Lesbos would provide the 
ground for an educational services-based model of development.
The structure of the institutional networks in Lesbos corresponds to the above mentioned 
features of its institutional infrastructure. Thus, the low rate of the density measure of the general 
exchange network (0.418), which reveals the degree of network cohesion, indicates that less that 
half of the actors are connected to each other.
TABLE 5.7
Centrality Measures of Exchange Network in Lesbos Prefecture 
Organization Network Centrality
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00
2. Lesbos Pref. Council 70.00
3. Mytilene City Council 70.00
4. Lesbos Chamber 40.00
5. Lesbos Ass. Munic.&Comm. 40.00
6. University 30.00
7. Lesbos Farmers’ Ass. 30.00
8. Lesbos Training Centre 30.00
9. Aeoliki Mun. Dev. Agency 20.00
lO.Mytilene Mun. Dev. Agency 20.00
11 .Lesbos Local Dev. Agency 10.00
Total Network Centralization 71.11%
Additionally, the centralization measures (table 5.7) reveal the way in which resources 
and power are distributed among the actors and, subsequently, the central actors within the 
network, that is those with the greatest number of linkages (Scott, 1994). Hence, the high degree
1 in terview s N o 11 and 30 with the secretary o f  the Research Committee o f  the University (Athens, 
November, 1996) and the dean o f  the Social Anthropology dept. (Mytilene, October, 1996).
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of network centralization (71.11%) indicates a vertical rather than horizontal structure of the 
network. What the low density and high centralization measures reveal is that power and 
resources are unequally dispersed among the actors, and subsequently, this structure inhibits the 
process of shifting alliances and creating synergies among public and private local actors and 
hence the learning and adaptation processes within the network. Thus, the local system of 
governance is characterized by a low degree of boundedness and endogenously driven decision 
making mechanisms.
In particular, as the individual centralization measures demonstrate, the Regional 
Secretariat, because of its role within the administrative hierarchy of the state, holds the central 
position within the institutional structure of the prefecture. Additionally, the only local actors 
with a substantial amount of linkages within the network are the Prefectural Council and the 
Mytilene City Council. All the other public and private actors are loosely connected within the 
network, which is an indicator for the lack of public/private partnerships and synergies creation 
and hence for a low level of collective action. Thus, the Association of Municipalities, despite 
its, formally, key role within the local system of governance as interlocutor between the first and 
the second tiers of local government, does not have the corresponding amount of linkages. The 
low centrality rate of the Chamber and the Farmers’ Association, on the other hand, which are 
the only private-interest organizations within the network, indicate the low, in general, level of 
the prefecture in public/private synergies. Moreover, although the University, because of its 
location, constitutes a more central actor in comparison with the prefectures of the Southern 
Aegean (Dodecanese and Cyclades), it cannot be considered yet integral part of the institutional 
structure of the prefecture. Finally, the marginal position of the training centres and the 
development agencies is generally improved within the policy network, because of their 
involvement in the implementation and monitoring of Structural Funds’ programmes.
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The structural features that derive from the analysis of the centrality measures are 
illustrated by the structural equivalence, which identifies common structural positions among the 
actors (Scott, 1994).
Figure 5.7
Structural Equivalence of Network Actors in Lesbos
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Thus, the first important outcome of the structural equivalence of the actors in the Lesbos general 
exchange network (Figure 5.7) is the central role of the Regional Secretariat, which is completely 
connected to all other actors of the prefecture. The second feature is that there are two other 
groups of both public (Prefecture Council, Mytilene City Council, Association of Municipalities, 
University) and private (Farmers’ Association, Chamber) actors that are loosely connected to 
each other. Hence, they cannot provide the potential for an endogenously-driven decision making 
mechanism that would provide the necessary alternative leadership roles. Finally, the prefectural 
and municipal development agencies (Lesbos Local Development Agency, Mytilene
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Development Agency, Aeoliki) are marginalized within the network, since they are mainly 
oriented towards the management and implementation of the Structural Funds programmes.
The graphical depiction of the network, by using the multidimensional scaling technique, 
in Figure 5.8 vindicates the above structural features. In particular, the Regional Secretariat is 
depicted at the centre of the graph and is surrounded by the actors of the second and third 
groups. The development agencies, however, are depicted at the margins of the network, 
according to the group of actors to which they are related.
Figure 5.8 
Institutional Network in Lesbos
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In conclusion, the Lesbos prefecture is characterized by a weak local institutional 
infrastructure, which has led to its dependence on the central state administrative structure for 
financial and technical resources. Thus, the network of general exchange has a vertical structure 
with the central role attributed to the Regional Secretariat. Additionally, the absence of a 
bounded and endogenously-driven policy-making environment is illustrated by the lack of local 
partnerships and synergies among public and private actors that would contribute to the
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overcoming of the public/private divide and achieving collective action.
5.3.3 Institutions and Institutional Networks in the Chios prefecture
The Chios prefecture demonstrates a relatively better quality of institutional infrastructure than 
Lesbos, which is interpreted, to a significant extent, as a consequence of the existing cultural 
differentiation (see section 5.4 of this chapter). The undertaken initiatives for the, unique for the 
Northern Aegean islands, voluntary merger of most of the communes of the island in five 
municipalities constitute an indication of its qualitative differentiation in terms of institutional 
infrastructure16. However, the quantitative and qualitative differentiation becomes evident mainly 
within the framework of European regional policy, by the comparatively higher level of local 
partnerships and synergies creation among the actors.
Thus, beyond the public actors, among which the City Council is the most active in local 
initiatives and has additionally established a cooperative relation with the University, the private- 
interest organizations, that is primarily the Mastic Growers’ Association and secondarily the 
Chamber play a key role within the institutional structure of the prefecture. This is due to their 
history and to their traditional links with the productive system of the island. In particular, the 
Chamber was established in 1918, during the take-off period of the Northern Aegean islands due 
to their trade relations with the Asia Minor region, and has around 3600 members. The Chamber 
is active participant in local initiatives pursued by the prefectural and city councils focusing on 
crucial local issues. Within this framework, it has played a key role in the procedures for the 
extension of the Chios airport, in the initiative for the creation of a trade centre in the city to
16The merger was a bottom-up initiative undertaken by the District Council o f  the northern part o f  the 
island before the compulsory merger, which is currently being imposed by the Ministry o f  the Interior in Greece 
(see chapter 3), and has had significantly improved the administrative and financial function o f  local authorities 
(Interview N o 13 with the local representative o f  the Coalition o f  the Left party; Chios, October, 1996).
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facilitate the development of the transport linkages of the island and in the creation of an 
industrial park17. Additionally, in cooperation with the Mastic Growers, it is actively involved 
in promotion projects and in joint participation in international exhibitions. Furthermore, along 
with the other Aegean islands’ chambers, it participates in the Chambers’ Association for the 
development of the Aegean islands, the only interregional network among the Northern and 
Southern Aegean regions.
The Mastic Growers’ Association, on the other hand, was established in 1938 and 
constitutes the umbrella organization for 20 first rank mastic growers cooperatives with around 
3000 farmers members. It aims at the collection, standardization and promotion of the mastic, 
which is a traditional product of the island. The main feature of the association is that it is an 
exports-oriented organization with an annual budget of 2.5 billion drs. Hence, it constitutes the, 
dynamically, most important private-interest institutional actor at the prefectural level. Under 
these circumstances, the Association, as most of the private-interest organizations of the 
Northern Aegean, favours the Greece-Turkey cross-border cooperation and the opening up of the 
Turkish market and therefore has a positive attitude towards the EU-Turkey Customs Union18.
Nevertheless, the strong presence of an isolation mentality accompanied by the intense 
fear of the Turkish threat, a consequence of the deterioration of the Greece-Turkey relations, are 
used as the explanatory variable for the poor institutional capacity of the prefecture. Thus, 
although the institutional capacity of the prefecture seems to be better than in the case of Lesbos 
(with a density rate 0.528), the network has a vertical and hierarchical structure. This is 
illustrated by the centrality measures of table 5.8, which reveal that beyond the Regional 
Secretariat and the Prefectural and City Councils there is a low degree of the private actors’
1 in terview  N o 10 with the president o f  the Chamber (Chios, October, 1996).
1 interview  N o 16 with the executive director o f  the Mastic Growers’ Association (Chios, October, 1996).
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involvement in the local system o f governance.
TABLE 5.8
Centrality Measures of Exchange Network in Chios Prefecture
Organization Network Centrality
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat
2. Chios Pref. Council
3. Chios City Council
4. Chios Chamber
5. University
6. Chios Ass. Munic.&Comm.
7. Chios Mastic Growers’ Ass.
8. Chios Mun. Dev. Agency
9. Chios Training Centre
100.00
87.50
75.00
50.00
37.50
37.50
37.50
25.00
25.00
Total Network Centralization: 60.71%
Thus, what the individual centralization measures of each actor demonstrate, is the
councils. However, the private-interest organizations’ (Chamber and Mastic Growers) relatively 
low rate of linkages within the network indicates the lack of public/private partnerships and 
synergies creation. Hence, this weakness of the institutional infrastructure cannot provide 
alternative leadership roles that a learning policy making environment and local system of 
governance would require. The relatively advanced role of the University should be attributed 
to the location of one of its main departments (business administration) on the island and, 
additionally, to its involvement in financed by the prefecture projects aimed at the improvement 
of the island environment by the management of the physical resources. Furthermore, the 
extremely weak presence of the Association of Municipalities, although its position is improved 
in the policy network, points to its outflanking by the City Council. Finally, the marginal role of 
the Municipal Development Agency is because it has been created by the City Council for the 
management of Community Initiatives, while the Training Centre is the outcome of a central
central role of the Regional Secretariat and, at a second stage of the Prefectural and municipal
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state actor (Greek Institute for Productivity) initiative and is also focused on the implementation 
of the EU Social Fund programmes.
The main features of the institutional infrastructure that derive from the centrality 
measures are further illustrated by the block model of structural equivalence, which identifies 
common structural positions among the actors.
Figure 5.9
Structural Equivalence of Network Actors in Chios
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In particular, as the structural equivalence of the actors in the general exchange network (Figure 
5.9) shows, the block of the leading actors consists of the Regional Secretariat and the 
Prefectural Council, which are linked to all other actors of the prefecture (with the exception of 
the Municipal Development Agency). Additionally, the City Council (second block) has a rather 
good rate of linkages within the network, with the exception of the Mastic Growers and the 
Training Centre. The fragmented role of the private-interest organizations (block four) is 
illustrated by the loose linkages with the public actors and by the strong relations among each
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other. Moreover, the role of the University and the Association of Municipalities is run out in 
the linkages with the Prefectural and City Councils. Finally, the Municipal Development Agency 
and the Training Centre are marginalized within the local system of governance.
The graph of the network (Figure 5.10) vindicates the above structural characteristics. 
Thus, the Regional Secretariat (NRGS) and the Prefectural Council (CPREFC) are depicted at 
the centre of the network, while, with the exception of the City Council (CCITY), all the other 
actors are portrayed at a rather marginal position around the central actors.
Figure 5.10 
Institutional Network in Chios
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To sum up, the Chios prefecture demonstrates a network structure, similar to Lesbos’s 
in many respects. In particular, the vertical rather than horizontal structure of the network is 
related to the relatively marginal role of private-interest organizations and, hence, to the lack of 
public/private local partnerships and synergies. Furthermore, although one of the basic 
departments of the University of the Aegean is located on the island, it has not yet been 
incorporated into the institutional structure of the prefecture. Nonetheless, the structure of the
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network is significantly improved in the framework of EU regional policy (see chapter 7).
5.3.4 Institutions and Institutional Networks in the Samos prefecture
The institutional infrastructure in the Samos prefecture reflects its isolation in terms of transport, 
communication and administrative linkages from the other prefectures of the Northern Aegean 
islands. Under these circumstances, the traditional for the Greek periphery parochialism has 
become more intense in the case of Samos, since it is associated with the issue of the distribution 
of the financial resources among the three prefectures of the region19. Thus, Samos demonstrates 
an extremely weak institutional infrastructure, characterized by the almost complete lack of local 
initiatives and subsequently by major cooperation and coordination problems among the 
institutional actors, whose relationships are almost exclusively confined within the framework 
of the necessary exchanges imposed by the functions of the administrative hierarchy. This policy 
making environment is further deteriorated by the huge divergence of the political climate among 
the main islands of the prefecture, that is Samos and Ikaria, in terms of the Left/Right divide (see 
section 5.1). However, the lack of any specific tradition in terms of the structure of the local 
economy may be seen as a positive factor in preventing the institutional lock-in and in allowing 
for some kind of tourist development.
Within this policy environment, the role of the Regional Secretariat is central within the 
institutional structure of the prefecture. Additionally, given the lack of any development agency 
that would combine public and private actors around specific development objectives, the 
Association of Municipalities has now undertaken an initiative for concentrating most of the
l9The percentage system o f  distribution o f  the Public Investment Programme financial resources (40% for 
Lesbos and 30% for Chios and Samos) is viewed as a crucial factor that contributes to the deterioration o f  the rival 
relations among the islands-prefectures (Interview N o 17 with the mayor o f  Samos city, Samos, November, 1996).
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local actors towards this objective20. The University, on the other hand, although one of its main
departments (mathematics) is located on the island, is completely marginalized within the
institutional structure of the prefecture, while the City Council is currently trying to pursue a 
form of cooperation21.
Moreover, the only important private-interest actor is the Association of Wine Producers. 
This is mainly attributed to the fact that the Chamber is a quite new institution. It was established 
just in 1988 by the merger of the two preexisting chambers of the prefecture and has around 4000 
members. The Wine Producers Association has undertaken some initiatives towards increasing 
its exports-orientation, while there have been identified cooperation problems with the 
Association of Municipalities.
Within this framework, the comparatively good rate of the density measure in the general 
exchange network (0.595) only partly reflects the real degree of the network cohesion, since it 
is based on exchanges deriving from the fundamental administrative functions of each actor.
TABLE 5.9
Centrality Measures of Exchange Network in Samos Prefecture
Organization Network Centrality
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat
2. Samos Pref. Council
3. Samos City Council
4. Samos Chamber
5. Samos Ass. Munic.&Comm.
6. Samos Wine Producers’ Ass.
7. University
100.00
83.33
83.33
50.00
50.00
50.00 
16.67
Total Network Centralization: 53.33%
20Interview N o 19 with the president o f  the Local Association o f  Municipalities (Samos, November, 1996).
9 1
" Interview N o 17 with the mayor o f  the Samos City Council (Samos, November, 1996).
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Additionally, looking at the centralization measures of table 5.9 the central role of the Regional 
Secretariat is illustrated. Furthermore, the Prefectural and City Councils have a considerable 
amount of linkages within the network, while the Association of Municipalities and the private- 
interest actors (Chamber and Wine Producers) are linked to half of the actors. Finally, the 
University is marginalized within the local institutional structure and its only link is that with the 
Regional Secretariat.
Figure 5.11
Structural Equivalence of Network Actors in Samos
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The block model of structural equivalence (Figure 5.11) demonstrates structural positions 
of the actors that correspond to their centrality measures. Thus, the Regional Secretariat is linked 
to all other institutional actors, while the University is clearly marginalized. The Prefectural and 
City Councils, on the other hand, are linked to all other actors with the exception of the 
University. Finally, the Association of Municipalities and the private-interest organizations have 
only the formal administrative linkages with the Regional Secretariat and the Prefectural and City
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Councils. Given the lack of any development agencies, the structure of the network reveals the 
fragmentation of the institutions within the prefecture and the absence of local partnerships.
This policy making environment is further illustrated by the graph of the network (Figure 
5.12), based on the multidimensional scaling. In particular, the graph demonstrates the lack of 
network cohesion and the loose linkages among the actors. The Regional Secretariat (NRGS), 
as the leading actor of the network, is depicted at the centre of the graph. The other actors are 
distanced form the centre, while the University is portrayed as the most marginalized institutional 
actor.
Figure 5.12 
Institutional Networks in Samos
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In conclusion, Samos demonstrates a weak institutional infrastructure, characterized by 
the vertical and hierarchical structure of the general exchange network, which has caused its 
dependence on the regional secretariat for administrative leadership. This unfavourable policy­
making environment has deteriorated by the diverging political climate among the islands of the 
prefecture and its isolation, in transport and communication linkages, from the other islands of
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the region. However, the lack of any strong tradition in its economic structure may be seen as a 
potentially positive factor that might facilitate its adaptation in the future.
5.4 Social Capital and Civil Society in Northern Aegean Islands
The identified in section 4.4 and illustrated in Figure 4.13 of the previous chapter differentiation 
in the level of participation in voluntarist organizations between the Southern and the Northern 
Aegean islands should be interpreted as an indication for the, in relative and comparative terms, 
weakness of civil society in the Northern Aegean Islands region. Beyond the quantitative analysis 
of the membership data, however, this weakness is vindicated by the qualitative analysis as well: 
in particular, the high level of voluntarist participation in organizations related to the provision 
of specific public goods, such as the health care and social protection, in the Southern Aegean 
islands vis-a-vis the negligible level of such a participation in the Northern Aegean.
Nonetheless, what both the quantitative and the qualitative analysis of the fieldwork 
research underlines, is that there is a similarity in attitudes between the two regions, with regard 
to the crucial law and order issue (obedience of the law22).
Looking at the prefectural level, however, the low level of voluntarist participation and 
the weakness of civil society in the Northern Aegean region seems to be related to local 
specificities and peculiarities. In particular, primarily the Lesbos and Samos respondents and 
secondarily those of the Chios prefecture underlined the role of the differentiation in mentalities 
between the Southern and the Northern Aegean23 in an attempt to explain the lack of adaptation
99
" In particular, the ‘absolutely agree’ and ‘more or less agree’ answers o f  the respondents, who, however, 
were not constituted a sample, to the statement: “the citizens o f  this region usually obey the law (traffic code, 
building regulations) only if  it does not contravene their personal interests” reached the 98% in all the prefectures 
o f  the Northern Aegean. Compare this with the, in many respects, similar outcome o f  the Southern Aegean (chapter 
4).
23Interviews N o 11 ,4 , 8, 6 ,1 2  (Lesbos, Samos, October-November, 1996).
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and the divergence gap of the region The usually used explanations for this differentiation, 
however, refer to feelings of isolation and to the fear of the Turkish threat, given the deterioration 
of the Greece-Turkey relations.
The in depth analysis of the fieldwork research at the prefectural level, however, points 
to a different direction. Thus, as the data of table 5.10 demonstrate, the voluntarist participation 
in the Lesbos prefecture is characterized by the lack of organizations focusing on the provision 
of social services-related public goods. Additionally, the only relatively active sector in 
participation is that of culture-related activities. Indeed, Lesbos is characterized by the presence 
of some historic voluntary cultural organizations, which are mainly literature and theatre- 
oriented24. The most important feature of Lesbos, however, is the intense evidence on lack of 
local leadership. This is interpreted as a consequence of the collapse of the old civil class without 
it having been replaced (Siphnaeou, 1996). Hence, the evidence from Lesbos seems to suggest 
there is neither local leadership nor networks.
TABLE 5.10 
Membership in Voluntary Organizations 1996
PREFECTURES Cultural Athletic Health Care Env/ment Other Total
Chios Pref. 4.9 0.15 0.9 0.8 0.45 7.2
Lesbos Pr. 1.1 0.18 0.15 0.1 1.53
Samos Pr. 1.2 0.1 1.3
Northern Aegean Isl. 2.15 0.15 0.25 0.3 0.17 3.02
Source: VOLMED Research Project (1996), author’s research; elaborated by the author.
On the other hand, the evidence from Chios seems to provide the best picture among the 
Northern Aegean islands with a particularly strong presence of culture-related voluntarist
24 Among others, the Agiassos Library, the Lesbos and A eolic Studies Societies and the Mytilene 
Progressive Society “Theophilos” deserve special reference.
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participation25. Indeed there seems to be an important activity of literature, treatre and music- 
related organizations, but negligible voluntarist participation in the provision of social services- 
related public goods. However, Chios demonstrates a better picture in all the other categories of 
voluntarist participation, such as the protection of the environment or the women issues-related 
social movements.
Finally, Samos seems to provide the weakest among the islands-prefectures evidence on 
voluntary participation with some culture-related organizations. Moreover, this picture of civic 
engagement and civicness seems to be consistent with the evidence from the institutional 
infrastructure of the prefecture.
What, however, reflects adequately the conditions of civicness and social capital 
endowments in the Northern Aegean is the evidence of the presence of social trust. In particular, 
by contrast with the Southern Aegean, a substantial number of the respondents in the Northern 
Aegean responded negatively to the question about the level of social trust in the region. This 
pattern of attitudes was more evident primarily in Lesbos26 and secondarily in Samos.
A catalytic, although overlooked, factor that seems to have influenced the formulation 
of crucial cultural norms, however, is the predominant role of the Communist party of Greece 
(the Stalinist one) primarily in the Lesbos and secondarily in the Samos prefectures, since its 
foundation in the late 1920s-early 1930s and definitely during the post-civil war period. Lesbos 
and Samos were until recently (early 1990s) considered -and in comparative terms they continue 
to be- strongholds of this Communist party. In Lesbos, in particular, the strong presence of the
25However, given the distinction between active and non-active members there should be a little doubt 
about the extent to which those data correspond to a really active voluntarism.
260 f  particular importance are the cases o f  the University Dean and the president o f  the Association o f  
Municipalities (Interviews N o 4 and 11), who expressed serious doubts with regard to the presence o f  social trust 
on the island: q. “in this region usually people trust each other”.
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Communist party seems to be related, on the one hand, to its phase of early capitalist 
development, which lasted until the dawn of the 20th century and, on the other, to the wave of 
refugees after the collapse of Asia Minor (see section 5.1). More specifically, the combination 
of the collapse of Asia Minor and the subsequent refugees’ wave with the strong presence of the 
Communist party and its later ideological orientation -well disposed towards the ex-Soviet Union 
and adoption of the central state-dominated ‘from above’ model of political and economic 
modemization-strongly influenced the formulation of the mentality and the attitudes at the local 
level. The main feature of this mentality is a specific victim’s attitude which has subsequently 
resulted in a pathetic and conspirational approach to events27. Thus, the answer of one of our 
interviewees to the question “what would better describe the region (Lesbos) ‘honesty’ or 
‘corruption’?” was characteristic about the cultural climate on the island. He said: “neither, only 
misery”28.
Under these circumstances Lesbos demonstrates an extremely weak civil society, closely 
linked to an unfavourable policy-making environment. In that sense, although it is similar and 
comparable to the Syros case, in history and social structure, it diverges significantly from it, in 
terms of both the quality of institutional infrastructure (networks and social capital) and the 
adaptation capacity (see chapter 4). Samos demonstrates similarities to the case of Lesbos, 
which are mainly related to the impact of political culture features on civic culture, despite the 
Left/Right divide between the two main islands of the prefecture (Samos and Ikaria).
Hence, this section has demonstrated that, despite the lack of mass survey data, there is 
evidence of a considerable differentiation, in civic environment, between the Southern and the 
Northern Aegean regions. In particular, the latter shows, in both quantitative and qualitative
27Interviews N o 4, 8, 10, 12 (Lesbos, October, 1996).
28InterviewNo 11 with the dean o f  the University -Social Anthropology dept.- (Lesbos, October, 1996).
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terms, a lower level of participation in voluntary organizations. Additionally, there is some 
evidence of anomic behaviour and lack of social trust, especially in the Lesbos prefecture. The 
increased influence of the Communist party, especially in the Lesbos and Samos prefectures has 
been identified as a crucial factor that has affected the level of social capital and civicness in the 
region.
Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that the divergence of the Northern Aegean Islands region at the 
national as well as at the European level is mainly because of the lack of adaptation of its 
economic structure to the changing conditions of the global and European environments. Thus, 
the basic feature of the economic structure of the region is its dependence on economic sectors 
traditional for each island. This deficiency of the economic structure, however, seems to be 
related to crucial institutional and political discrepancies of the region. In particular, the 
peculiarities of the institutional infrastructure of the region, given the common lack of intra- 
regional networks in Greece, because of the role of the prefecture within the state structure, are 
attributed to the specifics of the local systems of governance at the prefectural level.
The Lesbos prefecture is characterized by centralized and hierarchically-structured local 
institutional networks, which correspond to the structure of the system of local interactions in 
resource exchange and interdependence, as well as power distribution among the institutional 
actors. This structure reflects an unbounded and exogenously-driven local system of governance, 
which relies on central state institutions and particularly on the Regional Secretariat for financial, 
administrative and technical resources. The main feature of this weak local system of governance 
is the lack of learning and adaptation capacities, which is closely linked to an extremely weak 
civil society and lack of citizens’ engagement with voluntary organizations focused on the
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provision of social services-related public goods. Consequently, this has led to the continuous 
dependence of the Lesbos economy on the monoculture of the olive. Under these circumstance, 
a decisive role should be attributed to the unfavourable political climate characterized by the 
predominant role of the Communist party.
The Samos prefecture demonstrates a policy making environment to some an extent 
similar to Lesbos’s, characterized by multi-fragmented institutional networks at the prefectural 
level and lack of public/private synergies and local leadership. This extremely weak local 
institutional infrastructure is further aggravated by its almost complete isolation from the other 
islands-prefectures of the region. However, the lack of any particular tradition of productive 
orientation of the prefectural economy may be seen as a future asset for successful adaptation and 
adjustment, by avoiding the institutional lock-in. An illustration of that is the trend of the local 
economy towards small-scale tourist development supported by the agricultural sector.
Finally, Chios is partly differentiated from the other Northern Aegean islands, in 
institutional infrastructure and civic participation, mainly in culture-oriented voluntarist 
organizations. In particular, it demonstrates comparatively more horizontally-structured local 
institutional networks, without, however, having yet a learning and adaptable local system of 
governance. Moreover, this lack of adaptability is illustrated by the significant continuing 
dependence of its economy on the traditional sector of shipping and maritime industry.
Finally, the fieldwork research has clearly shown the inadequacy of the usually used 
explanations for the divergence of the region, that is the isolation and the fear of the Turkish 
threat.
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6. CATCHING UP BY LEARNING IN EUROPEAN STRUCTURAL POLICY: 
POLICY NETWORKS AND ADAPTATION IN SOUTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS
Introduction
Chapter 4 examined the institutional infrastructure in the Southern Aegean Islands region, and 
now this chapter focuses on the processes of both institutional and policy adaptation to European 
structural policy, with particular emphasis on the implementation and monitoring of the first CSF 
(1989-93). Since the CSFs have constituted a step forward in the formulation of European 
regional policy as far as the initialized by the IMPs integrated approach to development is 
concerned, evidence from the implementation of both the IMP (1986-92) and the initial face of 
the second CSF (1994-99) will be used on a comparative basis with regard to the adaptation 
process.
6.1 From the IMP to the MOPs
The introduction of the IMPs in 1985-86 has been interpreted as an attempt to initiate the 
integrated approach within the European regional development policy (see chapters 2 and 3). 
Within this framework the integrated approach to the development problems facing the Aegean 
islands determined, to a significant extent, the main priorities of the IMP for the entire Aegean 
islands area, which for the planning procedures of the IMP constituted a single region. The main 
priority objectives of the Aegean islands IMP were: first, the improvement of transport and 
communication linkages to combat the isolation of the islands; second, the control of the over­
concentration of tourism; third, the promotion of those islands underdeveloped by tourism; and 
fourth, the development of agriculture (URDP, 1992; Ministry of Nat. Economy, 1994a).
However, given the general problems in the planning and implementation of the IMPs in
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Greece, as discussed in chapter 3, the degree of completion o f the Aegean IMP cannot be 
characterized as satisfactory. Further, its implementation has demonstrated similarities with those 
of other regions (i.e Crete) in the dominant role of central state agencies in the management of 
the programme (Papageorgiou and Verney, 1993). The share o f central state agencies in the 
management o f the Aegean IMP funds almost reached 93% of the budget. Hence, as Figure 6.1 
reveals, even at the end o f 1993 the degree o f completion o f the actions o f the IMP as a whole 
was just 79%. In particular, looking at the measures o f the specific subprogrammes, the following 
points must be emphasized. First, the subprogramme IV for the development o f agriculture, 
involving mainly support for small-scale irrigation systems, fisheries and advisory services, 
demonstrates the greatest degree of completion (87%). Second, the crucial subprogramme III 
focusing on promoting tourist development in underdeveloped islands shows the least degree of 
completion (74%). It must be stressed that this subprogramme was mainly oriented towards 
supporting mostly central state agencies-driven schemes of agro-tourist projects for the tourist 
development o f areas in the
Northern Aegean islands with
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Figure 6.1. Source: Ministry of National economy, (1994a). 
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To achieve the objectives of the programme the particular measures in the Southern 
Aegean islands were focused on providing advisory services to SMEs, improving the roads, ports 
and airports linkages, as well as the tourist infrastructure (marinas, museums), by exploiting the 
cultural and architectural heritage, and reducing energy dependence and improving the living 
conditions (CEC, 1990a).
Nevertheless, although it has been extremely difficult to identify differences in the 
implementation of the programme -mainly because of its unified character- among the Southern 
and the Northern Aegean regions, some signs of an initially structural, but at a second stage 
effectiveness and efficiency-related differentiation has emerged. In that respect, the following 
points are significant. First, the Leros-programme1, which constituted an integral, as well as 
crucial, part of the IMP was almost entirely (98%) completed by the end of 1993, with good 
results for the island. Second, the emphasis on physical and social infrastructure, which will be 
raised in the following section as a structural feature of the MOP of the Southern Aegean, became 
evident even from the implementation of the IMP. In particular, the successful completion of the 
projects for the creation of two new airports on the Syros and Naxos islands and the substantial 
improvement of another one on the Karpathos island, which are the three of the four major 
interventions of the IMP in the airports-infrastructure policy area, all refer to the Southern 
Aegean region. Additionally, the Southern Aegean and especially the Dodecanese prefecture 
demonstrate a clearly better performance in the absorption of the ESF funds for training, 
emphasising in particular tourism (Ministry of Nat. Economy, 1994a). Finally, the interventions 
in the Northern Aegean islands region were mainly oriented towards the improvement of the
'The Leros-project was focused on the development o f  the Leros island, whose economy was almost 
exclusively dependent on the asylum for the mentally-ill. The goal achieved by the successful implementation o f  
the programme was two-fold; first, by facing the development challenges o f  the island in an integrated manner; and 
second, by bringing about a revolutionary, for Greece, reform o f  the psychiatric system.
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agricultural sector by small-scale irrigation schemes, the support of fisheries and the enhancing 
of central state agencies-driven initiatives for the creation of agro-tourist cooperatives. This trend 
should be interpreted as an attempt to reform the mainly agriculture-dominated productive 
structure of these islands, which, however, mainly because of its top-down character, had poor 
results.
To sum up: even though the IMP for the Aegean islands has demonstrated similar 
weaknesses with most of the other regions’ IMPs in planning and implementation, some signs 
of differentiation between the Southern and Northern Aegean islands regions have been 
identified, which point to the pre-existing differentiation in capacity for adaptation of the 
institutional infrastructure (see chapter 4). However marginal this differentiation may be, because 
of the role of the state, it is further illustrated by differentiation in the involvement of institutional 
actors, mainly in the implementation process of the IMP, as will be shown in the following 
section 6.3.1.
6.2 Planning and Implementing the CSF (MOP 1989-93)
The Multifund Regional Operational Programmes (MOPs) constitute the regional section of the 
Community Support Frameworks (CSFs), whose introduction marked the shift in European 
regional policy from the single-project to the programming approach. Furthermore, they opened 
up the process for establishing direct contacts between supranational and subnational levels of 
government and for active participation of the latter in the planning procedures of the 
programmes (see chapter 2). Thus, in Greece there have been thirteen MOPs for the thirteen 
Greek regions. Each MOP consists of mainly three subprogrammes corresponding to the three 
Funds responsible for the co-financing of the Community’s structural interventions, that is 
ERDF, ESF and EAGGF-Guidance Section, whilst the financial resources are allocated according
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to priority objectives specified for each region.
Within this framework the main priority objectives put forward by the MOP for the 
Southern Aegean region were focused on combatting the region’s isolation, the exploitation o f 
the region’s resources, the control of tourist development, the management o f water resources 
and improving living conditions (CEC, 1990a:42). These general objectives have been explicitly 
elaborated through specific measures, involving the improvement o f transport and 
communication, as well as the social and educational infrastructure, the improvement o f water 
and sewage networks, the promotion of tourism and the exploitation o f the cultural and 
architectural heritage in tourist underdeveloped islands and the development o f services for local 
SMEs. All these measures belong to the financial assistance provided by the ERDF. Furthermore, 
the ESF is responsible for financing mainly the vocational training-related measures, while the 
EAGGF focuses on measures for the protection o f natural resources and the repair o f damages 
caused by natural disasters.
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As Figure 6.2 demonstrates, there is an almost clear differentiation in the distribution of 
financial resources among the specific measures of the subprogrammes between the Southern and 
the Northern Aegean regions2. In particular, the programme of the Southern Aegean demonstrates 
a considerable orientation towards the creation of physical infrastructure and vocational training3, 
whereas in the Northern Aegean the shares o f the social infrastructure, business support and 
agriculture-related measures account for a significant part o f the allocated resources. This trend 
should be attributed, on the one hand, to the presence o f a comparatively advanced social 
infrastructure (hospitals, public buildings) in the Southern Aegean -which in the Dodecanese was 
left by the Italians- and, on the other hand, to the presence of an active entrepreneurship (see 
chapter 4) that does not 
require business support.
Instead it stresses the need 
for vocational training with 
an emphasis on tourism.
Moreover, the tourist 
industry combined with the 
multi-fragmentation o f 
space poses increased needs 
for technical infrastructure,
2This distribution represents budget data o f  the (1989-93) MOPs for the Southern and the Northern Aegean  
islands regions (URDP, 1992), which may vary significantly from the ex-post (after implementation) data. However, 
in this particular case, they reflect the real outcom e o f  the implementation process.
JThis trend in the Southern Aegean is identical in comparison with most o f  the other Greek regions as well, 
such as Western M acedonia, Central Macedonia and Eastern M acedonia and Thrace (U R D P, 1992).
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which is linked to crucial issues, such as the roads, ports and airports networks, as well as water 
and sewage-related problems.
Figure 6.3, which is based on 1995 ex-post data4, confirms the above trend. In particular, 
the airports, road networks, vocational training and environment-related infrastructure absorbed 
the greatest share of the financial resources of the MOP, while agriculture and support o f tourist 
development are marginal. It should be noted that the category “environment” includes water and 
sewage-related measures, while the category “airports” refers mainly to seven interventions, three 
in the Dodecanese and four in the Cyclades prefectures.
Beyond, however, the crucial and revealing qualitative differences identified in the 
structural orientation o f the EU interventions, the two regions o f the Aegean differ crucially in 
another important aspect of the implementation of the structural funds interventions: that o f the 
absorption capacity. As Figure
6.4 reveals, the Northern 
Aegean region has been 
lagging behind the Southern 
Aegean in absorption capacity 
during the entire period o f the 
implementation o f the
programme. Subsequently, at 
the end o f the period 
(31.12.93) the Northern 
Aegean absorption rate
4The data derive from the final report o f  the Programme Manager for the Southern Aegean MOP (1989-
93) (Aegean Ltd., Syros, February, 1995).
A e g e a n  Is la n d s  R e g io n s :  A b s o r p t io n  C o e f f .  (C S F  1 9 8 9 -9 3 )
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
i t
1= 1= H
1990 1991 1992  1993
^  Southern A egean  —  Northern A egean
Figure 6.4
228
did not exceed the 57% of the available funds, compared with almost 98% of the Southern 
Aegean5. This has caused serious delays, inconsistencies and the loss of substantial financial 
resources for the development of the Northern Aegean.
In the funding of the MOPs and, in particular, the contribution of the private sector to the 
Structural Funds programmes the Southern Aegean region constitutes an excellent example of 
the way in which the maintenance of the national regional policy through the incentives system 
(see chapter 3) leads to the distortion of the EU structural interventions. As table 6.1 below 
reveals, the region seems to demonstrate the lowest level in the country in private sector’s 
involvement in the funding of the MOP measures (0.27%). Although the table derives from 
elaboration of primary EU Commission’s budget data that may vary significantly from the ex­
post (after the implementation) final data6, the contribution of the private sector to the Structural 
Funds programmes is comparatively low in the Southern Aegean (around 3% according to 
estimated data). This is partly attributed to the role played by the national regional policy 
incentives scheme, especially during the 1980s and early 1990s.
In particular, the region demonstrates one of the highest rates of the country (12.9 per 
cent) in private investments supported by the regional development incentives scheme for the 
period 1982-91 (Ministry of Nat. Economy, 1993a: 105). These investments, however, refer, 
almost exclusively, to the tourist sector in the Dodecanese prefecture with particular emphasis 
on the island of Rhodes. Thus, since the creation of infrastructure is financed by Structural Funds 
money and private investments in the tourist industry are subsidized through the national regional
Elaboration o f  primary data deriving from the evaluation reports for both MOPs (Ministry o f  National 
Economy, 1993a,b).
6For instance, the private sector’s involvement in the Northern Aegean MOP has been substantially lower 
(1.42%) than the 3.41% indicated in the table (Ministry o f  Nat. Economy, 1993b), while in the case o f  other regions 
like Eastern Mecedonia/Thrace the high rate o f  private sector’s contribution to the MOP is related to the use o f  
MOP’s funds for support o f  private investments through the national regional policy incentives scheme (URDP, 
1992).
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policy, beyond the abolition of any notion of entrepreneurial risk, there is no motivation for the 
private sector to contribute to the Structural Funds programmes.
Table 6.1
Regions
Private 
Sector 
Contr. (%)
National 
Contr. (%)
Total EU 
Contr. (%)
ERDF 
Contr. (%)
ESF
Contr. (%)
EAGGF 
Contr. (%)
East Maced. & 
Thrace
6.03 38.51 55.46 47.53 5.22 2.71
Central
M aced/nia
1.23 40.58 58.19 41.65 11.64 4.90
Western
M aced/nia
1.83 35.95 62.22 50.50 7.77 3.95
Ipeiros 1.60 37.53 60.87 47.55 9.38 3.94
Thessalia 1.88 37.76 60.36 47.38 10.48 2.50
Ionian Isl. 3.70 37.72 58.58 50.94 5.91 1.72
Western Greece 2.75 37.40 59.85 46.17 9.66 4.00
Sterea Ellada 1.00 42.18 56.82 43.50 10.80 2.52
Peloponnese 2.77 35.54 61.70 45.30 11.77 4.61
Attika 1.72 37.15 61.13 40.76 19.88 0.50
Northern 
Aegean Isl.
3.41 37.51 59.08 50.21 7.32 1.54
Southern 
Aegean Isl.
0.27 32.86 66.88 56.35 9.67 0.85
Crete 2.21 39.54 58.26 47.90 8.24 2.12
GREECE
(Total)
7.40 39.71 52.72 31.86 17.60 3.11
Source: CEC (1992a,b), elaborated by the author.
Moreover, since the bureaucratic procedures of the national incentives scheme may 
involve a substantial amount of clientelism, access to the national regional policy money through 
clientelist networks is considered easier. What needs to be stressed, however, is, that the 
investments supported by the national incentives scheme may account for the expansion of the 
huge massive tourist industry mainly on the islands of Rhodes and Kos in the 1980s, but they
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cannot be considered as the explanatory variable for the successful adaptation of the Southern 
Aegean region and, in particular, the Dodecanese, since the early 1960s. Furthermore, the 
increased share of the EU contribution in the financing of the MOP (66.88%) may be seen as an 
indication of the relatively better absorption capacity of the local institutional infrastructure, 
which should be linked to its learning and adaptation capacities (see chapter 4).
Table 6.2
Groups of Islands According to the Level of Development
G ROUPI
AGATHONISI KEROS NISIROS
ANAFI KIMOLOS SIKINOS
ANTIPAROS KINAROS SCHINOUSA
ARKOI KOUFONISIA TELENDOS
DONOUSA LEIPSOI TILOS
IRAKLEIA MARATHOS FOLEGANDRO
THIRASSIA MEGISTI S
CHALKI
GROUP II
AMORGOS KASOS PAROS
ANDROS KEA PATMOS
ASTIPALAIA KYTHNOS SERIFOS
IOS LEROS SIFNOS
KALYMNOS MILOS SYMI
KARPATHOS MYKONOS TILOS
GROUP III
KOS RHODES SANTORINI
SYROS NAXOS
The planning and implementation processes of the MOP have been crucially affected by 
the significant intra-regional (among the islands) disparities in the level of development. Thus, 
the distinction among mainly three groups of islands, according to their level of development, 
as it is shown in table 6.27, has been adopted by both the local and central level planning bodies.
7Although there have been valid proposals for the reform o f  this categorization o f  the islands (i.e for the 
inclusion o f  Mykonos in the group III o f  most developed islands and o f  Syros in the group II o f  islands o f  medium  
level o f  development), it constituted the basis for the planning and evaluation procedures o f  the first CSF (Ministry
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According to this categorization, the third group (III) consists o f the most prosperous 
islands, namely Rhodes, Kos, Santorini, Syros and Naxos, among which the economic and 
administrative centres o f the region are shared. The second group (II) comprises islands of 
medium development, while the first group (I) consists o f the most disadvantaged small islands. 
As Figure 6.5 shows, the first group of the small and less developed islands and the third group 
of the most developed ones have consistently demonstrated the best performance in absorption 
capacity during the entire period of the Southern Aegean islands MOP (1990-938). This trend 
may be attributed, on the one hand, to the relatively small-scale projects undertaken on the less- 
developed islands and, on the other, to the clearly better quality o f institutional infrastructure of 
the developed ones. Conversely, since the second category comprises islands o f both prefectures 
and with relatively large-scale 
projects undertaken, the 
fragmentation of space and the 
well known coordination 
problems seem to have been 
the main reasons for the 
comparatively unsatisfactory 
absorption rates o f this group 
of islands.
of Nat. Economy, 1993a).
O
In particular, while, according to the evaluation report for the MOP, the absorption rates for the I and III 
groups ranges between 66.3% (1993) to 102.6% (1992) and 79.5 (1993) to 102.4% (1991) respectively, the rate of 
the category II has not exceeded the 79.6% (1992) (Ministry of Nat. Economy, 1993a).
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Beyond the outcomes deriving from the analysis o f the particular characteristics of the 
groups o f islands, however, important aspects o f the way in which local specificities have 
affected the implementation o f the programme emerge from the inter-prefectural, namely 
between Dodecanese and Cyclades, comparisons. In that respect, the differentiation illustrated 
in Figure 6.6 between the shares of each prefecture in any particular subprogramme of the MOP 
only partly may be attributed to the difference in population. Essentially, it may be viewed as 
reflecting the differentiation in local needs and the capacities o f the local institutional 
infrastructure in each prefecture. Thus, the marginally greater share of the Dodecanese in the 
mainly infrastructure- oriented ERDF subprogramme reflects the main priorities o f the prefecture 
initially in water and sewage-related infrastructure and at a second stage in the protection of the 
environment and educational infrastructure. Conversely, in the categories o f ports, airports and 
road networks a rather balanced allocation of the funds among the prefectures has been identified. 
Finally, in areas o f tourist infrastructure, such as the exploitation of the cultural heritage, there 
are no funds at all allocated to 
the Dodecanese.
In the ESF 
subprogramme, which focuses 
on vocational training, the 
almost huge gap between the 
two prefectures corresponds to 
the existing differentiation in 
numbers o f persons who 
undertook training in each 
prefecture.
233
SAI MOP: Share of the Prefectures in Subprogrammes
40
20
0
ERDF ESF EAGGF LOCAL GVS
SS CYCLADES =  DODECANESE
Figure 6.6
In particular, the Dodecanese has, almost traditionally, demonstrated a strong orientation towards 
vocational training with emphasis on tourism, which has been, to a significant extent, facilitated 
by the presence o f the central state-run High School for Tourist Training and the appropriate 
institutional infrastructure. Conversely, the share of the Cyclades funds has been mainly focused 
either on agriculture or training about local development issues.
With the EAGGF subprogramme, on the other hand, the huge gap between the prefectures 
in the allocated funds should be attributed to the increasing needs of the Dodecanese for forestry- 
protection measures, whereas Cyclades funds are mainly oriented towards primary sector-related 
activities.
Finally, the most revealing differentiation is in the specific subprogramme for Local 
Governments’ Actions. In particular, the strong tradition of the Dodecanese in institution- 
building at the local level and subsequently its effectiveness and efficiency in the absorption of 
the related funds and in performing the necessary actions has had important consequences for the 
way in which the funds are 
allocated and hence it may 
account for the Dodecanese’s 
greater share in the 
subprogramme.
W hat, however, 
illustrates the comparatively 
better performance o f the 
Dodecanese prefecture, is the 
absorption/commitments data 
of Figure 6.7.
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According to these data (Aegean Ltd, 1995), the Dodecanese has consistently demonstrated a 
better performance in the absorption rate of financial commitments o f the MOP in comparison 
with both the region and the Cyclades prefecture, during the entire period o f the CSF, which 
seems to be linked to the qualities of its institutional infrastructure.
Moreover, two o f the subprogrammes of the MOP, namely the ERDF and the specific 
Local Governments subprogramme, for which reliable data at the prefectural level were found, 
reveal a similar to the entire-programme picture in absorption capacity at the regional and 
prefectural levels. In particular, as Figure 6.8 reveals, the Dodecanese had a higher absorption 
rate in comparison with both the region and the Cyclades prefecture over the entire period of 
implementation o f the ERDF subprogramme. This differentiation reflects the strong orientation 
of the Dodecanese towards the infrastructure-related use o f EU funds, with particular emphasis 
on water-sewerage and educational infrastructure measures. Furthermore, the higher rates of 
differentiation during the initial phase of the programme among the Dodecanese and the 
Cyclades prefectures -which 
gradually declined by the end 
of the period- should be 
interpreted as an indication of 
the existing differentiation in 
the levels o f learning and 
adaptation among the 
institutional infrastructures o f 
the two prefectures concerned.
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On the other hand, the specific Local Governments’ subprogramme may be viewed as 
providing the most strong evidence about the differentiation in institutional capacity among the 
prefectures o f the Southern Aegean islands. As Figure 6.9 shows, there is a huge gap in the 
absorption rates o f the Dodecanese and Cyclades local governments over the entire period o f the
programme (1990-94). In particular, Dodecanese local authorities have been proved much more
competent in comparison with their Cyclades counterparts in planning and hence absorbing more 
funds for structural interventions that reflect the local needs and demands. Thus, in almost all the 
specific measures o f the 
subprogramme, that is: “road 
networks”, “social and 
cultural infrastructure”,
“p ro tec tion  o f the 
environment” and “tourist 
infrastructure”, there is a clear 
predominance o f the 
D o d e c a n e s e  l o c a l  
governments.
Figure 6.9
Finally, as far as the Community Initiatives9 are concerned, it has been extremely difficult 
to specify the particular actions, because of the dominant role of the central state in the planning 
procedures and the subsequent overlapping between several ministries involved. Therefore, we 
have relied on the evidence from fieldwork research at the regional and local levels. As it will
9The Community Initiatives constitute a sort of parallel to the CSF structural interventions, which are 
managed by the central state (Ministry of National Economy and other ministries) and are not considered as integral
part of the MOPs.
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be shown in the following section, the Community Initiatives have constituted important tools 
for the mobilization of local actors and the promotion of local partnerships within the EU 
regional policy environment. However, despite the lack of specific evaluation data at the regional 
or prefectural levels, specific Initiatives that accompanied the first CSF have played a more 
important role than others in the region concerned. Thus, the LEADER, VALOREN, HORIZON, 
ENVIREG and REGEN/INTERREG have been raised as the most important Initiatives for the 
Southern Aegean region.
Since the period of the fieldwork research coincided with the starting up of the 
implementation phase of the second CSF (1994-99), existing evidence from its ex-ante 
evaluations enables some preliminary observations to be made in comparative terms. The 
following points deserve note. First, although the second CSF (MOP) may be seen as a 
continuation of the first, since it focuses on the pursuit of the same main goals, there has been 
a shift in its approach to tourist development, involving in particular the gradual abandonment 
of the mass tourism model and the adoption of flexible, small-scale forms of leisure that are more 
appropriate for the smaller and less developed islands. Since this shift is accompanied by a 
specific integrated programme for the exploitation of the physical and cultural resources, it 
represents an outcome of the learning process from the implementation of the first CSF, which 
seems to have led to adaptations towards the changing patterns of demand in leisure (Stokowski, 
1994). Second, this process of policy adaptation goes hand in hand with integrated actions in 
transport, communication and social infrastructure to promote the catching up of the less 
developed islands, thus reducing intra-regional disparities. Third, the interconnectedness between 
the sustainability of natural resources and sustainable local development has been taken into 
account by the new programming approach. Hence the share of actions for the protection of the 
environment and urban planning have been substantially upgraded within the programme.
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Finally, there has been a strengthening of the role of local government institutions in the planning 
and implementation processes through increasing support in human and technical resources 
provided by the specific subprogramme for local governments.
This section has demonstrated that, despite significant intra-regional (among the islands) 
disparities in the levels of development and absorption capacity, there is an important 
differentiation between the Southern and the Northern Aegean islands regions in both the 
priorities in the use of the funds and the absorption capacity. In particular, the Southern Aegean 
region shows a strong orientation towards technical and educational infrastructure in the use of 
funds, whereas in the Northern Aegean business support, social and agricultural infrastructure 
account for a considerable share of the funds. Furthermore, at the prefectural level, the 
Dodecanese prefecture demonstrates a better performance than the Cyclades in almost all the 
subprogrammes and measures of the MOP and especially in the specific subprogramme for Local 
Governments. Notwithstanding the comparatively low level of private sector contribution to the 
Funds payments, because of the maintenance of the national regional policy incentives scheme, 
what provides the exegesis for the better performance of the Dodecanese is the differentiation in 
attitudes, which is illustrated by what an interviewee said: ‘Structural Funds money constitutes 
investment for the SAI (Dodecanese). In other regions it is used as social subsidy’10.
We now turn to assess, in the third section, the way in which the better learning capacity 
of the local institutional infrastructure in the Southern Aegean region in general and of the 
Dodecanese prefecture in particular as identified in chapter four has facilitated the adaptation 
process of the region to a -new- policy making environment, that of European regional policy.
1 in terv iew  N o 60 with the president o f  the Rhodes Hotel Owners Association conducted in Rhodes
(October 1996).
238
6.3 Institution Building, Policy Networks and Adaptation
By drawing the institutional map of the region and evaluating the structural features of the 
general exchange local institutional networks, chapter four explored the levels of collective 
action and hence the learning and adaptation capacities of the system of institutional interactions 
at the regional and prefectural levels. This section assesses the degree to which the main features 
of the local institutional infrastructure for collective action and learning have affected the 
processes of institution building and adaptation of the region to the rapidly-changing 
environment, characterized mainly by the gradual Europeanization of regional policy.
6.3.1 Institution Building, Policy Networks and Adaptation in the Southern Aegean islands
Although the Europeanization of regional policy and the introduction of the programming 
approach with the planning and implementation of the first MOP (1989-93) has constituted the 
most crucial external constraint for institution building and adaptation at the regional level, the 
centralized Greek administrative system and the multi-fragmentation of space have functioned 
as inherent impediments to the promotion of the adaptation process in the Southern Aegean 
region. Thus, despite the positive impact of the European structural policy programmes on 
improving significantly the policy-making environment at the regional level, and the substantially 
better network structures in comparison with the Northern Aegean, the combination of 
centralized decision-taking and fragmented policy action, which does not seem to be taken into 
account by the EU Commission (DG XVI), have played an important role in impeding the 
processes of institution building and achieving cohesion at the regional level11.
The Monitoring Committee for the CSF (MOP) implementation, that has been seen as the
1 'interview No 41 with the General Secretary o f  the Southern Aegean islands region (Ermoupolis, Syros,
November, 1996).
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institutionalized form of the linkages between supranational (EU Commission officials), national 
and subnational elites, has constituted the only aspect of “induced” institutional building at the 
regional level in the Southern Aegean as well. As table 6.3 reveals, this process has been 
substantiated by the broadening of the regional councils to include, beyond the prefects of the 
prefectures of the region and the representatives of the Local Associations of Municipalities and 
Communes, representatives of the major interest group-organizations in each prefecture 
(Chambers, Labour Movement Organizations).
Table 6.3
Southern Aegean Regional Partnership for Monitoring the MOP
A. President: Regional General Secretary
B. Members:
1. Prefects: Cyclades, Dodecanese.
2. Local Ass. of Munic.&Communes: Cyclades, Dodecanese.
3. Central Government (Ministries): National Economy, Agriculture, Employment, 
Interior, Environment&Public Works, Aegean.
4. Higher Education Institutions: University of the Aegean
5. Commission of the EC (DGs): XVI, V, VI
6. Interest Group Representatives: Cyclades and Dodecanese Chambers, Tourist 
Agents, Trade Unions etc.
7. Programme Manager
8. Evaluation Consultant
Source: Ministry o f  National Economy, 1992, 1995.
Notwithstanding the relatively limited role of the monitoring committee, especially during 
the initial phase of the first CSF, in the Southern Aegean the Structural Funds programmes have 
facilitated the gradual process of institution building at all levels of subnational government,
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which cannot still be raised at the regional level, because of the lack of directly elected regional 
councils12.
Within this policy environment, even though the structure of the policy network at the 
regional level has improved in comparison with that of the general exchange network (chapter 
4), it continues to demonstrate the same general characteristics. In that respect, the outcomes of 
the social network analysis (SNA), based on density, centralization and structural equivalence 
measures (see chapters 2 and 4) are revealing. Thus, although the density of the policy network, 
which is used as an indicator of network cohesion, has been substantially improved when 
compared with that of the exchange network (0.414 vis-a-vis 0.367 out of 1 respectively), 
essentially, it remains low, given that fewer than half of the actors are connected to each other 
within the network.
Furthermore, as table 6.4 with the centrality measures of both the general exchange and 
policy networks demonstrates, despite improvement in the degree of centralization, the policy 
network remains highly centralized (64.74%). What these low density and high centralization 
indicators underline, is that even within the European regional policy environment the network 
continues to demonstrate the same features, that is centralization around the Regional Secretariat 
and fragmentation at the prefectural level. The following lessons are drawn from this comparative 
analysis. First, even though the region has constituted a byproduct of the pressures for the 
implementation of the Structural Funds programmes, it has not yet been institutionalized, even 
within the favourable (for it) policy-making environment. Second, the processes of institution 
building and adaptation should be considered as slow as the learning process itself, while both 
the state structure and the general features of the socio-political system are unfavourable. Finally,
1 in terview  N o 41 (ibid.).
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learning and institution building are more easily achieved at the local and prefectural levels,
where the development of dialogue and communication linkages may be facilitated by relatively 
favourable local specificities that are more difficult to flourish at the regional level.
TABLE 6.4
Centrality Measures of General Exchange and Policy Networks 
in Southern Aegean Islands
Organizations General Exchange Policv Network
Network Centralitv Centralitv
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00 100.00
2. Dodecanese Pref. Council 55.00 55.00
3. Cyclades Pref. Council 50.00 50.00
4. Dodecanese Chamber 45.00 50.00
5. Cyclades Chamber 45.00 50.00
6. Dodecanese Ass. Munic.&Comm. 45.00 45.00
7. Cyclades Ass. Munic.& Comm. 45.00 50.00
8. Rhodes City Council 40.00 45.00
9. Dodecanese Tourist Ag. Ass. 40.00 40.00
lO.Kos City Council 35.00 40.00
11 .Rhodes Hotel Owners Ass. 35.00 40.00
12.Kos Hotel Owners Ass. 35.00 35.00
13.Mykonos City Council 35.00 40.00
14.Ermoupolis City Council 30.00 35.00
15.Mykonos Hotel Owners As. 30.00 35.00
16.Mykonos Tourist Agents As. 30.00 35.00
17.Cyclades Training Centre 20.00 20.00
18.Dodecanese Development Ag. 15.00 35.00
19.Cyclades Development Ag. 15.00 35.00
20.University 15.00 15.00
21.Ermoupolis Development Ag. 10.00 20.00
Total Network Centralization 70.00% 64.74%
Thus, the centrality measures of the individual actors within the network reflect mainly 
the degree to which the role of any particular actor has been upgraded within the EU regional 
policy environment. In that respect, the upgraded role of the Dodecanese, Cyclades and 
Ermoupolis development agencies in the policy network is because of their involvement in the 
management of specific Structural Funds programmes or initiatives (LEADER, URBAN), which
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will be raised more clearly at the prefectural level. Furthermore, the improved degree of centrality 
of important private-interest or associational actors (Chamber, Associations of Municipalities, 
Hotel Owners Ass.) should be attributed to their participation in the monitoring committee of the 
CSF and their involvement in specific projects of the MOP at the prefectural level. Finally, the 
marginal role of the University in the policy network reveals the degree of its legitimation within 
the institutional structure of the Southern Aegean region, given that it is a relatively new 
institution, significantly dislocated or completely absent, especially in the Cyclades13.
Figure 6.10 
Policy Network in Southern Aegean Islands
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The structure of the policy networks in the Southern Aegean is depicted in Figure 6.10, 
which is based on the multidimensional scaling technique. The main feature of the graph is its
l3In the Cyclades prefecture only recently (within the framework o f  the second CSF 1994-99) have local 
institutional actors started to seek the University’s cooperation either for joint participation in projects or for 
preparation o f  project proposals (Interviews No 42 and 44, Syros, November 1996).
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similarity with its equivalent of the general exchange network (see chapter 4). Hence, the regional 
secretariat, which remains the central actor is depicted at the centre of the graph, while the 
increased density of the policy network is illustrated by the structure of the actors at the 
prefectural level.
6.3.2 Institution Building, Policy Networks and Adaptation in Dodecanese
As it has been shown in chapters four and five, Dodecanese has the best institutional 
infrastructure in qualitative features, such as capacity for learning and adaptation, which is partly 
attributed, on the one hand, to the presence of social capital endowments and, on the other hand, 
to the technical and institutional infrastructure left by the Italians. This strong -for Greece- 
tradition in institution building seems to be relevant to the process of adapting to the European 
environment, by seizing the opportunities the Europeanization of regional policy presents for 
modernization, economic/institutional adjustment and development. Thus, notwithstanding the 
limited room for manoeuvre, because of the peculiarities of the Greek socio-political structure, 
the Dodecanese may be viewed as one of the most successful stories in adaptation among the 
Greek regions.
The approach to the EU regional policy as a challenge for opening up the process of 
institution building, by facilitating endogenous local action through the provision of the 
opportunity to bypass the central state structure, became evident in Dodecanese even during the 
implementation of the IMP for the Aegean islands. Thus, despite the central state-dominated 
processes of planning and implementation of the programme, in the Southern Aegean in general 
and in Dodecanese in particular there has been a -in relative terms- considerable presence of local
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non-state actors and voluntary organizations14.
Since the introduction of the CSF (MOP) opened up the game for supra-subnational 
linkages mainly in the planning and monitoring processes (monitoring committees), local 
governments and voluntary organizations in Dodecanese have been proved competent in 
comparison with their counterparts in other regions in both the implementation of specific 
measures and the institution building, mainly around specific Community Initiatives. Thus, 
although the implementation of the MOP was mostly run by the prefecture, most of the local 
governments were involved in the implementation of projects of the MOP and, in particular, of 
the subprogramme for the protection of the environment. In the same manner they were involved 
in the implementation of measures of the ENVIREG Initiative. Conversely, the implementation 
of both the INTERREGI and II Initiatives was undertaken by the prefecture.
Interestingly enough, even though the rapid changes in the external conditions, such as 
the gradual Europeanization of regional policy for Obj. 1 regions, may make old institutions 
redundant and hence the need for the creation of new ones, in the Dodecanese, because of the 
pre-existing qualitative features of the local institutional infrastructure in learning and adaptation, 
this trend did not vindicated15. On the contrary, the process of institutional building in the 
Dodecanese took the form of the adjustment of the existing institutional structures to the 
requirements of the new environment. Within this framework the creation primarily of the 
Dodecanese Development Agency (DDA) and secondarily of the Kos Development Agency were 
perhaps the only important additives in the existing institutional infrastructure. Thus, the DDA 
was created by the local Association of Municipalities (TEDK) and the Prefecture Council and
l4In the Dodecanese, despite their limited role, the presence o f  the Society o f  Rhodes Women and the Leros 
Metropolis as implementation agents must be stressed.
l5Compare this with the evidence from the Northern Aegean islands prefectures (chapter seven).
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focuses on developing local networks mainly around specific Community Initiatives. Hence, it 
has initiated joint actions with the Prefecture Council, involving the LEADER -for the islands 
of the I group (see section 6.2)- and INTERREG Initiatives16.
Whatever the degree of adjustment of the other institutions of the prefecture may be, the 
role of the Chamber has been dominant within the Dodecanese institutional infrastructure. Given 
its almost traditional role as initiator of all the fora for dialogue and communication among the 
actors at the prefectural and local levels, it constitutes the leading institutional actor in adjustment 
and adaptation to the Europeanization of the policy-making.
Table 6.5
Community Initiatives and Transnational Networks in Dodecanese
ACTORS INITIATIVE
a) Dodecanese Chamber a) Economic Observatory
Nice (France) (art. 10)
Irish
Spanish
Portuguese
b) Dodecanese Chamber b) ECOMOST
Majorca Chamber (T ourism&Environment)
c) Dodecanese Chamber c) MERCURE
Chamber Cote d’ Azur
d) Dodecanese Chamber d) MERCURE-TACIS
Kiev Chamber
e) Dodecanese Chamber e) EUROFORM
Chamber Cote d’ Azur
As table 6.5 demonstrates, beyond its role within the local general exchange network (see 
chapter 4), it constitutes the pioneer of developing and expanding its institution-building capacity 
at the transnational level. Within this framework, it has participated in numerous EU programmes
^Interview N o 58 with the executive o f  the DDA (Rhodes, November, 1996).
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and initiatives, such as the ECOMOST and ECOLOGIC HOTELS programmes of the DG XXIII, 
as well as, the MERCURE-TACIS and EUROFORM, along with other European regions. 
Additionally, it has organized, along with the Hotel Owners Association, a series of conferences 
on issues about the impact of tourism on development17.
Finally, a major step forward, in the process of institution building is under way in 
Dodecanese, involving a joint initiative of the basic institutional actors on a plan of the 
Prefectural Council for opening of an office in Brussels18.
The structure of policy networks in the Dodecanese reflects the relatively successful 
adjustment of its institutional infrastructure to the changing conditions and the level of institution 
building thus achieved. The density measure, which indicates the degree of network cohesion, 
in the policy network (0.800) is even higher than in the general exchange network (see chapter 
4). This density indicator demonstrates that almost all the actors are connected to each other 
within the network.
Furthermore, the centrality measures (table 6.6), which reveal the way in which resources 
are distributed among the actors and subsequently the dominant actors within the network, 
demonstrate a similar structure to that of the density measure. In particular, the degree of policy 
network centrality is even lower than that of the general exchange network (24.44% vis-a-vis 
33.33%). This low degree of centralization reflects an even more horizontal structure in the 
policy network than that at the general exchange one (chapter 4). Therefore, what the high density 
and low centrality measures of the policy network indicate, is that, within the European regional 
policy environment, resources and power are even more equally dispersed among the local actors. 
Hence, the possibilities for shifting alliances, creating synergies and achieving collective action
1 in terv iew  N o 50 with the president o f  the Chamber (Rhodes, November, 1996).
18Interview N o 55 with the -newly- elected prefect o f  Dodecanese (Rhodes, November, 1996).
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are even higher within the policy network. In that sense European regional policy may be viewed 
as a positive external shock that facilitates the processes of crossing the public/private divide, 
achieving synergies and collective action among public and private actors that constitute the 
prerequisite for the necessary learning and adaptation processes within the network structure.
Table 6.6
Centrality Measures of General Exchange and Policy Networks 
in Dodecanese Prefecture
Organization General Exchange Policv Network
Network Centralitv Centralitv
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00 100.00
2. Pref. Council 100.00 100.00
3. Association Mun.&Comm. 90.00 90.00
4. Chamber 80.00 90.00
5. Rhodes City Council 80.00 90.00
6. Tourist Agents’ Ass. 80.00 80.00
7. Kos City Council 70.00 80.00
8. Rhodes Hotel Owners Ass. 70.00 80.00
9. Kos Hotel Owners Ass. 70.00 70.00
lO.University 30.00 30.00
11 .Development Agency 30.00 70.00
Total Network Centralization: 33.33% 24.44%
Looking at the centralization measures of each individual actor on a comparative basis 
between general exchange and policy network the following points emerge. First, beyond the 
Regional Secretariat and the Prefectural Council, which, because of their position within the 
administrative structure of the state, provided the “traditional” leadership of the general 
exchange network, the role of all the other-public and private- actors has been significantly 
upgraded. Second, this almost horizontal structure of the network opens up opportunities for 
synergies among powerful public and private actors and hence for the provision of varying 
leadership roles. Third, this is crucially dependent on the role of the state structure and the
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dynamism of the system of interactions at the local level. Fourth, the upgraded role of the DDA 
creates possibilities for a crucial role it could play within the local system of governance, which 
would be favoured by the complete Europeanization of regional policy. Within such a policy 
environment, the DDA could function as a complementary or even substitute organization to the 
Association of Municipalities, providing local governments with technical and administrative 
assistance. Finally, the role of the University remains even in the policy network rather marginal. 
The only joint involvement of the University and local actors of the Dodecanese prefecture in 
projects financed by the Structural Funds seems to be the sewage system of the Lipsi island.
The structural features that derive from the centrality measures are further reinforced by 
the analysis of the structural equivalence, which categorizes actors according to their structural 
positions within the network. Thus, the structural equivalence (Figure 6.11), when compared with 
the general exchange network (chapter 4), reveals the following features of the policy network19. 
First, with the exception of the University (fourth block), almost all other actors are connected 
to each other. Second, because of the centralized administrative structure of the state (even in the 
implementation of the Community Initiatives and the Pilot Projects the state plays the key role), 
the public actors (Regional Secretariat, Prefecture Council, Cities’ Councils) provide the 
leadership of the policy network. However, almost all the actors of the second and third blocks 
can provide varying leadership roles in the future. Third, the upgraded status of the Dodecanese 
Development Agency (DDA) indicates its successful involvement in the LEADER and 
INTERREG initiatives and its possible role as interlocutor among public and private actors to 
achieve synergies at the prefectural level. Finally, the structure of the network provides the 
ground for crossing the public/private divide among the actors, thus facilitating collective action
19Because o f  the extremely large number o f  actors’ participation in specific programmes, measures or 
initiatives, the structural equivalence o f  actors in the policy network is based on linkages’ identification and does 
not present the number o f  programmes’ participation for each organization.
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and learning and adaptation processes.
Figure 6.11
Structural Equivalence of Policy Network Actors in Dodecanese
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The graph of the network based on the multidimensional technique, as depicted in Figure 
6.12, vindicates the structural features arising from the structural equivalence. The first 
observation is that the graph of the policy network represents a more balanced network structure, 
in comparison with that of the general exchange network (chapter 4). Furthermore, beyond the 
General Secretariat and the Prefecture Council, which are depicted at the centre of the graph, with 
the exception of the University, no other actor is marginalised within the network. Hence, the 
graph corresponds to the cohesive, horizontal and balanced structure of the Dodecanese policy 
network.
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Figure 6.12
Policy Network in Dodecanese
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In sum, the Dodecanese prefecture demonstrates a high (for Greece) degree of institution 
building and adaptation, which, however, is not characterized by the increasing redundancy of 
old institutions and the emergence of new ones, but rather by the successful structural adjustment 
of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure. On the other hand, the structure of the policy 
network is better than in the general exchange network, which means it has a structure more 
horizontal, cohesive and balanced between public and private actors.
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6.3.3 Institution Buildingy Policy Networks and Adaptation in Cyclades
As established in chapter four, the Cyclades prefecture demonstrates significant similarities to 
the Dodecanese in qualitative features of institutional infrastructure. In particular, even though 
Cyclades lack the Dodecanese’s tradition in institution building, its institutional infrastructure 
is characterized by a significant amount of synergies between the actors and the crossing of the 
public/private divide. The relatively good quality of the Cyclades institutional infrastructure may 
be attributed to the prompt adjustment of the economic and institutional structure of some islands 
(Mykonos) towards the tourist sector since the 1960s and to the historical trade and cultural 
relations of others (Syros) with western Europe.
The processes of institutional building and adaptation to the European policy-making 
environment, though less prompt than in the Dodecanese, had already become evident during the 
implementation of the IMP for the Aegean Islands. Thus, like the Dodecanese, the Cyclades was 
the second prefecture of the entire Aegean islands region with non-state public and voluntary 
organizations involved in the implementation of the programme20.
The introduction of the CSFs and MOPs marked the start of the learning process for local 
institutional infrastructure, which proved almost as competent as the Dodecanese in mobilizing 
around specific programmes or initiatives of European regional policy. The planning and 
monitoring (Monitoring Committee) processes of the MOP constituted an opening up of direct 
linkages between the supranational and the subnational levels of government. In this respect, 
local governments of the Cyclades prefecture, despite the fragmentation of space and the 
differentiation of economic and institutional structures, exploited the comparative advantage of 
having easier proximity to the capital of the region (Ermoupolis, Syros) and hence the seat of the
~ The Syros Lyceum o f  Greek Women and the Santorini Commune were amongst the few  non-state 
organizations involved in the implementation o f  specific projects o f  the programme (Ministry o f  Nat. Economy, 
1994a).
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Monitoring Committee. Even though the implementation process of the MOP as in every region 
in Greece was primarily run by the Prefecture, local governments were actively involved in the 
implementation of specific measures, in projects of the MOP and, especially, in the 
subprogramme for the protection of the environment. Furthermore, as in the Dodecanese, most 
of the Cyclades’s local governments and particularly those of the small and less developed 
islands were involved in the ENVIREG Initiative’s projects focusing on tackling water and 
sewage problems of the smaller and most disadvantaged islands.
With regard to the process of institution-building the response of Cyclades to the 
challenges imposed by the rapidly changing environment were rather different from those of the 
Dodecanese. In particular, there has been a gradual process of building new institutions, mainly 
because of the lack of appropriate institutional structure. Therefore, the new institutions have 
been brought about to fill specific gaps within the institutional infrastructure of the prefecture. 
Within this framework, the Cyclades Development Agency (CYDA) is the outcome of a 
cooperative network between the Prefectural Council and local Association of Municipalities and 
Communes21. On the other hand, the Ermoupolis Development Agency (ERMDA) was created 
by the Ermoupolis City Council and the Chamber. Moreover, a series of development agencies 
seem to be under way, such as the Naxos Development Agency. Thus, the gradual 
Europeanization of regional policy brought about new institutions focusing mainly on the 
development of local networking around specific Community Initiatives.
In that sense the Cyclades Development Agency has been currently involved in projects 
of the LEADER Initiative, whereas the Ermoupolis Development Agency is currently involved 
in the implementation of the URBAN Initiative in the city of Ermoupolis, which focuses on the
1
~ The mayor o f  Mykonos, is the president o f  both the local Association o f  Municipalities and the Cyclades 
Development Agency.
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regeneration of the old city centre22. Finally, several Hotel Owners Associations of the Cyclades 
complex have been involved in projects of the PRISMA Initiative, focusing on tourist promotion 
activities.
The structure of the policy network in Cyclades corresponds to the relatively successful 
adjustment of its institutional infrastructure to the Europeanization of regional policy. The 
density measure, which is used as an indicator of the degree of network cohesion, has 
significantly improved in the policy network in comparison with that of the general exchange 
(0.636 vis-a-vis 0.545 respectively). What the density measure of the policy network indicates 
is that more than half of the institutional actors are connected to each other within the network.
Moreover, with regard to the centrality measures (table 6.7), which demonstrate the way 
in which resources are distributed among the actors and hence the dominant actors within the 
network, there is a lower level of centralization in the policy network in comparison with that in 
the general exchange network (43.64% vis-a-vis 54.55% respectively). This change indicates that 
within the regional policy environment, the structure of the network tends to become more 
horizontal, given the higher degree of actors’ involvement in exchange relations with other actors 
of the network. Therefore, European regional policy creates favourable conditions for resource 
interdependence and hence for achieving synergistic effects and collective action which are 
viewed as prerequisites for learning and adaptation. What should be stressed, however, is that the 
relatively high degree of centralization in both the general exchange and policy networks is 
because of the extremely low presence of the University within the network.
22Interviews N o 43, 44 with the mayor o f  Ermoupolis and the president o f  the Chamber (Ermoupolis, 
October, 1996).
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Table 6.7
Centrality Measures o f General Exchange and Policy Networks
in Cyclades Prefecture
Organization General Exchange Policy Network
Network Centralitv Centrality
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00 100.00
2. Prefecture Council 81.82 81.82
3. Association of Munic.&Comm. 81.82 90.91
4. Chamber 72.73 81.82
5. Mykonos City Council 63.64 72.73
6. Ermoupolis City Council 54.55 63.64
7. Hotel Owners Ass. 54.55 63.64
8. Tourist Ag. Ass. 54.55 63.64
9. Training Centre 36.36 36.36
lO.Development Agency 27.27 63.64
11 .Ermoupolis Development Ag. 18.18 36.36
12.University 9.09 9.09
Total Network Centralization: 54.55% 43.64%
Looking at the centralization measures of any individual actor at both the general 
exchange and policy network, the following points should be emphasized. First, under the 
Regional Secretariat, which is the most central actor within the networks, there is a significant 
presence of institutional actors other than the Prefectural Council (especially in the policy 
network). In particular, primarily the local Association of Municipalities and the Chamber, and 
secondarily the Mykonos City Council, are well connected, important actors within the prefecture 
and especially in the policy network. Second, there is, especially in the policy network, a 
considerable presence of important public and private actors under the leading actors (Regional 
Secretariat, Prefectural Council, Association of Municipalities), that constitute the basis for 
future public/private alliances at the local level. Third, the upgraded role of both development 
agencies (CYDA and ERMDA) within the policy network indicates that under certain 
circumstances (favourable policy making environment, such as that of complete Europeanization
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of regional policy), they can play the crucial role of interlocutors between public and private 
actors, thus achieving synergies and providing local actors with crucial technical and 
administrative assistance. In that sense they may be seen as substituting for the role of the 
Association of Municipalities and Communes at the prefectural level. Finally, the role of the 
University remains extremely marginal, even within the policy network.
The main structural characteristics that derive from the analysis of the centrality measures 
are further strengthened by the structural equivalence, which identifies common structural 
positions among actors within the network, according to the structure of their relationships. Thus, 
the structural equivalence (Figure 6.13), when compared with the general exchange network 
(chapter 4), reveals the following structure of the policy network. First, the University is the only 
marginalized actor within the structure of the policy network. Second, there are some similarities 
to the policy network structure in the Dodecanese, in the sense that under the leading -public- 
actors (Regional Secretariat, Prefecture Council and Association of Municipalities), there is a 
group of public and private-interest organizations (Mykonos and Ermoupolis City Councils, 
Chamber, Hotel Owners’ Association and Tourist Agents), which, although less connected within 
the network, contribute to its cohesive and horizontal character.
However, with the exception of the University, there is a group of actors in the Cyclades 
network, namely the Ermoupolis Development Agency, the Training Centre and the Ermoupolis 
City Council, which for several reasons are still clearly less connected within the network. Hence 
their position in shifting alliances and achieving synergies and collective action is rather weak. 
Conversely, since the status of the Cyclades Development Agency has been substantially 
upgraded within the policy network, it constitutes a more important and cohesive actor in the 
sphere between public and private actors, and contributes to network cohesion as well. Within 
this framework there is a rather limited number of actors in comparison with the Dodecanese that
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can provide varying leadership roles and facilitate the stabilization of relations among the key 
institutional actors, which is required by the learning process.
Figure 6.13
Structural Equivalence of Policy Network Actors in Cyclades
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The graph of the network (Figure 6.14), based on a multidimensional scaling technique, 
depicts the main structural features arising from structural equivalence. In particular, the main 
characteristic of the policy network seems to be a slightly more balanced structure when 
compared with the general exchange network (chapter 4). On the other hand, it clearly illustrates 
that beyond the University, which is marginalised, the Ermoupolis Development Agency 
(ERMDA) and the Training Centre (CYKEK) are at the margins of the network, as they were in 
the general exchange network.
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Figure 6.14
Policy Network in Cyclades
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Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that, despite the general weaknesses in the implementation of the 
first integrated development plans of European regional policy (IMPs and MOPs) in Greece, 
there have been signs of some differentiation among the regions of the Aegean islands. In the 
case of the IMP -which referred to the entire Aegean islands region- the differentiation between 
the Southern and the Northern Aegean was identified with the structural priorities and 
effectiveness in the use of resources.
In the case of the MOPs, however, where comparisons are easier, despite the intra- 
regional (among the islands) differences, a more clear differentiation initially among the Southern 
and the Northern Aegean regions and at a second stage among Dodecanese and Cyclades has 
been identified, which seems to be related to the structure of priorities, the absorption capacity 
and the efficient use of resources per subprogramme.
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As the analysis of the processes of institution-building and adaptation in the Southern 
Aegean islands region has shown, the capacity for adaptation within the European regional policy 
environment is crucially dependent on specific features of the system of institutional interactions 
at the regional and local levels, such as learning capacity. The network analysis at both the 
regional and prefectural levels of the Southern Aegean has demonstrated that regions best able 
to adapt to changing conditions are those that possess learning institutional networks, that is 
networks able to change with changing conditions.
Moreover, even if there are no such networks at the regional level, the process of 
institution-building may be seen as an externally-driven process for promoting adaptation 
capacity at the local level. This process, however, is dependent on the presence of crucial socio­
cultural factors at the local level, such as trust, norms and networks that can facilitate collective 
action, and hence the learning and adaptation processes.
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7. NEITHER LEARNING NOR LEADERSHIP: POLICY NETWORKS 
AND STATE-DRIVEN ADAPTATION IN THE NORTHERN AEGEAN ISLANDS
Introduction
By focusing on the implementation and monitoring of the first CSF (1989-93), this chapter 
examines the degree to which the main features of the local institutional infrastructure in the 
Northern Aegean Islands region (chapter 5) have affected the institutions and policy-adaptation 
processes within the European structural policy. Given, however, the innovative character of the 
CSFs as a step forward in the integrated approach initiated by the IMPs and the generally poor 
results of the implementation of the first CSF in the region, the evidence from the 
implementation of the Aegean IMP and the initial phase of the second CSF (1994-99) is assessed 
to make an overall comparative evaluation of the adaptation process over a longer period of time.
7.1 Planning and Implementing the IMP in the Northern Aegean
As identified in chapter 6, for the planning procedures of the IMPs the entire Aegean islands area 
constituted a single region. Hence the common priority objectives of the Aegean islands IMP are 
the improvement of transport and communication linkages to combat the isolation of the islands; 
the control of tourist development; the promotion of tourism in the tourist-underdeveloped 
islands; and finally, agricultural development (see chapter 6).
However, beyond the generally low degree of completion of the programme as a whole 
(79%) and of its four subprogrammes in the entire Aegean islands region (chapter 6), the 
Northern Aegean has demonstrated important qualitative aspects in both the orientation of the 
funds and in the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of the programme. In that 
respect, the following points should be emphasized. First, the low degree of completion of the 
subprogramme III (74%), that was identified in chapter 6, is to a significant extent attributed to
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the poor results of the programme in the Northern Aegean islands. In particular, given the 
primary focus of the subprogramme towards the promotion of tourist development in the 
underdeveloped islands, its core was constituted by a specific measure for the promotion of agro­
tourism in the islands of the Northern Aegean. However, the orientation of the measure ended 
up in providing financial support for projects of central state agencies, focusing on the creation 
of a new source of income, complementary to the agriculture for the inhabitants, through the 
supplementary development of tourism1. Moreover, the lack of any bottom-up collective 
participation by local actors and the subsequent absence of the necessary structural support 
(promotion, advertisement) led initially to poor results and eventually to the complete failure of 
the projects.
Second, in the sector of power supply, despite the increase in demand over time and the 
significantly higher cost of electric power in comparison with continental Greece, the 
implementation of the measure in the Northern Aegean islands and particularly in Lesbos 
suffered substantial delays and inefficiencies. In particular, the project for the creation of a power 
plant in Lesbos, which had been included in the initial plan of the IMP, experienced significant 
delays because of local clientelist reactions and hence waste of financial resources. Thus, 
notwithstanding the existing range of the unexploited yet renewable sources of power on the 
islands, the implementation of the specific measures in the sector of electric power supply 
through conventional means was marked by a substantial differentiation between the Southern 
and Northern Aegean regions in the degrees of effectiveness and efficiency. This differentiation 
should be attributed to specific features of the institutional infrastructure in the Northern Aegean
'Although the implementation o f  the measure was managed by the Ministry o f  Agriculture, the most well- 
publicized projects were the women agro-tourist cooperatives o f  Petra (Lesbos) and Mesta (Chios), in which the 
active involvement o f  Mrs. Papandreou, the wife o f  the then prime minister, played the decisive role. The 84 agro­
tourist units in the Northern Aegean islands were located as follows: 41 in Lesbos, 11 in Chios and 32 in Samos 
(Ministry o f  National Economy, 1994a).
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and particularly in Lesbos.
Third, in the subprogrammes focusing on the upgrading of the basic and tourist 
infrastructure, as well as on the level of human capital, a differentiation in the orientation of the 
funds and in the levels of effectiveness and efficiency between the Aegean islands regions has 
been identified, which is closely linked to crucial deficiencies in the local institutional 
infrastructure and, at a second stage, to pressures from well-established local clientelistic 
networks. In particular, beyond the differentiation in the sector of transport linkages (ports, 
airports), which were identified in chapter 6, the comparative failure of the Northern Aegean 
region in the measures of the infrastructural subprogrammes II and III, involving projects of 
tourist infrastructure (marines) and projects aimed at the improvement of the general 
development infrastructure (i.e. Lesbos shell-fish production plant), has been attributed either to 
the incapacity of the local institutional infrastructure, or to clientelist reactions of local actors 
(Ministry of Nat. Economy, 1994a). Thus, the relatively good performance of the Northern 
Aegean in primarily small-scale projects for the expansion and improvement of the road network 
of the islands is viewed as a consequence of the dominant role played by local clientelist 
networks in the planning and monitoring processes of the IMP.
Finally, the still high, in comparison with the Southern Aegean, weight of agriculture in 
the use of the ESF funds for training and the improvement of human capital2 points to the 
maintenance of the agricultural orientation in the productive structure of the region.
In conclusion, the qualitative features of the local institutional infrastructure in the 
Northern Aegean islands (see chapter 5) have become evident even in the planning and 
implementation processes of the IMP, despite its unified structure and the dominant role played
2The trainees in the agricultural sector in the Northern Aegean have constituted the 17% o f  the total 
trainees, while the percentage for the entire Aegean islands region is just 7.2% (Ministry o f  Nat. Economy, 
1994a:84).
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by the central state in the management of the programme. These institutional weaknesses are 
further illustrated by the differentiation between the two regions in qualitative features of the 
institutional actors involved in the implementation of the programme, as it is demonstrated in the 
following section 7.3.1.
7.2 The Effectiveness Gap in Implementing the firs t CSF (MOP 1989-93)
The main feature of the effectiveness gap between the two Aegean islands regions in the 
implementation of the Multifund Regional Operational Programmes (MOPs) is, as identified in 
chapter 6 (Fig. 6.4), a differentiation in the capacity for absorption of the allocated funds of the 
programme. Furthermore, the priority objectives put forward by the MOP for the Northern 
Aegean islands region correspond to the existing differentiation in the phase of the adaptation 
process in comparison with the Southern Aegean. Thus, they emphasize sectors that can 
facilitate the processes of structural and productive adjustment in the region. Hence, the main 
priorities of the programme refer to improving the communications and energy infrastructures, 
the exploitation of raw materials and natural resources, the improvement of the living conditions 
through the upgrading of the basic infrastructure and the development of the human resources 
of the region (CEC, 1990a:40-41). The specific measures financed by the ERDF to achieve the 
above objectives involve the improvement of transport and communication linkages, as well as 
the water, sewerage, social and educational basic infrastructures, the exploitation of the cultural 
heritage and the provision of services to the SMEs. Additionally, the interventions financed by 
the ESF subprogramme in the region include vocational training measures in farming and spa- 
tourism, agricultural diversification, fisheries and geothermal energy. Finally, the EAGGF 
subprogramme is primarily focused on measures for the preservation and protection of natural 
resources and the environment, as well as the repair of damage caused by natural disasters.
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Within this framework the distribution of the financial resources in the MOP of the 
Northern Aegean region demonstrates a considerable orientation towards the sectors o f social 
infrastructure, business support and agriculture-related measures. In particular, as Figure 7.1 
reveals3, the sectors related to the crucial for the islands transport and communication physical 
infrastructure, such as airports and ports, account for just the 19% of the programme, while the 
social and basic infrastructure, which correspond to sectors o f social infrastructure, such as 
health, security, housing and water and sewerage absorb 24.6% of the allocated funds. 
Additionally, the high share of the road networks (24.80%) deserves special reference. It refers 
primarily to small-scale interventions that should be attributed to local clientelist pressures rather 
than to a demand 
rooted in real local 
needs4. Finally, the 
major share o f the 
funds allocated to 
the education and 
training sector 
(13.3%) refers to the 
creation of
JIt is based on data from the evaluation report of the MOP of the Northern Aegean (Ministry of Nat.
Economy, 1993a).
4Compare these data with the equivalent data of the Southern Aegean, where the airports and ports-related 
infrastructure represents the 28% of the funds, the road networks the 14.9% and the social services-related 
infrastructure did not exceed the 16% (see chapter 6).
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Figure 7.1
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educational infrastructure (school buildings) and only the remaining 8.7% is earmarked for 
vocational training, from which a substantial amount refers to the agricultural sector.
The impact, however, o f the problematic structural adjustment o f the region on the 
management of the EU funds becomes even more clear from analysis of the qualitative features 
of the absorption capacity per subprogramme. In particular, as Figure 7.25 demonstrates, the by 
far greater contributor to the funds allocated to the programme is the ERDF (78.99%), whose 
primary orientation is structural interventions in the physical infrastructure (transport, 
communication). Conversely, the Funds responsible for the creation of social infrastructure (ESF, 
EAGGF) represent a rather small part of the total funds o f the programme.
On the other hand, by looking at the structure of the generally low (57%) absorption rate 
of the region per subprogramme6 
(Figure 7.3), what emerges is the 
deficiencies o f the structural 
adjustment o f the region. In 
particular, the region demonstrates 
higher absorption rates (66% and 
67% respectively) in the ESF and
The data derive from the evaluation report and hence refer to the final structure of the programme as it 
was formulated after the successive reforms brought about by the Monitoring Committees (Ministry of Nat. 
Economy, 1993a).
6The data derive from the evaluation report and reflect the 1993 state of the implementation process of the 
programme (Ministry of Nat. Economy, 1993a). It should be noted that non absorbed funds of the first MOP 
transferred to the second MOP (1994-99).
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EAGGF subprogrammes, that is the lower funded and social infrastructure-oriented 
subprogrammes. Conversely, it shows low rates of absorption (just 47%) in the ERDF 
subprogramme, which provides financial assistance to physical infrastructure projects. Finally, 
the also low level o f absorption of the specific programme for projects undertaken by local 
governments (53%) reflects the limited capacity for learning and adaptation o f the local 
governments in the region as a whole. Furthermore, this picture reflects the problematic 
implementation o f a wide range of measures financed by the ERDF in basic infrastructure 
(promotion of region’s products, exploitation o f the cultural heritage), while the only relatively 
successfully implemented measures are related to the activities o f the mastic growers o f Chios 
(see below) and the improvement of the tourist infrastructure o f the island.
Moreover, on the contribution o f the private sector to the Northern Aegean MOP, the 
following points should be emphasized. First, as it has been shown in chapter 6, even though 
primary (ex ante) data show a contribution o f the private sector to the programme as high as 
3.41%, according to the ex-post 
(after implementation) data, it 
does not exceed 1.42% (Ministry 
of Nat. Economy, 1993a).
Second, this contribution
refers, almost exclusively, to the 
contributions o f the local 
governments to the projects of 
their specific subprogramme and
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to the measures of the EAGGF subprogramme for the processing of the cattle-farms’ waste 
material. Finally, despite the relatively low level of the private sector contribution to the 
Southern Aegean MOP (around 3%, as in chapter 6), it is well above the real rate o f the Northern
Aegean.
The impact, however, o f the local specificities on the degrees o f effectiveness and 
efficiency in the implementation and monitoring processes of the programme cannot be raised 
without taking into account the local specificities at the prefectural level. Furthermore, whatever 
the differentiation may be in local needs and institutional capacity between the Lesbos, Chios and 
Samos islands and simultaneously prefectures, it is expected to emerge by focusing on inter- 
prefectural comparisons. Thus, as Figure 7.4 -which is based on ex-post data from the major 
structural interventions financed by the MOP7- reveals, the general trend in the distribution of 
the EU financial resources per prefecture seems to follow the tradition established for the funds 
of the national Public Investment 
Programme, that is the scheme 40%,
30%, 30% for Lesbos, Chios and 
Samos respectively (see chapter 5).
This trend should be attributed to the 
dominant role o f the regional 
secretariat in the allocation o f the EU 
resources through the mechanisms of 
the Public Investment Programme.
7Because of the lack of appropriate -after implementation- data on the allocation of the funds at the 
prefectural level per Fund/subprogramme (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF), the Figure draws on data per category of 
structural interventions (Ministry of Nat. Economy, 1993a).
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NAI M O P :  Share  o f  the Prefectures  in S u b p r o g r a m m e s
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The Lesbos prefecture has the greater share in the two infrastructure-oriented categories of 
structural interventions, that is transport and communication linkages to combat the isolation of 
the islands and tourist development, which are mainly funded by the ERDF. Both categories, of 
tourist development and combating the isolation of the islands, involve a wide range of structural 
interventions from transport (airports, ports) linkages to water and sewerage infrastructure. 
However, the relatively balanced share with the Chios prefecture in the first category is attributed 
to the rather successful implementation of the specific National Programme of Community 
Interest (NPCI) for the Chios island, which was incorporated into the MOP in 1992 (see below).
Nevertheless, in the third category of the interventions in the agricultural sector, the case 
of the Lesbos prefecture deserves special reference. It provides evidence of the way in which the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), based on the price subsidization mechanism, not only 
contradicts the goals of European regional policy, but also often provides counter motives for 
adaptation and adjustment, thus contributing to the widening, in the long-term, of the divergence 
gap among the EU regions. In particular, the increased share of the Lesbos prefecture in the 
category of the mainly EAGGF-funded and agricultural restructuring-oriented measures of the 
programme is distorted by the heavy subsidization of olive oil production8 through the CAP. The 
CAP subsidies have constituted one of the main reasons for the failure of the agricultural 
restructuring subprogrammes and measures of the IMP, the first CSF and most important of the 
LEADER Initiatives in Lesbos. Moreover, the heavily subsidized producers lack motivation to 
participate in local networks and development initiatives focused on improving the adaptation 
capacity of the local economy by enhancing collective competitiveness.
O
In particular, the production subsidies in Lesbos amounted to 4.33% and 6.05% o f  the 1993 and 1994 
Gross Prefectural Product respectively, while the amounts seem to be similarly high during the following years, 
depending on the size o f  production (Interviews with the responsible directors o f  the Ministry o f  Agriculture and 
the Lesbos Prefecture, Athens, Mytilene, October, 1996).
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Whereas the share o f the Lesbos prefecture in almost all the categories of the EU 
structural interventions is substantially increased, the absorption rate data point to the opposite 
direction. In particular, as Figure 7.5 reveals, Lesbos demonstrates the lower absorption rate in 
the ERDF subprogramme over the whole programme period, which reflects the problematic 
implementation o f specific measures o f the subprogramme. The measures with the major 
deficiencies in Lesbos are in the sectors of water and sewerage, educational infrastructure, 
airports and promotion of the prefectural products. Although the factors that have affected these 
effectiveness and efficiency gaps in the management of the funds and the implementation o f the 
programme in Lesbos range widely from parochialist reactions closely linked to protection of 
individualistic interests to the institutional incapacity, what emerges from the qualitative analysis 
as the most important factor is the 
weakness o f the local institutional 
infrastructure.
C o n v e r s e l y ,  C h i o s  
demonstrates, in comparative terms, 
a better performance, which partly 
reflects the rather successful 
implementation o f the basic social 
infrastructure measures and the 
measures o f the specific National
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Programme of Community Interest (NPCI) for Chios9, which was mainly used for the 
improvement of the production methods and the promotion o f mastic and mastic-products. The 
successful implementation of the measures for market-research, promotion o f new mastic 
products and training of mastic growers, in which the Mastic Growers’ Association played the 
key role10, has contributed to the better overall performance o f Chios in the ERDF 
subprogramme. However, the generally better quality o f the local institutional infrastructure of 
Chios seems to be linked with the higher absorption rates in the subprogramme.
Finally, the comparatively satisfactory performance of Samos in the ERDF 
subprogramme is attributed to the rather successful implementation o f the measure for the 
creation of tourist infrastructure (marinas) and the measure for the improvement o f the road 
network on the Samos and Ikaria 
islands.
The existing differences in 
the capacity for learning and 
adaptation at the local government 
level between the islands are 
illustrated by the absorption 
performance in the specific 
subprogramme for local governments
9The National Programme of Community Interest (NPCI) for Chios was a ERDF-financed (21.858 Mecus) 
programme for the period 1/1/1988-31/12/1992 focusing on the sectors of the basic infrastructure, manufacturing 
and tourism. After a decision taken by the Monitoring Committee in 1992, the unabsorbed by 31/12/1992 funds of 
the programme were transferred into the MOP and hence the implementation of the programme was carried out 
through the subprogrammes of the MOP.
'interview No 16 with the director of the Mastic Growers’ Association (Chios, October, 1996).
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(Figure 7.6). In particular, notwithstanding the incapacity of all local governments of the region 
in protection of the environment, the Chios local authorities demonstrate a better performance 
in absorption rate during the whole period of the programme, when compared with the worst 
performance of Lesbos and the medium performance of Samos. Thus Chios’s local governments 
have proved particularly competent in comparison with their counterparts in other prefectures 
in most of the specific measures of the subprogramme, that is; road networks, water and 
sewerage, tourist and socio-cultural infrastructure. Samos local governments’ comparatively 
good performance, on the other hand, should be attributed to their competence in the specific 
measures of road networks and tourist infrastructure. Nonetheless, their incapacity in the specific 
measure for the protection of the environment contributed to its almost negligible rate of 
absorption. Finally, the institutional weakness of the Lesbos’s local governments is mainly 
illustrated by their failure in the specific measures of tourist and socio-cultural infrastructure and 
water and sewerage, while they proved incapable of carrying out the two major interventions in 
the protection of the environment (Ministry of Nat. Economy, 1993a).
For the Community Initiatives, which do not constitute an integral part of the MOPs (see 
chapter 6), despite the key role of the central state-agencies (ministries, organizations of public 
sector utilities) in the planning and implementation processes, the evidence from the fieldwork 
research proved adequate for defining the most important Initiatives for the region and the 
specific actions financed by them. Thus, by contrast with the Southern Aegean region, only the 
VALOREN, INTERREG and LEADER Initiatives were identified as linked to the specific 
structural interventions in the region. In particular, the VALOREN Initiative supported 
financially the creation of Aeolic parks on the Lesbos and Psara islands, the INTERREG 
financed part of the works for improvement of the Mytilene port, while the LEADER Initiative 
supported measures for agricultural restructuring and development in the entire Lesbos
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prefecture. The real impact, however, of the Community Initiatives on the mobilization of local 
actors and the promotion of local partnerships, which is considered their crucial contribution as 
policy-making tools, will be considered in the following section.
The coincidence of the fieldwork research with the starting up of the implementation 
phase of the second CSF (1994-99), however, enables for some preliminary comparative 
observations to be made, even though ex-ante evaluations were not possible. The following 
points deserve note. First, there is evidence in the second CSF (MOP) of a reorientation of the 
main development goals of the region towards the abandonment of the previous model based on 
the traditional sectors of each island (agriculture, maritime industry) and the adoption of tourism 
as the main developmental sector of the local economy supported by a small-scale agriculture. 
This shift is interpreted as an outcome of the dialogue, communication and learning processes, 
initiated by the planning and monitoring procedures of the Structural Funds’ programmes. 
Second, there is a significant improvement in the planning process characterized by an emphasis 
on the sectors of basic transport and communication infrastructure rather than on indirectly social 
policy-oriented measures. Finally, there is evidence of the strengthening of the role of local 
government institutions through the increased support in human and technical resources provided 
by the specific subprogramme for local governments (Regional Secretariat, 1994).
To sum up: this section has shown that the differentiation identified in chapter 6 between 
the Northern and the Southern Aegean islands regions in absorption capacity and in the 
orientation of the funds is accompanied by considerable differences between the islands- 
prefectures of the region. Thus, at the prefectural level the Lesbos prefecture, even though it has 
the greater share of the allocated funds, demonstrates the worst performance in absorption in all 
the subprogrammes. Conversely, the Chios prefecture shows a comparatively high level of 
absorption rates, mainly because of the relatively successful implementation of the National
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Programme of Community Interest. Finally, Samos lies between the two in absorption 
performance. On the other hand, the Northern Aegean islands region, despite the highly 
subsidized national regional policy incentive scheme, does not show either a high level of private 
investment in the region or of contribution of the private sector to the Structural Funds 
programmes.
Let us turn now to assess in the third section the impact of the weaknesses of the 
Northern Aegean islands institutional infrastructure at the regional and local levels, as identified 
in chapter 5, on the adaptation process of the region to the European policy-making environment.
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7.3 Institution Building, Policy Networks and Adaptation
Chapter five, by drawing the institutional map of the region and assessing the structural 
characteristics of the local institutional networks of general exchange, examined the level of 
collective action and subsequently the capacity for learning and adaptation of the system of 
institutional interactions at the regional and prefectural levels. This section evaluates the extent 
to which these qualitative features of the institutional infrastructure and, particularly, the capacity 
for collective action and learning, have affected the processes of institution building and 
adaptation of the region to the new European environment.
7.3.1 Institution Building, Policy Networks and Adaptation in the Northern Aegean Islands
The Europeanization of regional policy and the introduction of the programming approach with 
the first MOP (1989-93) have constituted the most crucial external constraint for both the 
institutional and policy adaptation of the Northern Aegean islands region. However, despite the 
presence of a relatively good administrative structure in stability, continuity and hence efficiency 
of the personnel at the regional level11 (regional Secretariat), the weaknesses of the local 
institutional infrastructure, as identified in chapter 5, and the subsequent reliance on the central 
state for vital administrative and technical resources have constituted key impediments to 
promoting the processes of adaptation and Europeanization in the Northern Aegean. Thus, 
notwithstanding the significant improvement of the policy-making environment that has become 
favourable for institutional and policy adaptation, the region continues to lag behind the Southern 
Aegean islands in quality of network structure and hence in capacity for learning and
11 Interview with the responsible in the DG XVI (EU Commission) for the Aegean islands’ Structural Funds 
programmes (see chapter 5).
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adaptation12.
Thus, the Monitoring Committee for the implementation of the MOP, beyond its role as 
the institutionalized form of the linkages between supranational, national and subnational levels 
of governance, represents for the Northern Aegean region ‘an unprecedented forum for dialogue 
and communication, focusing, almost exclusively, on the development problematique of the 
region’13.
Table 7.1
Northern Aegean Regional Partnership for Monitoring the MOP
A. President: Regional General Secretary
B. Members: 
1. Prefects: Lesbos, Chios, Samos
2. Local Ass. of Munic.& Communes: Lesbos, Chios, Samos
3. Central Gov/ment (Ministries): Agriculture, Interior, Employment, National 
Economy, Environment&Public Works, Aegean
4. Interest Group Representatives: Lesbos and Chios Chambers, Lesbos Farmers’ Ass., 
Chios and Samos Trade Unions
5. Commission of the EC (DGs): XVI, V, VI
6. Higher Education Institutions: University of the Aegean
Source: Northern Aegean’s Regional Secretariat
As table 7.1 demonstrates, this process of EU-induced institutional building is substantiated by 
the broadening of the regional council to include beyond the prefects and the representatives of 
the local Associations of Municipalities, representatives of the most important interest group- 
organizations of each prefecture, such as the Chambers and the Lesbos Farmers’ Association.
12This trend had become evident even during the implementation o f  the IMP for the Aegean islands, when, 
while in the Southern Aegean there was a considerable presence o f  non-state local actors and voluntary 
organizations (see chapter 6), in the Northern Aegean the implementation was a state-driven process.
13Minutes from the 14.12.94 meeting o f  the Monitoring Committee (Interview N o 1 with the General 
Secretary o f  the region, Mytilene, October, 1996).
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Nevertheless, although the implementation and monitoring of the Structural Funds programmes 
brought about the creation of a series of new institutions in the region, it is not revealed at the 
regional level, because of the lack of directly-elected regional council14. Conversely, as will be 
shown, the creation of new institutions is particularly evident at the prefectural level.
The structure of the policy network at the regional level reflects the above features of the 
policy-making environment of the region. Thus, although the policy network shows an improved 
structure in comparison with the network of general exchange (chapter 5), it continues to 
demonstrate the same general characteristics, that is low density and high centralization. In 
particular, even though the density of the policy network -which to reiterate indicates the degree 
of network cohesion- is improved in comparison with that of the general exchange network 
(0.277 vis-a-vis 0.237 out of 1 respectively), it remains extremely low, which reflects the small 
number of actors connected to each other within the network. Furthermore, as table 7.2 with the 
centrality measures of both the general exchange and policy networks indicates, despite the 
improvement in the degree of centralization of the policy network, it remains highly centralized 
(79.22%). What the low density and high centrality rates indicate, is that, even within the EU 
policy environment, the network continues to demonstrate the same structural features, that is 
fragmentation at the prefectural level and centralization in the regional secretariat.
The following lessons are drawn from this comparative analysis. First, although the 
creation of the region has constituted a reform of the Greek administrative system, imposed, to 
a significant extent, by the Europeanization of regional policy, it shows low degree of 
institutionalization within the local system of governance, even in the favourable environment 
of European regional policy. Second, despite the low capacity of the institutional infrastructure
14Moreover, the only presence o f  the region in transnational networks is in the EURISLES programme, 
through a mini-network, comprising the Research Unit for island Development o f  the University and the Chios 
Association o f  Municipalities, which had undertaken the implementation o f  the programme in the Northern Aegean.
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of the Northern Aegean in learning and adaptation, the European policy-making environment has 
functioned as an external impetus for the improvement of the main structural features of the local 
institutional network. Finally, the institution building and adaptation processes are as slow as the 
learning process, especially under conditions of an unfavourable socio-cultural environment and 
a centralized state structure.
TABLE 7.2
Centrality Measures of General Exchange and Policy Networks 
in Northern Aegean Islands
Organizations General Exchange Policy Network
Network Centralitv Centralitv
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00 100.00
2. Lesbos Pref. Council 40.91 40.91
3. Chios Pref. Council 36.36 36.36
4. Mytilene City Council 31.82 31.82
5. Samos Pref. Council 27.27 31.82
6. Lesbos Chamber 27.27 36.36
7. Chios Chamber 27.27 27.27
8. Chios City Council 27.27 31.82
9. University 22.73 27.27
lO.Lesbos Farmers’ Ass. 22.73 22.73
11 .Samos City Council 22.73 18.18
12.Samos Chamber 22.73 27.27
13.Lesbos Ass. Munic.&Comm. 18.18 36.36
14.Chios Mastic Producers’ Ass. 18.18 27.27
15.Samos Wine Makers’ Ass. 18.18 18.18
16.Lesbos Training Centre 13.64 13.64
17.Chios Ass. Munic.&Comm. 13.64 13.64
18.Samos Ass. Munic.&Comm. 13.64 18.18
19.Aeoliki Dev. Agency 9.09 9.09
20.Mytilene Mun. Dev. Agency 9.09 18.18
21.Chios Mun. Dev. Agency 9.09 13.64
22.Chios Training Centre 9.09 9.09
23.Lesbos Local Dev. Agency 4.55 27.27
Total Network Centralization: 83.55% 79.22%
The centrality measures of the individual actors within the policy network reflect the 
degree to which the role of any particular actor has been upgraded within the European regional
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policy environment. Thus, the upgraded role of the Lesbos Local Development Agency, Mytilene 
Municipal Development Agency, Aeoliki Development Agency and Chios Municipal 
Development Agency in the policy network reflects their involvement in the implementation of 
specific programmes or initiatives (LEADER, IMP, VALOREN), which will become more 
clearly evident in the analysis of the prefectural level. Additionally, the upgraded status of 
prominent private-interest or associational actors (Chambers, Local Associations of 
Municipalities and Communes, Chios Mastic Growers’ Association) in the policy network should 
be attributed either to their participation in the Monitoring Committee or to their involvement 
in the implementation of specific programmes of the MOP at the prefectural level. Finally, the 
relatively upgraded status of the University in the policy network corresponds to its participation 
in the Monitoring Committee, as well as to its involvement in implementation projects, mainly 
by carrying out research studies.
The graph of the Figure 7.7, which is based on multidimensional scaling technique, 
depicts the structure of the policy network in Northern Aegean. What the graph reveals is a 
structure of the network significantly similar with that of the general exchange network (chapter 
5). In particular, the regional secretariat, which remains the central actor within the network, is 
depicted at the centre of the graph, while the increased density of the network and the upgraded 
degree of centrality of particular actors is illustrated by the thicker structure of the actors at the 
prefectural level. Finally, what emerges by comparison with the policy network of the Southern 
Aegean (chapter 6), is that, despite the common structural features of fragmentation and 
centralization, the policy network in the Southern Aegean demonstrates a better structure at the 
prefectural level.
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Figure 7.7
Policy Network in the Northern Aegean Islands
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7.3.2 Institution Building, Policy Networks and Adaptation in Lesbos
As has been demonstrated in chapter 5, the qualitative and quantitative features of Lesbos’s 
institutional infrastructure reflect the lack of dialogue and communication among public and 
private actors and subsequently the lack of synergies at the local level that would facilitate the 
learning and adaptation processes. This weakness of the local institutional network corresponds 
to and is affected by the lack of local leadership, almost since the “golden age” at the start of the 
twentieth century. Therefore, the incapacity for the formulation of an endogenously-driven 
development strategy goes hand in hand with the lack of the appropriate mechanisms for the re­
stabilization of the system of local interactions, which the learning process would require during 
periods of catching up with changes occurring in the external environment. Hence the 
dependence of the local system of governance either on central state agencies or on fragmented 
initiatives undertaken by specific actors (Chamber) for the necessary administrative, financial and 
technical resources should be seen as a logical consequence.
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Nonetheless, even within this policy environment, the EU regional policy programmes 
constituted an external constraint for challenging the established relationships among the actors 
within the local institutional networks and promoting the institution-building and adaptation 
processes of the local system of interactions. After the introduction of the programming approach 
with the CSFs and the MOPs, in particular, and the opening up of the process for bypassing the 
central state level and establishing direct supra-subnational linkages, there was a start up of 
initiatives towards enhancing the learning process within the local system of governance15.
This process, however, was marked by a tendency to create new institutions, since 
changes in external conditions, such as the Europeanization of policy-making in this case, and 
the process of catching up, entailed by learning, often lead to a redundancy of old institutions: 
hence the necessity for the creation of new ones16. Thus, the Chamber has been involved, along 
with the Farmers’ Association and the Association of Municipalities, in the creation of the Local 
Development Agency for the management of specific Community Initiatives and, in particular, 
of the LEADER Initiative so crucial for the Lesbos’s monocultural economy. Furthermore, the 
Mytilene Municipal Development Agency, created by the Mytilene City Council, operates as a 
municipal enterprise and has been involved in implementing projects of the ERDF 
subprogramme of the MOP, such for the exploitation of geothermy in agriculture-related 
activities17. The Aeoliki is another Municipal Development Agency, created during the 
implementation of the IMP by the Mytilene City Council. It was involved in the implementation
1 in terview  N o 3 with the president o f  the Chamber (Mytilene, October, 1996).
16This phenomenon, however, should be compared with what happened in the Southern Aegean and 
particularly in Dodecanese, where, because o f  the pre-existing qualitative features o f  the local institutions in 
learning and adaptation, the process o f  institution-building took the form o f  adjusting the existing institutional 
structures to the requirements o f  the new environment (see chapter 6).
1 interview  N o 7 with the responsible councilor o f  the Mytilene City Council (Mytilene, October, 1996).
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of the VALOREN Initiative (which was managed by the state-owned electric power company) 
for building two wind-generators on the island. Finally, the Prefectural Council along with the 
local Association of Municipalities were involved in the creation of the Training Centre in an 
attempt to facilitate the implementation of the ESF subprogramme of the MOP18.
This rather extended process of institution-building, however, did not change significantly 
the mainly regional secretariat and prefecture-dominated process of the implementation of the 
MOP in the prefecture, which is indicated by the density, centralization and structural 
equivalence measures of the policy network. Thus, although the density measure, which shows 
the degree of network cohesion, has been substantially improved in the policy network (0.564 
vis-a-vis 0.418 of the general exchange), is still inadequate for the adaptation process, since it 
implies that only half the actors are connected with each other within the network.
Additionally, looking at the centrality measures (table 7.3) similar structural 
characteristics with that from the density indicator emerge. In particular, even though the degree 
of centrality in the policy network is significantly lower when compared with the general 
exchange network (53.33% vis-a-vis 71.11% respectively), the policy network retains its rather 
vertical structure, which indicates that power and resources are still unequally dispersed among 
the actors. Hence, what the density and centralization measures reveal is a structure of the policy 
network still unfavourable for shifting alliances, creating synergies and achieving collective 
action among public and private actors at the prefectural level, thus inhibiting the learning and 
adaptation processes within the network. Nonetheless, the significant improvement of both the 
density and centralization measures in the policy network indicates that, even if the conditions 
for learning and adaptation are unfavourable (lack of social capital endowment and weak
^Interview N o 2 with the prefect o f  Lesbos (Mytilene, October, 1996).
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institutional infrastructure), European regional policy challenges the resistance to change of the 
local institutional actors and initiates at least the starting up of the learning process.
TABLE 7.3
Centrality Measures of General Exchange and Policy Networks 
in the Lesbos Prefecture
Organization General Exchange Policy Network
Network Centralitv Centralitv
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00 100.00
2. Lesbos Pref. Council 70.00 70.00
3. Mytilene City Council 70.00 70.00
4. Lesbos Chamber 40.00 60.00
5. Lesbos Ass. Munic.&Comm. 40.00 80.00
6. University 30.00 40.00
7. Lesbos Farmers’ Ass. 30.00 50.00
8. Lesbos Training Centre 30.00 30.00
9. Aeoliki Mun. Dev. Agency 20.00 20.00
lO.Mytilene Mun. Dev. Agency 20.00 40.00
11 .Lesbos Local Dev. Agency 10.00 60.00
Total Network Centralization 71.11% 53.33%
From the centrality measures of the individual actors on a comparative basis the following 
points deserve reference: first, the Regional Secretariat remains the central actor, even in the 
policy network. This dominance reflects the weakness of the local institutional network to 
provide varying leadership roles for endogenous institutional actors. Second, the upgraded status 
of the Association of Municipalities in the policy network reflects its crucial role primarily in 
monitoring and secondarily in the implementation processes of the MOP, and especially in the 
ESF subprogramme for vocational training and the specific subprogramme for the local 
governments. What this upgraded status essentially brings about, however, is the traditionally key 
role the Association has as mediator between the first and the second tiers of local government 
within the local system of governance. Furthermore, this status establishes expectations for other 
leadership roles in the local network, along with the Prefectural Council and the Mytilene City
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Council. Third, the strengthened position of the Local Development Agency (LLDA) points to 
the possibilities for it having a more important role within the local system of governance in the 
future, that might be favoured by successful learning and adaptation processes necessitated by 
the further Europeanization process. The LLDA would expect to gain a complementary role to 
that of the Association of Municipalities, providing local governments with technical and 
administrative assistance. Finally, the role of the University is further upgraded in the policy 
network, especially in comparison with the Southern Aegean. This upgrading corresponds to its 
joint involvement with the LLDA and the Mytilene Municipal Development Agency in 
subprogrammes of the MOP.
The analysis of the structural equivalence, which categorizes actors according to their 
structural positions within the network, strengthens further the main structural features that derive 
from the centrality measures. In particular Figure 7.8 in comparison with the general exchange 
network (chapter 5) reveals the following structural features of the policy network19. First, the 
Regional Secretariat (block one) remains the only leading institutional actor within the network. 
Second, the upgraded role of the LLDA (block two) places it among the leading institutional 
actors within the local system of governance, along with the Prefecture Council, the Mytilene 
City and the Association of Municipalities. Third, the University and the other development 
agencies (Aeoliki and Mytilene), despite the relative improvement of their structural position in 
the policy network, remain at the margins of the local system of governance. Finally, although 
the structure of the policy network is better than that of the general exchange, it does not yet 
demonstrate the necessary structural features for crossing the public/private divide and thus 
facilitating collective action and the learning and adaptation processes.
19As in the Southern Aegean region, because o f  the extremely large number o f  actors’ participation in 
specific programmes or initiatives, the structural equivalence in the policy network is based on linkages 
identification and does not present the number o f  programmes for each organization.
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Figure 7.8
Structural Equivalence o f Policy Network Actors in Lesbos
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The structural features arising from the structural equivalence are illustrated by the graph 
of the network (Figure 7.9), based on the multidimensional scaling technique. What the graph 
demonstrates is that, while the Regional secretariat, depicted at the centre of the graph, remains 
the central actor of the network, the University, the Aeoliki and the Municipal Development 
Agencies are the most marginalized actors.
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Figure 7.9
Policy Network in Lesbos
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In conclusion, even within the process of European regional policy, the local system of 
governance of the Lesbos prefecture, despite the significant improvement of its structural 
characteristics, continues to demonstrate similar weaknesses with the institutional network of 
general exchange. In particular, the creation of new institutions did not improve adequately the 
quality of the local institutional infrastructure, which is still characterized by a lack of capacity 
for achieving local synergies, overcoming the public/private divide and achieving collective 
action among the actors. Hence, it seems to be still weak for successful adaptation to the 
European environment.
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7.3.3 Institution Building, Policy Networks and Adaptation in Chios
Chapter 5 established that the Chios prefecture demonstrates a relatively better quality of 
institutional infrastructure than Lesbos, an indication of which is the voluntary merger of most 
of the communes of the island in five municipalities, that has improved the administrative and 
financial functions of local authorities. Additionally, the comparatively higher level of 
partnerships and synergies-creation among the actors have been facilitated by the presence of two 
active private-interest organizations, that is the Mastic Growers’ Association and the Chamber, 
while the Chios City Council constitutes the most active public actor within the local institutional 
infrastructure.
However, within the framework of European regional policy a more clear differentiation 
in institutional capacity for learning and adaptation between Chios and the other Northern 
Aegean islands emerges. In particular, the programming approach to development initiated by 
the CSFs and MOPs enabled the active local actors and especially the Chamber and the Mastic 
Growers’ Association to be involved in subprogrammes and initiatives. In that respect the process 
of institution-building in the Chios prefecture did not lead to the creation of new institutions, but 
rather, opened up the game for the most capable local institutions to learn and adapt to the 
changes in external conditions. The only new institution is the Municipal Development Agency, 
created by the City Council mainly focusing on the effective management of Community 
Initiatives. Conversely, the Training Centre has been created by an initiative undertaken by the 
Greek Centre for Productivity (Elliniko Kentro Paragogikotitas-ELKEPA) -a central state actor- 
and is mainly focused on the implementation of the ESF subprogramme in the prefecture.
Thus, while the implementation of the MOP was primarily run by the prefecture, the City 
Council, the Mastic Growers’ Association and the Chamber were actively involved in the 
implementation of specific subprogrammes or initiatives. In particular, the Mastic Growers,
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arguably the most prominent private-interest actor of the prefecture, was involved in a 
INTERREG project undertaken at the regional level, focusing on the development of cross- 
border cooperation with Turkey and Bulgaria. Furthermore, the Association was involved in one 
of the actually few intra-regional networks that developed around the LEADER I and II 
Initiatives. The former was based on an initiative initially undertaken by the City Council and the 
Municipal Development Agency, while the latter, which refers to the second CSF, is expected 
to be based on joint action by the main local institutional actors. Finally, the most important 
involvement of the Mastic Growers’ Association in European regional policy programmes was 
in the implementation of the National Programme of Community Interest (NPCI) for Chios19. As 
has already been pointed out in the previous section, the NPCI included specific measures for the 
improvement of the efficiency levels in the production of mastic on the island, such as sectorial 
market research, promotion of mastic products and training in the production process.
The Chamber, on the other hand, beyond its participation in the Monitoring Committee 
for the implementation of the MOP, was actively involved in the local network for the LEADER 
Initiative, along with the Municipal Development Agency and the Mastic Association20.
Finally, the University was involved in the implementation of a project focusing on 
application of the telematique in the area of the mastic production, but this venture was a STAR- 
TELEMATIQUE subprogramme run by central state-agency (Ministry of Research and 
Development)21.
The structure of the policy network in Chios reflects the above-mentioned features of the
1 in terv iew  N o 16 with the president o f  the Mastic Growers’ Association (Chios, October, 1996). 
20Interview N o 10 with the president o f  the Chamber (Chios, October, 1996).
2'interviews N o 11 and 30 with the secretary o f  the Research Committee o f  the University o f  the Aegean  
(Athens, November, 1996).
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processes of institutional learning and adaptation in the prefecture. The density measure, which 
shows the degree of network cohesion, has significantly improved in the policy network, when 
compared with that of the general exchange (0.611 vis-a-vis 0.528). What the density measure 
indicates is that well over half the institutional actors are connected to each other within the 
network. Moreover, according to the centrality measures in table 7.4, which demonstrate the 
dominant actors within the network, the degree of centralization in the policy network is 
significantly lower in comparison with that of the general exchange (50.00% vis-a-vis 60.71% 
respectively). However, although the lower degree of centralization indicates a more horizontal 
structure of the policy network in comparison with the general exchange, this improvement 
should be mainly seen as the outcome of the upgraded status of the Mastic Growers’ Association, 
the City Council and the Municipal Development Agency.
TABLE 7.4
Centrality Measures of General Exchange and Policy Networks 
in Chios Prefecture
Organizations General Exchange Policy Network
Network Centralitv Centralitv
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00 100.00
2. Chios Pref. Council 87.50 87.50
3. Chios City Council 75.00 87.50
4. Chios Chamber 50.00 50.00
5. University 37.50 50.00
6. Chios Ass. Munic.&Comm. 37.50 37.50
7. Chios Mastic Producers’ Ass. 37.50 75.00
8. Chios Mun. Dev. Agency 25.00 37.50
9. Chios Training Centre 25.00 25.00
Total Network Centralization 60.71% 50.00%
Thus, looking at the centralization measures for each individual actor in both the general 
exchange and policy network, the following points should be underlined. First, the Regional 
Secretariat and secondarily the Prefecture Council are the most central actors within the network,
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which points to its domination by the hierarchical structure of the central state. Second, the City 
Council is the most central public actor, especially within the policy network, having outflanked 
the Association of Municipalities, whose position can be characterized as marginal within the 
institutional structure of the prefecture, given its formally key position within the local system 
of governance. Third, the Mastic Growers’ Association constitutes the most important private- 
interest actor, but only within the policy network, which reflects its dynamic position within the 
local productive system, and may justify expectations for its role as the initiator of networks 
development on intra-regional, inter-regional, or trans-regional basis. Conversely, the Chamber, 
which is the second most important private-interest institutional actor, demonstrates a stable, but 
limited role within the local institutional infrastructure. Fourth, the upgraded role of the 
University, especially in the policy network, should be attributed to the location of one of its 
main departments (business administration) on the island and additionally, to its involvement in 
MOP projects. Finally, the Municipal Development Agency demonstrates a considerable role 
within the policy network, while the role of the central state-run Training Centre is still rather 
marginal within the institutional structure of the prefecture.
The structural equivalence (Figure 7.10), which reveals common structural positions 
among the actors within the network, reflects the same structural features of the network with 
these that derive from analysis of the centrality measures. Thus, the comparison between the 
structural equivalence of the policy network and the exchange network (chapter 5) reveals the 
following structural features of the network. First, in both networks the block of the leading 
actors -which are connected with all the other actors of the other blocks- consists of public actors, 
namely the Regional Secretariat (NRGS), the Prefecture Council and the City Council. Second, 
by contrast with the network of general exchange, in the policy network there is evidence for a 
start up of network building among public and private actors, as illustrated especially in the block
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four, which comprises both the private-interest organizations, that is the Chamber and the Mastic 
Growers (CMASTA). Third, the position of the Association of Municipalities (CAMC) and the 
Training Centre (CKEK) remains marginal within both networks, while the participation of the 
Municipal Development Agency (CDA) in the MOP programmes (LEADER) and hence in 
public- private local networks has led to an improvement of its position within the policy 
network. Finally, despite the better structure of the policy network, it demonstrates weaknesses 
in building public/private synergies, which is considered an a prerequisite for learning and 
adaptation.
Figure 7.10
Structural Equivalence of Policy Network in Chios
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The graph of the network in Figure 7.11, which is based on a multidimensional scaling 
technique, depicts the main structural features of the policy network. This structure is, in many 
respects, similar to the structure of the general exchange network (chapter 5). In particular, while
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the General Secretariat (NRGS) and the Prefecture Council (CPREF) are depicted as the central 
actors in both networks, the Training Centre (CKEK) and the Association of Municipalities 
(CAMC) are represented as marginal actors. Conversely, the position of the Mastic Growers’ 
Association (CMASTA), the City Council (CCITY) and the Municipal Development Agency 
(CDA) is portrayed as significantly improved in the policy network when compared with the 
general exchange network.
Figure 7.11 
Policy Network in Chios
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7.3.4 Institution Building, Policy Networks and Adaptation in Samos
As established in chapter 5, the Samos prefecture demonstrates a weak institutional 
infrastructure, characterized by the lack of local initiatives and by major cooperation-problems 
among the institutional actors, whose relationships are confined within the framework of the 
necessary exchanges imposed by the functions of the administrative hierarchy. This institutional 
structure of the prefecture corresponds to its isolation in transport, communication and 
administrative linkages from the other two prefectures of the Northern Aegean.
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Within this policy environment the European structural policy programmes, despite 
criticisms of unfair allocation of resources among the islands and the role of the central state in 
this process, are viewed as providing a unique opportunity for institutional and economic 
development22. However, the poor performance of the prefecture in institution-building is 
illustrated by the lack of creation of any new institution and even in the policy network, the 
relations between the institutional actors are determined by exchanges within the administrative 
hierarchy. Additionally, beyond the formal participation of the Prefect and the Association of 
Municipalities in the Monitoring Committee of the MOP, the involvement of local institutional 
actors is extremely limited. In particular, given the lack of any development agency, which could 
create networks around specific programmes or initiatives, only the City Council and the 
Association of Municipalities were involved in the INTERREG Initiative and in a local action 
group for the LEADER Initiative. Nonetheless, what illustrates best the capacity for learning and 
adaptation of the local institutional infrastructure is the complete failure of the proposal for 
participation in the LEADER I Initiative, because of cooperation and coordination problems 
between the Association of Municipalities and the Wine Producers Association.
The structural features of the policy network in Samos only partly reflect the incapacity 
of the institutional infrastructure for learning and adaptation, because of the limited number of 
actors and the presence of exchanges that derive from the fundamental administrative functions 
of each actor. Thus, the density measure, which is an indicator of network cohesion, has been 
substantially improved in the policy network in comparison even with the comparatively high 
rate of the general exchange network (0.667 vis-a-vis 0.595 respectively). However, this rate does 
not correspond to the institutional capacity of the prefecture in learning and adaptation, given that
"'Interviews N o 17 and 20 with the mayor o f  the Samos City Council and the prefect (Samos, November,
1996 ).
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its improvement refers to the -ex officio- participation of actors in administrative functions (i.e 
Monitoring Committee). Furthermore, the centrality measures (table 7.5), which identify the 
central actors within the network, demonstrate in both the general exchange and policy networks 
a relatively horizontal rather than vertical structure (53.33% vis-a-vis 46.67% respectively). 
However, they do not reflect the real institutional capacity of the prefecture.
TABLE 7.5
Centrality Measures of General Exchange and Policy Networks 
in Samos Prefecture
Organizations General Exchange Policy Network
Network Centralitv Centralitv
1. Reg. Gen. Secretariat 100.00 100.00
2. Samos Pref. Council 83.33 83.33
3. Samos City Council 83.33 66.67
4. Samos Chamber 50.00 66.67
5. Samos Ass. Munic.&Comm. 50.00 66.67
6. Samos Wine Makers’ Ass. 50.00 66.67
7. University 16.67 16.67
Total Network Centralization 53.33% 46.67%
For the centrality measures of each individual actor at both the general exchange and 
policy networks, the central role of the Regional Secretariat, the marginal role of the University 
and the relative rates of the other actors deriving from the necessary administrative exchanges- 
involvements should be emphasized.
The main structural features that derive from the analysis of the centrality measures are 
further strengthened by the structural equivalence, which identifies common structural positions 
among the actors within the network, according to the structure of their relationships. Thus, the 
structural equivalence of the policy network reflects the same structural features with the 
centrality measures, that is the centrality of the Regional Secretariat (NRGS) and the marginal
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role of the University. All the other actors constitute a rather dense network, without, however, 
reflecting a real institutional capacity.
Figure 7.12
Structural Equivalence of Network Actors in Samos
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The graph of the network (Figure 7.14), based on multidimensional scaling technique, 
represents the structure of the network, as described by the centrality and structural equivalence 
measures. What the comparison between the policy network and the general exchange network 
reveals is that there are no important differences between the two networks. In particular, the 
Regional Secretariat and the University are depicted in both graphs as the most central and most 
marginal actors respectively. Additionally, the depiction of the other actors illustrates the 
looseness of the network with the small number of actors.
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Figure 7.13
Policy Network in Samos
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To sum up: the Samos prefecture reveals a poor institutional infrastructure in the policy 
network, which is characterized by a small number of institutional actors, linked mainly on the 
basis of the exchanges of the administrative system (i.e Monitoring Committees). The structure 
of the policy network is similar to the general exchange network (see chapter 5) despite the better 
density and centrality measures: hence, the dependence on the Regional Secretariat for 
leadership.
Conclusions
This chapter has shown that the differentiation identified in chapter 6 between Southern and 
Northern Aegean islands in absorption capacity and the orientation of the funds is accompanied 
by some differences among the islands-prefectures of the Northern Aegean region. In particular, 
the Lesbos prefecture demonstrates the worst performance in absorption in all subprogrammes, 
while the evidence from the Chios prefecture is comparatively better, because of the rather 
successful implementation of the National Programme of Community Interest (NPCI) for Chios.
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Finally, the Samos Prefecture lies between the two, even though its share in the MOP was 
relatively small. Furthermore, the Northern Aegean islands region, despite the highly subsidized 
national regional policy incentives scheme, does not show either a high level of private 
investment or, a considerable contribution of the private sector to the Structural Funds 
programmes. The problematic Europeanization of the region should be closely linked to the 
qualitative features of the institutional infrastructure at both the regional and prefectural levels. 
As the analysis of the processes of institution-building and adaptation in the region has shown, 
the institutional infrastructure at the regional level is characterized by a combination of 
centralization of the network around the regional Secretariat and fragmentation at the prefectural 
level. In that sense, it is similar to the general exchange network (chapter 5). Additionally, at the 
prefectural level all the prefectures demonstrate a lack of local leadership and capacity for 
learning and adaptation of the local institutional infrastructure, despite the unquestionable 
improvement in all islands. In particular, the following points should be emphasized for each 
island-prefecture. First, in Lesbos, despite the significant improvement of the structural 
characteristics in the policy network, it continues to demonstrate a lack of capacity for achieving 
local synergies and collective action among the actors. Second, Chios shows a comparatively 
better capacity for creating local synergies, learning and adaptation, while Samos demonstrates 
a poor institutional infrastructure in number of institutional actors involved in joint projects.
The following lessons should be drawn from the case of the Northern Aegean. First, the 
structure of the system of the intra-regional interactions plays the key role in facilitating the 
learning and adaptation processes. Second, even if the capacity of the local institutional 
infrastructure for learning and adaptation is poor, the Europeanization process constitutes an 
external shock for the local systems of governance that leads to the improvement of the local 
institutional infrastructure.
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8. CONCLUSIONS: SOCIAL CAPITAL, INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING 
AND ADAPTATION IN EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTEGRATION THEORY
Introduction
This thesis has shown that the concept of social capital, by facilitating the learning process within 
institutional networks at the regional and local levels, plays a crucial role in shaping the intra- 
regional interactions among the actors and hence in determining the capacity for adaptation and 
adjustment by regional and local systems of governance within the European regional policy 
environment. Thus, the main hypothesis of this thesis, established in chapter 2, is that the 
adaptation of local systems of governance to the European policy-making environment is 
dependent on:
-the presence of dense, intra-regional, functional institutional networks at the local level 
that cross the public and private divide by achieving synergies between public and private 
resources and have a capacity for learning whereby institutional relationships and policy 
outcomes adapt to changing conditions, and,
-the presence of social capital endowments that, by resolving dilemmas of collective 
action and thus enabling actors to be actively involved in the provision of public goods 
and services that support the local productive system, facilitate the formation of the 
system of interactions and the learning process within institutional networks.
Additionally, the capacity of the local institutional infrastructure for learning and adaptation is
to a significant extent conditioned by:
-the structure of the state and the functional and territorial distribution of power and 
resources through centre-periphery (intergovernmental) relations and the qualitative 
features of public administration, and,
-the process of Europeanization of public policy, which challenges well-established 
institutional structures and creates conditions favourable for institution-building, even if 
the pre-existing institutional capacity for learning is poor.
This final chapter evaluates the validity of the above theoretical framework, by drawing 
the most important conclusions that arise from the two cases, focusing on the main theoretical
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concepts of this thesis: social capital, learning and adaptation/Europeanization. It is divided into 
three sections. Section one examines the impact of the national (state structure) and international 
(Europeanization) factors upon the learning and adaptation capacity of the local institutional 
infrastructure. The second section, relying on the criteria for measuring learning and adaptation 
established in chapter 2, assesses the learning and adaptation capacity of the institutional 
networks in the two regions and the role of social capital in this process. Finally, the third section 
discusses the emerging theoretical implications for regional integration in general and European 
regional policy in particular.
8.1 National Structures, Local Institutional Capacity and the European Challenge
The capacity of local systems of governance for learning and adaptation to changing conditions 
brought about by the Europeanization of policy-making is shaped by the way in which the system 
of interactions between subnational institutions, national structures and European environment 
is formulated. The national and supranational levels of governance provide the structural and 
functional parameters within which local governments act to achieve objectives corresponding 
to local needs. Thus, within this complicated policy environment local institutions have, 
theoretically, a variety of ways for performing their functions. Therefore, the structural external 
parameters for action may inhibit or facilitate the learning and adaptation capacities of local 
systems of governance. Based on our evidence from a centralized state structure and a weak civil 
society, we examine the impact that the structure of intergovernmental relations has had on local 
institutional capacity and the role of Europeanization in this process.
The structure of the state, in general, is considered a crucial component that affects the 
formation of the system of local institutional interactions (institutional networks) and the capacity 
for learning and adaptation of local systems of governance. Three interrelated factors are crucial
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in this process: the power and resource-dependence relationships among tiers of government, the 
degree of centralization of the state and the presence of a directly-elected regional government. 
This thesis, however, is based on the theoretical assumption that intergovernmental relations is 
a dynamic system which cannot be simply reduced to the constitutional structure of the state. 
Within this theoretical framework resource dependencies between central and subnational levels 
of government and between public and private actors shape the degree of boundedness for the 
subnational systems of governance and for any particular local actor. Thus, the system of 
interactions among the local actors through the recognition of their mutual dependence and hence 
their collectivity constitutes the most important factor for learning and adaptation and may 
additionally enable the local system of governance to exploit the channel of intergovernmental 
relations for the satisfaction of local needs irrespective of the degree of centralization of the state 
(Paraskevopoulos, 1998a,b; Sabel, 1993b). The presence of a strong civil society and social 
capital endowments plays the key role in this process (Paraskevopoulos, 1998a). Within this 
dynamic system of intergovernmental and centre-periphery relations, intra-regional functional 
networks provide the locality with public goods and services and pursue endogenously-driven 
policies that meet local needs, while, on the other hand, they can use the channels of the 
intergovernmental networks to obtain access to additional resources from and coordinating 
policies at the national level. Hence, while resource-interdependence is seen as the prerequisite 
for network-building, the presence of social capital and the strength of civil society at the regional 
and local levels constitute the decisive factors enabling local actors to recognize their mutual 
dependence and collectivity, thus shaping the system of local interactions and facilitating the 
learning process within the networks.
The centralized and hierarchical structure of the state in Greece and the peculiarities of 
the system of intergovernmental and centre-periphery relations, characterized by the dominant
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role of the prefecture as a deconcentrated administrative unit of the central state at the local level 
and the lack of a directly-elected regional government, did not inhibit the process of institution- 
building and network creation, primarily in Dodecanese and secondarily in Cyclades since the 
1960s. This process was a function beyond the boundaries of the formal hierarchically-structured 
intergovernmental networks. Chapter four provides evidence for this prompt formation of intra- 
regional interactions and network-building, which enabled local actors to avoid the inter-local 
competition for resources from the central state and subsequently allowed for the collective, in 
comparative terms, moulding of the policy priorities within the local system of governance. In 
particular, the Organization of Tourist Promotion and the Advisory Committee for Local 
Development in Dodecanese, as well as the informal Tourist Committees in Cyclades, constituted 
the nuclei for network-building and collective action at the local level. These networks provided 
the local productive system with vital public goods and services and facilitated the learning 
process and the prompt adjustment of the local system of governance and its policy outputs to 
the changing conditions of the external environment (shift towards tourism).
Conversely, in the prefectures of the Northern Aegean the poor institutional capacity and 
the weak civil society (lack of social capital endowments) led the local system of governance to 
dependence on the hierarchical structure of intergovernmental relations for the necessary 
financial and administrative resources. Hence, its dependence on the central state is interpreted 
not merely as a consequence of the structure of centre-periphery relations, but mainly as a result 
of the weakness of the institutional infrastructure. Chapter five provides evidence for the way in 
which the lack of local networks and the weak civil society led to exogenously-driven local 
systems of governance and subsequently to the problematic adjustment of these prefectures in 
terms of policy outcomes. Thus, the productive structures of the Northern Aegean islands 
remained crucially dependent on the traditional sectors of each island, that is the mono-culture
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of olive for Lesbos, the shipping-maritime industry for Chios and agriculture for Samos.
The gradual Europeanization of public policy in general and of regional policy in 
particular since the early 1980s brought about radical changes in the structure of the Greek state 
and the system of intergovernmental relations (chapter 3). The creation of regions and regional 
councils -even without directly-elected members- and the gradual move initially from the 
clientelist to a rather neo-corporatist pattern of regional-interest representation at the prefectural 
level with the 1982 reform of the prefectural councils, and later (1994) to the directly-elected 
second tier of subnational government, constitute the most important reforms, attributed to 
pressures imposed by the European environment. Furthermore, the opening up of the system to 
bottom-up initiatives and the subsequent unclear distribution of functions among the tiers of 
government, coupled with the rationalization of the local government finance introduced by the 
“Central Autonomous Resources” scheme, opened up possibilities for dynamic flexibility in the 
system of intergovernmental relations. Finally, the ability of local governments to impose 
additional taxation for the completion of local-scale projects created an environment favourable 
for regions and localities who were institutionally capable of bottom-up initiatives in adapting 
their structures and policies.
The response of the two case study-regions to the intended and unintended consequences 
of the Europeanization, however, was analogous to their preexisting institutional capacity. The 
evidence provided in chapters six and seven supports the hypotheses, on the one hand, that 
regional differentiation in learning and adaptation capacities, though possible even within 
centralized states, usually reflects a preexisting differentiation in institutional capacity, and on 
the other, that even if the preexisting local institutional capacity is poor, the challenge of 
Europeanization and involvement in EU programmes and initiatives constitute a positive external 
shock for local systems of governance, which caused an improvement of the local institutional
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infrastructure. The cases demonstrate that the European dimension provides as an alternative 
policy-making field for local governments that can counterbalance possible rigidities within the 
structures of the traditional nation-state.
Thus, the prefectures of the Southern Aegean were better able than their Northern Aegean 
counterparts to exploit the changes occurring in the system of intergovernmental and centre- 
periphery relations and to adapt their institutional structure and policy process to the new 
European environment. In particular, the preexisting structure of local institutional networks in 
the Dodecanese and Cyclades prefectures was further improved by the strengthening of 
public/private synergies among the institutional actors. This process was substantiated by the 
intersection between the local sectoral networks already in place and the hierarchical 
intergovernmental networks between region, prefecture and city. The functional networks, 
emerging through the combination of public and private actors, provided an environment 
favourable for learning, since they facilitated the exchange of information, ideas and knowledge 
about the new policy environment. Hence, despite the comparatively low level of the private- 
sector contribution to the Structural Funds programmes, because of the maintenance of past 
clientelistic practices operating around the national headquarters of regional policy, especially 
in the Dodecanese, a significant coordination of public and private resources took place. EU and 
public funds were used for the improvement of the physical infrastructure, while, even though 
the involvement of the private sector was in general low, it had a considerable presence in 
Community Initiatives-projects. These features are illustrated by the absorption rates, primarily 
of the Dodecanese and secondarily of the Cyclades prefectures, in all the subprogrammes and 
measures of the first CSF (chapter 6). What both the significant improvement of the network- 
structure and the absorption rates in the Southern Aegean indicate is that, despite the centralized 
and hierarchical structure of the state and the system of intergovernmental relations, the
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preexisting institutional capacity at the prefectural level led to a rather successful adaptation o f
the local economies and societies to the EU regional policy environment. Finally, on whether the
role of Europe was an alternative to the nation-state policy-making field, the answer of one of our
interviewees was characteristic:
for our region the bypassing of the nation-state level and its mismanagement of the EU 
resources -for social policy rather than for development- is so important, that we would 
prefer completely direct contacts with Brussels without any interference from the state 
structures1.
In a similar vein, in the prefectures of the Northern Aegean the learning capacity of the 
preexisting institutional infrastructure played the most important role in the adaptation process. 
Although both the qualitative features of the network structure and the policy outputs have been 
substantially improved within the European regional policy environment, the three prefectures 
of the Northern Aegean lag behind the Southern Aegean and even most of the other Greek 
regions in adaptation capacity. In institutional infrastructure the lack of functional networks in 
the processes of general exchange, combining public and private actors within the European 
policy environment, was replaced by a process of institution-building, which led to the creation 
of new institutions, especially in Lesbos, without, however, changing dramatically the structure 
of the networks. Thus, with the partial exception of the Chios prefecture which had shown some 
elements of qualitative change with the creation of public/private partnerships around the specific 
National Programme of Community Interest (NPCI), the structure of the policy networks in the 
prefectures of the Northern Aegean did not demonstrate the necessary structural features for 
crossing the public/private divide and thus facilitating collective action, learning and adaptation. 
Therefore, the predominance of the hierarchical structure of the system of intergovernmental 
relations, namely the Regional Secretariat, within the local system of governance reflects, to a
'interview N o 60 with the president o f  the Rhodes Hotel Owners’ Association (Rhodes, October, 1996).
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significant extent, the weakness of local institutional networks and should not be attributed 
exclusively to the state structure. The institutional weakness of the prefectures of the region is 
illustrated by the low level of effectiveness and efficiency of the local systems of governance in 
the management of the EU funds. In particular, beyond the low level of the private-sector 
contribution, the prefectures of the region demonstrated one of the lowest rates of absorption 
capacity in the country during the first CSF (MOP). Additionally, as the qualitative analysis of 
the use of the funds shows, the bulk of the EU funds was used for social and small-scale physical 
infrastructure (road network, education), which only partly reflects local needs, given that its 
major part is the outcome of clientelist pressures. Finally, the start up of debate among the main 
local actors of the Northern Aegean prefectures-islands on the necessity for adaptation of both 
the institutional structure and policies (i.e shift towards tourism) constitutes the most important 
innovation brought about by the Europeanization of regional policy. Hence, the improvement of 
the local institutional structure, and the beginning of learning procedures within the local system 
of governance in the Northern Aegean, vindicate the hypothesis that the challenge of 
Europeanization, even in areas of poor institutional capacity, constitute a positive external shock 
starting up institution-building and the learning processes that eventually led to improvement of 
the local institutional infrastructure.
To sum up, even though the state structure plays an important role in determining the 
learning and adaptation capacity of local systems of governance, the latter is crucially dependent 
on certain capacities for collective action at the local level which facilitate the formation of the 
system of interactions among the actors. The presence of social capital and of a strong civil 
society is the most important factor in this process. The Europeanization process, on the other 
hand, by providing an alternative to that of the nation-state policy-making field for local 
governments, plays, especially within centralized states, a crucial role in changing the rules of
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the game and thus enhancing the institution-building process at the local level, which eventually 
leads to significant improvement of the preexisting institutional capacity.
8.2 Social Capital, Learning and Adaptation: An Agenda fo r  Europe o f  the 21st Century? 
Institutional learning has been defined in chapter two as a function involving the changing of 
ideas, preferences or policy choices and the improved capacity of institutional actors to design 
and implement these new policies, all of which may affect the balance of power among the 
actors. This process is crucially influenced by the presence of social capital and the structure of 
the networks. This section evaluates the learning capacity of the institutional networks by using 
the criteria for measuring learning established in chapter two, and then examines the impact of 
social capital and networks’ type and structure on the learning process. Finally, it categorizes the 
case study-regions according to the measures of Europeanization established also in chapter two.
8.2.1 Measuring Learning
Five criteria have been identified for measuring the learning capacity of local institutional 
infrastructure. First, the presence of fora for dialogue and communication among the actors, 
which is considered a prerequisite for the exchange of information, ideas and knowledge and 
hence for shaping the interactions among the actors. Second, the process of institution-building 
and adaptation of the network structure refers to the creation of new institutions or to change in 
the existing institutional structure as a consequence of the learning process. The third criterion 
is the extent to which partnerships among public and private actors have been established, which 
facilitate the communication of new knowledge and information and hence the formulation of 
policy priorities. The fourth variable is the common understanding of the major issues facing the 
local system of governance, which constitutes a precondition for dialogue among the actors.
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Finally, the adaptation of the policy output is the fifth criterion, which can reveal the way in 
which the institutional structure has responded to the requirements for policy change posed by 
the changing conditions. Table 8.1 below presents a synopsis of the indicators of learning at the 
regional and prefectural levels.
For dialogue and communication the main feature of the prefectures of the Southern 
Aegean is the presence of multiple fora, some of which are not associated with European regional 
policy. Thus, in the Dodecanese prefecture the Organization for the Promotion of Tourism, which 
focuses on the exchange of knowledge and information about policy for tourist development, had 
its origins in the 1960s, and has constituted an important component for the successful adaptation 
of the productive structure of the prefecture towards the development of the tourist sector. 
Additionally, the advisory committee, which comprised prominent public and private institutional 
actors of the prefecture, functioned as an advisory forum for dialogue and communication 
alongside the prefectural council until 1994, when the first elections for a directly-elected council 
took place. Finally, a series of conferences on the problems of tourist development, which had 
been organized mainly by the Chamber’s initiatives since the early 1980s, constitute pioneering 
fora for the communication of primary knowledge and information, without, however, being all 
of them associated with European regional policy. Yet the Europeanization of regional policy, 
and the initiation of the Structural Funds programmes, contributed to the further improvement 
of dialogue and communication in the prefecture with new fora for dialogue required by the 
implementation of the partnership principle. In this category fall the Monitoring Committee for 
the CSF (MOP) and the fora created for the implementation of the Community Initiatives 
(LEADER, VALOREN, HORIZON, INTERREG).
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Table 8.1
Indicators o f Learning Capacity in Southern and Northern Aegean
CRITERIA FOR 
MEASURING LEARNING
SOUTHERN AEGEAN 
REGION
NORTHERN AEGEAN 
REGION
Fora for Dialogue and 
Communication
A. Dodecanese pref.:
1 .Tourist Promotion
2. Advisory Committee
3. CSF Monit.Committee
4. Tourism/Devel. Conf.
5. LEADER
6. VALOREN
7. HORIZON
8. INTERREG
B. Cyclades pref.:
1. Tourist Committees
2. CSF Monit.Committee
3. LEADER
4. ENVIREG
5. URBAN
6. PRISMA
A. Lesbos pref.:
1. CSF Monit. Committee
2. LEADER
3. VALOREN
B. Chios pref.:
1. CSF Monit. Committee
2. NPCI
3. LEADER
4. STAR/TELEMATIQ.
C. Samos pref.:
1. CSF Monit. Committee
2. LEADER
3. INTERREG
Institution Building 
(Network Creation)
A. Dodecanese pref.:
1. Org. for Tourist Prom.
2. Cooperative Bank
3.DDA
4. KDA
B. Cyclades pref.:
1.CYDA
2. ERMDA
A. Lesbos pref.:
1.LLDA
2. AEOLIKI
3. MMDA
B. Chios pref.:
1.CDA
2. Chios Training Centre
C. Samos pref.: --
Crossing the Public/Private 
Divide (partnerships)
A. Dodecanese pref.: 
present
B. Cyclades pref.: present
A. Lesbos pr.: almost absent
B. Chios pref.: partly
C. Samos pref.: absent
Problem Identification 
among the Local Actors
A. Dodecanese pref.: partly
present
B. Cyclades pref.: partly
present
A. Lesbos pref.: starting up
B. Chios pref.: starting up
C. Samos pref.: starting up
Policy Adaptation A. Dodecanese pref.: partly
B. Cyclades pref.: partly
A. Lesbos pref.: starting up
B. Chios pref.: starting up
C. Samos pref.: starting up
The Cyclades prefecture demonstrates to a significant extent a similar environment for 
communication and dialogue. In particular, the tourist committees were primary fora for dialogue
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and policy advice to the prefecture bodies at the local/island level, which functioned until the first 
elections for the new prefectural councils took place (1994). In a similar vein to Dodecanese, the 
Monitoring Committee for the CSF, and the mobilization of local actors around specific 
Community Initiatives, contributed to the upgrading of the prefecture’s capacity for dialogue and 
communication.
The prefectures of the Northern Aegean islands demonstrate a different picture. The 
existing fora for dialogue and communication constitute byproducts of the implementation of the 
Structural Funds programmes and Initiatives, given the lack of any preexisting mechanisms for 
facilitating the communication of new information and the exchange of ideas. This weakness 
reflects the dependence of the local system of governance on the centralized structure of 
intergovernmental relations and hence the dominant role of the prefecture. Thus, the Monitoring 
Committee for the CSF and the Community Initiatives are the only opportunities for dialogue in 
Lesbos and Samos, while the NPCI for Chios contributed substantially to the improvement of the 
capacity of the island for dialogue and communication.
The evidence from the regions about the second variable of institution-building and 
network-creation reflects their differentiation in the capacity for dialogue. However, the strong 
tradition of the Dodecanese in local institutional capacity and institution-building, almost since 
its incorporation into the Greek state, led to its differentiation from all the other prefectures. 
Whereas in them the process of network-creation was closely linked to the Europeanization of 
regional policy, in the Dodecanese the EU programmes contributed to an improvement in the 
preexisting network structure (Cooperative Bank, Organization for Tourist Promotion etc), and 
the new networks are well-connected within the institutional infrastructure. Thus the 
Europeanization of regional policy brought about the further improvement of the Dodecanese 
networks rather than the creation of new institutions, which remained comparatively limited. This
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pattern contrasts with the Northern Aegean and particularly Lesbos, where the creation of new 
institutions and networks is a consequence of the redundancy of a major part of the old 
institutional infrastructure.
With the third criterion, the presence of communication channels between public and 
private actors, the network structure of the Southern Aegean prefectures provides convincing 
evidence of public/private partnerships, which constitute, on the one hand, fora for dialogue, 
information exchange and the formulation of policy priorities, and on the other, channels for 
linking the local system of governance with the central state through the structure of 
intergovernmental relations. Conversely the structure of the networks of the Northern Aegean 
islands’ prefectures reveals, with the exception of Chios, an absence of communication on a 
horizontal basis between public and private actors. In Chios the implementation of the NPCI has 
played an important role in enhancing partnerships between public and private actors. The 
leading actors in this process are the Mastic Growers’ Association and Chamber.
With the fourth variable, the common understanding of the problems or challenges facing 
the localities, the evidence from the two regions proves they are similar in one respect: both face 
adaptation challenges of a different phase and scale. In particular, the major challenge for the 
prefectures of the Southern Aegean (Dodecanese and Cyclades), which are characterized by 
development of the mass tourist industry, is whether they will exploit the opportunities provided 
by European structural policy to adjust their policy priorities and reform their institutional 
structures to the new patterns of demand in leisure (small-scale tourism). The evidence shows 
that the local actors in both prefectures have to a significant extent a common understanding of 
the problems they face. The challenges facing the Northern Aegean islands, on the other hand, 
are to use Structural Funds money for building the necessary infrastructure and to adapt their 
institutional structure and policies towards development based on small-scale tourism, thus
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avoiding the paradigm of the mass tourist industry in which the Southern Aegean were trapped 
since the 1970s. As the evidence from the Northern Aegean shows, this debate, which involves 
the gradual shift from the traditional for each island productive sectors, has just started in these 
islands.
Finally, the evidence on the crucial fifth criterion, policy adaptation, corresponds to the 
level of problem identification for each prefecture. Thus, the evidence for the presence of policy 
adaptation in Dodecanese and Cyclades is illustrated by both the pursuit of innovative policies 
and the orientation of the major part of the EU funds. In particular, the conclusions of the 
conferences, organized by the Dodecanese Chamber, which suggested changes in the priorities 
of tourist policy (conference tourism, expansion of the tourist period to the Winter underpinned 
by small-scale units), were introduced into the policy priorities. This trend has become evident 
by the policy for control of tourist development in the islands of Rhodes and Kos and by the 
pursuit of small-scale tourist development in the still underdeveloped islands of the prefecture. 
Additionally, in Cyclades, where the problem of over-concentration is less intense, the policy 
priorities adopted focus on expansion of the tourist period, the promotion of qualitative tourism 
and avoidance of concentration. The above policy priorities are reflected also in the orientation 
of EU funds and especially during the period of the second CSF (1994-99) towards the creation 
of basic infrastructure on underdeveloped islands and of appropriate infrastructure for the 
promotion of flexible forms of tourism (yachting). By contrast, the Northern Aegean islands lag 
behind in policy adaptation, since they are currently in the phase of early debate on the necessity 
for adaptation. Hence there is no evidence of formulation of policy priorities and even less of 
policy adaptation.
In conclusion, the evaluation of the case study-regions, according to the criteria for 
measuring learning, indicates that in the Southern Aegean islands prefectures an institutional
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structure and policy environment favourable for learning have facilitated the learning process 
among the actors and hence the learning capacity of the local systems of governance. Conversely, 
the lack of these features in the Northern Aegean has led to an institutional environment poor in 
learning, which shows some signs of improvement only within the framework of the EU 
structural policy.
8.2.2 Social Capital, Networks and Learning: evaluating Europeanization
This section tests the main hypothesis of this thesis, that the local systems of governance better 
able to learn and adapt to changing conditions are those whose institutional structure is based on 
dense functional networks that combine public and private actors and have a horizontal rather 
than a vertical structure. This process, however, is crucially determined by the presence of social 
capital and a strong civil society that facilitate communication, the sharing of new ideas and 
knowledge, and hence collective action among the actors, and the learning process within 
institutional networks. Therefore, social capital (trust, norms) and inter-organizational structure 
are to be assessed as the explanatory (independent-intervening) variables of the learning and 
adaptation capacity of the case-study regions.
Chapters four and five have shown that the institutional networks of general exchange in 
the Southern Aegean islands prefectures demonstrate substantially higher density rates in 
comparison with the equivalent networks of the prefectures of the Northern Aegean. In particular, 
in Dodecanese, which has the most dense network, the density rate is 0.727 out of 1, while in 
Cyclades, because of the low presence of the University of the Aegean, the density rate found was 
0.545 out of 1. Conversely, the density rates of the networks in the prefectures of the Northern 
Aegean are significantly lower, 0.418 for Lesbos, 0.528 for Chios and 0.595 for Samos.
This differentiation in the density of the networks reflects differentiated levels of network
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cohesion among the prefectures. Primarily in Dodecanese and secondarily in Cyclades the 
comparatively high density rates reflect the presence of bonds of trust among the actors, which 
facilitate better communication of new ideas and knowledge and hence dialogue. Additionally, 
the dense networks correspond to bringing together public and private actors, thus achieving 
synergies and subsequently shared rules and a common understanding of the problems and 
challenges facing the local economy and society. By contrast, the low density rates in the 
networks of the prefectures of the Northern Aegean indicate a less shaped system of institutional 
interactions, which is characterized by the lack of channels for dialogue and communication 
among the actors and an absence of a common understanding of the problems that inhibit the 
learning process.
Variation in the degree of centralization among the prefectural networks, however, is 
more indicative than that of the density measures, given that centralization reveals the 
distribution of resources and power among the actors and subsequently the structure (hierarchical 
or horizontal) of the network. Thus, the centrality measures of the Dodecanese and Cyclades 
general exchange networks are significantly lower (33.33% and 54.55% respectively) than those 
of the Lesbos, Chios and Samos networks (71.11%, 60.71% and 53.33% respectively).
This differentiation in centrality reflects the different structures of the networks. In the 
Dodecanese and Cyclades prefectures the structure of the networks is more horizontal than 
vertical. What this structure reveals is that the Dodecanese and Cyclades networks are based on 
cohesive functional networks that combine public and private actors and constitute key 
components for the formation of the local institutional interactions. Thus, despite the centralized 
structure of the state and subsequently the leading role of public actors (Regional Secretariat and 
Prefecture Councils), the core of the network structure consists of functional networks, 
comprising public and private actors well-connected within the network structure. Additionally,
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actors in the functional networks may provide alternative solutions for the leadership roles in the 
future, as the latest reforms lead to a less hierarchical structure of the intergovernmental relations. 
The horizontal structure of institutional interactions in Cyclades and Dodecanese reflects the 
comparatively more balanced distribution of resources and power among the actors, which allows 
for horizontal exchange of valuable resources (knowledge, information) and facilitates the 
learning and adaptation processes.
Conversely, the high centrality rates of the networks in the prefectures of the Northern 
Aegean indicate the lack of core functional networks that combine public and private actors and 
facilitate collective action and coordination of resources at the local level. Hence, the local 
systems of governance tend to have a vertical rather than a horizontal structure, which is 
overwhelmingly dependent on the central state through the system of intergovernmental relations. 
As identified in chapter two, the vertical-hierarchical structure of institutional networks inhibits 
the exchange of information, new ideas and knowledge and hence communication and dialogue 
among the actors. This weakness of the institutional infrastructure in the prefectures of the 
Northern Aegean has led to a policy-making environment characterized by the dominant role of 
the Regional Secretariat as the leading actor within the institutional structure of each prefecture 
and the lack of other leading actors to provide leadership from within the institutional structure. 
This vertical and hierarchical structure of the local systems of governance has constituted a major 
impediment to the learning and adaptation processes in the Northern Aegean islands, which is 
illustrated by the problematic adjustment of their economic structures to the changing economic 
environment in the 1960s and 1970s.
These characteristics of the institutional networks of general exchange played an 
important role in determining the adaptation capacity of the two regions to the European 
environment. Nonetheless, whereas in the Southern Aegean their preexisting institutional
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capacity facilitated their comparatively successful adjustment to European regional policy, in the 
Northern Aegean the Europeanization of regional policy signaled the start up of the process of 
institution-building, which led to a substantial improvement in local institutional capacity. Hence, 
improvement of the institutional structures in both regions is illustrated by the structural features 
(density, centralization, structural equivalence) of the policy networks.
Table 8.2 below presents a synopsis of the territorial structure of institutional networks 
in the two regions per dominant actor. This table reveals the predominance of the prefectures of 
the Southern Aegean region in functional networks, the absence of intra-regional networks with 
the exception of the regional councils and the Monitoring Committees of the CSF, and weak 
inter-regional cooperation which is restricted to a sectoral network created by the Chambers. At 
the transnational level the dominant role of the Dodecanese Chamber, which has participated in 
numerous sectoral networks, is clear. By contrast the participation of the Northern Aegean region 
in the EURISLES Initiative is characterized by the dominant role of local government agencies 
(Chios Association of Municipalities).
The differentiation in institutional capacity for learning and adaptation between the 
prefectures of the case-study regions, however, is linked to their categorization by degree of 
Europeanization. Thus, according to the criteria established in chapter two, the following points 
should be stressed. First, there is convincing evidence that the prefectures of the Southern 
Aegean, given the limitations of the Greek socio-political structure, may be easily categorized 
in the third stage of Europeanization, since they fulfil the criteria of management and 
communication of EU-related information among the actors, involvement in programmes and 
ability to gain access to more EU funding, as well as developing network structures which 
overcome the public/private divide among the actors. Additionally, the plan of the newly-elected 
Dodecanese prefecture council along with other private and public actors of the prefecture for
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Table 8.2
Institutional Networks by Type in Southern and Northern Aegean Islands
Territory Prefectural Intraregional Interregional Transregional
Dominant Actor S. Aegean N. Aegean S. Aegean N. Aegean S. Aegean N. Aegean S. Aegean N. Aegean
Governmental Lesbos 
Train. Cent. 
(Kekanal)
Chios
Train. Cent.
Regional
Council
Regional
Council
Lesbos
Univ/sity/
Eurisles
Chios
CAMC/
Eurisles
Sectoral Dod/nese
&
Cyclades
Chambers
Aegean Isis
Chambers’
Association
Lesbos
Chios
Samos
Chambers
Aegean Isis
Chambers’
Association
Dod/nese
Chamber/
1 .Economic 
Obs/tory
2.Ecomost
3.Mercure
4.Tacis
5.Euroform
Functional Dodecanese
Tourist
Promotion
Coop/tive
Bank
DDA
KDA
CYDA
ERMDA
LLDA CSF
(MOP)
Monitoring
Committee
CSF
(MOP)
Monitoring
Committee
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opening an office in Brussels is viewed as an indicator of its entering into the final stage of full 
Europeanization, characterized by the development of European-style initiatives at the local level 
and advisory channels towards the Commission through its participation in transeuropean 
networks. Second, the prefectures of the Northern Aegean are categorized in the second stage of 
Europeanization, given that they are involved in the management of information and mobilized 
around EU Structural Funds programmes, but they display a poor performance in the 
development of public/private networks. Finally, the evidence from the two regions should be 
interpreted in relative terms, given the still centralized state structure and the general weakness 
of local governments in Greece.
Variation in the strength of civil society, and the presence of social capital endowments 
constitute the explanatory variable for the diversified degree of learning and adaptation to the 
European environment among the Aegean islands regions. Despite the difficulties of identifying 
clear-cut differences in the level of social capital among the regions, chapters four and five 
provide evidence based on both quantitative and qualitative research on the differentiation of the 
two regions in the strength of their civil society. Thus, beyond the clear superiority of the 
Southern Aegean in participation in all the categories of voluntarist organizations, the analysis 
of the data has revealed crucial qualitative differences in participation in the two regions. In 
particular the presence of numerous networks of civic engagement focusing on the provision of 
crucial public services (health care) in Dodecanese and Cyclades in comparison with the rather 
culture-oriented voluntarist organizations in the Northern Aegean islands has been illustrated by 
the involvement of the Dodecanese Association of persons with Special Needs in the 
implementation of the HORIZON I Initiative. Furthermore, the involvement of voluntarist 
organizations (Lyceums of women) in EU programmes had already become evident, even during 
the implementation phase of the Aegean IMP. This evidence seems consistent with the strong
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tradition in institution-building primarily in Dodecanese and secondarily in Cyclades since the 
1960s. Thus, although the evidence demonstrates similarities between the two regions over “law 
and order”, a strong civil society and important voluntarist organizations constitute intrinsic 
elements of the local systems of governance in both prefectures of the Southern Aegean and have 
facilitated the processes of general exchange and policy network-building.
The interrelationship between the presence of social capital and the quality of local 
institutional structure (networks) is illustrated by the descriptive graphs (A.1-A.6) in appendix 
A. These graphs present correlations between the main variables of this thesis, that is social 
capital, structure (vertical or horizontal) of the general exchange and policy networks, economic 
performance and absorption capacity from the Structural Funds programmes (1st CSF-MOP). The 
main conclusion that emerges from these graphs is that the presence of social capital and a strong 
civil society are highly correlated with the structure of the local institutional networks and then- 
capacity for learning and adaptation.
8.3 Implications fo r  Policy and Integration Theory
The theoretical framework of this thesis initiated the notions of social capital and institutional 
(inter-organizational) networks as crucial conceptual tools for understanding how the learning 
and adaptation processes of the local systems of governance in the European regional policy 
environment were facilitated. This final section draws the main theoretical implications deriving 
from this research for integration theory in general and European regional policy in particular.
Since both concepts, social capital and networks, have been used for explaining the 
adaptation process in industrial districts and areas of industrial decline, their introduction into the 
European policy-making process is linked to the existing within the European environment 
similar needs for adaptation and adjustment. The increasing importance of the network paradigm
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across a wide variety of research fields, as a form of governance distinct from the models of 
market and hierarchy, is related to its capacity for explaining the complex system of exchanges 
and interdependencies among the actors on a horizontal basis.
Subsequently, the use of the network metaphor in European regional policy implies the 
need for overcoming the traditional in the problematique of regional development state/market 
dichotomy and the respective theoretical implications for policy design, implementation and 
outcomes. By mapping institutional structures and hence actors’ interdependencies, institutional 
networks challenge the main ontological assumption about actors’ independence, upon which the 
market model is based. On the other hand, networks question the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the hierarchically-structured and top-down state intervention in achieving adaptation and positive 
economic outcomes at the regional level. Thus, the view of local systems of governance as 
systems of interactions emphasizes the role of the networks as the appropriate conceptual tools 
for capturing these interactions and the subsequent processes of resource exchange and 
interdependence among institutional actors at the local level. It is within this institutional 
environment that synergies among public and private actors are achieved and the public/private 
divide is overcome. In that sense, institutional networks constitute the organizational form of 
collective governance within which the pursuit of individual interests is seen as a function of 
collective rather than of autonomous-individual actions.
Within such a policy environment, however, still dominated by rationality-based actors’ 
preferences through the processes of exchange and interdependence, the concept of social capital 
emerges as a set of norms, internalized by individual actors, that introduces the notion of social 
structure into the rational-choice paradigm, thus bridging the gap between rational or purposive 
action and social structure, and facilitating collective action among the actors within the 
networks. Social capital is the key conceptual tool for learning and adaptation processes for two
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main reasons. First, given that the learning process is crucially affected by the uncertainty and 
volatility that characterize modem institutional settings and depends on information exchange, 
communication and dialogue, social capital, by facilitating collective action among actors within 
networks, plays the most important role in enhancing the learning and hence the adaptation 
functions. Second, since the functions of institutional learning and adaptation usually undermine 
the stability of relations among actors, the forms of social capital (trust, norms) play a key role 
in re-stabilizing relations among the involved actors and thus the further development of the 
network stmcture.
Under these considerations, social capital and networks constitute key components of the 
main theoretical argument of this thesis: that learning, adaptation and hence development are 
socially and institutionally embedded processes, which cannot be understood either by the old 
leftist tradition of state intervention or by the new-right orthodoxy which emphasizes governance 
by a self-regulating economy. This “embeddedness thesis”, which implies the overcoming of the 
notion of methodological individualism for utility maximization and hence the neo-liberal 
predominance, constitutes the comer stone of the notion of collective competitiveness 
(Paraskevopoulos, 1998a,b). Collective competitiveness, in turn, is the prerequisite for successful 
learning, adaptation and the Europeanization of subnational governments across Europe. Within 
this framework the lesson drawn for European regional policy is that the main criterion for the 
evaluation of the success or failure of the Structural Funds programmes should be the degree of 
synergies and networks creation at the regional and local levels through enhancement of the 
partnership principle.
From the evidence of European structural policy arise important implications for 
contemporary integration theory. First, “traditional” theories of regional integration are, to varied 
degrees, incapable of capturing the complexities of the current state of the art in the integration
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process in Europe. In particular, even though neofunctionalism’s emphasis on the role of 
supranational institutions and the ‘top-down’ process of transformation of loyalties and identities 
implicitly acknowledges a role for learning on a top-down basis, it is incapable of capturing the 
dynamics of the system within which the multiplicity of interests has been raised as its main 
feature. On the other hand, although intergovemmentalism’s emphasis on the bargains between 
member-state governments describes adequately the formalities of the decision-making process 
in the EU, it overlooks the bottom-up dynamics of the system, within which, at least after the 
completion of the SEA, the role of the nation-states has, to a significant extent, been replaced by 
the role of the market and civil society (Paraskevopoulos, 1998c).
Second, for the contemporary debate among the neo-institutionalist approaches to the 
integration process the evidence from structural policy underlines the limitations of the rational- 
choice neo-institutionalist approach and the assumptions of methodological individualism upon 
which it is based. The attempt to introduce rationality-based actors’ preferences as the only 
explanatory variable for the selection of specific formal institutional arrangements at the EU level 
neglects the role played by historical institutional evolution and the norms of institutional 
behaviour in determining actors’ preferences and explaining institutional change within the EU. 
In a similar vein historical institutionalism’s pure path-dependence logic and the deterministic 
interpretations of history, although involving a substantial amount of evolution that the learning 
process would imply, are incapable of capturing the bottom-up dynamics within the system.
Third, the notion of learning initiated by this thesis, challenging the traditional 
domination of Western culture by the rationality of both markets and hierarchies, introduces civic 
engagement and strong civil society as intrinsic elements of the Western culture, alternatives to 
both markets and hierarchies. In that respect this thesis emphasizes the role of social capital 
(norms) in the formulation of actors’ preferences (Paraskevopoulos, 1998c). Additionally, it
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opens up the debate on the impact of “learning and socialization processes” (J. Checkel, 1998:9) 
on integration in Europe through modes of interaction, construction of collective identities and 
thus the formulation of actors’ preferences.
Finally, the challenge of this thesis to the methodological individualism-based and 
rational choice-oriented approaches to European integration is consistent with the emerging 
literature in the field of international relations, which stresses the role of communication and 
knowledge in the processes of institution-building in the modem world set within the framework 
o f ‘epistemic communities’ (P. Haas, 1992).
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A. DESCRIPTIVE GRAPHS*
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It should be noted that these graphs derive from correlations among the variables. However, because of 
the small number of cases, they are statistically insignificant and hence they are presented as descriptive graphs.
344
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GRAPH A.3
Social Capital and Policy Networks
(education controlled)
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GRAPH A.5
Social Capital and Economic Performance
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GRAPH A.6
Policy Networks and Absorption Capacity
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B. QUESTIONNAIRES
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
Department of Government 
IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY STUDY
Interview Schedule 
Associations
Interview No.
Objective: I am interested in studying the role partnerships play in the process by which European 
Regional Policy (CSF 1989-93) is planned and implemented. You and your organization have been 
identified as significant actors in this process. I would like to talk with you about local development 
initiatives and the role you have played in the implementation of European regional policy (CSF 
1989-93). Since interviews are being carried out in two regions (Southern and Northern Aegean 
islands) with a variety of different organizations, I will follow an interview schedule to guarantee I 
cover all topics in a quick and efficient manner.
PART I: GOALS, PURPOSES AND INTERESTS
A. I would like to start by asking you a few general questions about your organization.
1. How would you describe the main activities and functions of your organization?
2. When was your organization established?
3. What is the membership in your organization?
4. How many people does your organization employ? (nationally, regionally, and locally)
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5. How many offices do you have in Cyclades and Dodecanese to serve your members?
6. What services do you offer your members?
7. Does your organization receive any financial support from the City or Prefecture Councils?
8. Does your organization have any commercial contracts with the City or Prefecture Councils of 
your region?___________________________________________________________________
9. Are there any City or Prefecture Councillors on your Board of Directors? If yes, please specify 
name and Committee.
PART R: LOCAL INITIATIVES
A.I. Are you participant in any regional/local initiative undertaken by the City or Prefecture 
Councils or other Regional Authorities? For each initiative, please specify how you participated and 
if you were instrumental in gaining the participation of others.
2. Are there any other initiatives undertaken by actors other than the local government 
organizations of your region, in which you have participated? Please, specify.
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B. In general, do you feel that you have some degree of influence on the policy 
process?_______________How much?
__________a good deal
__________some
__________very little
__________none
C. In general, why do you participate in local initiatives? What results do you hope to achieve?
D. 1 In general, how would you assess your relationship with the: 
City Council_________________________________________
Prefecture Council-Prefect
Regional Secretariat (Regional secretary)
2. Do you have regular contact with the City Council? 
Which Departments?_________
a) How often?
____________weekly
____________monthly
____________ every few months
b) What form does that contact take?
____________formal meetings: specify_____
____________informal settings such as lunch
____________phone contacts
____________social events
____________letters/correspondence
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c) Taking into account all the contacts with the City Council, what percentage of the 
total time do you meet
with councillors?__________%
with officers?____________%
3. Do you have regular contact with the Prefecture Council (Prefect)?____________
Which Departments?________________________________
a) How often?
____________weekly
____________monthly
____________every few months
b) What form does that contact take?
____________formal meetings: specify_______________________________
____________informal settings, such as lunch
____________phone contacts
____________social events
____________ letters/correspondence
c) Taking into account all the contacts with the Prefecture Council, what percentage of 
the total time do you meet
with councillors?__________%
with officers?____________%
4. Do you have regular contact with the Regional Secretariat?____________
Which Departments?______________________________________________
a) How often?
____________weekly
____________monthly
____________every few months
b) What form does that contact take?
____________formal meetings: specify___________________________________
____________informal settings such as lunch
____________phone contacts
social events
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____________ letters/correspondence
c) Taking into account all the contacts with the Regional Secretariat, what percentage of 
the total time do you meet
with councillors?_____________%
with officers?______________%
PART m : REGIONAL NETWORKS
A . 1 1 am going to give you a list of all associations and organizations that have had an involvement 
in local development initiatives and in the implementation of European Regional Policy. Could you 
tell me which groups you regularly have contact with and undertake joint projects with?
Business Associations
 1. Cyclades Chamber_________________________________________________
 2. Dodecanese Chamber______________________________________________________
 3. Dodecanese Hotel Owners Associations_____________________________________
 4. Cyclades Hotel Owners Associations________________________________________
 5. Other, specify_____________________________________________________
Training Organizations
 6. Rhodes High School for Tourist Training___________________________________
 7. Other, specify_____________________________________________________________
Trade Unions
 8. Cyclades Farmers’ Association______________________________________________
 9. Dodecanese Farmers’ Association__________________________________________
 10. Cyclades Local Association of Municipalities and Communes_______________
 11. Dodecanese Local Association of Municipalities and Communes____________
354
12. Other, specify
Education Institutions
 13. University of the Aegean
Public/Private Organizations
 14. Cyclades Development Agency
15. Dodecanese Development Agency
16. Other, specify
Private Sector
 17. Private Agro/Tourist Enterprises, specify
18. Consultants, specify
19. Banks, specify
20. Others, specify
Voluntary Associations
 21. Dodecanese Society of Persons with Special Needs
22. Syros Blood Donors Association
23. Kos Ecological Society
24. Rhodes Society for the Conservation of the Architectural Heritage
25. Rhodes Society for the Conservation of the Environment
26. Dodecanese Cultural Society “Avra”
27. Other, specify
355
Others
 28. Specify
2. Are you or any one in your organization a member or on the board of Directors or Advisory 
Committee of any of the above associations? Which ones?________________________________
3. Do any of those organizations or their leadership hold membership or have representatives on 
your organization's board of directors or advisory committee?_____________________________
4. Of all these associations, which do you feel stand out as especially influential in the planning, 
implementation and monitoring processes of regional/local development projects and especially 
those financed by EU Structural Funds?______________________________________________
PART IV: INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION
A. 1. I will give you a list of all associations and organizations that have had some involvement in 
development initiatives in the Northern Aegean Islands region. Could you tell me which groups you 
regularly have contact with, undertake joint projects with, and participated jointly in Programmes 
or Initiatives of European regional policy (IMP, CSF 1989-93)?
Business Associations
 1. Mytilene Chamber__________________________________________________
 2. Chios Chamber____________________________________________________
 3. Lesbos Hotel Owners_______________________________________________
 4. Chios Hotel Owners________________________________________________
 5. Other, specify_____________________________________________________
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Training Organizations
 6. Specify______
Trade Unions
7. Lesbos Farmers’ Association
8. Chios Farmers’ Association
9. Chios Mastic Growers’ Association
10. Samos Wine Makers’ Association
11. Other, specify
Education Institutions
 12. University of the Aegean
Public/Private Partnership Organizations
 13. Lesbos Local Development Agency (LLDA)
14. Mytilene Municipal Development Agency (MDA)
15. Aeoliki Municipal Development Agency
16. Other, specify
Private Sector
 17. Private Agro/Tourist Enterprises, specify
18. Consultants, specify
19. Banks, specify
20. Other, specify
Voluntary Associations
 21. Mytilene Progressive Society “Theophilos”
22. Samos Ecological Society
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23. Samos Movement for the Ecology and the Environment
24. Chios Ecological and Environmental Society
25. Lesbos (Agiassos) Library______________
26. Lesbos and Aeolic Studies Society_______
Other
 27. Specify_________________________________________________________
2. Are you or any one in your organization a member or on the board of Directors or Advisory 
Committee of any of the above associations?__________________________________________
3. Do any of these organizations or their leadership hold membership or have representatives on 
your organization's board of Directors or Advisory committees?___________________________
4. Of all these organizations, which do you feel stand out as especially influential in the formulation 
and implementation of development strategies in NAI region?_____________________________
PART V: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
A . 1. Do you have regular contacts with any of the central government departments? Which ones?
a) How often?
____________weekly
____________monthly
____________every few months
b) What form does that contact take?
_______________formal meetings: specify___________
_______________informal settings such as lunch; specify
_______________phone contacts
358
 social events
_______________ letters/correspondence
c) What percentage of that time concerns issues of importance to regional policy (national 
or European)?_____________%
2. Has the central government been generally supportive of local initiatives towards development?
3. Do you think your organization is an active participant in the planning and implementation of the 
national and European regional development policy? If yes, how?__________________________
PART VI: SOCIAL CAPITAL
1. State and civil society.
1.1. In general, how do you assess the impact of social capital (trust, networks, norm of 
reciprocity) on the level of local institutional capacity and the way in which local development 
strategies are planned and implemented?______________________________________________
a) Indispensable
b) Necessary
c) Not so important
1.2. How important is the role of the state in regions' capacity to adapt to the changing global 
environment and gain access to more EU funds?_______________________________________
Scale as above
1.3. In comparison with the role of the state, how important do you assess the presence of a strong 
civil society and dense networks of civic engagement at the local level for the achievement of the 
above mentioned goals?__________________________________________________________
Scale as above
2. Citizens’ participation.
2.1. Based on your experience in this region, what is your evaluation of the degree to which citizens 
are active participants in voluntary associations and organizations?_________________________
a) satisfactory
b) more or less satisfactory
c) non satisfactory
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2.2. Based on your experience in this region, what is your estimation of the degree to which citizens 
are involved in the planning and implementation processes of regional development programmes?
Scale as above
3. Trust.
3.1. Based on your experience in this region, what is your estimation of the degree to which one 
can trust the elected politicians?____________________________________________________
a) One can certainly trust
b) One may trust, but there are some exceptions
c) One cannot trust even if there are some exceptions
d) Of course, one cannot trust
3 . 2 . Based on your experience, what is your estimation of the degree to which one can trust the
elected local and regional authorities in your region?____________________________________
Scale as above
4. In comparison with other regions (i.e. Southern Aegean), what, in your opinion, would better 
describe politics in this region: "honesty" or "corruption"?_________________________________
5. Some people say that you usually can trust people. Others say that you must be very waiy in
relations with people. Which is your view?____________________________________________
6 What is your estimation of the amount of power wielded by each of the following groups in the 
political life of this region?
6.1. National Party Leaders_________________
a) Great influence
b) Considerable influence
c) A certain amount of influence
d) Little influence
e) No influence
6.2. Local Party Leaders____________________
Scale as above
6.3. Prefecture Councillors___________________
Scale as above
6.4. Press/Media_______________________
Scale as above
6.5. Government ministers
360
Scale as above
6.6. Local authority managers in the region_________________
Scale as above
6.7. Local private actors________________________
Scale as above
6.8. Trade unions___________________________
Scale as above
6.9. Agricultural organizations_______________________
Scale as above
7. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements
7.1. In this region, people, generally obey the laws (traffic code, urban planning regulations) only if 
they are not contradict their individual interests_______________________________________
a) Agree completely
b) More or less agree
c) More or less disagree
d) Disagree completely
7.2. In social and economic affairs today technical considerations have greater weight than political 
ones________________________________________
Scale as above
7.3. Normally in politics one can trust others___________________________
Scale as above
7.4. Generally in political controversies one should avoid extreme positions because the proper 
solution usually lies in the middle______________________________
Scale as above
7.5. In spite of the development of recent years the social structure of this region has remained 
unchanged_____________________________
Scale as above
7.6. The compromise between political opponents is dangerous because that normally leads to the 
betrayal of one’s own side_______________________________
Scale as above
7.7. Basically in this region no one is much concerned with what happens to his neighbour
Scale as above
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7.8. At the regional level there are no great differences of opinion on the principal problems
Scale as above
7 .9 . All citizens should participate actively in the collective life of his/her community___________
Scale as above
7.10. He, who asserts that he is motivated by the public good rather than by his private interest is a 
liar or a fool___________ ________________________________________
Scale as above
7.11. One’s primary responsibility is towards one’s own family or towards oneself, not towards the 
whole community____________________________
Scale as above
8. From your experience, how often crucial issues for your region are settled by compromise 
between different approaches________________________________
a) Very often
b) Often
c) Not so often
d) Seldom
9. With regard to each of the following aspects of the operation of Regional Government in this 
region, are you: very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not much satisfied, or not at all satisfied?
9.1. Planning capacity_____________________________________
a) Very satisfied
b) Somewhat satisfied
c) Somewhat dissatisfied
d) Very dissatisfied
9.2. Utilization of EU funds___________________________________
Scale as above
9.3. Time taken to implement decisions_______________________________
Scale as above
9.4. Co-operation with local authorities_______________________________
Scale as above
9.5. Utilization of University/research capacity of the region___________________________
Scale as above
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9.6. Co-operation with central government_____________________________
Scale as above
9.7. Citizens’ participation in the decision-making_______________________________
Scale as above
10. What is your assessment of this region’s economic and social condition? For each of the 
following sectors please indicate your evaluation.
10.1. Port system______________________
a) Adequate
b) Somewhat adequate
c) Inadequate
10.2. Air service________________________
Scale as above
10.3. Road network______________________
Scale as above
10.4. Social service network_______________________
Scale as above
10.5. Health service____________________________
Scale as above
10.6. Higher education____________________________
Scale as above
10.7. Training_______________________________
Scale as above
10.8. Agricultural restructuring_______________________________
Scale as above
10.9. Restructuring of SMEs________________________________
Scale as above
10.10. Utilization of historical/environmental resources_____________________________
Scale as above
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PART VU: EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY
A.I. Have you been involved in the planning or implementation processes of any programmes of 
financed by the Structural Funds? Specify project and type of involvement____________________
2. Have you participated in the meetings of the IMP or the CSFs Monitoring Committees?
If yes, how often?
a) In all meetings
b) In few meetings
c) In one meeting
3. I will give you a list of EU Programmes and Initiatives. Could you please tell me if you 
participated in any of these programmes or programme bids, how you participated, who asked you 
to participate, and if you asked any other organization to participate.
1. VALOREN
2. REGEN-INTERREG
3. LEADER________
4. EUROFORM______
5. ENVIREG
6. RECHAR
7. STAR-TELEMATIQUE
8. PRISMA
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9. EUROPARTENARIAT
10. RECITE
11. NOW
12. Regional Operational Programme (ROP) of the CSFs
13. Other programmes supported by any of the Structural Funds, specify
B. 1. Are you active participant in any European organization or network?
_______ a) Committee of Regions
_______ b) Networks of inter-regional/transregional co-operation
_______ c) Office in Brussels
_______ d) Other, specify____________________________________________________
2. Have you used your own European links or the contacts of any other organization of your region 
to support your attempts to win EU funding? If yes, how?________________________________
3. Have you asked any of the other organizations of your region to participate in the setting up of 
an office in Brussels? Specify______________________________________________________
4. How important are the European links? What advantage do they bring? Are they becoming more 
important?_____________________________________________________________________
365
PART VIII: CONCLUDING REMARKS
A. What have been the overall effects of European regional policy (IMP, CSF) in relation to the 
development prospects of your region? To what degree do they meet the local needs?__________
B. What are the major obstacles for the exploitation of the opportunities European regional 
policy presents for the development of your region?__________________________________
C. What still needs to be done?
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LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
Department of Government 
IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY STUDY
Interview Schedule 
Public Authorities
Interview No._______
Objective: I am interested in studying the role partnerships play in the formulation of regional 
development strategies in general, and in the process by which European Regional Policy (CSF 
1989-93) is planned and implemented. You and your organization have been identified as 
significant actors in this process. I would like to talk with you about local development initiatives 
and the role you have taken in the implementation of European regional policy (CSF 1989-93). 
Since interviews are being carried out in two regions (Southern and Northern Aegean islands) with 
a variety of different organizations, I will follow an interview schedule to guarantee I cover all 
topics in a quick and efficient manner.
PART I: GOALS, PURPOSES, AND INTERESTS
A. I would like to start by asking you a few general questions about your department.
1. How would you describe the main activities and functions of your department?
2. How many people does your department employ?____________________________________
3. Taking into account all the economic development initiatives you pursue, what percentage of 
your activity is devoted to the EU programmes and initiatives?___________________________%
4. What goals do you seek to achieve by exploiting the opportunities European regional policy 
provides?
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5. What type o f opposition do you face in the pursuance o f your development strategy?
PART II: REGIONAL NETWORKS
A. 1. I am going to give you a list of all associations and organizations that have been involved in 
the planning and implementation process of regional development projects. Could you tell me 
which organization(s) have you regularly contact with, consult with both generally and specifically, 
were involved in the main development programmes and why were they chosen?
Business Associations
 1. Mytilene Chamber__________________________________________________
 2. Chios Chamber____________________________________________________
 3. Lesbos Hotel Owners_______________________________________________
 4. Chios Hotel Owners________________________________________________
 5. Other, specify_____________________________________________________
Training Organizations
 6. Specify______
Trade Unions
 7. Lesbos Farmers’ Association_____
 8. Chios Farmers’ Association______
 9. Chios Mastic Growers’ Association
10. Samos Wine Makers’ Association
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11. Other, specify
Education Institutions
 12. University o f the Aegean
Public/Private Partnership Organizations
 13. Lesbos Local Development Agency (LLDA)
14. Mytilene Municipal Development Agency (MDA)
15. Aeoliki Municipal Development Agency
16. Other, specify
Private Sector
 17. Private Agro/Tourist Enterprises, specify
18. Consultants, specify
19. Banks, specify
20. Other, specify
Voluntary Associations
 21. Mytilene Progressive Society “Theophilos”
22. Samos Ecological Society
23. Samos Movement for the Ecology and the Environment
24. Chios Ecological and Environmental Society
25. Lesbos (Agiassos) Library
26. Lesbos and Aeolic Studies Society
Other
 27. Specify
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2. Are you or any one on the Council (City, Prefecture) a member or on the board of Directors or 
Advisory Committee of any of the above associations? Which ones?________________________
3. Are there any members of the above organizations, who participate in your Council or 
Department?____________________________________________________________________
4. Of all these associations, which do you feel stand out as especially influential in the planning, 
implementation and monitoring processes of regional/local development projects and especially 
those financed by the Structural Funds?____________________________________________
B . 1. How do you assess your relationship with the other public actors of your region both generally 
and in the particular field of regional development policy?________________________________
2. Which other public actors (Councils etc) of your region do you have regular contacts with?
a) How often?
___________weekly
___________monthly
___________every few months
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b) What form does that contact take?
___________formal meetings: specify_____________________
___________informal settings such as lunch
___________phone contacts
___________social events
___________ letters/correspondence
c) Taking into account all the contacts with the other public actors in your region, what 
percentage of the total time do you meet
with councillors?_____________%
with officers?________________%
PART HI: INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION
A.I. How do you assess your relationship with the public actors (City, Prefectural, Regional 
Councils) of the Southern Aegean region, both generally and in the particular field of European 
regional policy?_________________________________________________________________
2. Which Councils/Departments of the SAI region do you have regular contact with?
a) How often?
___________weekly
 ______ monthly
___________every few months
b) What form does that contact take?
___________formal meetings: specify_____
___________informal settings such as lunch
___________phone contacts
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___________social events
___________letters/correspondence
c) Taking into account all the contacts with the SAI Councils, what percentage of the 
total time do you meet
with councillors?__________%
with officers?_____________%
B.l. Are there any projects of the Aegean islands IMP, or of the ROPs ( lst&2nd CSF), or 
Community Initiative, in which you have participated jointly with any public actors of the SAI 
region? If yes, specify project and actors._____________________________________________
PART IV: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
A.I. Do you have regular and routine contacts with any of the central government departments? 
Which ones?
a) How often?
____________weekly
____________monthly
____________every few months
b) What form does that contact take?
____________formal meetings: specify___________
____________informal settings such as lunch; specify
____________phone contacts
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____________social events
____________letters/correspondence
c) What percentage of that time concerns issues of importance to the implementation of
European regional policy ? ______________________________%
2. Has the central government been generally supportive of local initiatives towards development?
3. Do you think your organization is an active participant in the planning and implementation of the 
national and European regional policy? If yes, how?_____________________________________
PART V: SOCIAL CAPITAL
1. State and civil society.
1.1. In general, how do you assess the impact of social capital (trust, networks, norm of 
reciprocity) on the level of local institutional capacity and the way in which local development 
strategies are planned and implemented?______________________________________________
a) Indispensable
b) Necessary
c) Not so important
1.2. How important is the role of the state in regions' capacity to adapt to the changing global 
environment and gain access to more EU funds?_______________________________________
Scale as above
1.3 . In comparison with the role of the state, how important do you assess the presence of a strong 
civil society and dense networks of civic engagement at the local level for the achievement of the
above mentioned goals?__________________________________________________________
Scale as above
2. Citizens’ participation.
2.1. Based on your experience in this region, what is your evaluation of the degree to which citizens
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are active participants in voluntary associations and organizations?_________________________
a) satisfactory
b) more or less satisfactory
c) non satisfactory
2.2. Based on your experience in this region, what is your estimation of the degree to which citizens 
are involved in the planning and implementation processes of regional development programmes?
Scale as above
3. Trust.
3.1. Based on your experience in this region, what is your estimation of the degree to which one 
can trust the elected politicians?____________________________________________________
a) One can certainly trust
b) One may trust, but there are some exceptions
c) One cannot trust even if there are some exceptions
d) Of course, one cannot trust
3 . 2 . Based on your experience, what is your estimation of the degree to which one can trust the
elected local and regional authorities in your region?____________________________________
Scale as above
4. In comparison with other regions (i.e. Southern Aegean), what, in your opinion, would better 
describe politics in this region: "honesty" or "corruption"?_________________________________
5. Some people say that you usually can trust people. Others say that you must be very wary in 
relations with people. Which is your view?____________________________________________
6. What is your estimation of the amount of power wielded by each of the following groups in the 
political life of this region?
6.1. National Party Leaders_________________
a) Great influence
b) Considerable influence
c) A certain amount of influence
d) Little influence
e) No influence
6.2. Local Party Leaders____________________
Scale as above
6.3. Prefecture Councillors___________________
Scale as above
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6.4. Press/Media_______________________
Scale as above
6.5. Government ministers_________________
Scale as above
6.6. Local authority managers in the region_________________
Scale as above
6.7. Local private actors________________________
Scale as above
6.8. Trade unions___________________________
Scale as above
6.9. Agricultural organizations_______________________
Scale as above
7. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements
7.1. In this region, people, generally obey the laws (traffic code, urban planning regulations) only if 
they are not contradict their individual interests_______________________________________
a) Agree completely
b) More or less agree
c) More or less disagree
d) Disagree completely
7.2. In social and economic affairs today technical considerations have greater weight than political 
ones________________________________________
Scale as above
7.3. Normally in politics one can trust others___________________________
Scale as above
7.4. Generally in political controversies one should avoid extreme positions because the proper 
solution usually lies in the middle______________________________
Scale as above
7.5 . In spite of the development of recent years the social structure of this region has remained
unchanged_____________________________
Scale as above
7.6. The compromise between political opponents is dangerous because that normally leads to the
betrayal of one’s own side_______________________________
Scale as above
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7.7. Basically in this region no one is much concerned with what happens to his neighbour
Scale as above
7.8. At the regional level there are no great differences of opinion on the principal problems
Scale as above
7 .9. All citizens should participate actively in the collective life of his/her community___________
Scale as above
7.10. He, who asserts that he is motivated by the public good rather than by his private interest is a 
liar or a fool____________________________________________________
Scale as above
7.11. One’s primary responsibility is towards one’s own family or towards oneself, not towards the 
whole community____________________________
Scale as above
8. From your experience, how often crucial issues for your region are settled by compromise 
between different approaches________________________________
a) Very often
b) Often
c) Not so often
d) Seldom
9. With regard to each of the following aspects of the operation of Regional Government in this 
region, are you: very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not much satisfied, or not at all satisfied?
9.1. Planning capacity_____________________________________
a) Very satisfied
b) Somewhat satisfied
c) Somewhat dissatisfied
d) Very dissatisfied
9.2. Utilization of EU funds___________________________________
Scale as above
9.3. Time taken to implement decisions_______________________________
Scale as above
9.4. Co-operation with local authorities_______________________________
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Scale as above
9 .5. Utilization of University/research capacity of the region___________________________
Scale as above
9.6. Co-operation with central government_____________________________
Scale as above
9.7. Citizens’ participation in the decision-making_______________________________
Scale as above
10. What is your assessment of this region’s economic and social condition? For each of the 
following sectors please indicate your evaluation.
10.1. Port system______________________
a) Adequate
b) Somewhat adequate
c) Inadequate
10.2. Air service________________________
Scale as above
10.3. Road network______________________
Scale as above
10.4. Social service network_______________________
Scale as above
10.5. Health service____________________________
Scale as above
10.6. Higher education____________________________
Scale as above
10.7. Training_______________________________
Scale as above
10.8. Agricultural restructuring_______________________________
Scale as above
10.9. Restructuring of SMEs________________________________
Scale as above
10 .10. Utilization of historical/environmental resources_____________________________
Scale as above
377
PART VI: EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY
A. Have you been involved in the planning or implementation processes of any programmes of the 
IMP or CSF financed by the Structural Funds? Specify project and type of involvement_________
2. Have you participated in the meetings of the Monitoring Committees of the IMP and the CSFs?
If yes, how often?
a) In all meetings
b) In few meetings
c) In one meeting
3 .1 will give you a list of EU Programmes and Initiatives.
a) Which of these Programmes/Initiatives have you received financial support from? Which 
did you bid for unsuccessfully?
b) For each Programme, could you tell me which organizations supported your bid or 
participated in the policy implementation, how they participated (managerially, financially 
or information/advice), how their participation was gained, and why were they chosen?
1. VALOREN
2. REGEN-INTERREG
3. LEADER
4. EUROFORM
5. ENVIREG
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6. RECHAR
7. STAR-TELEMATIQUE
8. PRISMA
9. EUROPARTENARIAT
10. RECITE
11. NOW
12. Regional Operational Programme (ROP) of the CSFs
13. Other programmes supported by any of the Structural Funds, specify
B. 1. Are you active participant in any European organization or network?
_______ a) Committee of Regions
_______ b) Networks of inter-regional/transregional co-operation
_______ c) Office in Brussels
_______ d) Other, specify____________________________________________________
2. Have you used your own European links or the contacts of any other organization of your region 
to support your attempts to win EU funding? If yes, how?________________________________
3. Have you asked any of the other organizations of your region to participate in the setting up of
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an office in Brussels? Specify
4. How important are the European links? What advantage do they bring? Are they becoming more 
important?_____________________________________________________________________
PART VII: CONCLUDING REMARKS
A. What have been the overall effects of European regional policy (IMP, CSF) in relation to the 
development prospects of your region? To what degree do they meet the local needs?__________
B. What are the major obstacles for the exploitation of the opportunities European regional 
policy presents for the development of your region?__________________________________
C. What still needs to be done?
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